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INTRODUCTION
Solitary confinement has a long and entrenched history in the United States. Estimates vary, but
at the height of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, one report suggested that up to 300,000
people were being held in isolated conditions in US prisons. 1
Since the first use of solitary confinement in the US in the late 1700s, it has been clear that the
practice of isolating people and subjecting them to sensory deprivation in conditions “perilously
close to a penal tomb” exposes them to significant risks of serious harm. 2 Albert Woodfox, who
was released from prison in 2016 after spending over four decades in solitary confinement in
Louisiana, describes the practice as “a punishment for the specific purpose of breaking a
prisoner.” He urges people to “see solitary confinement for what it is, morally reprehensible.” 3
In recent decades, a robust body of scientific evidence has been developed that illustrates the
many different forms of harm that solitary confinement can cause. Despite this literature and the
harrowing accounts of people who have been held in solitary confinement for months, years, or
decades, little has been done to improve conditions or reform the practice until very recently.
The practice has been the subject of numerous court challenges, but only a few judicial decisions
have resulted in meaningful change.
Some states and prisons have started to take proactive steps to reform the use of solitary
confinement. These measures have been implemented through legislation, litigation, and
administrative decisions. Some reforms are still in their infancy and many states are yet to even
acknowledge the need for reform. In March 2021, the New York Times’ Editorial Board
observed that “[t]he horror of solitary is being addressed slowly, in bits and pieces.” 4
This dissertation examines the historic and current use of solitary confinement in the US and
analyzes the different approaches taken to reform. It contributes to the body of legal scholarship

1

UNLOCK THE BOX, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS NEVER THE ANSWER 3 (2020).
Apodaca v. Raemisch, 139 S. Ct. 5, 10 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).
3
ALBERT WOODFOX, SOLITARY: MY STORY OF TRANSFORMATION AND HOPE 175, 410 (2019).
4
The Editorial Board, Governor Cuomo, End Long-Term Solitary Confinement, NEW YORK TIMES, (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/opinion/cuomo-solitary-confinement.html.
2

1

on the topic of solitary confinement by situating the well-traversed federal jurisprudence in the
context of the current reform efforts and identifying the issues that require further consideration
if reform is to be truly successful. The dissertation explores not only the historical use of solitary
confinement, but also the flaws in the oversight of the practice during that early period, the
deference that was shown to penitentiary officials, and the circumstances that led to its demise in
the early twentieth century. It also examines the role of state courts and the justifications for the
development of state constitutional jurisprudence as an underexplored avenue for potential
challenges of solitary confinement.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 1 discusses the historical use of solitary
confinement as first introduced in Pennsylvania and New York and later copied by other states,
examining official investigations into the practice and the reasons why it was eventually
abandoned. Chapter 2 outlines the current use of solitary confinement today. Drawing on
accounts from incarcerated people, it describes conditions in solitary confinement and their
effects. It also provides an overview of the available demographic data about people held in
solitary confinement in US prisons. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the respective federal and state
constitutional jurisprudence relating to solitary confinement, including the various barriers to
relief. Chapter 4 also includes analysis of the underexplored potential of bringing challenges in
state courts. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the recent and current reforms introduced and
implemented through legislation and regulations, bills, settlement agreements and consent
decrees, and administrative measures. It includes analysis of the different approaches to reform,
as well as thematic issues that arise across all types of reform. Chapter 6 identifies issues that
may impede successful reform and the areas where further attention is required for reform to be
successful. Chapter 7 concludes and makes recommendations for future reforms.

2

CHAPTER 1. HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTS IN SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
Introduction
Solitary confinement was first introduced in the United States in jails and penitentiaries in New
York and Pennsylvania in the late 1700s. While the concept of using isolation in prisons
originated in Europe, it was the United States that developed it further once the European nations
became preoccupied with the Napoleonic Wars. 1 This chapter focuses on the solitary
confinement experiments of the pioneers in the area, Pennsylvania and New York, but interest in
the practice was not confined to these states. It was copied in other prisons and jails, and by
1833, it was in use in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois,
and Ohio.2 The practice continued to be adopted by even more states, although it was not
uniformly imposed for the duration of a sentence; in some jurisdictions, the prison sentence
might incorporate, for example, twenty days of solitary confinement with the remainder to be
served at hard labor.3
This chapter contributes to the body of literature examining the early solitary confinement
experiments by analyzing the legislative investigations into allegations of abuse, highlighting the
discretion granted to penitentiary officials, and exploring the factors that led to the demise of the
early use of solitary confinement. The issues of officials’ discretion and limited oversight
remain pertinent to current practice and reform efforts.

1

W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK, 1796-1848,
27-28 (1965); MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN GANGS: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE
HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 49 (1997). See also Martin B. Miller, Sinking
Gradually into the Proletariat: The Emergence of the Penitentiary in the United States, 14 CRIME & SOCIAL JUSTICE
37, 37 (1980) (“Not only does the State penitentiary not resemble a “reformative” institution, but it was not
particularly American in origin …”).
2
BOSTON PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1833).
3
See, e.g., Howell v. State, 1 Or. 241, 243 (1859) (describing Oregon’s sentencing statute which provided that “in
every case in which punishment in the penitentiary is awarded against any convict, the form of the sentence shall be
that he be punished by confinement at hard labor; and he may also be sentenced to solitary confinement for such
term as the court shall direct, not exceeding twenty days at one time …” (Statutes of Oregon, sec. 5, page 274)).
3

1.1

Origins of Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement as a punitive measure is monastic in origin: a seventeenthcentury Benedictine monk, Jean Mabillon, recommended that penitents choosing a life of
“expiation and atonement”4 be held in unbroken solitude in separate cells, to be allowed visits
only from approved religious figures.5 The purpose of solitude was principally to lead the
penitents to reform through silence, work, and spiritual counsel. 6
In 1775, the Maison de Force, a workhouse in Ghent, Belgium, was reorganized so people would
work together by day and be confined in solitary confinement at night. 7 In 1771, an English
clergyman, Samuel Denne, wrote to the Lord Mayor of London to advocate for the “confinement
of criminals in separate apartments.”8 Denne proposed the placement of people into individual
cells for two reasons: to improve hygiene and to force people to reflect upon their past actions.
Denne was concerned about the spread of communicable diseases within London jails, and he
believed that “rampant vapors” would be curtailed by keeping each person in their own separate
space.9 The English philosopher William Paley published a book in 1785 recommending solitary
confinement with or without hard labor as a solution to “the cause from which half the vices of
low life deduce their origin and countenance.” 10
In his writing about the English prison system, the penal reformer John Howard recommended
the construction of new prisons designed to hold people in solitary confinement at night. 11
Howard advocated for solitary confinement as the primary means of preventing moral
contamination among incarcerated people. 12 His recommendations were informed by his
inspections of prisons and jails throughout Europe, as described by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in a 1914 decision:

4

W. DAVID LEWIS, supra note 1, at 8.
NEGLEY K. TEETERS & JOHN D. SHEARER, THE PRISON AT PHILADELPHIA, CHERRY HILL: THE SEPARATE SYSTEM
OF DISCIPLINE 1829-1913, 12-13 (1957).
6
ANDREW SKOTNICKI, RELIGION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PENAL SYSTEM 8 (2000).
7
M. COUSINS & A. HUSSAIN, MICHEL FOUCAULT 168 (1984).
8
SAMUEL DENNE, A LETTER TO SIR ROBERT LADBROKE (1771).
9
Id. at 7.
10
Thorsten Sellin, Paley on the Time Sentence, 22 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 264, 265 (1931).
11
W. D. LEWIS, supra note 1, at 23.
12
MARK COLVIN, supra note 1, at 49.
5

4

“[Howard] found that the prisons were for the most part pestiferous dens, overcrowded, dark,
foully dirty, not only ill-ventilated, but deprived altogether of fresh air. The wretched inmates
were dependent for food upon the caprice of their jailers or the charity of the benevolent. Water
was denied them except in the scantiest proportions. Their only bedding was putrid straw.
Everyone in durance, whether tried or untried, was heavily ironed. All alike were subject to the
rapacity of their jailers and the extortions of their fellows. Jail fees were levied ruthlessly. Also a
contribution was paid by each individual to a common fund, to be spent by the whole body
generally in drink. Idleness, drunkenness, vicious intercourse, sickness, starvation, squalor,
cruelty, chains, awful depression, and everywhere culpable neglect. In these words may be
summed up the state of the jails at the time of Howard’s visitation.”13

The court noted that the squalid conditions in European jails were born out of earlier forms of
imprisonment:
“Further back in the so-called days of chivalry, throughout Europe every baron and lordling had
beneath the lower floor of his castle a cellar into which he cast without trial, and often without
food, in the mire and ooze, any who displeased him. Their only avengers were the diseases
which, rising from such pollution, often devastated the families of those on the upper floors, who
spent their time dancing in revelry, while the unhappy victims, without light, often without food,
were groaning in the underground receptacles, where amid pollution and filth they passed to a
miserable death.”14

Jonas Hanway, an English writer, was another enthusiastic supporter of solitary confinement,
proposing a model prison which completely isolated people from one another. 15 Jeremy
Bentham briefly joined proponents of solitary confinement in the 1780s, but he later turned his
attention to the Panopticon prison design which allowed prison officers to see every cell from a
single vantage point.16
In 1787, the prominent Pennsylvania physician Dr. Benjamin Rush published his views on
punishment, which drew heavily on the work of John Howard and Jonas Hanway. 17 Like many
others, Dr. Rush did not consider solitary confinement to be a “milder corrective” than other
13

State v. Nipper, 81 S.E. 164, 166 (N.C. 1914).
Id.
15
Id. at 25-26.
16
W. DAVID LEWIS, supra note 1, at 26.
17
MARK COLVIN, supra note 1, at 49.
14

5

forms of punishment.18 He believed that corporal punishments were light when compared with
“letting a man’s conscience loose upon him in solitude.”19 In addition to being influenced by the
European writers, Dr. Rush had experience with solitary confinement from his work at a
psychiatric hospital in Philadelphia. He advocated for the establishment of a “house of
repentance” in Pennsylvania that would lead people to salvation and reformation. 20
In the US the term “penitentiary” came to be favored over “prison” since the latter term was
associated with institutions of “promiscuity and debauchery.” 21 The new penitentiaries where
solitary confinement was introduced were regarded as fundamentally different in nature from the
overcrowded, chaotic jails and prisons, where criminal activity flourished and people had little to
no chance of reformation or rehabilitation.
Penitentiaries gained support as a more palatable form of punishment than the death penalty. In
Pennsylvania, opposition to the death penalty was led by the Quakers, who came to have the
greatest influence of any group in the state over the new penitentiaries. New York’s penal code
of 1796 had also abolished the death penalty for most offenses. 22 As a consequence, more
offenses were punished with terms of imprisonment. The penitentiaries were also viewed as a
civilized alternative to the spectacle of public punishments. Public convict labor, a common
form of punishment before the movement favoring penitentiaries, came to be regarded as
“debasing and humiliating” and as reflecting poorly on the larger community in which the labor
was carried out.23 Other public punishments, such as branding, whipping, and the pillory, were
described by one Philadelphia philanthropist as “cruel and vindictive penalties which are in use
in European countries.”24
Solitary confinement was not necessarily destined to form the basis of the punishment regime
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Other options were also considered by the
18

MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE: PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA,
1760-1835, 1 (1996).
19
MARK COLVIN, supra note 1, at 52.
20
TEETERS & SHEARER, supra note 5, at 224; MARK COLVIN, supra note 1, at 52.
21
TEETERS & SHEARER, supra note 5, at 224.
22
SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 94 (1998).
23
TEETERS & SHEARER, supra note 5, at 6.; ROBERTS VAUX, NOTICES OF THE ORIGINAL AND SUCCESSIVE EFFORTS
TO IMPROVE THE DISCIPLINE OF THE PRISON AT PHILADELPHIA, AND TO REFORM THE CRIMINAL CODE OF
PENNSYLVANIA: WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM, PHILADELPHIA 21 (1826).
24
GEORGE WASHINGTON SMITH, DESCRIPTION OF THE EASTERN STATE PENITENTIARY OF PENNSYLVANIA 7 (1829).
6

Pennsylvania and New York legislatures. These included fines, public shaming, physical
punishments, labor, banishment from the state, the establishment of a penal colony in the Pacific
Northwest, and the death penalty.25 Legislatures in other states considered abandoning the
penitentiary system altogether.26 Some favored the death penalty, while others preferred
involuntary labor. However, proponents of penitentiaries claimed that they would obviate the
need for physical punishment and promote reformation. They also pointed out that penitentiaries
would remove the spectacle of punishment as public entertainment, remedying concerns about
harm to the general population.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has described a “radical” change that occurred in
1812 when punishments such as whipping, the pillory, and the gallows were replaced in the state
by solitary confinement and hard labor.27 The court remarked that this new approach
“practically took away all the degrading and ignominious punishments formerly provided by
law.”28 Nevertheless, the court considered that solitary confinement was an “infamous
punishment,” noting that people were:
“subject[ed] to solitary imprisonment, to have [their] hair cropped, to be clothed in conspicuous
prison dress, subjected to hard labor without pay, to hard fare, coarse and meagre food, and to
severe discipline.”29

Some people considered that the harshness of solitary confinement justified shorter sentences; 30
however, this view was not universally accepted. For example, an 1828 report by the
commissioners charged with reviewing Pennsylvania’s Penal Code considered that reducing
sentences would “tend in a great measure to defeat the object of the law, and to destroy whatever
hope might be entertained of the efficacy of the punishment.” 31 Solitary confinement at the new
penitentiaries in both New York and Pennsylvania had two distinct purposes: it was imposed en

25

REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776-1941, 51-52 (2008).
26
Id.
27
Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 343 (Mass. 1857).
28
Id. at 349.
29
Id.
30
GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 11 (Francis Lieber trans., Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1833).
31
REP. OF THE COMM’RS ON THE PENAL CODE READ IN THE PA. SENATE 37 (JAN. 4, 1828).
7

masse on all incarcerated people in the normal operation of the penitentiary and it operated as a
disciplinary measure, typically in combination with reduced food rations or a dark cell.
The decision to institute solitary confinement in Pennsylvania and New York reflected the
reports and recommendations of influential figures such as John Howard and Benjamin Rush.
Local religious and philanthropic organizations also supported solitary confinement and exerted
considerable influence in shaping the states’ punishment regimes. 32 In Pennsylvania, members
of the Philadelphia Prison Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons (“Philadelphia
Prison Society”) made thousands of visits to the Eastern State Penitentiary, and some were
appointed to its board of inspectors. Penitentiaries operating under New York’s model often
received financial support from the Boston Prison Discipline Society (“BPDS”). Each group
maintained its public presence by publishing official documents touting the virtues of its system
and criticizing the other’s.
Public interest in the solitary confinement experiments was enhanced by visits from notable
foreigners. The French aristocrats Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville toured the
penitentiaries in the 1830s. While they expressed reservations about aspects of their regimes,
they did not call into question the assertion that solitude exercised a “beneficial influence.” 33
Charles Dickens visited Eastern State in 1842 and was much less impressed with solitary
confinement than de Beaumont and de Tocqueville. He reported the system to be “cruel and
wrong,” and “immeasurably worse than any torture of the body,” even though there could be no
question of “the excellent motives of all who are immediately concerned in the administration of
the system.”34 The Philadelphia Prison Society appointed the consul-general of Great Britain to
pen a response to Dickens, which was published in the Society’s journal in 1861. 35 Dickens’
critics argued that he had exaggerated the severity of the conditions because in Pennsylvania,
solitary confinement was not absolute since people received official visitors and could work,
exercise, and read in their cells.36

32

MARK COLVIN, supra note 1, at 53.
DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 6.
34
CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 147 (1842).
35
TEETERS & SHEARER, supra note 5, at 115.
36
Id. at 113-115.
33

8

The many supporters of solitary confinement, and officials and visitors, produced reams of
material about almost every aspect of the penitentiaries. Additionally, the public had the
opportunity to visit some of these facilities through paid tours. However biased the reports and
however sanitized the public tours, there was thus a considerable amount of public information
available regarding solitary confinement.
The fact that penitentiaries came to be operated as sources of income undermined the stated
purpose of reformation. Similarly, public morality was not enhanced when some facilities were
opened to the public, who could tour the penitentiaries and observe incarcerated people “as if
they were animals in a zoo.”37 Public visits, however, provided a valuable stream of revenue: the
penitentiary at Charlestown, Massachusetts, charged visitors an entry fee of twenty-five cents
and in 1845 some six thousand people visited. 38
Despite the differing religious justifications for solitary confinement, the practical reality for
incarcerated people – at best, the ability to communicate with a small number of official visitors,
and at worst, total isolation – was much the same. Whatever the proponents’ objectives, both
New York and Pennsylvania’s systems exposed people to physical abuse and neither achieved
the stated goals of reformation, rehabilitation, or improvement of behavior. While some
criticized the penitentiaries as “failed experiment[s]” and a tax on the public without its
consent,39 others regarded them with “a kind of quasi-mystical faith.” 40

1.2

Pennsylvania

Solitary confinement in Pennsylvania reflected the Quakers’ objective of individual reformation.
Unlike their counterparts in New York, Pennsylvania’s prison reformers sought to accomplish
the spiritual redemption of incarcerated people by separating them from the world, particularly
the corrupting influence of others. The Quaker belief that everyone, including a person
convicted of a crime, possessed a divine “inner light,” was to be reflected in a model prison
where people would be reformed through appropriate treatment. 41 As a result of endless hours of
37
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isolation and with the assistance of a Bible, the person would ultimately embrace religion. 42 The
Philadelphia Prison Society, a philanthropic group composed predominantly of Quakers, led the
movement for the introduction of solitary confinement. The Society’s goal was for penitentiaries
to convert people into “model citizen[s]” who worked obediently as individuals. 43

1.2.1 Walnut Street Jail
The first experiment with solitary confinement in Pennsylvania began in 1786 at the Walnut
Street Jail. The jail was constructed in 1773 and people were “thrown together in one sordid
mass of humanity” until 1786.44 To the disapproval of the Philadelphia Prison Society, people in
the jail were not separated by gender or by the type of offense of which they were accused or
convicted. The jail’s keeper extorted fees and supplemented his income by maintaining a bar
within the jail.45 There was no work or activity to occupy people.
The Philadelphia Prison Society sought to reform the jail by separating people by age and the
offense they were alleged to have committed. To that end, in 1788, the Society petitioned the
state legislature to implement “solitary labour [that] would more successfully tend to reclaim the
unhappy objects” of the jail.46 The legislature agreed to the proposal and in April 1790 passed
legislation requiring the construction of solitary cells to hold a small number of people. 47 Under
this statute, solitary confinement was authorized solely as a disciplinary measure. The Act
provided for “unremitting solitude at hard labor,” 48 but only for a maximum of two days. 49 Any
extension to this period required approval from the jail’s inspectors and the mayor of
Philadelphia.50 One scholar has described the system as one of “sophisticated constraints” that
limited the jailers’ discretion to place people in solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons. 51
However, it may be too generous to characterize the restrictions on solitary confinement at
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Walnut Street as sophisticated. Jail staff were not generally held in high regard 52 and it is not
clear from the historical record whether they actually complied with the two-day limits on
solitary confinement placements. In 1794, further legislation relating to the jail’s operation was
enacted which extended the length of solitary confinement allowed. Longer periods could be
imposed by the courts at sentencing, but jailers were still restricted to imposing a maximum of
two days.53
Any conclusions about the success of the Walnut Street Jail’s solitary confinement experiment
must also take into account its small size. Only thirty-six solitary confinement cells were
constructed at the jail due to space constraints. Moreover, the courts exercised their power to
sentence people to solitary confinement sparingly: in 1795, only four of the 117 people to arrive
at Walnut Street were sentenced to spend a portion of their term in solitary confinement, and in
1796, only seven of 139 were so sentenced. 54 Between 1795 and 1800, only twenty-nine people
were sentenced to solitary confinement out of a total 748 people committed to the jail. 55 Many
commentators consider that the Walnut Street experiment was unsuccessful, due in part to the
fact that people in the solitary cells could still communicate with other people. 56 Moreover, the
cells reduced the space available for the remainder of the jail’s population, exacerbating the
problem of chronic overcrowding. It is not surprising in these circumstances that the few
individuals held in solitary confinement were reportedly not reformed in any way by the end of
their sentences.57 Nevertheless, official observers in Pennsylvania were “quite satisfied” with the
operation of the Walnut Street Jail during the period from 1790 to 1798. 58
Despite the small size of the Walnut Street experiment, a number of other states copied its
design, with Maryland, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, and Virginia each implementing
similar systems.59 Walnut Street’s solitary confinement cells also served as a model for New
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York officials, who visited the jail to collect information which would inform their drafting of a
new penal code.60 The layout of the Walnut Street Jail was used as the basis for an early design
of the Auburn Penitentiary in New York. 61

1.2.2 Eastern State Penitentiary
Interest in solitary confinement was not diminished by the fact it could not be fully evaluated at
the Walnut Street Jail. In 1821, the Philadelphia Prison Society petitioned the legislature to
construct the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia. The objective was to build an institution
where everyone would be held in solitary confinement for the entire duration of their sentence,
regardless of the crime for which they had been convicted. An act of March 1821 directed the
construction of the penitentiary using the same layout as the Western State Penitentiary in
Pittsburgh, “provided always that the principle of the solitary confinement of the prisoners be
preserved and maintained.”62 The Western State Penitentiary, which opened in 1826, was
designed based on the ideas of the Panopticon and was later operated on a model of solitary
confinement without labor.63
Unlike the statutory regime that had limited the imposition of solitary confinement at the Walnut
Street Jail, legislation was enacted in 1829 which required solitary confinement for the total
prison sentence.64 Thus the courts no longer exercised discretion in deciding whether to impose
solitary confinement, or the length of such a sentence.
The Eastern State Penitentiary opened in 1829. It initially consisted of two hundred and fifty
individual cells measuring eight by twelve feet, each with an adjoining exercise yard measuring
eight by twenty feet.65 By way of comparison, the area of a solitary confinement cell in a
modern prison is in the range of seventy-five to eighty-seven square feet. 66 In 1831, the
legislature passed an act directing the construction of an additional four hundred cells at Eastern
60
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State “suitable for the confinement of convicted criminals in solitary imprisonment at labour.” 67
Part of the reason for expanding the penitentiary was to accommodate people from the Walnut
Street Jail, which was to be closed.68
1.2.2.1

Conditions

Everyone at Eastern State was held in absolute solitary confinement and they could only leave
their cells if they were unwell or when their sentences ended. 69 At the time Eastern State
opened, Pennsylvania was the only state that did not have the death penalty for any offense, and
life imprisonment was a rare sentence imposed only upon conviction of more than one murder
charge.70 Other serious crimes such as high treason, manslaughter, arson, rape, and burglary
were all punishable by prison terms of between ten and fifteen years, while less serious crimes
such as horse stealing and forgery resulted in shorter sentences (between one and four years). By
1840, the average length of a prison sentence in Pennsylvania was two years and five months. 71
Mindful of the problems that arose when solitary confinement was first introduced at the Auburn
penitentiary in New York in 1821 (discussed below), the commissioners at Eastern State
emphasized that their penitentiary’s regime was not one of solitary confinement, but rather of
“separate confinement,” designed for “the permanent moral benefit of the prisoner.”72 Under the
separate system, people were isolated from one another, but received visits from prison officials
and approved visitors.73 The warden visited every person daily, and keepers were required to
visit the people they supervised at least three times per day to ensure that their meals were
delivered and to supervise their work. 74 Religious instructors, many from the Philadelphia
Prison Society, made thousands of visits to the penitentiary each year. People at Eastern State
thus tended to have more direct human contact than many people in solitary confinement have
today.
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The Pennsylvania system incorporated prison labor as a subsidiary component. The purpose of
labor was twofold: to provide people with a distraction from the endless hours of tedious
isolation, and to generate income for the penitentiary. Legislation dating back to 1790 required
incarcerated people to carry out labor “of the hardest and most servile kind.” 75 At Eastern State,
people worked individually in their cells. They performed tasks such as shoemaking and
weaving, which could be carried out in complete isolation. This approach reflected
Pennsylvania’s artisan culture and avoided conflict with Philadelphia’s labor movement which
objected to industrial work in prison.76 De Beaumont and de Tocqueville reported that
“there was not a single one among [the people incarcerated at Eastern State] who did not speak of
labour with a kind of gratitude and who did not express the idea that without the relief of constant
occupation, life would be insufferable.”77

The inspectors of Eastern State, who were appointed by the state supreme court to govern the
penitentiary and provide reports to the legislature, 78 were clearly aware that total solitary
confinement (that is, without labor or visitors) could be harmful. In their second annual report to
the legislature, the inspectors emphasized that Eastern State’s approach, which included
“instruction in labor, morals and religion,” did not result in “insanity [or] bodily infirmity.” On
the other hand, a regime without labor or moral and religious instruction would have been
unacceptable to the inspectors and “they would feel little hesitation in recommending its repeal
as cruel, because calculated to undermine the moral and physical powers of the prisoner.” 79
1.2.2.2

Legislative Investigation

Despite the many reports on the success of Pennsylvania’s model of separate confinement at
Eastern State, a legislative investigation in 1834 revealed significant problems at the
penitentiary. A committee of the state legislature was convened to investigate allegations that
penitentiary officials had misappropriated funds and labor and inflicted cruel and unusual
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punishment. The committee received written and oral evidence from sixty-six witnesses. 80
Though the investigation did not consider whether solitary confinement itself was cruel or
unusual, the evidence pointed to mistreatment and abuse of incarcerated people. The
investigation also showed how quickly one of Pennsylvania’s fundamental justifications for
solitary confinement – namely, to avoid the need for physical punishment – was frustrated by
officials who had broad leeway to operate the penitentiary however they saw fit.
At the hearing, the witnesses who testified in defense of the warden Samuel Wood included
members of the penitentiary board, administrators of other institutions, doctors, and prominent
advocates of penal reform. These witnesses emphasized that Wood had the “personal credibility
of a gentleman,” and the committee readily accepted their views. 81 The investigation report
noted, for instance, that Wood had for many years been devoted to the improvement of
Pennsylvania’s penitentiary system and that he had traveled abroad “like the celebrated [John]
Howard” to acquire more information about prison discipline. 82
The charges of cruel and unusual punishment arose from two instances of physical abuse. The
first involved the death of a man who had been forced to wear an iron gag, a square inch piece of
metal forced into the mouth and fastened in place by chains around the jaws to the back of the
neck.83 The iron gag has been described as “the most extreme of a series of measures prison
officials employed to quiet noisy, or discipline refractory, inmates.” 84 The committee found that
the officials involved had tried to remove the gag shortly after it was put on, because the man
was “becoming insensible,” and efforts to revive him were unsuccessful. The post-mortem
showed that he had died of a “disease of the brain,” which it found to be a chronic, long-standing
condition. Thus the committee concluded that this disease, and not the iron gag, had caused the
death. The committee received evidence that the iron gag was used as a form of punishment in
the US navy at the time, and it had also been used in the Walnut Street Jail, as well as on other
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people at Eastern State. Therefore, it was not deemed an unusual punishment. The fact that it
was not unusual, the committee concluded, also demonstrated that it was not cruel.
The second charge of cruel and unusual punishment alleged that a man became “incurably
insane” after he was subjected to a “shower-bath,” in which he was tied to an outside wall and
buckets of icy water were thrown over him on a cold day in the middle of winter. The
investigators accepted the officials’ claim that this conduct also was not cruel or unusual because
the same practice was used on mentally ill people at other institutions for disciplinary and
curative purposes. They found that the man was mentally ill from the time he was committed to
the penitentiary, and that his condition did not change while he was incarcerated. 85 While the
shower bath may have been “indiscreet,” the fact it was used in these other situations, the
committee said, demonstrated a lack of intentional cruelty and therefore was not to be regarded
as unusual.86 Concluding that the people subject to these abuses were “refractory convicts,” the
committee dismissed the claims. The dismissal was based on supposed evidence adduced though
no such evidence was described in the committee’s report. 87
Notably absent from the committee’s report was any reference to evidence of other instances
where people had been subject to extreme physical abuse. Such detail is only known because of
a dissenting member of the investigating committee. Thomas McElwee was so frustrated by his
colleagues’ readiness to find in favor of the penitentiary officials that he published a separate
report of the proceedings hoping to stir public outrage about conditions at the penitentiary. 88
McElwee’s report referred to evidence that food was withheld from people, in one case for six
successive days.89 Other forms of punishment included straitjackets and a “mad-chair,” where
people were fastened by their limbs to a plank of wood and beaten. 90 McElwee also pointed to
evidence that penitentiary officials were ignoring legislative provisions that limited the length of
time for which disobedient people could be confined to dark cells on limited food rations to only
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two days.91 In contrast to McElwee, the committee majority accepted the argument advanced on
behalf of Wood that none of these practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Some of the arguments accepted by the committee are similar to those advanced today to defend
conditions of confinement. The committee deferred to Wood’s exercise of discretion in
disciplining recalcitrant people, finding that the various punishments had been imposed out of
necessity. Physical punishment was justified by the need for “great firmness and discretion” and
to “produce obedience” that would lead people to reformation. 92 Therefore, the committee
explained:
“[I]t becomes necessary to adopt some punishment beyond that which is inflicted under the
sentence of the convict, and which is essential to secure his quiet subjection to the sentence. To
allow him a refractory disregard of the proper order of the institution, would be not only of great
prejudice to himself, but would seriously affect those in whom a more proper frame of mind had
been produced. Our system requires not only labor, but solitude, which combined are calculated
to bring about reflection upon past misdeeds, and their evil consequences. It will not do to allow
the convict to interrupt that solitude … or in any respect withhold the most implicit obedience to
the order of the institution.”93

The need to maintain order within the institution was a further basis for condoning the fact that
some of the punishments inflicted were not part of the sentence. The committee noted that the
penitentiary’s board of inspectors was authorized, consistent with the principles of solitary
confinement, to make rules for the internal government of Eastern State. Since the board had
failed to make such rules, its discretion had devolved to Wood. 94

1.2.3 The End of Pennsylvania’s Solitary Confinement Experiment
By 1849, some Pennsylvania politicians apparently had misgivings about the harmful nature of
solitary confinement. A report to the legislature contained the following statement from the
Governor:

91

Act of April 5, 1790, ch. MDV, § 21, in LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: MAY 24, 1781-SEP. 3,
1790, 537 (1810).
92
REP. OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE (1835), supra note 80, at 12.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 13.
17

“It is worthy of serious consideration, whether, by the adoption of a system of solitary
confinement, the severity of the punishment authorized by law does not injuriously affect the
mental and physical vigor of the prisoner; and the frequent recommendations to the executive for
pardons of convicts afflicted with ill health and imbecility, would appear to require a
modification of the present law.”95

Though no change was made to the law and the regime of solitary confinement officially
continued, in practice it became less common from the 1850s onward as the state’s prison
population increased. Due to overcrowding, people were forced to share cells. Financial
pressure also played a part in the demise of large-scale solitary confinement because funds were
not available to construct more cells. To help reduce the costs of operating the penitentiary,
people were allowed out of their cells to carry out tasks such as cooking and building
maintenance. Consequently, they were able to communicate with one another and with external
contractors working at the site. They were also able to communicate by tapping out messages on
the heating and plumbing pipes. The board of inspectors conceded defeat, noting that this open
communication had frustrated “the purpose of the separate system.”96
Subsequent legislation continued to erode the system of solitary confinement. A statute enacted
in 1876 allowed people in prison to have access to newspapers, thereby removing the absolute
ban on news from outside the penitentiary. 97 While the abuses revealed in the 1834 investigation
did not appear to result in the kind of public outrage that McElwee had hoped for, his report may
have contributed to a reduction in public support for the penitentiary, and with it the expense of
maintaining the regime of solitary confinement.
In 1913, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute authorizing the congregate worship, labor,
and recreation of incarcerated people.98 Since, however, solitary confinement was not expressly
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abolished, defendants continued to be sentenced pursuant to provisions that referred to
imprisonment “by separate or solitary confinement at labor” until the 1970s. 99

1.3 New York
Solitary confinement in New York was influenced by the early experiment at the Walnut Street
Jail. However, the rationale for the practice in New York differed from the Quaker philosophy
that influenced Pennsylvania. New York’s solitary confinement regime, which reflected a
combination of Calvinist beliefs of “order and financial stability,” 100 and military influence,
resulted in operational differences from that of Pennsylvania. At the time, these differences were
highly controversial between proponents of each states’ approach to incarceration.
In 1796, legislation was enacted in New York directing the construction of two state prisons, one
in New York City and one in Albany. 101 In the same year, the state enacted a comprehensive
penal code which was modeled on Pennsylvania’s legislation. New York’s penal code abolished
the death penalty for all but a small number of crimes. Judges were authorized to impose terms
of imprisonment with hard labor or in solitude, and the code eliminated whipping as a
punishment.102

1.3.1 Newgate Prison
The Newgate Prison in Greenwich Village in New York City was the first prison in the state
where solitary confinement was introduced. The prison was designed by a Quaker merchant,
Thomas Eddy, who had assisted with the drafting of the state’s penal code. Newgate was
modeled on the Walnut Street Jail, with solitary cells situated in wings that also contained larger
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cells to house multiple people.103 Most of the prison’s cells were intended to hold up to eight
people.104
Newgate opened in 1797 and was “doomed from the start.” 105 Despite having read John
Howard’s writing on prisons that emphasized the need to separate people at night, Eddy designed
Newgate Prison in a way which did not allow for such separation. 106 Much like the Walnut
Street Jail, the limited solitary confinement experiment at Newgate could never properly be
evaluated since only a small number of solitary cells were constructed and they were intended
for punishment only. The prison was quickly beset by financial problems and overcrowding. 107
It was closed in 1828 and people incarcerated there were moved to Sing Sing Penitentiary.

1.3.2 Auburn Penitentiary
When Newgate’s failings became clear, New York, like Pennsylvania, turned to larger
penitentiaries as sites for a new regime where everyone could be held in solitary confinement.
The Auburn Penitentiary opened in 1817. It was initially designed for congregate confinement,
but criticism of the chaotic nature of Newgate Prison and concerns about people’s ability to
“corrupt one another” led the legislature to authorize a new solitary confinement regime in
1820.108 Pursuant to that regime, most people imprisoned at Auburn continued to be housed in
congregate cells, but eighty people were moved to new solitary cells in December 1821. This
group was held in complete isolation and prevented from communicating with anyone except the
chaplain. They did not work and were forbidden to lie down during the daytime.
This initial experiment with solitary confinement was disastrous: many of the people became
mentally ill, with at least one person attempting suicide and another seriously injuring himself.
The Governor of New York visited the penitentiary in 1823, whereupon he pardoned twenty-six
people held in solitary immediately, partly out of concern for their health, and partly because he
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believed that punishment by solitary confinement did not conform to the conditions to which
people had been sentenced.109
Despite the problems with the first attempt at solitary confinement at Auburn, officials did not
abandon the practice. Instead, they changed the conditions and expanded the regime to subject
everyone to it. The reluctance to abandon solitary confinement can be attributed to various
factors, including that Auburn was a purpose-built penitentiary that could not easily be altered
without considerable expense. Concerns about security are also likely to have influenced the
decision to expand solitary confinement. In 1818, a prison in Virginia had been burned down by
people imprisoned there, and there were reports of attempted uprisings at the Newgate Prison in
the same year.110 Some employees therefore believed that the congregate housing model made
them vulnerable, and they advocated for the adoption of solitary confinement throughout the
penitentiary.111
1.3.2.1

Conditions

As a result of these concerns, solitary cells were constructed at Auburn for everyone. The cells
were significantly smaller than those at Eastern State, measuring only seven feet by three-and-ahalf-feet.112 However, unlike Eastern State, where the larger cell size was partly attributable to
the fact that people rarely left them, Auburn was designed so that the people would spend their
days working together in workshops under the supervision of keepers. The penitentiary was
essentially organized as an industrial center that operated in a manner akin to military discipline:
people marched to and from the workshops in lockstep and in single file, with each person’s
hand on the shoulder of the person in front, their eyes directed toward the keepers. People
worked in silence during daylight hours and they were not permitted to rest until they received a
signal to return to their cells.113
Unlike the Quaker emphasis on individual spiritual reformation, the Auburn experiment was
grounded on the pessimistic Calvinist view of people’s inevitable depravity and the devil’s
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irresistible “temptations to misconduct.”114 The Auburn Penitentiary emphasized obedience,
discipline, and economic viability for the institution. The goal of the Auburn system was to
“break the spirit of the prisoner and produce a mental state of complete submission.” 115 The
Calvinists were not unified in their belief as to what should happen once such a state of
submission had been achieved. One group believed that incarcerated people were mere
instruments to be used to maximize profit for the state through the performance of hard labor; the
other considered that every incarcerated person should receive an education and religious
instruction so that he would return to society “a better man.” 116 The latter view, which bears a
closer resemblance to the Quaker philosophy, did not dominate the New York experiment,
particularly in the early decades. Some Calvinist clergy regarded the Quaker objective of
reformation as blasphemous, holding that the sole authority to reform souls was reserved to
God.117
New York officials were also more concerned with the profitability of the Auburn Penitentiary,
in contrast to their counterparts in Pennsylvania. The New York legislature directed that the
costs of the penitentiaries were to be “supported wholly, or as nearly as shall be practicable, by
the labor of the prisoners.”118 New York’s profit-oriented viewpoint was also reflected in the
type of work assigned to people. The penitentiary entered into contracts with private
manufacturers who paid fixed rates for labor. The factory-style workshops produced a wide
range of objects, including cabinets, furniture, carpets, tools, and steam engines. 119
Unlike Pennsylvania’s claimed disavowal of the use of physical punishments, Auburn had no
hesitancy in using corporal punishment to maintain order and discipline. In an interview with de
Beaumont and de Tocqueville, Elam Lynds, the first warden at Auburn and later the warden at
Sing Sing, described the need for physical punishment in the following terms:
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“chastisement by the whip [is] the most efficient, and at the same time, the most humane
[punishment] which exists … Solitary confinement … is often insufficient, and always dangerous
… I consider it impossible to govern a large prison without a whip.”120

Lynds’ view reflected the Calvinist-influenced belief that corporal punishment was necessary
since people needed to “feel the wrath of God as a pretext for conversion.” 121 It also reflected
Lynds’ background in the navy, where flogging had been a common form of punishment. 122
The Auburn regime of solitary confinement found strong support in the influential BPDS.
Established in 1825, BPDS advocated, among other things, for solitary confinement as well as
Sunday Schools and religious instruction in prisons. Its secretary, Rev. Louis Dwight, published
an annual report describing conditions in prisons, criticizing their flaws, and making
recommendations for improvements. Much of his material was based on reports from prison
officials to their respective state legislatures. In its early years, BPDS published thousands of
copies of its annual report which was purchased by state legislatures and foreign governments. 123
BPDS was funded by donations and subscriptions from members of the public.
Dwight traveled throughout the US to gather information and extol the virtues of Auburn. An
Auburn-style penitentiary was erected in Charlestown, Massachusetts in 1829, and by 1833
BPDS had made financial contributions toward the building of Auburn-style penitentiaries in
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Virginia, Tennessee,
Louisiana, Missouri, Illinois, Ohio, and Canada. 124 Dwight’s strong criticism of Pennsylvania’s
system of solitary confinement was often reflected in BPDS’s annual reports. He particularly
disapproved of the amount of money Pennsylvania had spent on the construction and
maintenance of the Eastern State Penitentiary. However, parsimony did not stop Dwight and
BPDS from paying the salaries of chaplains in penitentiaries constructed in accordance with the
Auburn model.125
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1.3.2.2

1825 Investigation

In 1825, Lynds was appointed by the legislature to supervise the construction of the Sing Sing
Penitentiary. He selected incarcerated people from Auburn to build the new institution. Shortly
after he left Auburn, a scandal led to investigations by the local district attorney and the New
York Senate. A woman incarcerated at Auburn had died in January 1826, only a few days after
giving birth to a child which had reportedly been conceived while she was in solitary
confinement. The autopsy revealed that the woman had been whipped, even though state law
expressly forbade the whipping of females. 126 Investigation into the events leading to her death
was hampered because incarcerated people were not regarded as competent to give evidence.
The keeper responsible for supervising the woman was convicted of assault and battery and fined
$25, but he was allowed to continue working in the same role. 127 Lynds was not prosecuted.128

1.3.3 Sing Sing Penitentiary
The Sing Sing Penitentiary opened in 1826 and by 1828, people previously incarcerated at
Newgate had been relocated there. The penitentiary had eight hundred solitary cells and became
fully operational in 1829. Another two hundred cells were added within several years. 129 De
Beaumont and de Tocqueville visited Sing Sing in 1831 and found it was operating under the
same strict discipline as Auburn. Their report to the French government expressed some
reservations about the penitentiary’s system:
“[a]lthough the discipline is perfect, one feels it rests on fragile foundations: it is due to a tour de
force which is reborn unceasingly and which has to be reproduced each day, under penalty of
compromising the whole system of discipline.”130

1.3.3.1

1828-1829 Investigation

Problems arose at Sing Sing shortly after it began operating. Two members of the three-person
Board of Inspectors, Samuel Hopkins and George Tibbits, both former US Congressmen, “began
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to suspect [Lynds’] integrity, faithfulness, and humanity.” 131 The inspectors were made aware of
reports of cruelty and corruption at the penitentiary. In 1828, they sent written questions to Sing
Sing officials, including Lynds, to obtain further information. They also visited the penitentiary
twice to speak to officials and employees directly. The third inspector disapproved of his
colleagues’ inquiries and he did not participate in this “secret investigation.” 132
Based on the information they gathered, Hopkins and Tibbits believed that Lynds had embezzled
prison funds, withheld food from incarcerated people, and tolerated severe and unwarranted
punishments. Hopkins presented eleven allegations against Lynds to the legislature, and the
Senate convened a select committee to investigate them. 133 The committee members spent a
week at Sing Sing examining witnesses and interviewing the three inspectors. In March 1831,
the committee produced a report which described Hopkins and Tibbits’ earlier investigation as
“ill-judged and unprofitable,” finding “much to admire and approve, and little or nothing to
censure.”134 The report concluded that “the whole moral aspect of the prison government [is]
most happy; and … the more publicly its condition is known, the more creditable will it be to the
State.”135 At pains to underscore the credibility of Lynds and his fellow officials, the report
emphasized that Lynds had “in no way impaired his well-earned fame.” 136
1.3.3.2

1839 Investigation

In 1839, another select committee was appointed by the New York Senate to investigate
allegations of abuse and financial impropriety at Sing Sing. 137 The Senate then broadened the
investigation to include Auburn as well. 138 At Sing Sing, fifty-five allegations were made
against the warden, officers, and employees, and included a wide range of financial
improprieties, cruel treatment of incarcerated people, and burial of the deceased without
coroners’ inquests. The allegations relating to Auburn, where Lynds had resumed his role as
131
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warden, included various forms of brutality, subjecting people to freezing temperatures, and
withholding food (a repetition of a complaint against him at Sing Sing).
A majority of the three-person committee found that none of the allegations had been proved.
The third member of the committee, Henry Livingston, filed a dissenting report criticizing his
colleagues for having admitted the testimony of incarcerated people only when it tended to
exculpate prison officials.139 Like the dissenting report written by Thomas McElwee concerning
the allegations of abuse at the Eastern State Penitentiary, Livingston’s report sheds additional
light on the nature of the committee’s investigation, the abuses at the penitentiaries, and the
extent to which legislators sought to conceal those matters from the public. For example, the
majority’s report refers to records of punishments inflicted on incarcerated people, but
Livingston’s report casts doubt on the completeness of those records. He referred to evidence
that a prison official tore up a written punishment report after telling the employee who wrote it
that it was of no use to him.140 He also described many instances in which people were beaten
repeatedly, sometimes to the point of unconsciousness or death.
Much like the majority report by the committee investigating the Eastern State allegations, this
committee’s majority report is also revealing in its inclination to find no fault on the part of
prison officials, lest such a finding reflect badly on the state or undermine its whole system of
punishment:
“[H]owever invaluable the system [at the penitentiaries], it requires public opinion to sustain it.
Every individual, therefore, who is solicitous for the welfare of society, cannot fail to feel the
deepest interest in eliciting the truth upon this important subject, and of relying upon that as the
polar star by which to direct his course. He who by misrepresentation excites a popular prejudice
against our penitentiary system, aims a deadly blow at the most valuable institutions of our
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country, which, if effectual, would again compel us to resume sanguinary punishments with all
their horrid cruelty.”141

Despite this statement, the majority conceded that there were cases where physical punishments
had been too severe, and it recommended that the law be amended to limit officials’
discretionary power.142
The treatment of mentally ill people also came under criticism in Livingston’s report. Many, it
appears, were frequently whipped. Livingston observed that “[i]t would appear in almost every
instance to have been taken for granted, that the convict was feigning derangement, even when
the absence of all possible motive would show the absurdity, or at least the unreasonableness of
such a supposition.”143 He acknowledged that some people might feign insanity to avoid work,
but considered it natural for someone who had been “plunged into the lowest depths of hopeless
misery and degradation” to become mentally ill. 144
By the time the committee’s reports were filed, Lynds had resigned, and some other officials at
both penitentiaries had left (whether voluntarily is not clear from the reports). Livingston
recommended that the remaining officials at both Auburn and Sing Sing be removed and
replaced by men who respected the laws relating to prison management and were less inclined to
resort to physical punishment.145
When Rev. Dwight learned of possible abuses at Auburn and Sing Sing, he toured both
institutions to determine the credibility of the allegations. His visits “left him horrified at the
neglect of the reformative programs he had fought so hard to establish.” 146 BPDS’s annual
report for 1839 expressed Dwight’s consternation at the state of affairs at both institutions. He
was troubled by Lynds’ decision to disband the Auburn Sunday school in order to save money. 147
The BPDS report stated that the country had been shocked by the physical abuse at Auburn,
which Dwight described as “alarming cruelty.” 148 Writing about his visit to Sing Sing, Dwight
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described the physical punishments inflicted on people as “odious and detestable, both in manner
and degree.”149 He also believed that people were not receiving enough food and that the
penitentiary’s hospital was not providing adequate care. 150 It was therefore not surprising to
Dwight that the mortality rate at Sing Sing in the prior year was double that of Auburn’s. 151

1.3.4 The End of New York’s Solitary Confinement Experiment
The demise of solitary confinement in New York can be attributed to overcrowding, as was the
case in Pennsylvania. In addition, external opposition to prison work by organized labor
undermined the penitentiaries’ ability to remain self-supporting. In 1835, the New York
legislature passed a statute which prohibited the training of incarcerated people in any
mechanical trades except for those roles that produced articles which would otherwise be
imported from overseas.152 In 1842, the legislature forbade incarcerated people to work in any
trade that they had not learned and practiced prior to their incarceration. 153
As overcrowding became increasingly problematic, it was impossible for the penitentiary staff to
enforce silence. In an effort to maintain order and encourage good behavior, the staff began
allowing certain privileges, including reading and writing. This further undermined the
principles of separation and silence.154 By 1866, the New York penitentiaries had no choice but
to confine more than one person to a cell.155
Opposition to the Auburn system grew throughout the 1840s. Interest in prison reform on the
part of philanthropic groups waned, just as it had done in Pennsylvania. These groups’ focus
shifted to public schools as vehicles for moral reform. 156 BPDS disbanded after the death of
Dwight in 1854, thus ending the annual reports touting the virtues of solitary confinement. The
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New York Prison Association, established in 1844 to advocate for the improvement of prisons,
lacked the necessary public support and financial resources to take over the BPDS’s role. 157
Official statements and reports reflected the ebbing tide of support for solitary confinement. In
1852, a committee was appointed by New York’s legislature to investigate the finances,
management, and disciplinary practices of the state’s prisons. 158 Its report acknowledged the
important role of the penitentiaries in protecting the public through the removal of incarcerated
people from society but noted that people were no safer to society upon re-entering it at the end
of their sentences. The report conceded that Auburn’s system of enforced silence was ineffective
because people were able to speak while working in the congregate workshops. 159 The
committee did not go so far as to recommend that solitary confinement be abolished, but it made
various other suggestions to improve general conditions. These included substituting solitary
confinement with hard labor for practices like the shower bath; and annual reports following
inspections, in preference to reliance on accounts from the penitentiaries’ boards of inspectors. 160
The committee also pointedly remarked that the community would no longer tolerate “that the
report of an investigating committee be nothing more than an instrument for white-washing the
public officers connected with [the penitentiary].” 161
The Commissioner of Public Charities and Correction for New York echoed some of the
concerns expressed by the committee of 1852 in its own statement some fourteen years later. In
1866, it described the state’s system of prison discipline as defective and noted its tendency to
increase the likelihood that people would reoffend once they had completed their sentence. 162

1.4 Later Oversight
1.4.1 Judicial Oversight
The courts’ role in relation to solitary confinement can be broadly grouped into four categories
during the historical period from 1790 to the early 1900s: sentencing, ruling on the legality of
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solitary confinement legislation, defining the authority of penitentiary officials, and determining
whether conditions were cruel or unusual.
The courts’ practice of sentencing people to solitary confinement did not last long; it shifted to
penitentiary officials in the nineteenth century. In 1882, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
considered whether a court could impose a sentence of solitary confinement on a person who
attempted to escape from prison.163 It held that an 1872 statute wholly abolished the court’s
power to do so; only the warden could impose the punishment as a form of discipline. 164 In a
1904 case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the 1860 penal code specifically
prescribed the form of punishment. Depending on the crime, a person would either be sentenced
to imprisonment in a county jail, where he would not be subject to solitary confinement, or to
imprisonment in a penitentiary, where the solitary confinement and labor regime was in
operation.165 In 1934, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania clarified that only a small number of
statutes explicitly allowed the courts to choose whether to sentence a person to a county jail or a
penitentiary.166 The remaining statutes prescribed the type of sentence that the court was
required to impose. In most cases, the court had no discretion.
In the case of In Re Medley in 1890, the Supreme Court described solitary confinement in a case
concerning the retroactive application of a statute requiring that people sentenced to death be
held in solitary confinement prior to execution. 167 Characterizing solitary confinement as “an
additional punishment of the most important and painful character,” 168 the Court traced the
development of the practice from its origins in Europe to its introduction at the Walnut Street
Jail:
“[E]xperience demonstrated that there were considerable objections to it. A considerable number
of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it
was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still,
committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in
most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
163
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community. It became evident that some changes must be made in the system, and the separate
system was originated by the Philadelphia Society for Ameliorating the Miseries of Public
Prisons … it is within the memory of many persons interested in prison discipline that some 30 or
40 years ago the whole subject attracted the general public attention, and its main feature of
solitary confinement was found to be too severe.”169

By the early 1900s, the courts were becoming somewhat more willing to curtail the authority of
prison officials, albeit only in extreme cases. In 1908, the Supreme Court of Michigan ordered a
county sheriff to desist from keeping a man in conditions akin to solitary confinement for failure
to pay a debt.170 Reviewing those conditions, the court declared them to constitute solitary
confinement as defined by the Supreme Court in Medley, observing that “prisoners charged with
a crime in this jail were treated with less severity” than this debtor. 171 Recognizing that the
sheriff had discretion in regard to the treatment of incarcerated people facing both criminal and
civil processes, the court nevertheless held that that discretion was limited and could not be
abused. In the instant case, the court found that the sheriff’s treatment of the man was not only
illegal, but “contrary to every sentiment of justice and humanity.” 172 Particularly troubling to the
court was the fact that the sheriff had imposed such conditions at the request of the lawyer for the
creditor who was also the public prosecutor.173
In 1914, the Supreme Court of North Carolina dealt with the question of solitary confinement in
a dictum. The court upheld a charge of assault against prison guards who whipped a man with a
leather strap. Though the man died later that day, the county physician determined that the death
was not attributable to the beating.174 Holding that no law authorized the beating of incarcerated
people, the court noted the provisions of the state’s Constitution of 1888 that “death,
imprisonment with or without hard labor, fines, removal from office, and disqualification to hold
office” should be the only punishments in the state.175 However, the court exempted from its
ruling other forms of prison discipline, stating that the constitutional provision had
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“no direct application to the discipline required in our jails and penitentiaries; for, if so, it would
prevent solitary confinement, restriction of rations, and other reasonable punishments that are in
customary use in prisons and penitentiaries.”176

In 1925, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the superintendent of the state prison had acted
unlawfully by keeping a person in solitary confinement for five months, thirty days of which
were spent in a dark cell.177 The man had been allowed to speak only to the person who brought
him food, had received only bread and water, and had left the cell only twice for a few hours
each time to give evidence in court proceedings. The court held that such treatment was “harsh
and unreasonable,” and that the superintendent had acted outside the scope of his authority to
“receive and safely keep” people.178
Challenges based on cruel or unusual punishment were generally unsuccessful. In 1861, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed a lawsuit against the master of a house of
correction brought by a man who alleged that he suffered injuries to his feet from being held in
solitary confinement without proper clothing in a cold cell. 179 The court held that to allow the
action would
“transfer to the supervision of the courts … the question of the proper management of our jails
and houses of correction and require them to pass upon all the alleged abuses arising from neglect
by the officers to discharge the functions of their offices properly.”180

It concluded that there was no relationship between an incarcerated person and the master that
would give rise to cause of action in such a case. 181
In 1890, a New York court dismissed a lawsuit brought by a man incarcerated at Sing Sing who
was restrained in handcuffs in a wet dungeon for eight days and given only bread and water, then
held “for a long time” in solitary confinement. 182 Holding that the punishment was authorized by
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statute, the court deferred to the decision of the warden that the measure was necessary in order
to produce “the submission or obedience of the convict.” Thus it was not cruel or unusual.
In State v. Cahill, a man claimed that he was justified in escaping from a prison in Iowa where he
was held in solitary confinement due to the conditions in his cell which he described as 183
“infested with bugs, worms, and vermin; … the toilet was so out of repair that when it flushed the
water ran out upon the floor; [and] … the cell was without a chair, bed, or other reasonable
comforts.”184

Rejecting the claim, the court held that the legislature had the right to punish people with solitary
confinement. If the cell in which the man was held was “not kept clean and healthful, it should
have been given immediate attention by those in charge, and all of the matters complained of
entirely corrected.”185 The conditions, even if inadequate, did not violate the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment in the state constitution and did not justify the man’s escape. 186
In 1860, the Supreme Court of Indiana remarked that solitary confinement, like other forms of
punishment, had been tried “but without satisfactory results.” 187 A concurring justice of the
Supreme Court of Florida later remarked in a dictum that solitary confinement, along with
various physical punishments, was:
“admitted to be cruel punishment, but … had been abolished fifty or sixty years ago when our
Declaration of Rights was adopted.”188

In 1919, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the right of private parties to criticize solitary
confinement. The warden of the state penitentiary brought a libel action against a newspaper
publisher for statements about the warden’s “barbaric and archaic treatment of prisoners in the
penitentiary.”189 In response, the newspaper brought out the fact that one man had been placed
in solitary confinement and forced to stand with his hands chained above his head for nearly
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fifteen hours a day for twenty consecutive days, he was not allowed to leave his cell at any time,
and he was forced to sleep on a bare board on the concrete floor. The man endured these
conditions until he made a false statement about a bottle of whisky that had been found in his
possession.190 The defendant also described the practice of guards’ whipping incarcerated
people. The court rejected the warden’s libel claim, holding that newspapers had the right to
criticize the official acts of public officers such as the warden, and finding there could be no
doubt that the subject was of great public interest. 191

1.4.2 Legislative Oversight
State legislatures had an important role in convening investigations into conditions at the
penitentiaries when reports of abuses emerged, but the early reports were flawed in their
determination not to find fault on the part of officials. The 1852 report to the New York
legislature on the state’s prisons acknowledges that the earlier investigations into the
penitentiaries overlooked allegations against officials rather than holding them to account for
abusive and harmful practices.
Most of the legislative investigations focused on abuses other than solitary confinement even
though strict rules governing the practice enabled officials to abuse incarcerated people without
facing any consequences for doing so. The 1849 report to the Pennsylvania legislature did
question the effect of solitary confinement on the “physical and mental vigor” of people.
Similarly, earlier accounts, such as those recording the 1821 experiment at Auburn, made clear
the legislators’ awareness that solitary confinement could be harmful. Nevertheless, none of the
reports directly considered whether solitary confinement itself was cruel or unusual.

1.5 The End of the Early Experiments
Unlike the deliberate decision to commence solitary confinement, no official decision was made
in either Pennsylvania or New York to end the practice; rather, legislation signaling a new
approach was enacted long after the practice had ceased.
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Cost considerations impeded reform of solitary confinement. Once the states had committed
funds for constructing and operating solitary confinement cells, it was unlikely that they would
simply abandon these purpose-built facilities, a point which remains pertinent to current solitary
confinement reform. The rivalry between New York and Pennsylvania about which state had the
better system may also have distracted from broader questions about the legitimacy and
justification for the practice itself and, instead, focused on the narrow areas where the states’
practices differed.192 As the decades wore on, legislative interest in experimenting with different
methods of punishment dwindled. Economic downturns and expanding populations distracted
public attention away from the penitentiaries. The time frame for experimenting with different
forms of punishment was much shorter than the lifespan of these penitentiaries.
In 1867, the Prison Association of New York directed two of its members, Enoch Wines and
Theodore Dwight, to “visit and inspect the penal and correctional institutions of the states of the
Union, to examine their systems, and to inquire into their systems of criminal justice.” 193 Wines
and Dwight visited prisons in eighteen states and in Canada. Referring to New York and
Pennsylvania, the authors noted that both states’ regimes had a common basis of “isolation and
labor,” the main difference between them being one of application rather than principle. 194 The
report went on to estimate that one-third of people incarcerated in the US did not have individual
cells and that consequently the rule of silence (derived from the Auburn system) had been
relaxed in at least four states and was being enforced with varying degrees of strictness in
others.195
Wines and Dwight questioned the necessity of enforcing absolute and unbroken silence and
recommended a gradual reduction of separation and silence during the course of a person’s
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sentence.196 The report recommended that people in prisons be allowed to associate “as human
beings, and not be doomed … to eternal dumbness, with heads and eyes fixed like some statue in
some direction.”197 Describing solitary confinement as a “warfare on nature,” Wines and Dwight
recognized that the human instinct towards sociability was necessary for the improvement of
people’s character.198 They concluded that they had not observed a single prison in the US in
which the disciplinary regime imposed by solitary confinement led to the reform of incarcerated
people.199
The Wines and Dwight report prompted the establishment in 1870 of the country’s first national
prison reform association to address the entire prison system. The National Prison Association’s
Declaration of Principles was adopted at a convention that year and included a statement that the
objective of prison discipline was the “moral regeneration” of incarcerated people and not “the
infliction of vindictive suffering.” 200 The Principles recommended that prison discipline should
seek to improve people through education, privileges, a conduct-based system of probation, and
religious instruction.201 Notably absent was any reference to solitary confinement.
Even if the original claimed justification for the early solitary confinement experiments was
rehabilitative, in practice, it quickly deteriorated into a punitive measure with few constraints.
There was no evidence to suggest that the early solitary confinement experiments led to genuine
rehabilitation or behavioral change. As shown by the legislative investigations, penitentiary
officials were given considerable discretion to operate the institutions however they saw fit, with
few checks on their authority, even after evidence of brutality and harm was apparent. And
while widescale solitary confinement was eventually abandoned in the penitentiaries, its use was
not fully relinquished. As a result of it having been introduced in the first place, it became an
established component of incarceration in America and was later expanded to an even greater
order of magnitude.
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1.6 The Re-Emergence of Solitary Confinement
Though solitary confinement as a component of the prison sentence ended in the nineteenth
century, it continued to be used in prisons. In 1934, the Federal Government opened the
penitentiary at Alcatraz, complete with solitary confinement cells where people were held in
isolation, sometimes for long periods of time.202 The Task Force on Corrections of the
President’s 1967 Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice observed in its
report that “almost every correctional institution includes a special confinement unit for those
who misbehave seriously after they are incarcerated.”203 That report described such units as
“usually a place of solitary confinement, sometimes without bedding or toilet facilities,
accompanied by reduced diet and limited access to reading materials and other diversions, and
occasionally without any other kind of light.”204

It appears that the authors of the 1967 report, like some of the early proponents of solitary
confinement, were supportive of measures that improved people’s behavior rather than
advocating for harsh treatment as a justification in and of itself. The report emphasized that
“reward regulates behavior more effectively than punishment,” and “when penalties seem
excessive, capricious or otherwise unjust, it is difficult for the [prison] officer to be accepted also
as a friend or counselor.”205 This movement towards rehabilitation was short-lived.
The reemergence of solitary confinement was particularly pronounced from the 1970s onwards
as it came to be used disproportionately against incarcerated political activists, predominantly
Black people.206 Prison officials locked people in isolation in their cells for increasingly long
periods to suppress disturbances and to control “those portions of the prison population …
deemed dangerous and violent.”207 During the 1971 uprising at Attica prison in New York, one
of the demands made of prison administrators was to end the use of solitary confinement. This
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request was ignored, and the riot was brutally suppressed, resulting in the deaths of forty-three
people.208
In 1983, the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, was placed into a permanent
lockdown following the murder of two correctional officers and several incarcerated people, and
a number of escape attempts. One unit in the penitentiary remained in lockdown for twentythree years, with people confined in their cells in solitary confinement. 209 In 1986, Arizona then
opened the country’s first supermaximum-security, or “supermax,” unit, ushering in a new era of
solitary confinement. Each cell in the new unit was made of poured concrete, with no windows,
and designed so that prison officers could see into multiple blocks of cells at one time. 210
In 1994, the Federal Government opened the Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence,
Colorado, to replace Marion as a purpose-built supermax facility. The Federal Government also
established new “special management units” to hold people in solitary confinement within other
federal prisons. These units were justified in part by the murder of a single correctional officer
in the early 2000s; as a result, by 2012, over 2,000 people were held in special management units
in federal prisons.211 The historical use of solitary confinement was thus revived and scaled up
in response to a perceived “spike in prison violence.” 212
By 2010, almost every state and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) had either built a new
supermax unit or retrofitted an existing prison facility to hold people in long-term solitary
confinement.213 Much like the historical experiments, these modern equivalents did not end up
being used in the way that the designers envisaged. For example, the people who oversaw the
design and construction of Pelican Bay State Prison, a supermax facility in Northern California,
expected that it would provide a “small, fixed number of supermax beds,” and that people would
be assigned to these units on a short-term basis. 214 Instead, people were placed in solitary
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confinement at Pelican Bay for years or decades. The conditions in these modern institutions are
discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2. THE CURRENT STATE OF SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
Introduction
Since early 2020, around seventy-five percent of people living in America have been subject to
some form of lockdown or stay-at-home order as states took steps to fight the spread of the novel
coronavirus.1 Of the many concerns associated with lockdown orders, one is the psychological
effects of social isolation.2 Since the onset of the pandemic, many people have died alone, their
family members unable to visit them in hospital, or to grieve their loss with family and friends in
ways that are religiously and culturally familiar. 3 Though these restrictions pale in comparison
to the experience of incarceration, they amplify the reasons to be concerned about the harm
suffered by people in solitary confinement, who experience far more punitive restrictions. 4 They
are exposed to the risk of chronic physical and mental health problems, can rarely, if ever,
contact or see their families, and experience constant verbal and physical abuse.
Modern solitary confinement is a severe practice which involves segregating people from the
general prison population and holding them in bare cells for twenty-two or more hours a day.
They have almost no human contact and suffer intense sensory deprivation.
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Coronavirus: Three Out of Four Americans Under Some Form of Lockdown, BBC, (31 Mar. 2020),
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Drawing on the accounts of incarcerated people, this chapter describes the conditions of solitary
confinement in US prisons today. It discusses the effects of the practice and the range of harms
to which people are exposed, with reference to scientific evidence. The second part of the
chapter explores the available demographic data regarding the people held in solitary
confinement.

2.1

Types of Solitary Confinement

Solitary confinement is used for different purposes which vary from state to state and prison to
prison. Some aspects of solitary confinement may differ depending on the reason for the
placement, but generally people face similar conditions and risks of harm. In the case of In Re
Jackson, the New York Supreme Court described the different categories of people held in
solitary confinement in New York City jails:
“All [solitary confinement] inmates, whatever their status, are subject to the most severe isolation
imposed in the New York City prison system. The program does not distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates serving sentences, between the most vulnerable inmates and
the most predatory; between those convicted of the most serious felonies and those convicted of
the most minor offenses; or between those who request voluntary placement due to fear for their
own safety and those who are involuntarily placed due to their propensity for violence. The
[solitary confinement regime] treats all inmates the same, confining them to cells for up to
twenty-three hours per day.”5

Though the above statement described jails rather than prisons, the same description applies to
the latter.
Various terms are used to describe solitary confinement and new terms are constantly being
introduced. Certain labels are common to most US jurisdictions. “Administrative segregation”
generally refers to solitary confinement that is not imposed for disciplinary reasons but is instead
justified as necessary for the safety of the institution. This form of segregation is often used
when people are believed to pose a threat to the orderly operation of the prison, a justification
that is deployed frequently by corrections officers even when the threat to orderly operation may
be minor or non-existent. The criteria for placement into administrative segregation are
5

In Re Jackson, 895 N.Y.S. 2d 633, 641 (2010).
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generally vague by design.6 People are often placed in administrative segregation because they
are suspected to be associated with a prison gang. Depending on the jurisdiction, very little may
be required to merit assignment to administrative segregation. A particular tattoo, speaking to or
receiving correspondence from a known gang member, or even having a library book that was
previously borrowed by a gang member may all constitute sufficient evidence. 7 Expressing
discontent with changes such as the introduction of double-celling has also been held to support
a finding that a person poses a threat to the safety and security of the prison. 8 Administrative
segregation can be among the longest of all forms of solitary confinement and may run for the
entire duration of a prison sentence. 9
Race and ethnicity often influence administrative segregation classifications. For example, in
California, possession of artwork containing Aztec images or pamphlets in certain foreign
languages was considered confirmation of gang membership, ensuring that people would be
placed in administrative segregation until the end of their sentence. 10 In litigation in
Massachusetts, prison officials sought to justify the placement of people in administrative
segregation without due process by relying on evidence of “the changing racial composition of
the prisoner population (increases in African-Americans, Hispanics, and others who are labeled
as gang members)” to suggest there had been an increase of violence within the prison. 11 In
Texas, people are placed in indefinite administrative segregation if they are deemed to be
members of “security threat groups,” the terminology used by departments of corrections to
define prison gangs. Of the twelve prison gangs identified by the Texas Department of Criminal
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Justice (“TDCJ”), eight are predominantly Latino in membership while two are predominantly
Black.12
“Disciplinary segregation” is typically imposed for a breach of prison rules and tends to be of a
fixed, rather than indefinite, duration. In some states, however, prison officials “stack” sentences
so that people face years or even decades in solitary confinement for minor behavioral
infractions. It is not the case, as is often claimed by prison officials, that solitary confinement is
only used in response to threatening and dangerous behavior by “the worst of the worst.” 13 For
example, in Florida, a mentally ill eighteen-year-old was sent to solitary confinement for sixty
days when she allegedly asked for a high calorie meal. 14 Within her first three months in
isolation, she was found guilty of nine new disciplinary infractions which added another 270
days to her time in solitary confinement. The stacked infractions of which she was found guilty
included behavior such as yelling, kicking her cell door, and disrespecting prison staff. 15 In
Virginia, a person already in solitary confinement had his initial term stacked because he
complained of being denied recreation.16 In Georgia, such confinement was prolonged for
infractions like banging on cell walls or doors, or holding open the metal slot in cell doors. 17 Ian
Manuel, who was held in solitary confinement in Florida from the age of fifteen, spent eighteen
consecutive years in solitary confinement because of continued disciplinary infractions. These
infractions included minor matters such as “having a magazine that had another prisoner’s name
on the mailing label.”18
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Disciplinary segregation has been imposed on people for no valid reason in various states.
People incarcerated in New York state prisons were wrongfully placed in solitary confinement
due to flawed drug tests that led to a product liability lawsuit being filed in 2019. 19 One man was
placed in disciplinary segregation for six months on the basis of the faulty test results. This
delayed his scheduled release from prison and resulted in his losing a job that he had arranged to
begin at the time of his release. Other people reportedly were denied release on parole, removed
from programs, and held beyond their scheduled release dates because of the faulty tests.
Imposition of solitary confinement is usually unrelated to the crime for which the person has
been incarcerated. The main exception tends to be for “protective custody,” where the crime
may make a person a target for abuse in prison. Members of the LGBTQI community, people
who have “snitched” on others in prison, former law enforcement officials, or those who have
committed particularly heinous or egregious acts are typically candidates for protective custody,
which they themselves sometimes request. 20
People convicted of the most serious crimes are not necessarily the ones suffering the harsh
conditions of solitary confinement. In some states, people on death row have successfully
challenged rules automatically placing them in solitary confinement. And in California, the
isolation of people condemned to death (before the moratorium on the death penalty in March
2019) was ameliorated by the requirement that they participate in prison work.
Assignment to solitary confinement can make it difficult or impossible for a person to obtain
parole. Among the factors the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles is required to weigh is
whether solitary confinement was imposed. If so, the person cannot possibly meet the other
requirement of having attended certain classes, since such classes are not offered to people in
solitary confinement.21 Other collateral consequences of solitary confinement include
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difficulties instructing counsel for postconviction proceedings; 22 inability to participate in courtordered programs or attend court proceedings relating to parental orders; 23 and ineligibility for
education programs.24
The vague and overbroad criteria for placement into solitary confinement are troubling
considering the harsh conditions that result. In some jurisdictions, prison staff can assign people
to solitary confinement for years or decades for reasons unrelated to behavior. In Virginia, for
example, a person can be confined to “intensive management,” a form of long-term solitary
confinement, if they display a “routinely disruptive and threatening pattern of behavior and
attitude,” or demonstrate “the potential for extreme and/or deadly violence against other inmates
or staff, as evidenced by their institutional adjustment history, … [or] an extensive criminal
history and lifestyle.”25 The state’s policy does not define what is meant by “disruptive” or
“routinely disruptive” behavior, nor does it provide any guidance as to how a person’s criminal
history should be taken into account in deciding on placement into long-term solitary
confinement.
From time to time, prisons and jails impose “lockdowns” that curtail any movement within the
facility and prevent any visitors from entering. Such lockdowns are usually imposed for security
reasons such as suppressing a disturbance. While lockdowns are in place, people are confined to
their cells and must live in conditions that bear similarities to solitary confinement. In Larocque
v. Turco, the Superior Court of Massachusetts described the circumstances in which a lockdown
is permitted:
“A lockdown is ordered when an event occurs within the prison that requires the entire prison to
be shut down but does not require the assistance of outside personnel and can be handled
internally. Lockdown occurs after instances of inmate insurrection, work stoppage, fire, power
outage, or loss of other services. An emergency is declared and an announcement is broadcast in
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the institution. Every individual in the facility is returned to his cell. Lockdowns are sometimes
followed by institutional searches.”26

The lockdown that was the subject of Larocque v. Turco was imposed after four prison staff
were assaulted at a Massachusetts prison. Over the course of eleven days, people were locked in
their cells and only some were allowed showers, after a three-day wait. All telephone calls and
visits (including from attorneys) were suspended, and mail and email services were delayed or
suspended for up to one month. Every single item in every cell was removed and searched.
These items included correspondence with lawyers and information relating to legal proceedings.
This material was not returned for several weeks after the end of the lockdown. 27
Though lockdowns are usually of short duration, this is not always the case. In 1983, the Marion
Penitentiary was placed in lockdown after an officer was stabbed, and one unit remained locked
down, with many people living in solitary confinement, for twenty-three years. 28 Many prisons
have imposed months-long lockdowns over the past year in an attempt to manage the
coronavirus pandemic.29

2.2

Conditions

Solitary confinement is “punishment taken to the extreme.” 30 It may induce “the bleakest
depression, plunging despair, and terrifying hallucinations.”31 It has been described as a “prison
within a prison.”32 Conditions vary in different prisons, but solitary confinement units and
supermax prisons share many common features. People are forced to endure these conditions for
twenty-two or twenty-three hours per day, over a period of days, weeks, months, or years.
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Thomas Silverstein is incarcerated at the federal supermax in Florence, Colorado. He has been
held in solitary confinement for thirty-seven years. For purposes of a lawsuit against the FBOP,
Mr. Silverstein described the physical conditions in the supermax:
“The cell was about 8’6” by 10’” … Each [cell] contained a cement bed with metal restraint
rings, a cement desk, sink, toilet and shower. In one cell, the walls were cement and I had a
mirror and a small horizontal window near the ceiling that I could look out of if I stood on my
desk. I could only see the concrete barriers of the outdoor workout area. I couldn’t see the sky.
In the other cell, the walls were made of steel, and there was no mirror. There was a window;
however, I couldn’t see out the window because it was covered in mesh that had been painted
over, making it difficult for light to shine in. Even though I could dim my cell light, I could never
turn it completely off. In addition, the lights in the sallyports of both cells were on twenty-four
hours a day.33

Others have described solitary confinement cells as similar in size to a small bathroom or a kingsized mattress.34 Cell roofs are low; people can touch the ceiling if they stand on their toes.
Double-celling, in which two people share a cell, is generally used due to overcrowding.
Although it might appear confusing to refer to a shared “solitary” cell, this terminology still
applies to double-celling because all the other aspects of solitary confinement remain the same.
While sharing a cell may reduce social isolation, it is intensely challenging for two people to
occupy such a small space for any period, particularly when their habits may be completely
different and their personalities incompatible. The harm caused by solitary confinement is not
ameliorated simply by forcing people together. A man incarcerated in Arizona described doublecelling as the worst experience of solitary confinement “because it’s more frustrating seeing a
stranger every day and dealing with his habits and attitudes.”35
Solitary confinement cells are designed to deaden the senses. Rather than having bars, the cell
door is typically solid, so that the person cannot see out. At Pelican Bay State Prison in
California:
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“The doors to the cells consist of solid steel, rather than bars, and are perforated with small holes
that allow for a partial view into a concrete hallway. The door has a food slot that an officer may
unlock to insert food or mail, and that is also used to handcuff the prisoner before the door is
opened.”36

Aaron Lewis, who is incarcerated at Northern Correctional Institution in Connecticut, wrote that
“everything is gray. The walls are all dark gray with holes in it – it’s all made out of Quikrete
[quick-pour concrete].”37 The effect of such a monotonous outlook is then exacerbated by prison
rules and regulations, such as those banning the display of photos or art on cell walls. 38 At
Pelican Bay, people in solitary confinement were eventually allowed to have one wall calendar,
and that concession was only made after a prolonged hunger strike. 39
Bedding consists of a thin mattress, sheets, and two thin blankets. 40 In some cells, all bedding is
removed during the day. People’s clothes may sometimes be removed as an additional form of
punishment, leaving them with only their underwear. Cells are not always temperaturecontrolled, and in some prisons the temperature exceeds ninety degrees Fahrenheit during the
summer and drops below freezing in the winter.
Insect infestation can be severe, particularly in the summer, forcing people to close windows (if
they have them) and wear long-sleeved clothing, even in the oppressive heat. 41 Rodent
infestation is also common. Shearod McFarland, who is incarcerated in Michigan, wrote:
“You would barely notice the mice during the day, but at night they would come alive. The
sound of rodents romping through the heat registers was loud enough to wake you up. It may
sound weak, but being awakened by the sounds of mice in the middle of the night is extremely
traumatizing. That along with everything else was a form of psychological terror.”42
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Some cells are designed to be soundproof, but it is more common for people to experience
interminable noise. The sounds echo throughout the building and include people screaming and
banging on walls, officers’ conversations, cell doors slamming, and keys and chains rattling
constantly. At nighttime, officers slam doors and wake people up as they count them. 43 The
sound is constant and agonizing:
“any kind of sustained or focused thought is virtually impossible due to the constant screams,
moans, curses, animal noises, maniacal laughter and hallucinatory ravings of severely mentally ill
prisoners, and because of the collective din of prisoners pounding on cell bars and door frames.” 44

Recognizing the harm caused by solitary confinement, the American Institute of Architects
(“AIA”) amended its Code of Ethics in December 2020 specifically to prohibit its members from
knowingly designing spaces intended for prolonged solitary confinement. 45 In a press release
announcing the change, the AIA stated that the design of such facilities was inconsistent with
“the profession’s fundamental responsibility to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
public and uphold human rights.”46
One hour a day is typically allocated to allow people a brief escape from the harsh conditions of
solitary confinement cells. People are theoretically entitled to exercise for up to an hour outside
of their cells, but prison officers frequently do not grant them this respite. In Virginia supermax
prisons, people must be awake at 5:30 in the morning to inform prison officers that they wish to
exercise or take a shower that day. If they are not awake when the prison staff make their
rounds, they cannot leave their cells for the entire day. 47 Similarly, in Arizona, the staff does not
always ask people if they want to exercise, or the question is put quietly or when people are
asleep so they cannot hear the offer. 48 Some people choose not to leave their cells for recreation
because they do not wish to submit to strip searches, and the staff searches their cells during
exercise time and destroys their belongings in the process. 49
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People in solitary confinement do not exercise in an open space. Instead, they are escorted to a
room or cage that is not much bigger than their cell. Such spaces are referred to as “dog pens” or
“dog runs” because they are constructed of heavy-duty steel and resemble cages. 50 Exercise
equipment is seldom provided. At the Florence supermax, the recreation area is a “concrete pit
surrounded by high, featureless walls on all sides. It [is] like being inside of a deep, empty
swimming pool.”51 The space is so small that people can walk only ten steps in any direction
and thirty steps in a circle.52 In some prisons, people in solitary confinement must remain
handcuffed and shackled while they are in the exercise area. 53
Within the harsh conditions of solitary confinement, some states have created additional, even
harsher versions of the practice. For example, in Florida, there are four different forms of
solitary confinement. The harshest category, “Maximum Management,” is for those who are
deemed to pose an “extreme security risk.” 54 People in Maximum Management are locked in
cages within cells, they are allowed no visitors and no reading material except for a religious
text, and their out-of-cell time is extremely limited. On average, people assigned to Maximum
Management spend six months in these conditions. 55 The second harshest form is “Close
Management,” solitary confinement of indefinite duration in a tiny cell (as small as sixty square
feet), isolated from others or with a cellmate, and with very limited out-of-cell time. 56 The other
two forms used in Florida are “Disciplinary Confinement,” similar to disciplinary segregation,
and “Administrative Confinement,” used temporarily until a person’s housing classification
status is determined.57
People are generally allowed out of their cells three times a week to take a shower for ten to
fifteen minutes. Tonja Fenton, who experienced solitary confinement in New York, explained
that “[i]n the SHU (Special Housing Unit), hygiene is on the back burner. You might shower
three times a week, but that’s only if they decide to let you.” 58 In Arizona, people are sometimes

50

SIX BY TEN, supra note 37, at 132.
Silverstein Declaration, supra note 33, at 32.
52
Id. at 33.
53
Presley v. Epps Complaint, supra note 41, at 6.
54
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: INHUMANE, INEFFECTIVE, AND WASTEFUL 7 (2019).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 8.
58
SIX BY TEN, supra note 37, at 184.
51

50

left in the shower cells for hours at a time due to staffing shortages. 59 They are allowed only the
bare minimum of personal hygiene items, such as soap and a toothbrush. If people need
feminine hygiene products, they must ask a prison officer each time they require them. 60
Personal property is generally subject to tight restrictions. Property allowances can be as limited
as a maximum of ten books or magazines and up to six cubic feet of property in total. 61 If people
want to get a book from the prison library, they might be able to borrow only two books at a time
and wait for weeks or months to exchange books. 62 The only library books that some people can
access are those allocated to a trolley that is wheeled around the unit from time to time. Many of
the books are legal texts.63 In some states, people in disciplinary segregation are not allowed
library books at all.64
If people can afford a television or radio, they may be allowed to purchase one from the prison
commissary, but the stations and programs available are limited and reception is bad. Many
people are not allowed to have television sets in solitary confinement. 65 Those who have
difficulty reading and who cannot afford a television or radio must endure “enforced idleness”
with little to do but sleep and pace around their cells. 66
Telephone calls and visits are heavily restricted. Typically, a person in solitary confinement is
allowed one or two fifteen-minute telephone calls per month. As is the case for the general
prison population, telephone calls are expensive, since such services are provided by third
parties.67 Because most people in solitary confinement cannot work, they have no way of
earning the money needed to make phone calls.
Visits from family or friends are also infrequent. Many people do not have any visitors because
supermax prisons are often located in isolated areas that are difficult to reach. For example,
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Pelican Bay State Prison in California is located near the state’s northern border with Oregon. It
is a 355-mile drive from San Francisco and a 728-mile drive from Los Angeles, where many of
the incarcerated people’s families live.68 Visiting hours are limited and subject to change with
little or no notice. That fact further discourages visits. Potential visitors are unlikely to travel to
prisons in far-flung locations even if they have the means if they know there is a reasonable
chance they will not be allowed to see the person they have traveled to visit. When visits do take
place, the parties are separated by a glass partition and have no physical contact.
Meals are eaten in the cells, in the same small space in which people sleep and use the toilet. It
is easy for people to become dehydrated because their only source of water is the toilet and sink
combination and sometimes the water is turned off. 69 In some units, the toilets are flushed on
timers that are controlled by prison officers.70 Thus people may be forced to eat their meals amid
the stagnant smell of the unflushed toilet.71
Meals are pushed into cells on trays through slots in the cell doors. They are often late, cold, and
of poorer quality and quantity than the food served to people in the general prison population. 72
Some people are allowed to purchase supplemental food from the commissary, but because the
food is expensive, many people lack the means to do so. Most are not allowed to receive food
packages.73 In some prisons, the food served can be dangerously unsanitary. At Mississippi
State Penitentiary, for example:
“The carts holding the stacked food trays are filthy; and the trays on which the food is served are
cracked, encrusted with residue from other prisoners’ meals, littered with insects, and soiled with
bird droppings. The food trays are often left for hours in the hot sun before being served, causing
the food to spoil. Sudden bouts of vomiting and diarrhea, likely caused by contaminated or
spoiled food, afflict prisoners on a regular basis after meal service.”74
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It is not uncommon for people in solitary confinement to lose weight because of the poor quality
of the food.75
Some solitary confinement units substitute normal meals with “nutraloaf” as an additional form
of punishment. There is no set recipe for nutraloaf; it typically consists of some combination of
potatoes, rice, beans, grains, flour, and margarine that is blended and baked into a solid loaf. At
some facilities, nutraloaf is made of leftovers from other meals. 76 Some states have abandoned
the nutraloaf, but it continues to be used in parts of the country.

2.2.1 Conditions Specific to the Coronavirus Pandemic
The coronavirus pandemic has created a special situation which has placed even some general
prison populations into effective solitary confinement. In addition, prison administrators have
attempted to use actual solitary confinement units and supermax facilities as makeshift medical
isolation units despite their unfitness for such purposes. The current situation is due to the
virtual impossibility of having incarcerated people follow the advice of public health officials on
the steps required to reduce transmission of the coronavirus. That advice includes social
distancing, limiting face-to-face contact, washing hands frequently and using hand sanitizer, and
wearing face masks. People in prisons are confined in crowded spaces with many people sharing
cells or living in close proximity in dormitories.77 Meals, showers, and recreation all take place
in shared areas. It is difficult for people to maintain adequate hygiene because soap and cleaning
products are often in limited supply. Even when available, such products may not be hygienic:
for example, approximately 125 people at Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution in Louisiana
must share bars of soap. They also share four sinks, six showers, and eight toilets between
them.78 There are no clean hand towels, and the laundry is done only twice a week. 79 The
unavailability of hand sanitizer is yet another example of cruel and dehumanizing treatment of
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incarcerated people. Though people in prison are denied hand sanitizer because of its alcohol
content, some states, including New York and Nebraska, use prison labor to manufacture the
sanitizer for sale or use by the public.80
Since implementation of the necessary measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus is
difficult, public health experts have recommended that the populations of jails and prisons be
reduced.81 Despite this advice, few people have been released. 82 Instead, lockdown procedures
have restricted the number of people entering the facilities and the movement within them.
People are confined to their cells or dormitories for up to twenty-three hours per day, 83 cannot
make phone calls, take daily showers, 84 or collect mail or medication;85 they are given
sandwiches instead of hot meals for weeks at a time,86 and they have no access to common areas
or television sets.87 No outside visitors are allowed, few or no classes and programs are offered,
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and prison employment is suspended. 88 Thus the recent experience of general prison populations
in many respects parallels that of people in solitary.
Prison officials have also largely ignored public health experts’ recommendation that
coronavirus outbreaks in prisons and jails be managed by treating people who are symptomatic
or who test positive for the virus in “medical isolation.” According to experts, medical isolation
should be overseen by medical staff rather than prison officers; medical isolation areas should be
well-ventilated and temperature-controlled; patients should be seen at least daily by medical and
mental health staff and provided with access to television, music, tablets, email, reading
materials, daily telephone calls, and daily outdoor exercise; and people placed in such areas
should be informed of the probable length of their stay in isolation and discharged as soon as
they are cleared by medical staff. 89 These recommendations stem from the recognition that fear
of being placed in solitary confinement may deter people from reporting symptoms. 90 The
concern is well-founded, as shown by the fact that people in some prisons have been staying in
their cells and trying to avoid attention for fear of being placed in solitary confinement. 91
Contrary to public health advice, many prisons and jails are using solitary confinement units and
supermax prisons to manage coronavirus outbreaks. The Louisiana Department of Corrections
reopened a solitary confinement unit at Angola Penitentiary known as “Camp J,” which was
closed two years ago as part of “a widely publicized reduction in the state’s use of solitary
confinement.”92 A lawsuit challenging the use of Camp J to house people suspected of having
the coronavirus describes the facility as “notoriously unfit for housing even healthy individuals”
because it lacks ventilation, heating, and cooling. 93 While there are ceiling fans to help circulate

88

Joseph Shapiro, As Covid-19 Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of More Solitary Confinement, NPR,
(June 15, 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdowns-spark-fearof-more-solitary-confinemen.
89
David Cloud et al., supra note 81.
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Elizabeth Weil-Greenberg, Prisoners Who Test Positive for Covid-19 in Connecticut Are Sent to a
Notorious Maximum-Security Prison, THE APPEAL, (May 8, 2020), https://theappeal.org/connecticut-covid-19prison-quarantine-northern-correctional-institution/.
92
Jean Casella & Katie Rose Quandt, Prisons’ Use of Solitary Confinement Explodes with the Covid-19 Pandemic,
While Advocates Push for Alternatives, SOLITARY WATCH, (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://solitarywatch.org/2020/04/10/prisons-use-of-solitary-confinement-explodes-with-the-covid-19-pandemicwhile-advocates-push-for-alternatives/.
93
Class Action Complaint at 155, Gumns et al. v. Edwards et al. (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2020).
55

air, the lawsuit notes that “large fans blowing air are likely to spread aerosolized agents around
the facility.”94
The University of California, Irvine, has generated a digital archive of reports from people
incarcerated in California’s prisons during the pandemic. The titles of some accounts alone
reflect the level of suffering experienced by incarcerated people: “Hungry Most Days,”
“Confusion Reigns,” “Fear for My Safety,” “Ended His Own Life,” and “Total Utter Collapse.” 95
One person, incarcerated in the California Institute for Men in Chino, described the experience of
spending thirty days alone in a cell in conditions equivalent to administrative segregation. Their
mental health deteriorated to the point where they became suicidal and had to be transferred to a
crisis unit for six weeks because of the intense difficulty of living in solitary confinement-type
conditions. The person described the fear among incarcerated people of reporting symptoms of
coronavirus due to the knowledge that they would be placed in solitary confinement:
“What they were doing is like the folks that tested positive were there, they just put a sign on the
door said isolation, and they left them locked in their cell for their 14-day isolation. They didn’t
even get a chance to use a phone or take a shower. So it made it very counterproductive for
anybody that was having symptoms … but nobody wanted to report them because they were
afraid of the situation they would be put in, cut off from their family, stuck in a cell alone for, you
know, 24 hours a day, 14 straight days without even the ability to use a shower.”96

The families of people incarcerated during the pandemic have suffered a range of harms due to
the loss of physical contact and connection with their relatives. Dr. Shona Minson, a
criminology professor at the University of Oxford, conducted interviews with parents and carers
of children with a parent in prison in the United Kingdom, where prisons implemented
lockdowns like those in US facilities.97 Dr. Minson’s research found that relationships between
incarcerated parents and children deteriorated due to the lack of in-person visits and difficulties
with phone calls. This loss of contact, Dr. Minson concluded, negatively impacted children’s
94
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mental and physical wellbeing, and was likely to affect family reunification and resettlement
when people are released from prison.98
Lawsuits were filed in courts across the US urgently seeking the release of vulnerable people.
Only a few individual applications for compassionate release have been granted. In October
2020, the Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to implement plans for the immediate transfer or
release of people at San Quentin State Prison to reduce the population by fifty percent, based on
findings that the coronavirus infection rate was as high as seventy-five percent among
incarcerated people at that facility and had resulted in the deaths of twenty-eight incarcerated
people and one employee.99 The court found that the CDCR had acted recklessly in refusing to
release or transfer people from San Quentin after receiving advice from public health experts in
June about the urgent need to reduce the population. This advice emphasized that the population
reduction was necessary to facilitate physical distancing and in light of the “antiquated” state of
the prison, with windows that have been welded shut and fans that have not been operated for
years.100 California’s Supreme Court has since frozen the relief ordered by the Court of Appeal
and directed the lower court to consider holding an evidentiary hearing to investigate whether
prison authorities took any steps that would contradict the court’s finding that officials acted with
deliberate indifference in failing to follow the public health advice. 101
In June 2020, the Superior Court of North Carolina issued a preliminary injunction directing the
Governor and state prison officials to take steps to address the challenges associated with
protecting incarcerated people from the pandemic. 102 The injunction included an order that
people transferred between correctional facilities must not be isolated in a manner that would
otherwise be associated with “punitive or disciplinary purposes.” 103 The court specified that
prohibited forms of isolation included solitary confinement involving the loss of privileges such
as withholding access to telephone calls, canteen privileges, or personal property; restrictions on
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exercise, television, radio, or recreational, educational, or vocational activities; or placement in
restraints for out-of-cell time.104 In October 2020, the court ordered the state to provide further
information about conditions of confinement and noted that at least twelve incarcerated people
had died of the coronavirus since April 2020. 105 That order sought information as to how the
state was separating people for isolation and quarantine and when people were returned to their
usual incarceration status. The case is ongoing.
In October 2020, the New Jersey state legislature passed the first “public health crisis
sentencing” legislation in the country. The statute provides for eligible incarcerated people
(excluding anyone convicted of murder or aggravated sexual assault or deemed to be a repetitive
compulsive sex offender) to earn “public health emergency credits” if they are within one year of
their scheduled release date so that they can be released earlier than they otherwise would have
been.106 As a result, more than 1,000 incarcerated people in New Jersey will be eligible to be
released over the coming months and the state’s incarcerated population will reduce by
approximately thirty-five percent. 107
In January 2021, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an interim
order to address the lockdown conditions imposed by the Philadelphia Department of Prisons. 108
The order stated that the Department’s existing “shelter-in-place” policy meant that incarcerated
people received only fifteen minutes out-of-cell time each day. The court concluded that “such
prolonged confinement is harmful to the mental and physical health of incarcerated
individuals.”109 The order directed the Department to increase out-of-cell time to at least fortyfive minutes per day to allow people to take showers, make telephone calls, and exercise.
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2.3

Treatment of People in Solitary Confinement

To live in solitary confinement is to experience loneliness, boredom, sensory deprivation, fear,
disruption, and violence. Unlike people in the general prison population, those in solitary
confinement have no work assignments and very limited human interactions. 110 They are aware,
however, that every aspect of their life, including their time in the showers, is under constant
surveillance.111
The main human contact that most people in solitary confinement experience is that of being
handcuffed and shackled to be escorted to the shower or exercise areas, or being subjected to
strip searches. Before people leave their cells, they must place their wrists and ankles through
slots in the door so that the restraints can be fitted. Aaron Lewis described the effect of being
restrained in that way when he arrived at the Northern Correctional Institution:
“When I first came into Northern, they stripped me of all my clothes – my drawers, socks, T-shirt
– and put me in a jumpsuit. They chained me up with leg irons, handcuffs behind my back, and
then a tether chain and padlock connecting the handcuffs to the leg irons. They marched me
down the hall, like ten COs [corrections officers] and a lieutenant. They want you to know who
is running the show. They letting you know like, go ahead, try something. When you chained up
like that, and you’re naked, it actually paralyzes you. You feel vulnerable in the presence of
force. You feel defeated.”112

When people misbehave in their cells for whatever reason, they face “extraction teams” of prison
officers dressed in riot gear:
“In this procedure, five hollering guards wearing helmets and body armor charge into the cell.
The point man smashes a big shield into the prisoner. The others spray mace into his face, push
him onto the bed, and twist his arms behind his back to handcuff him, connecting the cuffs by a
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chain to leg irons. As they continue to mace him, the guards carry him screaming to an
observation room, where they bind him to a special chair. He remains there for hours.” 113

It is traumatic for everyone in solitary confinement to hear or see a person being extracted from
their cell. Professor Mika’il DeVeaux described the experience in a 2013 article:
“These incidents were alarming because while in a cell on the gallery, I could hear the sounds as
the events were unfolding. And when I could not see, I somehow knew the actions
accompanying each sound. These incidents were frightening because being “dragged out” meant
that a person was dragged out of a cell feet first, with their head trailing behind on the floor, and
often being beaten while being moved. I can still remember the screams, the wailing, the cursing,
and the anger. These events were alarming because all who witnessed them unfold could feel the
humiliation and shame. We in the cells were utterly powerless and could face a similar fate.
There was nothing I could do, nothing anyone could do, except hope to get out of there alive.
The possibility of being beaten was all too real. Whom could I tell? Who would listen? Who
would care?”114

People in solitary confinement are subject to frequent strip searches, including body cavity
searches. Anyone who objects to these searches face extraction teams. Extractions and searches
can be particularly demeaning for women and transgender people, especially when carried out by
male officers:
“The use of extraction teams is a routine practice in supermax facilities; women are not exempt
from it. For women, however, this treatment is uniquely traumatic because male guards usually
perform the extraction. The incidents are highly sexualized: women are rendered immobile,
placed in a position of extreme vulnerability, stripped of all of their clothing, and then subjected
to a full body search. Because about sixty percent of women in prison are survivors of some form
of physical or sexual abuse, cell extractions for many of them are not only traumatic in the
moment, but result in a re-experiencing of past trauma.”115

Other abuses are also documented. In 2016, the state of Alaska reached a settlement with the
family of Davon Mosley, a twenty-year-old man who died while being held in solitary
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confinement at the Anchorage Correctional Complex for a parole violation. His fiancée obtained
video footage of Mr. Mosley’s final day in the prison. The film shows
“[t]he guards throwing food at Davon through the slot in the door … They just throw it in there
like he’s a dog or something. And they pepper-sprayed him through that slot in the door. You
see these long shots of pepper spray going in. Then they took him out of one cell and put him in
another. The video didn’t show anyone beating him, but it does show five officers walking out of
his cell, walking down the hallway high-fiving and laughing. When they brought him back he
was naked. He was beat, and they just threw him in. Then they cut his water off, and they
pepper-sprayed him while he was naked and had handcuffs on … In the video you see Davon
using the water that was in the toilet to rinse his face after the pepper spray because his water got
cut off.”116

Pepper spray, “an everyday possibility in segregation,” can spread to surrounding areas and
affect people in neighboring cells as well.117 Albert Woodfox writes that “gassing prisoners was
the number one response by security to deal with any prisoner at Angola who demanded to be
treated with dignity.”118
People in solitary confinement depend entirely on prison officers for every aspect of their lives.
The staff decide whether people will receive their food on time and in a sanitary manner,
whether they will be permitted to make phone calls or borrow library books, and what cleaning
products will be available. Prison officers treat every basic necessity, from showers to exercise,
as “privileges” that can be withheld at any time and for no reason. The same staff conduct strip
searches and cell extractions. They are in a position to make people’s lives even more difficult
through cruel and petty decisions.
Many people in solitary confinement find it hard to complain about poor conditions or
mistreatment. Those who want to do so must obtain complaint forms from the prison staff.
Requests for such forms are often ignored, as are the complaints themselves. 119 Fear of
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retaliation also inhibits complaints.120 It is common practice, for example, for people who
complain about sexual assault by a prison officer to be transferred to solitary confinement while
the matter is investigated (if such an investigation actually occurs). The Civil Rights Division of
the Department of Justice investigated the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women in New
Jersey and concluded that women who reported sexual abuse were typically subjected to physical
examinations while handcuffed and shackled, strip-searched, and then placed in solitary
confinement where they were subject to the same punitive conditions and protocols as people in
disciplinary segregation.121 These women were kept in isolated cells and deprived of work
opportunities. The Department of Justice criticized the prison’s approach of “categorically
subjecting women who report sexual abuse to segregation,” noting that this practice could result
in increasing the trauma to victims of sexual abuse. 122 Unsurprisingly, victims of sexual assault
in prison face a dilemma between reporting the incident and facing retaliation, or not reporting it
despite the risk of further abuse.123 Many choose the latter.124
When people in solitary confinement choose to participate in litigation regarding prison
conditions, the risk of retaliation is high. In recent litigation in Florida, the district court issued a
protective order that described the retaliation and threats visited on people in solitary
confinement simply for speaking to the lawyers for the named plaintiff. 125 The court received
evidence that people were expressly or implicitly discouraged by prison staff from participating
in the litigation; told that they needed to make staff “look good and don’t talk to the visitors”
during inspections; and threatened with disciplinary violations or property restrictions if they
complained. Prison staff also refused to allow people to participate in confidential calls with
counsel, withheld meals, did not flush toilets, and confined people in shower cells or restraints
for hours at a time.126 The person conducting the inspections reported that up to seventeen staff
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were present during cell front interviews, when it was normal practice for only four or five staff
to be present.127
In issuing the protective order, the magistrate judge described the retaliation, together with “the
threat …, or even the reasonable perception” of such retaliation as concerning. 128 The court
found that retaliation existed and that it posed a substantial risk to the fairness and integrity of
the litigation.129 While the protective order stated that retaliation would not be tolerated, it only
laid out guidelines that were intended to “remain somewhat flexible,” depending on the input and
experience of the very prison staff who had been found to have engaged in retaliation. 130 As a
result, while the Department of Corrections was formally ordered to cease any retaliation or
threats, it is not clear to what extent it would be followed. This is particularly troubling given
that this was the second such protective order to be issued in the case to address the issue of
retaliation.
Due to the futility and potential risk of pursuing official complaints processes, people in solitary
confinement find other ways to protest or raise concerns. Hunger strikes are one such method.
In July 2011, a group of people incarcerated at Pelican Bay organized a hunger strike that was
joined by over 6,600 other people in thirteen California prisons. Earlier that year, incarcerated
people had written to the Governor, the Secretary of the CDCR, and the Pelican Bay warden to
request improved conditions, including regular and meaningful social contact, adequate
healthcare and food, and expanded programs. When their requests were ignored, they began the
hunger strike. The group organized the strike by shouting to one another through plumbing pipes
in their cells and drainpipes in the exercise area, passing notes under cell doors, and sending
correspondence to advocates in San Francisco. 131
The strike lasted for nearly three weeks, until a representative from the CDCR met with the
people leading the strike and agreed to limited improvements. These changes included allowing
people to have colored pencils, wall calendars, and warm caps to wear during winter in the
exercise area, and to send one photograph of themselves home each year. The departmental
127
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representative also agreed to review the procedures for assigning people to solitary confinement.
He was criticized by prison officials for agreeing to the requests and was accused of having been
coerced by manipulative gang members. 132
By September 2011, the participants had lost confidence that the promised improvements would
be implemented, and a second hunger strike ensued. With 12,000 people in prisons across
California participating, the strike lasted for two-and-a-half weeks. 133 It was suspended after the
CDCR made a presentation to the representatives leading the strike that detailed the steps that
had been taken to implement policy changes. 134
Frustrated by the slow pace of reform, the group organized a third hunger strike in 2013. It
lasted for over two months and involved over 30,000 incarcerated people. 135 An unknown
number of participants were hospitalized. Some people signed “do not resuscitate” orders, but a
district judge issued an order permitting force-feeding.136 The hunger strike ended before the
order was implemented, after two state legislators announced an investigation and possible
legislative reforms at a press conference.
Some of the people who participated in the hunger strikes faced retaliation for their involvement.
The leaders were charged with disciplinary violations. During the 2011 strikes, some people
were moved into “strip cells” which had air conditioning running constantly, and they were
denied adequate clothing or bedding. Another person was moved to a cell where fecal matter
had been smeared on the walls. Prison officers refused to provide the requested clothing,
bedding, or cleaning products, telling the participants that they could return to their usual cells as
soon as they ate something.137 Prior to the hunger strike, another man had been looking after a
frog that he found in the exercise area at Pelican Bay. The man’s wife reported that caring for
the frog was therapeutic for him, since he had been held in solitary confinement for sixteen
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years. After the man participated in the hunger strikes, prison officers took the frog away from
him.138
Some jurisdictions make little or no accommodation for people in solitary confinement with
physical disabilities. For example, in Florida, a 46-year-old man used a wheelchair due to partial
paralysis and he also suffered from seizures. His cell contained no call button that would have
enabled him to alert the staff to warning signs of a seizure. Other people who, observing his
distress, did alert the staff, risked receiving a disciplinary infraction for “disorderly conduct” or
“inciting a riot.”139 The same man needed urinary catheters. The staff did not consistently bring
the correct type or quantity of catheters, forcing him to wash and re-use old catheters without
adequate cleaning supplies. As a result, he suffered frequently from painful urinary tract
infections.140
Another man in Florida lost his balance and fell when he was walking while restrained in leg
irons, breaking three bones in his foot. The medical staff directed that crutches be ordered for
him, but prison officers refused to provide them, forcing the man to hop around on one foot for
several weeks.141 Despite the risk of another fall, whenever he left his cell the man continued to
be restrained in handcuffs, a “black box,” which fixes the handcuffs at waist level and confines
movement, and a belly chain.142

2.4 The Effects of Solitary Confinement
2.4.1 First-Hand Accounts
Sensory deprivation has deleterious effects. Jack Henry Abbott wrote that “solitary confinement
in prison can alter the ontological makeup of a stone” 143 and he described its effect upon his
release to the general prison population:
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“I could not orient myself. The dull prison-blue shirts struck me, dazzled me with a beauty they
never had. All colors dazzled me. A piece of wood fascinated me by its feel, its texture. The
movements of things, the many prisoners walking about, and their multitude of voices – all going
in different directions – bewildered me. I was slow and slack-jawed and confused – but beneath
the surface I raged.”144

People in solitary confinement suffer from disturbed sleeping patterns and chronic insomnia.
This can be attributed to any number of factors, including the constant noise and the fact that
lights are always on, and that few cells receive much in the way of natural light.
Many people experience hallucinations and delirium. Maryam Henderson-Uloho spent seven
years in solitary confinement at the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women. When she
hallucinated, she thought she could see her deceased son and hear him speaking to her. She
described the utter hopelessness of being stuck in solitary:
“Your world becomes consumed inside a six-by-nine prison cell, year after year after year.
You’re just in complete despair. After a while, you start to lose hope. You feel helpless. You
just sit there, and you sit there, and you sit, day after day. What kind of life is that for a human
being?”145

The effects of solitary confinement are particularly devastating to people with mental illnesses,
which may develop or be exacerbated by the harsh conditions. In the Florence supermax, for
example:
“Prisoners interminably wail, scream and bang on the walls of their cells. Some mutilate their
bodies with razors, shards of glass, writing utensils and whatever other objects they can obtain.
Some swallow razor blades, nail clippers, parts of radios and televisions, broken glass and other
dangerous objects. Others carry on delusional conversations with voices they hear in their heads,
oblivious to the reality and the danger that such behavior might pose to themselves and anyone
who interacts with them.”146
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Self-mutilation and self-harm are common. One man incarcerated at the Florence supermax bit
off his own finger. He did not receive mental health care until he was transferred to another
prison. As soon as he began to recover, he was repeatedly sent back to Florence, where his
condition deteriorated again.147 Ian Manuel, who was held in solitary confinement in Florida,
wrote that:
“On occasion, I purposely overdose on Tylenol so that I could spend a night in the hospital. For
even one night, it was worth the pain.”148

Mentally ill people in solitary confinement who are in distress throw food and excrement on the
floor and walls of their cells and into the hallways. These people may be restrained, that is,
chained by their arms and legs to a concrete block, sometimes for an extended period. When
they are left in this position, they often have no choice but to urinate and defecate on themselves.
They are also unable to eat because of the restraint of their arms.
Despite the known risk of serious mental illness, mental health care in solitary confinement is
often inadequate. Consultations with mental health staff take place at cell doors, can be
overheard by others, and last only a few minutes. In a 2016 decision, the Appellate Division of
the Superior Court of New Jersey expressed concerns about the inadequate mental health
evaluations of a man who spent over three years in administrative segregation. 149 The
evaluations were conducted in English, which was not the man’s native language, and the man
was asked questions through a locked cell door and he did not answer. Based on these nonresponsive evaluations, the mental health staff concluded that the man was not delusional or
suffering from any mental illness.150
In many prisons there is little opportunity for private consultations or any follow-up therapy.
The main form of mental health treatment is psychotropic medication. People may be permitted
to attend group therapy sessions, but these sessions are conducted in the presence of prison
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officers.151 The people who are allowed to attend these groups are often shackled and sometimes
locked in individual cages.152
Some people in solitary confinement report that even when they are experiencing serious
symptoms of mental illness, the only assistance they have received from mental health staff has
been in the form of activities like crossword puzzles. They have reported feeling belittled by
mental health and correctional staff when they describe their symptoms, further perpetuating the
stigma of mental illness.153 They perceive that the mental health staff fail to prevent the abuse
and neglect of mentally ill people and ignore pleas for help. Mark Hinkston, who is incarcerated
in Ohio, writes:
“A prisoner here was having issues a month ago. He expressed to this mental health staff worker
that he was feeling “disturbed” and would harm himself. Although he has a history of selfmutilation, this mental health staff worker walked off laughing then as well. The prisoner cut his
arm wide-open in several places and as a result, had to be taken to a medical facility outside of
the prison.”154

Not only do prison officers and mental health staff fail to assist people who require help, in some
instances they continue to perpetuate cruel treatment even after a serious incident has occurred:
“A prisoner had to be rushed to a hospital after slashing his own throat with a razor. Returned
soon after to the same solitary cell, waiting prison guards gave him a mop and bucket and ordered
him to clean up the mess left by his own spilled blood.” 155
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2.4.2 Scientific Research
2.4.2.1

Psychiatric and Psychological Harm

The psychiatric and psychological distress reported by incarcerated people is consistent with
findings from clinical studies into the psychopathological effects of solitary confinement.
Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has studied the effects of solitary confinement, describing as “tragic
and highly disturbing” the fact that lessons from the historical experiments with solitary
confinement discussed in chapter 1 have been ignored by those responsible for addressing the
mental health needs of people in prisons today. 156
A sizeable body of research confirms that people with underlying mental illnesses are likely to
suffer exacerbated psychiatric and psychological harm due to solitary confinement. Dr.
Grassian’s research shows that symptoms include “florid psychotic delirium, marked by severe
hallucinatory confusion, disorientation, and even incoherence, and by intense agitation and
paranoia.”157
People with mental illness are overrepresented in solitary confinement populations. 158
Researchers tend to agree that numerous factors contribute to such overrepresentation. These
include: a large proportion of incarcerated people present with untreated mental health conditions
due to a lack of publicly-available psychiatric care; 159 because of symptoms of mental illness,
people may have difficulty complying with prison rules and regulations, leading to placement in

156

Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 325, 329 (2006).
Id. at 332.
158
See, e.g., David H. Cloud et al., supra note 7, at 22 (“The grave overrepresentation of people with serious mental
illnesses in the nation’s prisons and jails – and within segregation units in particular – is a public health crisis that
demands a response.”); Laura Dellazizzo et al., Is Mental Illness Associated with Placement in Solitary Confinement
in Correctional Settings? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 29 INT. J. MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 576, 579
(2020) (finding a moderate association between having a “mental health problem” and placement in solitary
confinement based on a meta-analysis of a sample of 163,414 incarcerated people; the association remained present
once outliers and confounding factors were considered); Craig Haney, supra note 111, at 253-54; Peter Scharff
Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34
CRIME & JUST. 441, 503 (2006) (“the allocation of mentally ill inmates to supermax prisons (and sometimes to other
places of punitive or administrative segregation) is likely to be high, but the prevalence of adverse psychological
symptoms in some supermax prisons is clearly significantly higher than even high base expectancy rates for mental
illness.”).
159
David H. Cloud et al., supra note 7, at 22 (referring to a 2014 study which found that in forty-four states, more
people with serious mental illness were confined in jails and prisons in the state that in the largest remaining state
psychiatric hospital).
157

69

disciplinary segregation;160 and people with mental illnesses may be more susceptible to
victimization such that they are placed in solitary confinement for protective reasons. 161
Furthermore, inadequate screening and treatment of mental illness within prisons results in
correctional staff responding to symptoms of mental illness with punitive measures rather than
treatment. Placing a person with a mental illness in solitary confinement causes further
deterioration of their condition, potentially exacerbating the length of time that they must spend
in isolation.162 Prison officers may also overlook the need for mental health care out of the
misguided belief that a person exhibiting symptoms of mental illness is malingering. 163 The
perception among prison officers that incarcerated people feign symptoms of mental illness
(despite the ongoing stigma of mental illness within prisons) is longstanding: as noted in chapter
1, officials operating New York’s penitentiaries in the 1800s held similar views. 164
Many people in prison have experienced trauma prior to their incarceration, and placement in
solitary confinement can exacerbate the risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. 165 One
researcher has identified that the trauma of solitary confinement involves not only that caused by
profound social isolation and sensory deprivation, but also trauma associated with structural
racism for Black people who are disproportionately placed in solitary confinement in comparison
to other incarcerated people.166
While people with mental illnesses or prior trauma are particularly vulnerable to suffering further
harm in solitary confinement, the practice presents risks to everyone. Dr. Grassian suggests that
although people who are better able to modulate their emotional expression and behavior and
those with stronger cognitive functioning are less severely affected, all individuals placed in
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solitary confinement still experience “a degree of stupor, difficulties with thinking and
concentration, obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability, and difficulty tolerating external
stimuli.”167
Other researchers have reported similar findings. Stanford University’s Human Rights in
Trauma Mental Health Laboratory conducted a study of people who had been released from
long-term solitary confinement at Pelican Bay. 168 The study excluded people who had been
transferred to mental health units and those who were unable or unwilling to give informed
consent. The results therefore presented a summary of the psychological impact of solitary
confinement among what the study’s authors described as “likely the most resilient and
resourceful” of people formerly held in solitary confinement. 169 Nevertheless, almost all
participants in the study reported symptoms consistent with the fifth edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (“DSM-5”) diagnosis for major depressive disorder,
including depressed mood, feelings of hopelessness, anger, irritability, loss of pleasure, fatigue,
guilt, loss of appetite, and insomnia.170 The participants also reported symptoms consistent with
DSM-5 diagnoses for panic disorder, traumatic stress disorder, and obsessive compulsive
disorder, which manifested as feelings of nervousness and worry, paranoia, hyperarousal, and the
fear of losing control, as well as physiological symptoms such as increased heart rate and
respiration, sweating, muscle tension, and nightmares. 171 Participants also experienced
emotional numbing and desensitization which interfered with their social functioning once they
returned to the general prison population.172
Other documented effects of solitary confinement include confusion, impaired concentration,
loss of memory, lethargy, and debilitation.173 Studies also point to increased rates of self-harm
and suicides among people held in solitary.174
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Professor Craig Haney, a psychologist, observes that scientific knowledge about the harmful
psychological effects of solitary confinement is informed by broader literature regarding social
isolation, loneliness, and social exclusion. 175 He describes how the “toxic” isolation of solitary
confinement causes “natural human reactions and adaptations to the experience of social
isolation and loneliness” that can result in dysfunctional and problematic behaviors. 176 For
instance, studies have found increased hypervigilance to perceived social threats, which can
result in overreactions to external stimuli, and some people in solitary confinement become
susceptible to “institutional paranoia” whereby they distrust everyone with whom they
interact.177
Notably, Dr. Grassian has found that the effects of isolation vary depending not only on the
environmental conditions, but also the perceived intent of solitary confinement. For example, if
a person perceives that the situation is “likely to be benign” as opposed to threatening, he or she
will be more likely to tolerate it better and is less likely to develop adverse psychiatric reactions
to the experience.178 Furthermore, the degree of sensory deprivation, influenced by the physical
conditions in solitary confinement (e.g. whether cell doors are solid steel or barred, and whether
people receive visitors or have access to reading material and televisions), influences the risk of
adverse psychiatric consequences.179
2.4.2.2

Neuroscientific Evidence of Brain Deterioration

Neuroscientific research confirms that brain deterioration resulting from the social and
environmental deprivations of solitary confinement can be caused by even a brief period in such
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an environment, and “such deteriorations have been associated with a number of potentially
irreversible mental conditions.”180
Due to the ethical and practical challenges of conducting research on people in solitary
confinement, only one study has measured the brain activity of humans in solitary
confinement.181 In 1972, psychologist Paul Gendreau used electroencephalography (EEG) to
measure changes in neural activity in twenty incarcerated people held in solitary confinement for
seven days.182 The study found that after people spent one week in solitary confinement, there
was a slowing in EEG frequency, representing a tendency toward increased theta activity that is
associated with frustration and stress. 183 More recent neuroimaging research examining the
effect of isolation on non-incarcerated adults has shown that socially isolated people are quicker
to perceive threatening social stimuli than non-isolated people, producing a “hypervigilant
response [that] corresponds with continuous activation of certain neural networks involved in
alertness.”184
Experimental animal research supports clinical studies documenting the effects of solitary
confinement on the brain.185 A series of studies show that social isolation and environmental
deprivation result in
“negative repercussions for both brain structure and function, including reduced cortical volume,
diminished neuronal connections in cortical areas and the hippocampus, decreased myelin
production, and altered activity in the reward system and the amygdala.”186
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In humans, such cerebral alterations have been linked to detachment, hostility, higher levels of
aggression, and increased susceptibility to psychiatric diseases and neurodegenerative
disorders.187 Such changes may occur after even a short period of time and continue once the
person is returned to a social environment. 188 Animal research also shows that the chronic stress
of social and environmental deprivation results in brain damage associated with memory loss,
cognitive decline, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder in humans. 189
The body of neuroscientific evidence that shows how social pain of the like resulting from
solitary confinement is “profoundly embodied in the brain” has led neuroscience experts to
describe such pain as “fundamentally physical.” 190 This evidence undermines the distinction that
is often drawn between physical or “real pain” and social or “metaphorical pain.” 191
2.4.2.3

Barriers to Mental Health Treatment

Professor Haney has studied the cultural dynamics that contribute to the inadequate mental
health treatment in supermax prisons and solitary confinement units. 192 He observes that the
notion that misbehavior might indicate that a person is suffering from psychological
impairments, or struggling with personal problems or the untenable environment, becomes
inconceivable to the staff working in these units. 193 Instead, a toxic atmosphere within supermax
prisons contributes to a culture of harm which leads to mistreatment and brutality. Correctional
officers working in these environments are also affected by the “thinly veiled hostility and
disdain [that] prevails, [with] tension and simmering conflict often palpable.” 194 Even among the
mental health staff, Professor Haney writes, “there is a powerful psychological message
conveyed by the architecture of containment, separation, and isolation that dominates the
supermax environment.”195 The result is a “cruel ecology” that inures staff to the suffering of
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people confined in these units and leaves staff members with little choice but to follow
procedures and perpetuate that suffering.
Andrew Clark, a professor of psychiatry, has examined the tension between the ethical
obligations of healthcare professionals working in prisons and the practical realities of working
in those environments, noting that the “institutional priorities [of prisons] may conflict with, and
often trump, the clinical needs of individual patients.” 196 In a 2016 article, Professor Clark
referred to guidelines promulgated by the World Health Organization and the National
Commission on Correctional Health Care, which recommend that clinicians should not
participate in “clearing” people for placement in solitary confinement. 197 Instead, those
guidelines advise healthcare professionals to ensure that close oversight and appropriate care is
provided to people in solitary confinement. Professor Clark’s article suggested that while
clinicians could follow the approach of some medical practitioners in relation to capital
punishment and decline to work in settings where solitary confinement is practiced at all, the fact
remains that patients in solitary confinement need effective mental health services. 198 He
describes working in such units as an “ethics challenge,” noting that if psychiatrists closely
observe people in solitary confinement and monitor them for signs of distress, prison
administrators may assume that the risk of harm is reduced such that the practice may be
continued. In addition, there is a risk that, by advocating on behalf of patients suffering from
acute psychological deterioration, psychiatrists “tacitly fail to advocate on behalf of other
patients who are somewhat more resilient but suffering nonetheless.” 199
The ethical challenges of providing adequate care to people in solitary confinement are further
exacerbated by the physical environment. Because most mental health consultations take place
at the cell door, with the practitioner and patient speaking to each other through the food slot or
the door, there is little privacy and “no ability to develop trust and patient rapport.” 200 Mental
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health staff also experience the challenge of having their professional concerns ignored by
correctional staff who regard them as being too sympathetic towards incarcerated people. 201
Deficiencies in mental health screening and treatment in solitary confinement are epitomized by
the case of Madrid v. Gomez, which alleged numerous failures by the CDCR in the provision of
treatment to people incarcerated at Pelican Bay. In 1995, the District Court for the Northern
District of California ruled that the CDCR violated the Eighth Amendment by, among other
things, failing to provide adequate mental health care. 202 Chief Judge Thelton Henderson
described the “grossly inadequate” mental health care system that existed when the prison
opened in 1989 without a single psychiatrist employed to work there. Although some mental
health professionals had since been employed, continued understaffing, combined with other
chronic problems, rendered ongoing care “constitutionally inadequate.” 203
The judge referred to the heightened need for mental health services due to the prison’s solitary
confinement unit, but he noted that by 1993, and only as a result of litigation pressure, just nine
mental health staff were employed at the prison. At the time, the prison housed 3,500-3,900
people, approximately 1,500 of whom were in solitary confinement. 204 Understaffing, poor
record-keeping, and the exclusion of psychiatrists and psychologists from decisions about cell
housing decisions resulted in serious compromises to mental health care. 205 As a consequence,
the judge concluded, people experiencing severe symptoms due to the conditions in solitary
confinement were “simply medicated with psychotropic drugs or ignored.” 206 The court ordered
ongoing monitoring by a special master and directed the CDCR to fund and fill additional mental
health positions at the prison. Monitoring and ongoing litigation concerning CDCR’s provision
of mental health care throughout the state’s prison system continues. 207
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2.4.2.4

Physical Health Risks

While the physical health risks of solitary confinement have historically received less attention
than mental health risks, medical experts have begun to develop a body of research on the
issue.208
Professor Brie Williams has examined the physical health effects of solitary confinement on
older people. In one study, she observed that the prolonged lack of exposure to sunlight in
solitary confinement can cause vitamin D deficiency, placing older adults at a greater risk of
fractures and falls.209 In addition, the small size of solitary confinement cells and the limited
opportunities for exercise increase the risks of hypertension, diabetes, arthritis, heart disease, and
other conditions, all of which are already disproportionately high among incarcerated people. 210
Professor Williams also writes about older individuals’ experiencing visual depth disturbances
and exaggerated isolation due to hearing impairments, which can worsen heart disease. 211
In a 2019 study, Professor Williams examined the cardiovascular health of people in solitary
confinement, comparing the prevalence of hypertension diagnoses among men between the ages
of twenty-seven and forty-five who were held in solitary confinement at Pelican Bay with men in
the maximum-security general population at the prison. 212 The study found hypertension rates
were significantly higher among the group in solitary confinement (47.51 percent compared to
16.53 percent).213
Another recent study examined self-reported physical symptoms of people held in solitary
confinement in Washington state.214 That research concluded that solitary confinement
exacerbates the existing physical health risks of incarceration arising from disruptions to daily
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life and routines, as well as undiagnosed, untreated, or mistreated illnesses. 215 Participants in the
study reported weight fluctuations, which, the authors noted, can result in “adverse
cardiovascular and psychological outcomes.” 216 Another commonly-reported complaint was
musculoskeletal pain. The study emphasized that these health concerns have a “grossly
disproportionate impact on communities of color” and given the higher rates of placement of
Black, Latino, and Native American people in solitary confinement, the physical symptoms
reported are likely to impact these groups of people at disproportionately high rates. 217
Other physiological symptoms reported in connection with solitary confinement include severe
headaches, heart palpitations, abdominal pain, chest pressure and pain, problems with digestion
and diarrhea, loss of appetite, perspiring hands, dizziness, and fainting. 218 The Stanford study
found that people held in long-term solitary confinement at Pelican Bay suffered from chronic
pain, vitiligo, joint problems, and visual impairments, all of which continued after they left
solitary confinement.219
In 2015, the Women in Prison Project of the Correctional Association of New York commented
on the specific risks that solitary confinement poses to pregnant people, because it restricts
access to critical obstetric care and prevents people from getting the “regular exercise and
movement that are vital for a healthy pregnancy.” Moreover, the report noted, high levels of
stress and depression that can be exacerbated by solitary confinement are particularly dangerous
for pregnant people, because they reduce their ability to fight infections, and increase the risk of
preterm labor, miscarriage, and low birth weight in babies. 220
2.4.2.5

Challenges Following Release from Solitary Confinement

The extensive literature on the harm caused by solitary confinement confirms not only that
people experience harm while confined, but also that such harm continues after release.
Professor Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist who has given expert evidence in numerous lawsuits
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challenging conditions in solitary confinement, developed the concept of the “SHU Post Release
Syndrome.”221 This syndrome, he observed, is most likely to emerge among people who have
been held in solitary confinement for a very long time and who are then transferred to a general
prison population or released from prison. Professor Kupers describes a number of symptoms
associated with the syndrome, including: a tendency to retreat into a confined space and limit the
number of people one interacts with; feelings of anxiety in unfamiliar places and with unfamiliar
people; heightened suspicion of anyone in close physical proximity; difficulty expressing
feelings or trusting anyone; problems with concentration and memory; personality changes; and
in some cases, a tendency to resort to alcohol or illicit substances to cope with emotional pain,
confusion, and anxiety.
The lasting harm that results from solitary confinement, which is confirmed by neuroscience
research showing that brain damage is not reversed upon reintroduction to a normal social
environment, affects people’s ability to reintegrate into the general prison population or wider
society.222 Participants in the Stanford study reported a number of challenges on their return to
the general prison population, including relational estrangement, social impairment, physical
illness, and difficulty with the transition to a more chaotic and flexible environment. 223 This
group considered that the step down programs facilitated prior to their transition to the general
population were of little assistance, with some participants describing them as “unhelpful and
disingenuous.”224 Study participants had reservations about correctional officers conducting the
programs and they would have preferred that they were run by external coordinators. The
participants all reported feeling distressed, overstimulated, and underprepared for “the
cacophony of the general prison environment.” Some also encountered ongoing restrictions on
their movement and activities in the general prison population due to their security status such
that their out-of-cell time, employment, education, and contact with family continued to be
severely limited.225
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Research concerning the experiences of people held in solitary confinement confirms higher
rates of post-release harm when compared to incarcerated people who were not held in solitary
confinement. For example, one study of formerly incarcerated people found that, among those
who had been in solitary confinement, forty-three percent reported symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder, as compared to sixteen percent of those who had been in the general prison
population.226 The study showed no difference in the presence of symptoms between people
who had spent longer or shorter periods of time in solitary confinement. 227 No conclusion was
reached in the study as to whether solitary confinement was causative of post-traumatic stress
disorder. The researchers suggested that isolation could be a traumatic event that contributed to
the illness, or, alternatively, people with undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder could have
had their symptoms exacerbated while incarcerated, leading to their placement in solitary
confinement. Either possibility, the researchers concluded, supported the need for better
screening and provision of mental health treatment during and after incarceration. 228
Another study of formerly incarcerated people concluded that people who reported psychotic
symptoms were fifty percent more likely to have spent time in solitary confinement than those
who did not report such symptoms.229 Like the study examining post-traumatic stress disorder
among formerly incarcerated people, this research did not draw conclusions as to the causative
directions of solitary confinement, due to the researchers’ reliance on participants’ retrospective
recall.
A 2019 study of over 200,000 people released from prisons in North Carolina found that people
who had spent any time in solitary confinement were more likely to die in the first year after
their release from prison compared to people who had not been held in solitary. 230 Death by
suicide or homicide in the first year after release, and opioid overdose within the first two weeks
of release were more common among people who had experienced solitary confinement. The
study also found that the risk of death and reincarceration was higher among people who had
226
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been in solitary confinement more than once, and among people who spent more than fourteen
consecutive days in solitary.231 A Danish study has found that people who had spent even short
periods of time (less than a week) in solitary confinement had higher overall mortality rates five
years after their release from prison than people who had not been held in solitary. 232
Researchers have sought to examine whether solitary confinement has any bearing on the
likelihood of offending or reincarceration. The data are mixed, though Professor Haney suggests
that the experience of solitary confinement does not decrease the likelihood of post-prison
criminal behavior.233 One study found that the risk of recidivism is reduced if people in solitary
confinement spend at least three months in the general prison population prior to their release to
the community.234
Another study examined the effect of disciplinary segregation on subsequent violent infractions
in prison and concluded that disciplinary segregation did not significantly affect the rate of
subsequent infractions.235 The researchers found a twenty-one percent decrease in the likelihood
of committing a violent infraction following placement in disciplinary segregation among Black
people, and people who were identified as being affiliated with a gang were no more likely to
commit a subsequent infraction than others released from disciplinary segregation. Furthermore,
people who received at least one visit from a family member had a nineteen percent decrease in
the likelihood of engaging in a subsequent violent infraction; people who participated in a
rehabilitation program had a fourteen percent decrease; and people attending job programs had a
six percent reduction.236 These data contradict the oft-repeated claim that people in solitary
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confinement are the so-called “worst of the worst” and must remain in solitary confinement to
ensure the safety and security of others.
As Professor Haney suggests, reliance on recidivism to determine the effect of solitary
confinement is a less meaningful measure than the quality of life experienced by people when
they are released.237 There are limitations to the studies on recidivism, including the sample
sizes and comparators used; the extent to which mental health issues and re-entry challenges are
taken into account; and differences in measuring, and the definition of, recidivism.

2.5

Demographic Data

2.5.1 Records Available
Data collection relating to solitary confinement varies considerably in quality and reliability
among states. Some states publish their own statistics about their prison populations, but few
provide detailed demographic information about people in solitary confinement.
It is difficult to verify the accuracy of self-reported data, some of which appear unreliable. For
example, the Minnesota legislative auditor published a report noting that, while information on
people in solitary confinement is recorded in a prison database, records concerning the length of
solitary confinement vary.238 Some records reflect the length of a disciplinary sentence, while
others record actual days spent in solitary. These figures are not necessarily the same because
people may be moved due to overcrowding, or they may require medical or mental health care in
a separate unit before the end of their solitary sentence. 239
When departments of corrections report data regarding their solitary confinement populations, it
is not uncommon for them to point to lower figures by highlighting particular categories of
solitary confinement at the exclusion of others. For example, in testimony submitted to the
Connecticut Senate in 2019, the Commissioner of Correction stated:
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“Currently, out of a population of approximately 13,300 offenders there are 29 offenders on
Restrictive Housing Status. That means that only 0.2% of our total population has been
administratively placed on Administrative Segregation.”240

Other data collected from Connecticut, however, show that in 2019, the state held 106 people (or
0.8 percent of the prison population) in various forms of solitary confinement. 241
Since 2013, the Correctional Leaders Association (“CLA”) and the Arthur Liman Center for
Public Interest Law at Yale Law School have conducted a series of nationwide surveys on the
number and demographics of people in “restrictive housing.” The reports they have produced to
date provide a partial picture of solitary confinement in the nation’s prison systems based on
self-reported data from states that choose to participate.
2.5.1.1

2020 CLA-Liman Statistics

The CLA-Liman reports use the term “restrictive housing” as opposed to “solitary confinement.”
The term was defined in the 2016 report as detention in single or double cells separate from the
general prison population for twenty-two hours per day or more, for fifteen or more continuous
days.242 The 2018 report amended the definition to mean: “separating prisoners from the general
population and holding them in their cells for an average of twenty-two or more hours per day
for fifteen or more continuous days” (emphasis added). 243 The same definition was used in the
2020 report.244
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The 2018 report was based on data from forty-four states and the FBOP, 245 while the 2020 report
reflected responses from thirty-nine states.246 Not all of the reporting jurisdictions provided
more specific data about the age, race, and gender of their solitary confinement populations, as
discussed further in the next sections.
Extrapolating from the information provided by the reporting jurisdictions, the reports estimate
the total number of people held in restrictive housing in all US prisons. The 2020 report
estimated that between 55,000 and 62,500 people were held in restrictive housing in the summer
of 2019.247 Because the data were collected before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, they
do not take account of the increased use of solitary confinement in 2020. In June 2020, Solitary
Watch, a national advocacy organization, estimated there had been a 500 percent increase in the
use of solitary confinement in state and federal prisons since the start of the pandemic, with the
result that approximately 300,000 people were being held in solitary confinement in 2020. 248
CLA-Liman’s 2018 report estimated that a total of 61,000 people were held in restrictive housing
as of the fall of 2017.249 The 2014 report estimated that between 80,000 and 100,000 people
were so held in 2013.250
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The percentage of people in restrictive housing, calculated as the number in restrictive housing
divided by the total prison population reported by each jurisdiction, ranged from 0 to 11 percent
among the jurisdictions that self-selected to participate in the 2020 report. 251 In 2018, the
percentage ranged from 0.05 percent to 19.0 percent of the total prison population. 252 In 2020,
the median percentage of the prison population held in restrictive housing was 3.4 percent, a
reduction from 4.2 percent reported in 2018; the average in 2020 was 3.8 percent, while in 2018
it was 4.6 percent.
Thirty-three states now track the length of time that people are held in restrictive housing, but not
all states conduct retrospective analyses of their restrictive housing populations. 253 According to
the 2020 report, people held for fifteen days to one month in restrictive housing represented 18.6
percent of the total; 27.5 percent were held for one to three months, 15.7 percent for three to six
months, 12.7 percent for six months to one year, 14.5 percent for one to three years, 5.2 percent
for three to six years, and 5.7 percent for six years or more. 254
Some states under-report the number of people in solitary confinement through a strained
definition of that term, as discussed in further detail below. Errors in data collection may also
affect other aspects of the statistics, such as racial demographics and the length of time spent in
solitary.
2.5.1.2

Other Statistics

In some states, no public data are available regarding solitary confinement populations. In
Maine, data may be collected to measure compliance with 2010 reforms intended to reduce the
solitary confinement population, but they are not publicly available. In Georgia, West Virginia,
New Hampshire and Vermont, no data appear to have been collected and these states have never
participated in any of the CLA-Liman surveys. States which did not participate in the CLALiman surveys, but for which data are available from other sources, provide the statistics shown
below.
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2.5.1.2.1

California

As noted above, in 2018 CLA-Liman changed its definition of “restrictive housing” to make the
term more inclusive. This new definition likely increased some jurisdictions’ solitary
confinement statistics, a fact which may explain why fewer jurisdictions provided figures for the
2018 and 2020 reports. Notably, jurisdictions with large prison and restrictive housing
populations, such as Florida and California, were among those that did not provide data for 2018
or 2020.
Under the earlier CLA-Liman definition of restrictive housing, California was able to report a
low number of people in solitary. The 2016 CLA-Liman report recorded that as of September
30, 2015, California had only 1,104 people in restrictive housing out of a total prison population
of 117,171. This is because most people in restrictive housing were allowed at least ten hours
out of their cells each week, but those ten hours were unevenly distributed throughout the week,
so that on some days people were in their cells for less than twenty-two hours a day. Thus the
1,104 number provided by California was simply the population of men held in solitary
confinement at Pelican Bay. The state’s claim that it had no women in restrictive housing seems
suspect for the same reason.
A more accurate account of California’s restrictive housing population can be obtained by
considering the number of people held in such housing for between sixteen and twenty-four
hours per day. Consideration of this number, as reported in CLA-Liman’s 2016 report, resulted
in an additional 7,225 people. Since California implemented reforms to its restrictive housing
policies in response to Ashker v. Governor of California, its restrictive housing population has
dropped even as the litigation continues, more than ten years after it began. 255
Although California did not provide data for the 2018 or 2020 CLA-Liman reports, its own
statistics for May 2019 record that at the end of that month, the state held 3,408 people, 830 of
them female, in some form of solitary confinement such as administrative segregation, SHUs in
supermax prisons, and short-term restricted housing. 256 The statistics include some information

255

See infra section 5.3.3.
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Monthly Report of Population as of Midnight May 31,
2019, https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/wp256

86

about the length of time that people are held in solitary confinement, but no data are provided
about race or age.
2.5.1.2.2

Federal Bureau of Prisons

The FBOP did not provide data for CLA-Liman’s 2020 report. Under the First Step Act of 2018,
the Director of the FBOP must now include in data submitted for the National Prisoner Statistics
Program the number of people placed in solitary confinement at any time during the previous
year.257 In February 2021, the Bureau of Justice published statistics regarding people
incarcerated in federal prisons during 2018 and 2019. In 2018, 11,675 people were held in
solitary confinement in federal prisons, constituting 6.4 percent of the total federal prison
population. In 2019, 12,035 people were held in solitary confinement in federal prisons, making
up 6.8 percent of the total prison population.258 According to the report, some of these records
may have included the same people if they were held in segregation more than once during the
year.
More detailed data about people in solitary confinement in federal prisons can be found in the
CLA-Liman reports. According to the 2018 report, as of fall 2017, 7,974 people (7,873 men and
101 women) were held in restrictive housing in federal prisons. The percentage of men in
restrictive housing in federal prisons was 5.5 percent; while 0.01 percent of women were in
restrictive housing.259 The racial composition of people in restrictive housing in federal prisons
in 2015 and 2017 is shown in the following tables.
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Table 1: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
Federal Prisons, 2015 and 2017260

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2017261
Total male RH
population: 7,873

2015262
Total male RH
population: 8,827

28.8%

25%

27.0%

26%

40.6%

36%

39.8%

36%

27.1%

35%

28.8%

34%

1.3%

1%

0.8%

1%

2.2%

No data

3.5%

No data
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Table 2: Racial Composition of Women in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population
in Federal Prisons, 2015 and 2017263

White Women
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Women
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Women
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Women
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American
Women
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2.5.1.2.3

2017
Total female RH
population: 101

2015
Total female RH
population: 115

39.4%

40%

35.6%

34%

22.2%

23%

36.6%

34%

33.1%

32%

24.8%

27%

2.1%

2%

0%

2%

3.1%

No data

3.0%

No data

Florida

Unlike many other states, Florida is something of an outlier in that it uses solitary confinement to
manage nearly ten percent of its prison population, more than twice the national average, and it
has not taken any steps to date to reduce its use of the practice. 264 According to the 2016 CLALiman report, Florida held 8,103 people in restrictive housing. As already noted, the 2016 report
used a narrower definition of “restrictive housing” than the 2018 and 2020 reports; thus,
Florida’s restrictive housing population may have increased since the 2016 report.

263
264

Sources: ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243, at 28-30; ASCA-LIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38.
Harvard v. Inch Complaint, supra note 14, at 4.
89

2.5.1.2.4

Virginia

In accordance with a statute mandating the annual publication of information about people in
solitary confinement, the Virginia Department of Corrections published “The Reduction of
Restrictive Housing in the Virginia Department of Corrections” in October 2019. 265 According
to the report, the state’s restrictive housing population dropped from 1,513 to 521 between
January 2016 and June 2019.266 The report claims that there were 484 people in short-term
restrictive housing, 37 people in a step-down program, and 602 in SAM Units, protective
custody units not regarded as restrictive housing. There is no reference in the report to “longterm restrictive housing.”267
The statute pursuant to which the report was published defines “restrictive housing” in the
following broad terms:
“Special-purpose bed assignments operated under maximum security regulations and procedures,
and utilized under proper administrative process, for the personal protection or custodial
management of offenders. The Department of Corrections’ restrictive housing shall, at a
minimum, adhere to the standards adopted by the American Correctional Association, the
accrediting body for the corrections industry.”268

Twenty-nine percent of people held in short-term restrictive housing in Virginia, according to the
report, are held for thirty days or more. The length of time beyond thirty days is not reported.
The state could be keeping these people in solitary confinement for months or years and still
label them as “short-term.” Because the statistics do not delineate the time spent in solitary
confinement beyond thirty days, the actual length of Virginia’s solitary confinement sentences is
not known. Moreover, the report does not treat the stacking of separate sentences to solitary
confinement as one continuous term.269 It is possible, therefore, that people are held in solitary

265

HAROLD W. CLARKE, THE REDUCTION OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS (2019).
266
Id. at 2.
267
Id. at 3-5.
268
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-39.1(A) (West 2019).
269
HAROLD W. CLARKE, supra note 265, at 9 (“If an offender was placed into and released from short-term
restrictive housing or step down program multiple times during the year, each release is shown [separately] … in
order to present the length of stay for each [time] in the step down program or short-term restrictive housing”.).
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confinement for weeks or months without interruption, but their confinement is recorded as a
series of separate, shorter sentences.
The Virginia Chapter of the ACLU has questioned the accuracy of the state’s figures. 270 In a
lawsuit filed in May 2019, the ACLU alleged that at least 242 people had been held for years or
decades in Virginia’s two supermax prisons, Red Onion State Prison and Wallens Ridge State
Prison.271 The complaint also alleges that although disciplinary segregation in Virginia is
explicitly limited to thirty days by the state’s policy, people spend months in isolation for
disciplinary infractions.272
The ACLU’s lawsuit challenges the efficacy of Virginia’s step down program, which was
implemented in 2012 to reduce the size of the solitary confinement population. 273 The complaint
describes the step down program as “a confusing maze that lacks transparency and clear
benchmarks for progression to the next phase.” 274 It alleges that people remain stuck in the
program for months at a time and are frequently forced to restart it, all the while being kept in
solitary confinement.
Some people are kept permanently in the step down program under a policy labeled “intensive
management,” which is simply solitary confinement by another name. According to the
complaint, people in intensive management are held in permanent isolation even if they complete
the step down program and do not commit any disciplinary infractions while they are in the
program.275 The “intensive management” designation is applied to people “with the potential for
extreme and deadly violence, defined by a history of willingness to carry out serious or deadly
harm or as a result of institutional charges with intent to cause serious harm or kill, or offenders
with a high escape risk because of the offender’s high profile or notorious crime.” 276 These
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Frank Green, Virginia Prison ‘Restrictive Housing’ Report Shows Its Use is in Decline, RICHMOND TIMES
DISPATCH, (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/virginia-prison-restrictive-housing-reportshows-its-use-is-in/article_af118a46-a72c-5101-973d-92a2eca703cd.html.
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Thorpe et al. v. Virginia Dep’t of Corr. Complaint, supra note 25.
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Id. at 32.
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Id.
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Id. at 34.
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Id. at 37.
276
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION VIRGINIA, SILENT INJUSTICE, supra note 16, at 26-27.
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people have no meaningful opportunity to have their status reviewed or to progress to a less
restrictive environment.
Virginia’s Department of Corrections does not regard “intensive management” as solitary
confinement; rather, it reports people held there as part of the general prison population, even
though they are held in total isolation with severe restrictions on every aspect of their life. 277
Ostensibly complying with the policy that people in intensive management be kept in “single
celled housing, segregated recreation and out of cell restraints,” people are confined in small
cells where they eat all their meals, and are subjected to body cavity searches every time they
leave their cells.278 In August 2016, eighty-four people were in intensive management. 279 The
ACLU criticized the step down program in 2018, noting that the state’s claimed success in
implementing the program was “difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate due to a lack of
mandatory reporting or tracking.”280

2.5.2 Gender
For CLA-Liman’s 2020 report, thirty-four jurisdictions provided disaggregated gender data. The
responding jurisdictions reported an aggregate 4.28 percent of the total male prison population
and 0.8 percent of the total female population in restrictive housing. 281 In absolute numbers,
30,473 males were held in restrictive housing across the reporting jurisdictions (the total male
custodial population in those jurisdictions was 711,570) and 542 females were held in restrictive
housing (out of a total female custodial population of 61,690). 282
Most litigation about solitary confinement has focused on men’s prisons. As a result, less is
known about the conditions in women’s prisons. However, it appears that though far fewer
women are held in solitary confinement, their conditions are at least as harsh, and sometimes
harsher than the men’s.283
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Transgender people are usually held in prisons based on their sex at birth, despite the provisions
of the Federal Prison Rape Elimination Act requiring an individual assessment of such persons to
determine the best housing for them. Prison officials retain significant discretion. 284 Assignment
according to sex at birth creates special vulnerability for transgender people in prison. In 2015,
the Department of Justice reported that thirty-five percent of transgender people who had spent
time in prison during the previous year were victims of sexual assault. 285 Advocates have noted
that the assaults were likely undercounted given the risk of retaliation for reporting. 286
Having been placed in prisons according to their assigned sex at birth, many transgender people
are then placed in protective custody, allegedly for their own good. They may also face solitary
confinement for disciplinary violations if they seek to express their gender identity in violation of
grooming or dress requirements.287
Limited data are available about the number of transgender people held in solitary confinement,
and jurisdictions have different methods of identifying such people. In the 2020 CLA-Liman
report, twenty-four jurisdictions reported holding an aggregate of 2,371 transgender people in
their general prison populations, and 112 people in restrictive housing. 288 The percentage of
transgender people in restrictive housing ranged from 0 percent to 14.3 percent of all transgender
incarcerated people.289 Given the limited record-keeping and the variance in identifying
transgender people in prison, it is likely that a greater number of transgender people are held in
some form of solitary confinement.290

2.5.3 Age
Of the thirty-two jurisdictions that provided data about the age of their solitary confinement
populations for the 2020 CLA-Liman report, men and women aged 26 - 35 constitute the
284

Kate Sosin, Trans, Imprisoned – and Trapped, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020),
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Annette Brömdal et al., Whole-Incarceration-Setting Approaches to Supporting and Upholding the Rights and
Health of Incarcerated Transgender People, 20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRANSGENDERISM, 341 (2019).
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See, e.g., BLACK & PINK, COMING OUT OF CONCRETE CLOSETS: A REPORT ON BLACK & PINK’S NATIONAL
LGBTQ PRISONER SURVEY (2015) (finding that out of the total number of LGBTQ people surveyed, 85 percent
reported having been held in solitary confinement at some point during their sentence).
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majority of restrictive housing populations. The data for males show 16.2 percent of those in
restrictive housing are between the ages of 18 and 25; 41.6 percent are aged 26 - 35; 32.4 percent
are between the ages of 36 and 50; and 9.8 percent are 50 or older. The statistics for females in
restrictive housing are: 21.4 percent are between the ages of 18 and 25; 44.9 percent are aged 26
- 35; 24.3 percent are 36 - 50, and 5.6 percent are older than 50. 291
These statistics exclude young people held in juvenile detention centers. Limited data about the
solitary confinement populations in these facilities are available. According to the 2016 Juvenile
Residential Facility Census, twenty-two percent of facilities reported holding youth in isolation
rooms for four hours or more.292 In 2014, the Federal Government banned the solitary
confinement of people under eighteen. 293 Twenty states have banned or limited the solitary
confinement of young people through legislation or administrative rules. 294 Nevertheless, a
small number of people under the age of eighteen, having been moved to adult prisons, are then
placed in solitary confinement. This may be due to a requirement in the Prison Rape Elimination
Act requires that young people be kept entirely separate from adults. 295 According to the CLALiman 2020 report, four jurisdictions reported holding a total of eight people under the age of
eighteen in restrictive housing.296
The use of solitary confinement for older people is an increasing problem as prison populations
age. Such confinement exacerbates the physical and mental deterioration experienced by older
people in prison, which includes memory loss, confusion, and heart disease. In addition, the lack
of sensory stimulation and access to medical care is inconsistent with standard expectations of
care for older people, particularly individuals with dementia. 297
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2.5.4 Race and Ethnicity
The racial and ethnic disparities in America’s criminal justice system are well-documented.
Confinement in solitary facilities reflects a further exacerbation of the disproportionately high
rates of incarceration of Black and Latino people.
The disparity in the total prison population is most evident for Black Americans, but Latino
people are also overrepresented throughout the criminal justice system. Black and Latino people
are more likely than whites to be arrested; once arrested, to be convicted; and once convicted, to
receive long prison sentences. In 2016, Black Americans represented 27 percent of all those
arrested in the US, more than double their share of the total population. They were 3.5 times
more likely to be held in pre-trial detention than non-Hispanic whites. Black and Latino adults
combined constitute 29 percent of the total US population, but make up 57 percent of the
country’s prison population. In 2016, 48 percent of adults serving life sentences were Black and
15 percent were Latino.298
The asymmetric racial composition of people in solitary confinement shows similar phenomena.
A 2019 report by the Southern Poverty Law Center reflects pronounced racial disparities in
Florida’s use of solitary confinement. As of December 2018, over 60 percent of people so held
were Black (compared to 47 percent of the prison population), while only 34.5 percent were
white (compared to 40.1 percent of the prison population). 299
2.5.4.1

CLA-Liman 2020 Racial Data Regarding Men in Restrictive Housing

The 2020 CLA-Liman report showed the racial composition of people in restrictive housing
through data provided by thirty-two jurisdictions. These jurisdictions held a total of 28,155
people in restrictive housing, which is estimated to constitute between 45 and 51.2 percent of the
total population in restrictive housing in the US. 300 Of these thirty-two jurisdictions, Black men
comprised 43.4 percent of the total male restrictive housing population, as compared to 40.5
percent of the total prison population. In contrast, white men constituted 36.9 percent of the
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restrictive housing population and 41.4 percent of the total prison population. Only two states
(Mississippi and Tennessee) reported having a higher percentage of white men in restrictive
housing than in the total prison population.301
Like many other prison statistics, the CLA-Liman reports do not distinguish between race and
ethnicity, and they treat Hispanic or Latino people as a standalone category. This section
therefore includes data about Hispanic or Latino people in solitary confinement as reported by
CLA-Liman. Of the jurisdictions that provided racial and ethnic data to CLA-Liman for the
2020 report, Hispanic men constituted 16.9 percent of the restrictive housing population and 15.4
percent of the total male prison population. 302 Native American men constituted 2.1 percent of
the restrictive housing population and 1.7 percent of the total prison population, and Asian men
constituted 0.3 percent of the restrictive housing population and 0.5 percent of the total prison
population.303
Table 3: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
the Five Jurisdictions with the Largest Restrictive Housing Populations Included in CLALiman (2020) Report304

White Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive
Housing
Population

Texas
Total male RH
population: 4,326

Missouri
Total male RH
population: 2,187

Georgia
Total male RH
population: 2,118

New York
Total male RH
population:
2,074

Arizona
Total male
RH
population:
1,919

31.8%

61.8%

34.6%

23.7%

37.8%

24.5%

55.7%

27.5%

19.1%

23.1%

301

Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 24.
303
Id.
304
Source: CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241, at 29-31.
302
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Black Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive
Housing
Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive
Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive
Housing
Population
Native
American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive
Housing
Population

Texas
Total male RH
population: 4,326

Missouri
Total male RH
population: 2,187

Georgia
Total male RH
population: 2,118

New York
Total male RH
population:
2,074

Arizona
Total male
RH
population:
1,919

33.5%

36.4%

61.3%

49.6%

15.2%

25.5%

43.7%

68.8%

54.4%

17.1%

34.1%

2.0%

3.6%

23.2%

39.8%

49.9%

0%

3.5%

23.9%

50.4%

0.4%

0.2%

0.3%

0.6%

0.4%

0.1%

0.1%

0.1%

0.2%

0.2%

0%

0.3%

0%

0.9%

5.2%

0%

0.3%

0%

0.8%

8.2%

As shown by the above table, in all five of these jurisdictions, white men constitute a smaller
percentage of the restrictive housing population than the general prison population. In contrast,
in four of the five jurisdictions, Black men are overrepresented in restrictive housing compared
to their number in prison generally. The same is true for Hispanic men in three of the five
jurisdictions.
2.5.4.2

CLA-Liman 2020 Racial Data Regarding Women in Restrictive Housing

With respect to women in restrictive housing, six of the thirty-two reporting jurisdictions had a
higher number of white women in restrictive housing compared to their number in the overall
97

prison population. It should be noted, however, that the number of women in restrictive housing
is small in absolute terms. The total number of women held in restrictive housing among the
jurisdictions that reported racial and ethnic data to CLA-Liman in 2020 was 497, compared to
28,149 men.
The percentage of Black women in restrictive housing (42.1 percent) was significantly higher
than their percentage of the total prison population (21.5 percent). Hispanic women comprised
9.3 percent of the female restrictive housing population as compared to 10.3 percent of the total
female prison population.305
Table 4: Racial Composition of Women in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population
in the Four Jurisdictions with the Largest Restrictive Housing Populations Included in
CLA-Liman (2020) Report 306

White Women
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Black Women
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Hispanic Women
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Women
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

305
306

Texas
Total female RH
population: 75

Missouri
Total female RH
population: 71

North Carolina
Total female RH
population: 48

Wisconsin
Total female RH
population: 39

54.0%

82.8%

69.1%

65.3%

10.7%

60.6%

50.0%

35.9%

23.5%

14.7%

26.3%

22.2%

50.7%

36.6%

41.7%

56.4%

22.0%

3.2%

2.0%

3.3%

38.7%

0%

2.1%

2.6%

0.4%

0.8%

0.2%

8.2%

0%

1.4%

0%

0%

CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241, at 35.
Id. at 32-34.
98

Native American
Women
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2.5.4.3

Texas
Total female RH
population: 75

Missouri
Total female RH
population: 71

North Carolina
Total female RH
population: 48

Wisconsin
Total female RH
population: 39

0.1%

0.8%

2.2%

8.2%

0%

1.4%

6.2%

5.1%

Racial Data in States that have Introduced Significant Legislative or Policy
Reforms

The following tables show that racial disparities in the use of restrictive housing, according to
data provided to CLA-Liman, have not changed significantly between 2015 and 2019 in
jurisdictions that have implemented legislative or administrative reforms. For the sake of
completeness, it is noted here that not all jurisdictions provided data for all of the CLA-Liman
reports. The available data are shown in the tables below. Racial data pertaining to females in
restrictive housing in these states are not included because it is difficult to draw any conclusions
given the small numbers of women in restrictive housing in each single jurisdiction.
Table 5: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
Colorado, 2014-2017307

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population

2017
Total male RH
population: 10

2015
Total male RH
population: 214

2014308
Total male administrative
segregation population:
207

45.0%

45%

45%

20.0%

38%

25%

307

Sources: ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243, at 28-30; ASCA-LIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38; ASS’N
OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS AND THE LIMAN PROGRAM, YALE LAW SCHOOL, TIME-IN-CELL: THE
LIMAN-ASCA 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN PRISON 32 (2015) [hereinafter ASCALIMAN (2015)].
308
ASCA-LIMAN (2015) defined “administrative segregation” as “separating prisoners from the general population,
typically in cells, either alone or with cellmates, and holding them in their cells for most of the hours of the day for
thirty days or more. Common terms for this type of confinement include administrative detention, intensive
management, and restrictive housing. Please note that administrative segregation does not include
punitive/disciplinary segregation or protective custody.” ASCA-L IMAN (2015), supra note 307, at 10-11.
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Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2017
Total male RH
population: 10

2015
Total male RH
population: 214

2014308
Total male administrative
segregation population:
207

18.2%

19%

19%

20.0%

14%

21%

32.5%

32%

32%

60.0%

43%

51%

1.1%

1%

1%

0%

0%

0%

3.1%

No data

No data

0%

No data

No data

Table 6: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
Massachusetts, 2014-2019309

White Men
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2019
Total male RH
population: 1

2017
Total male RH
population: 420

2015
Total male RH
population: 447

2014
Total male
administrative
segregation
population: 340

41.5%

42.8%

43%

43%

100%

35.5%

37%

40%

28.5%

27.9%

29%

29%

0%

31.4%

35%

35%

309

Sources: CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241 at, 29-31; ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243 at 29-30; ASCALIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 38; ASCA-LIMAN (2015), supra note 307, at 32.
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Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total
Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American
Men
Percentage of
Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2019
Total male RH
population: 1

2017
Total male RH
population: 420

2015
Total male RH
population: 447

2014
Total male
administrative
segregation
population: 340

27.1%

26.5%

26%

25%

0%

30%

25%

22%

1.4%

1.4%

1%

1%

0%

2.1%

2%

2%

0.6%

0.7%

No data

No data

0%

0.2%

No data

No data

Table 7: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
Minnesota, 2015 and 2019310

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population

310

2019
Total male RH
population: 246

2015
Total male RH
population: 602

50.1%

45%

32.9%

28%

38.6%

36%

41.1%

45%

0%

7%

Sources: CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241, at 29-31; ASCA-LIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38.
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Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2019
Total male RH
population: 246

2015
Total male RH
population: 602

0%

7%

2.8%

3%

0%

1%

8.3%

No data

23.2%

No data

Table 8: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
Nebraska, 2015-2019311

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2019
Total male RH
population: 253

2017
Total male RH
population: 389

2015
Total male RH
population: 589

51.1%

51.8%

55%

43.5%

44.7%

52%

28.3%

28.6%

27%

26.5%

29.0%

23%

14.7%

13.8%

13%

22.1%

19.3%

18%

0.8%

0.8%

1%

0%

0.3%

1%

311

Sources: CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241, at 29-31, ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243, at 28-30; ASCALIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38.
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Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2019
Total male RH
population: 253

2017
Total male RH
population: 389

2015
Total male RH
population: 589

4.3%

4.1%

No data

7.5%

5.9%

No data

Table 9: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population in
New Jersey, 2014-2017312

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2017
Total male RH
population: 1,143

2015
Total male RH
population: 1,316

2014
Total male administrative
segregation population:
1,076

20.4%

22%

22%

21.4%

19%

17%

61.8%

60%

60%

61.3%

63%

68%

15.6%

16%

17%

15.0%

17%

13%

0.6%

1%

1%

0.4%

0%

0%

0%

No data

No data

0%

No data

No data

312

Sources: ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243, at 28-30; ASCA-LIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38; ASCALIMAN (2015), supra note 307, at 32.
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Table 10: Racial Composition of Men in Restrictive Housing and Total Prison Population
in New York, 2015-2019313

White Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Black Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of Restrictive
Housing Population
Hispanic Men
Percentage of Total Prison
Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Asian Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population
Native American Men
Percentage of
Total Prison Population
Percentage of
Restrictive Housing
Population

2.5.4.4

2019
Total male RH
population: 2,074

2017
Total male RH
population: 2,630

2015
Total male RH
population: 4,410

23.7%

23.4%

24%

19.1%

18.1%

17%

49.6%

48.7%

50%

54.4%

55.2%

56%

23.2%

24.7%

23%

23.9%

23.8%

24%

0.6%

0.5%

0%

0.2%

0.2%

0%

0.9%

0.8%

No data

0.8%

0.8%

No data

Examination of Racial Disparities

According to a small number of studies that have examined the racial disparities in the use of
solitary confinement, race does not always play a decisive role in the use of the practice, after
controlling for factors such as the reported commission of infractions. 314 At least one study has,
however, indicated that race remained a factor in determining the likelihood of placement in
restrictive housing. That study concluded that Native American men were more likely to be held
313

Sources: CLA-LIMAN (2020), supra note 241, at 29-31, ASCA-LIMAN (2018), supra note 243, at 28-30; ASCALIMAN (2016), supra note 242, at 37-38; ASCA-LIMAN (2015), supra note 307, at 32.
314
See, e.g., Joshua C. Cochran et al., Solitary Confinement as Punishment: Examining In-Prison Sanctioning
Disparities, 35 JUST. QUARTERLY 381 (2017) (reviewing administrative records from Florida Department of
Corrections from 2005-2011 and concluding that after controlling for variation in commission of infractions, race
did not feature in decisions to place people in disciplinary segregation).
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in restrictive housing than white men, but Black and Latino men were less likely to be so placed.
The state that was the subject of this research was not identified by name in the study. 315
The value of these studies depends on the quality of the administrative records used for the data
analysis. It is clear that the records in some states do not accurately represent solitary
confinement populations. Moreover, while the studies control for factors such as commission of
offenses that lead to disciplinary segregation, they do not examine whether bias may lead prison
officers to report disciplinary infractions by non-white people for behavior that is overlooked
when it involves white people. These studies should also be viewed with caution because they
focus on one or two types of solitary confinement and extrapolate their conclusion about the
practice in general from a limited sample.
While the disproportionate assignment of Black, Latino, and Native American people to solitary
confinement results from a number of factors, the broad discretion exercised by prison officials
and the deference granted to their decisions by the courts play a significant part. Prison officials
have considerable discretion in determining security classifications, the issuance of disciplinary
violations, and decisions on how long people spend in solitary confinement and under what
conditions. Moreover, unlike other parts of the criminal justice system where different agencies
bear responsibility at different stages of the proceedings (arrests, charges, sentences, and
appeals), all decisions about prison discipline, including reviews and appeals, are made by prison
officers alone.316
Prison officials enforce broad and overly vague disciplinary rules which frequently penalize
conduct that may be commonplace outside of the institution. Rules prohibiting behavior such as
“insolence” enable prison officials to punish people for almost any behavior that is deemed
objectionable. A 2016 New York Times review of 60,000 disciplinary cases in New York
prisons revealed that racial disparities were most evident in the case of infractions involving the
exercise of discretion by officers, such as rules against disobeying direct orders. The disparities

315

See, e.g., Melinda Tasca & Jillian Turanovic, Examining Race and Gender Disparities in Restrictive Housing
Placements, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE (2018) (reviewing administrative records on all
people released from prison in one large state between 2011 and 2014 and concluding that Native American men
were more likely to be placed into restrictive housing or disciplinary segregation than white men, whereas Latino
and Black men were less likely than white men to be placed into restrictive housing or disciplinary segregation).
316
Andrea C. Armstrong, Race, Prison Discipline, and the Law, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 759, 777 (2015).
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were less pronounced for violations that required physical evidence, like possession of
contraband.317
Although there are limited data available about the way these rules are enforced, implicit racial
bias likely influences decisions about whose behavior constitutes “insolence.” These vague
standards may also lead to the punishment of people exhibiting symptoms of mental illness. As
non-white people are less likely to receive a diagnosis of mental illness, 318 they may be more
likely to be subject to disciplinary violations relating to conduct stemming from such illness.
The courts’ deference to prison administrators is shown by the federal court rule that only “some
evidence” is needed to meet the standard for a disciplinary violation. 319 The few administrative
prison standards that are subject to strict scrutiny, such as race-based housing assignments,
require proof of discriminatory intent.320 It is difficult to prove such intent when assignment
results from systemic and structural arrangements rather than the specific decisions of individual
prison guards.321 This is further complicated by a total absence of transparency around prison
officials’ decision-making. The legal framework, including the courts’ tendency to grant
deference to prison officials, is discussed in the following chapters.
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Michael Schwirtz et al., The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York State’s Prisons, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 3,
2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-state-prisons-inmates-racial-bias.html.
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Racial Disparities in Mental Illness and Criminal Justice, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS
https://www.nami.org/Blogs/NAMI-Blog/July-2019/Racial-Disparities-in-Mental-Health-and-Criminal-Justice.
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See infra section 3.2.3.
320
Andrea C. Armstrong, supra note 316, at 760.
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CHAPTER 3. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE
Introduction
This chapter examines the development of federal constitutional jurisprudence relating to solitary
confinement. Despite the Court’s pronouncement in Wolff v. McDonnell that “there is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country,” 1 federal courts have
gradually imposed stringent tests that limit meaningful constitutional oversight.
Through the development of complex tests to prove both Eighth Amendment and Due Process
challenges to solitary confinement, in combination with the statutory barriers presented by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), many federal court decisions appear to reflect the
archaic common law concept of civil death. Under that principle, a person who was outlawed or
convicted of a serious crime lost rights of access to the courts. 2 In 1871, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that a person convicted of a felony was entitled only to the rights
afforded to incarcerated people by statute, and not to any rights in the state’s constitution. 3
Though the courts rejected that notion during the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court
nevertheless expressed reservations about intervening in the internal affairs of prisons and
emphasized the need for deference to the judgments of prison officials. 4
Even when the Supreme Court first applied the Eighth Amendment to conditions of confinement
in Rhodes v. Chapman in 1981, it was compelled to state that “the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons.”5 In Due Process challenges to solitary confinement, the courts assess
conditions based on the “ordinary incidents of prison life,” which have led some courts to treat
long-term solitary confinement as an acceptable baseline despite the extreme deprivation

1

418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
Civil Death, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 790 (1871).
4
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 394, 404-405 (1974). See also Howard Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Rights
Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U.L.J. 417, 423, 426 (1993).
5
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
2
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experienced by people living in such conditions. Equal Protection jurisprudence has also had
limited influence on solitary confinement with only a few successful challenges to date.

3.1 Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments was taken from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689. Significantly, the provision in the latter was intended to prohibit
punishments not specifically authorized by statute or by a sentencing judge. 6 Despite its
derivation, the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by US courts, has not incorporated that
prohibition.
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles announced the general approach of federal courts,
stating that the words of the Eighth Amendment
“are not precise, and … their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”7

The Supreme Court considers different sources to determine the meaning of “evolving standards
of decency.” On occasion, it has had regard to foreign and international law. Thus in Trop v.
Dulles, a plurality observed that “the civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime.” 8 In Atkins v. Virginia, a majority
of the Court acknowledged that imposition of the death penalty on intellectually disabled people
was “overwhelmingly disapproved” within the world community, 9 and in Roper v. Simmons, the
majority referred to the “overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty.”10 The majority in Roper observed that while foreign opinion was not controlling, it
provided “respected and significant confirmation” for the Court’s own conclusion. 11
Another source that the Court has considered relevant to the meaning of “evolving standards of
decency” is evidence of a national consensus reflected by state legislation and practice. In
Roper, the Court explained that these “objective indicia of consensus” provided “essential
6

COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 6 (2007).
Trop v. Dulles, 315 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
8
Id. at 102-103.
9
536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
10
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
11
Id.
7
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instruction,” but went on to note that it was the Court’s role to exercise its own independent
judgment as to whether the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.12 The rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority
of states, and its infrequent use in states where the penalty remained in existence, the Court held,
constituted sufficient evidence that society viewed juveniles as “categorically less culpable than
the average criminal.”13
In 1962, the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California held that the provisions of the Eighth
Amendment apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 It was only in 1978 that
the Supreme Court first addressed conditions of confinement in the case of Hutto v. Finney,
holding that they were subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 15 There, the Court
affirmed a remedial order entered by the district court to address cruel and unusual conditions in
Arkansas’ prison system. One of the requirements of the remedial order was a thirty-day
limitation on placements in solitary confinement. Generally, however, challenges to solitary
confinement based on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment have had mixed success. The courts have held that “the mere fact of solitary
confinement does not, in and of itself, violate the Eighth Amendment.” 16
The Court has developed a two-part test to assess whether conditions within prisons violate the
Eighth Amendment. The test comprises an objective component, i.e., proof that a given
condition or deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and a subjective component, i.e., that it was
inflicted with “deliberate indifference.” 17 The test has resulted in limited scrutiny of prison
conditions, including solitary confinement.
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Id. at 564.
Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
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Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 600 (1962) (holding a California statute that imposed a sentence of
imprisonment upon conviction of the offense of addiction to narcotics to be cruel and unusual in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
15
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
16
Brown v. Faucher, No. 3:19-CV-00690, 2019 WL 3231205 at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2019), (citing Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)).
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Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
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109

3.1.1 Sufficiently Serious Conditions
To establish a sufficiently serious condition or deprivation, proof of serious harm or a
“substantial risk of serious harm” is required. 18 The standard is high. In Rhodes v. Chapman,
the Court held that double-celling in cells designed to hold a single person did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell stated that the Constitution “does
not mandate comfortable prisons,” and only deprivations that deny “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities” meet the standard of an Eighth Amendment violation. 19 In Hudson
v. McMillian, a case concerning the excessive use of force by prison officers who assaulted a
man while he was handcuffed and shackled, the Court reasoned that “extreme deprivations are
required to make out a conditions of confinement claim” because “routine discomfort is part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” 20 In one case, the fact
that a person spent thirty years in solitary confinement did not satisfy the objective test. 21 Even
the extreme practice of placing people in isolation in “strip cells” without sheets, blankets, or
clothing has not been regarded as a sufficiently serious deprivation. 22
The courts have further held that to establish a violation, the conditions challenged must result in
the deprivation of a single need. Solitary confinement, however, rarely presents a single
deprivation. The Court in Wilson v. Seiter held that a combination of unfavorable conditions
may violate the Eighth Amendment when any single one of them would not do so, but the
conditions must have a “mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth or exercise – for example, a low cell temperature
at night combined with a failure to issue blankets.” 23 The Court said that “nothing so amorphous
as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment” when there is no
deprivation of a single need.24
The complaint in Wilson v. Seiter alleged that conditions within an Ohio prison violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, it asserted that the prison was overcrowded,
18

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981).
20
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347).
21
Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522, 524 (7th Cir. 2017).
22
Guinn v. Rispoli, 323 Fed. Appx. 105, 107, 108 (3d Cir. 2009).
23
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
24
Id.
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with people double-bunked in dormitories and allocated less than fifty square feet of space each.
Temperatures were said to be excessively high in the summer which gave rise to heat-related
rashes and respiratory problems, while in winter the dormitory was “nearly frigid,” and people
were not given enough clothes to keep warm. The complaint further contended that bathrooms
were dirty and slippery, and the food services posed a serious threat because of inadequate
sanitation, ventilation, and drainage. Housing assignments were said to contribute to a
dangerous and stressful environment, because people were not classified in accordance with
regulations, and people with physical and mental illnesses were housed in the wrong
dormitories.25
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected a proposed distinction between “short-term” or
“one-time” conditions in which proof of an official’s state of mind would be required to establish
an Eighth Amendment violation, and continuing or systemic conditions where no proof of
mindset would be necessary.26 Rather, the majority required proof of deliberate indifference, in
addition to proof that the condition in issue is sufficiently serious. The Wilson Court’s rejection
of a broader “totality of conditions” approach is problematic for challenges to solitary
confinement. The combination of factors which sustain the practice may result in a range of
harms rather than a single deprivation. Because of the Court’s narrow approach, many
challenges to solitary confinement focus on a single element of the practice, such as constant
lighting,27 lack of outdoor exercise,28 or inadequate food.29 Thus the actual experience of living
in solitary confinement becomes diminished due to the artificial focus on a single deprivation.
The test’s requirement for proof of a single deprivation also appears to disregard the fact that
solitary confinement produces lasting harm that manifests itself in different ways. 30

25

Brief for Petitioner at 3, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (No. 89-7376).
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
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Obama v. Burl, 477 Fed. Appx. 409 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding allegations of constant lighting stated claim for
violation of Eighth Amendment); but see Stewart v. Beard, 417 Fed. Appx. 117 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding constant
illumination in solitary confinement unit did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
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Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 803 (1999) (holding plaintiff housed in administrative segregation
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A further problem with the “sufficiently serious” standard is that it is at odds with another test
for harm in Eighth Amendment cases alleging excessive force by prison officials. The Court has
held in such cases that proof of “significant injury” is not required. 31 The claimant need only
show that the harm was not de minimis.32 The Court explained its rationale for the different tests
in Hudson:
“In the excessive force context, society’s expectations are different. When prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always
are violated … This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise the Eighth
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,
inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as
unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today.”33

Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting, called attention to the inconsistency between the two
tests.34 Justice Thomas questioned the majority’s reasoning that “society’s standards of decency
are not violated by anything short of uncivilized conditions of confinement … but are
automatically violated by any malicious use of force, regardless of whether it even causes an
injury.”35 The justice described the distinction as “puzzling:”
“I see no reason why our society’s standards of decency should be more readily offended when
officials, with a culpable state of mind, subject a prisoner to a deprivation on one discrete
occasion than when they subject him to continuous deprivations over time. If anything, I would
think that a deprivation inflicted continuously over a long period would be of greater concern to
society than a deprivation inflicted on one particular occasion.”36

The dissenting opinion highlights the artificial nature of the objective test for which there is no
basis in the text of the Eighth Amendment.

31
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3.1.2 Deliberate Indifference
The deliberate indifference test originated from a case concerning the provision of medical
treatment to incarcerated people. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that to state a violation of
the Eighth Amendment in relation to medical treatment, there must be allegations of “acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”37
Only deliberate indifference to such needs, the Court said, offends “evolving standards of
decency” and violates the Eighth Amendment. 38
The issue before the Court in Estelle was framed in terms of the government’s obligation to
provide medical care for people in prison, but the case also shows the punitive use of solitary
confinement. Mr. Gamble had sustained a back injury when a bale of cotton fell on him while he
was unloading a truck in the course of his prison job. He repeatedly sought medical treatment
and exemptions from returning to work due to ongoing back pain, heart trouble, and migraines.
He was prescribed pain medication on several occasions but was not exempted from work. He
was charged with a disciplinary infraction for refusing to work and was then placed in solitary
confinement for two months.39 While in solitary confinement, Mr. Gamble asked to see a doctor
because he was experiencing chest pains and blackouts. He was not seen by medical staff for a
full day after making this request because the warden’s permission was required before a person
in solitary confinement could see a doctor. 40 When Mr. Gamble complained of chest pains later
that week, he was not allowed to see a doctor for another two days. 41
Although the majority’s opinion acknowledged that “an inmate must rely on prison authorities to
treat his medical needs,”42 it nevertheless held that Mr. Gamble did not state a cognizable Eighth
Amendment claim in respect of the actions of the prison’s medical staff. The staff’s decisions
not to order x-rays or other diagnostic tests, the majority considered, did not rise to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment, and at most, amounted to medical malpractice which should be
pursued as a tort claim in state court. 43 Because Mr. Gamble had been seen repeatedly by
37
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medical staff, delays and inadequacies in his care notwithstanding, the majority concluded that
there was no deliberate indifference. The majority did not consider whether placement in
solitary confinement, and delays in allowing Mr. Gamble to see medical staff while he was so
held, constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that criticized the majority’s imposition of subjective
motivation, namely, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as the criterion for
determining whether cruel and unusual punishment had been inflicted. 44 He considered that the
constitutional standard should be based on the character of the punishment and not the
motivation of the individual who inflicted it.45
In Whitley v. Albers, the Court justified the deliberate indifference standard for medical treatment
cases because it could “typically be established or disproved without the necessity of balancing
competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates.” 46 This reasoning
does not, however, account for the fact that competing institutional factors did appear to affect
the adequacy of medical treatment in Estelle. One of the reasons that the treatment was said to
have been inadequate was that Mr. Gamble did not have prompt access to medical treatment
while he was in solitary confinement because of the prison’s policy that required the warden’s
approval for him to see a doctor. Nevertheless, the Whitley Court considered the distinction
appropriate for medical cases.
The respondent in Whitley had been shot in the leg by a prison officer who was attempting to
quell a disturbance and free another officer who had been taken hostage at the Oregon State
Penitentiary. Prior to the shooting, several people incarcerated in the prison had been found to
be intoxicated and they were placed in solitary confinement. Others living in the same cellblock
became agitated because they believed officers were using unnecessary force. 47
In determining the appropriate standard for establishing an Eighth Amendment violation, the
Court reasoned that:
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“the infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure … does not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force
authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict
sense.”48

The Court’s deference to prison security measures arose in the context of prison officers using
force to subdue a disturbance, but similar deference to institutional security as a justification for
practices that cause harm can be found in cases regarding solitary confinement.
The Whitley Court held that the infliction of pain did not violate the Eighth Amendment because
it did not rise to the level of “wanton and unnecessary.” 49 Although the Court acknowledged that
Mr. Albers was only in the area where the disturbance took place “for benign reasons,” it
considered that prison officials could not realistically have been expected to consider every
contingency or minimize every risk. The fact that the prison officials did not consider making an
exemption from the order to shoot people not involved in the disturbance, the Court held, was
unfortunate, but it did not constitute wantonness.50
In Wilson v. Seiter, the Court did not apply Whitley’s “wanton and unnecessary” standard but
instead extended the deliberate indifference test to a claim regarding prison conditions. 51 The
Whitley Court’s reasoning that a different test for medical treatment was justified given the
influence of institutional concerns was therefore abandoned. In defining “punishment,” the
Wilson majority reasoned that “if the pain is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute
or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer.” 52 The
Court referred to Judge Posner’s definition of punishment in Duckworth v. Franzen to support its
reasoning:
“The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what the
word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century … [I]f a guard accidentally

48
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stepped on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like
the accepted meaning of the word.”53

Duckworth v. Franzen concerned a fire on an Illinois Department of Corrections bus that was
transporting people to different prisons. Thirty-five passengers were handcuffed and chained
together on the bus when it caught fire. Only one person managed to get off the bus and he was
pushed back inside by a prison officer. One person died in the fire and others suffered serious
injuries. Judge Posner held that a reasonable and properly instructed jury could not have found
the prison officials’ behavior to be punishment because there was no evidence of either
deliberate or reckless infliction of suffering. 54
3.1.2.1

High Threshold

Case law demonstrates that it is very difficult for incarcerated people to establish deliberate
indifference, even in situations where they have suffered serious harm. Although deliberate
indifference may be inferred where prison officials ignore a serious medical condition that is
known or obvious to them,55 the courts have routinely held that a showing of medical
malpractice is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. 56 In Smith v. Harris, a man was
unable to show deliberate indifference by prison dental staff who delayed treatment for infected
teeth and denied him pain medication when his teeth were eventually extracted. 57 The Fifth
Circuit held that a delay in medical care violates the Eighth Amendment only if it results in
substantial harm, and “at most,” Mr. Smith could only establish that the dental staff were
negligent in failing to prescribe him pain medication.
The interests of prison officials tend to be prioritized over those of incarcerated people in
determining whether there was deliberate indifference. In Arenas v. Calhoun, for example, the
mother of a man who died by suicide alleged that a prison official was deliberately indifferent
because the official waited for seven minutes to enter the man’s cell after first observing he had a

53

Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986).
Id. at 652-53.
55
Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990).
56
See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Harris, 401 Fed. Appx. 952 (5th Cir. 2010);
Hart v. Bertsch, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D.N.D. 2008).
57
401 Fed. Appx. 952 (5th Cir. 2010).
54

116

noose tied around his neck.58 Yet the Fifth Circuit found the officer was not deliberately
indifferent, observing that the threshold to meet that standard was “extremely high.” 59 While the
officer recognized a substantial risk of harm, the court decided that entering the cell alone
“would have jeopardized [the officer’s] personal safety and that of the prison itself.” 60 The court
noted the possibility that the man may have been staging a suicide attempt to lure officers into
his cell, despite there being no evidence of his having ever acted in such a way. Moreover, the
officer was wearing a stab-proof vest and armed with pepper spray, and all the other people in
the unit were locked in their cells. 61 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the officer had never
interacted with the man and it was “irrelevant that [he] lacked a violent criminal history, because
[he] had no way of knowing that.”62
In Richardson v. District of Columbia, the warden of a DC jail was found not to have acted with
deliberate indifference towards a transgender woman by placing her in a cell with a man. The
woman had repeatedly expressed concern about her cellmate threatening to sexually assault her;
she had asked to be moved to a different cell and had submitted three written grievances. 63 She
was later raped by her cellmate. The court held that the warden was not aware of the concerns
that Ms. Richardson had relayed to prison officials such that no jury could find the warden had
the requisite knowledge to support a finding of deliberate indifference. 64 The court considered it
more plausible that the warden acted with deliberate indifference by failing to prevent
transgender women from being housed with men, but held that if that were the case, then the
warden was entitled to qualified immunity.65
Courts have been willing to find deliberate indifference in particularly egregious cases. In Weeks
v. Chaboudy, the Sixth Circuit held that prison officials were deliberately indifferent in declining
to admit Mr. Weeks, a paralyzed man who required a wheelchair, to the prison infirmary (the
only area of the prison equipped for wheelchairs) and instead kept him in administrative
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segregation.66 As a consequence, Mr. Weeks was unable to shower or leave his cell. The court
held that the squalid conditions in which Mr. Weeks was forced to live due to his being denied a
wheelchair were clearly foreseeable by the prison doctor who declined to admit Mr. Weeks to the
infirmary.67 The court rejected the doctor’s asserted defense of qualified immunity.68
In Casey v. Lewis, the District Court for the District of Arizona held that Arizona’s Department
of Corrections had been deliberately indifferent to systemic failings in the provision of medical,
dental, and mental health care.69 The various problems identified by the court included a lack of
staff, delays in specialist referrals and care, prison officials’ obstructing medical care, delays in
dental treatment, and people with serious mental illnesses being placed in solitary confinement
without receiving any treatment for weeks or months at a time. The court held that because of
these problems, the existing healthcare staff could not provide adequate treatment. 70 The court
described the treatment of mentally ill people as “appalling” and “inexcusable.” 71 While it noted
that the staff shortages were attributable to the Department’s financial difficulties, it concluded
that lack of funding was not a defense to deliberate indifference. 72
3.1.2.2

Definition of Punishment

The Wilson Court’s narrow definition of punishment as constituting only the specific penalty
imposed by statute or the sentencing judge ignores the reality that prison conditions are part of
the punishment. In his concurring opinion in Farmer v. Brennan, Justice Blackmun took the
same view, observing that “[t]he Court’s unduly narrow definition of punishment blinds it to the
reality of prison life.”73
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That definition also disregards the interpretation of the English Bill of Rights that prohibited
punishments not authorized by statute or by the sentencing judge. Moreover, it is at odds with
Hutto v. Finney where the Court recognized that solitary confinement “is a form of punishment
subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” 74 Finally, the interpretation is
inconsistent with decisions outside the Eighth Amendment context. For example in Griffin v.
Wisconsin, a Fourth Amendment case, the Court described solitary confinement as a form of
punishment.75
The courts have held that the penological justification for a condition of confinement is relevant
to whether that condition violates the Eighth Amendment. 76 Absent a “legitimate penological
purpose for a prison official’s conduct, courts have ‘presumed malicious and sadistic intent.’” 77
Yet that doctrine is defeated by judicial deference to decisions of prison officials, particularly
when the justification of institutional security is asserted. Close examination is rarely given to
claims by officials that solitary confinement has a legitimate penological justification, namely, to
maintain order and safety within the prison.78
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3.1.2.3 Conditions of Confinement
The application of the deliberate indifference test to cases involving prison conditions is
problematic because, unlike those relating to medical treatment, these cases do not always
involve identifiable prison officials to whom this mental element can be attributed. 79 This was
recognized by Judge Posner in Duckworth v. Franzen when he criticized the term “deliberate
indifference,” labeling it “not self-defining.” Judge Posner added: “[i]ndeed, like other famous
oxymorons in law – “all deliberate speed” for example or “substantive due process” – it evades
rather than expresses precise meaning.”80
In light of these problems, some scholars have suggested that deliberate indifference or actual
awareness could be imputed to prison officials by a showing of the scientific evidence
demonstrating the harm caused by solitary confinement. 81 The Fourth Circuit took such an
approach in Porter v. Clarke, where it held prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
“substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional harm” arising from the placement of
people on death row in long-term solitary confinement. 82 The court pointed to the “extensive
scholarly literature describing and quantifying the adverse mental health effects of prolonged
solitary confinement” as evidence that “the risk of such harm ‘was so obvious that it had to have
been known.’”83 The court agreed with the lower court’s finding that “it would defy logic” to
suggest that prison officials were unaware of the potential harm caused by the lack of human
interaction.84
An alternative to imputing knowledge to prison officials is simply to remove the subjective test
altogether.85 Such an approach has support from the concurring opinion in Rhodes, which took
the view that when determining whether prison conditions are cruel and unusual, the “touchstone
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is the effect upon the imprisoned.”86 The concurrence cited Laaman v. Helgemoe, which held
that when “the cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the physical,
mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates and/or creates a probability of
recidivism and future incarceration,” the conditions violate the Constitution. 87 If the test for
violation of the Eighth Amendment focused on the effect of the condition on the incarcerated
person, the mindset of officials would be irrelevant. To be sure, for such a test to be truly
effective, the “totality of conditions” rule may also require revision to reflect the realities of
prison life. The touchstone test would be open to the criticism that it might open the floodgates
of litigation relating to prison conditions. However, statutory barriers to frivolous litigation
guard against such a concern. In any event, the contours of the constitutional prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment should not be determined by concerns about courts’ workloads. 88
Although the Supreme Court has not directly considered the application of the Eighth
Amendment to solitary confinement, three justices have indicated a need for scrutiny of the
practice. In Davis v. Ayala, a death penalty case decided by the Court in 2015, Justice Kennedy
penned a concurring opinion in which he expressed concern about the fact that the petitioner had
been held in administrative segregation for approximately twenty years. Justice Kennedy wrote
that if the issue were presented,
“the judiciary may be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether
workable alternative systems for long-term [solitary] confinement exist, and, if so, whether a
correctional system should be required to adopt them.”89

In 2017, Justice Breyer dissented from the denial of a stay of execution of a death sentence in
Ruiz v. Texas. He observed that Mr. Ruiz had spent twenty-two years in solitary confinement
and had developed symptoms including severe anxiety and depression, suicidal ideation,
hallucinations, disorientation, memory loss, and sleep difficulty. Justice Breyer considered that
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the case was appropriate for Eighth Amendment scrutiny of extended solitary confinement. 90 In
2018, in a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Apodaca v. Raemisch, Justice
Sotomayor called for courts and corrections officials to “remain alert to the clear constitutional
problems” of keeping people in “near-total isolation” in long-term solitary confinement. 91

3.2 Due Process
Unlike in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has specifically considered due
process challenges to placement in solitary confinement. The case law reveals, however, that the
due process protections provide only limited oversight. Over the last fifty years, the Court has
narrowed the protection against the deprivation of liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in the context of prison disciplinary decisions. In 1968, then-Judge Brennan wrote
in Jackson v. Bishop that
“a prisoner of the state does not lose all his civil rights during and because of incarceration. In
particular, he continues to be protected by the due process and equal protection clauses which
follow him through the prison doors.”92

Despite this statement, the jurisprudence has developed in such a way that only limited due
process protection is now afforded to incarcerated people seeking to challenge the process by
which they are placed in solitary confinement.

3.2.1 Development of Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the Due Process Clause to prison
disciplinary proceedings in 1974 in Wolff v. McDonnell.93 At issue in the litigation was the
process by which Nebraska’s prison officials imposed penalties for “flagrant or serious”
90
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misconduct.94 The two kinds of punishment for such misconduct were forfeiture of good-time
credits, which increased the length of incarceration, or solitary confinement, which “involve[d]
alteration of the conditions of confinement.” 95 The class action centered around the deprivation
of good-time credits but the majority observed in a footnote that the same procedure for
deprivation of good-time credits applied to solitary confinement placement. In finding that it
would be difficult to distinguish between the procedural due process requirements for the
imposition of each penalty, the majority considered that solitary confinement represented “a
major change in the conditions of confinement” such that there should be “minimum procedural
safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of
the sanction.”96
Justice White’s majority opinion rejected the state’s contention that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not protect the interests of incarcerated people who were subject to disciplinary procedures.
While the Constitution itself did not guarantee good-time credits, the majority found that the
state had created such a right by statute. It held that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment entitled incarcerated people to minimum due process procedures. 97
In determining what procedures were required to satisfy the Due Process Clause, Justice White
wrote of the contentious atmosphere in which prison disciplinary proceedings take place:
“Although there are very many varieties of prisons with different degrees of security, we must
realize that in many of them the inmates are closely supervised and their activities controlled
around the clock. Guards and inmates co-exist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between
them is unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace. Relationships among
the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts
inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner.”98

Against this background, the majority decided that the procedures required to satisfy the Due
Process Clause included advanced written notice (at least twenty-four hours) of the claimed
violation, determination of the matter by an impartial committee, the opportunity to call
94
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witnesses and present documentary evidence when not in conflict with institutional safety, and a
written statement of the committee’s findings describing the evidence relied upon and the
reasons for the disciplinary action that resulted. 99
In holding that people did not have an unconditional right to call witnesses or present
documentary evidence in their defense, the majority wrote that to allow such rights would
present “obvious potential for disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in
individual cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the institution.” 100
The majority also held that allowing confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses would
pose “considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls,” despite evidence that many states
already allowed cross-examination in prison disciplinary proceedings. 101 The majority
concluded that the prescribed procedures required to satisfy the Due Process Clause were not
“graven in stone” and further consideration would be required if the nature of prison disciplinary
proceedings changed in the future.102
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting as to the due process requirements prescribed by the majority. In his view, the due
process protections were “little more than empty promises.” 103 Justice Marshall considered that
the Court’s decision deprived people of the procedural tools that were essential to present a
meaningful defense. Specifically, without an enforceable right to call witnesses or present
documentary evidence, people had no ability to defend themselves beyond giving their own
version of events.104 And absent a right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, people
had no ability to challenge the allegations of prison officials. As a result, the disciplinary hearing
would constitute “little more than a swearing contest, with each side telling its version of the
facts – and, indeed, with only the prisoner’s story subject to being tested by cross-
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examination.”105 To Justice Marshall, it seemed obvious that “even the wrongfully charged
inmate will invariably be the loser.” 106
Justice Douglas also filed a separate opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s view that the Due
Process Clause did not give rise to rights of confrontation or cross-examination. He agreed that
solitary confinement was a deprivation that required due process prior to its imposition, noting
that such rights are required “whenever an individual risks condemnation to a ‘grievous loss.’” 107
The justice considered that because the liberty of incarcerated people was already circumscribed
by their confinement, their interest in the limited liberty remaining was more substantial. 108 He
reiterated that conviction of a crime “does not render one a nonperson whose rights are subject to
the whim of the prison administration.”109 Justice Douglas, like Justices Marshall and Brennan,
considered that cross-examination and confrontation were essential rights that should be
available in disciplinary cases. The availability of these rights, he emphasized, should not be left
to “the unchecked and unreviewable discretion of the prison disciplinary board.” 110 Justice
Douglas rejected the suggestion that to allow such rights would undermine prison administration,
describing that view as “outmoded and indeed anti-rehabilitative, for it supports the prevailing
pattern of hostility between inmate and personnel.” 111
Though Wolff was primarily concerned with the forfeiture of good-time credits, federal courts
proceeded on the basis that the same due process protections also applied to disciplinary
proceedings that resulted in different types of solitary confinement. In McKinnon v. Patterson,
for example, the Second Circuit held that people confined to “keeplock” in a New York state
prison were entitled to Wolff due process protections.112 The court examined conditions in
keeplock, where people were confined in their own cells for twenty-three or more hours a day,
denied contact with others, unable to work or participate in the normal routine of the prison, and
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had limited access to showers and physical activity. 113 Comparing keeplock to other forms of
solitary confinement, the court held that, but for the fact that people were confined in their own
cells and retained their personal belongings, the deprivations were much the same as those
visited on people segregated in a SHU.114 Differences in terminology among the various forms
of solitary confinement were not dispositive in determining whether minimal due process was
required.115 Because keeplock did not differ substantially from other forms of punishment that
constituted “substantial deprivations” requiring due process, imposition of this sanction likewise
required due process.116 The court reached this finding even though the keeplock sanctions were
imposed for a maximum of two weeks. It reasoned that neither Wolff nor subsequent cases
created exceptions based on the duration of the sanction. 117
The Supreme Court next had occasion to consider the application of the Due Process Clause to
prison disciplinary proceedings in 1983 in Hewitt v. Helms.118 The case concerned the placement
of a man in administrative segregation for over seven weeks while his involvement in a riot
within a prison in Pennsylvania was investigated. Mr. Helms was found guilty of participating in
the riot and was placed in disciplinary segregation for a further six months. 119 The Court held
that the placement in administrative segregation in “less amenable and more restrictive quarters
for nonpunitive reasons” while the investigation was conducted was “the sort of confinement that
inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration.” 120 It
distinguished administrative segregation from penalties like loss of parole or good-time credits,
which, the Court reasoned, resulted in a “far more significant change in a prisoner’s freedoms
than that at issue here.”121 That distinction relies on the view that penalties such as loss of parole
and good-time credits extend the time that must be spent in prison, unlike solitary confinement.
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Despite finding that Mr. Helms did not have a liberty interest based on the Fourteenth
Amendment in avoiding administrative segregation, the Court nevertheless held that he had
acquired such an interest due to the language of the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations in
issue. Because of the repeated use of “explicitly mandatory language requiring specific
substantive predicates,” the state had created a liberty interest such that Mr. Helms was entitled
to due process.122
The Court upheld the state’s procedures for assigning Mr. Helms to administrative segregation.
It measured the procedural requirements with reference to Matthews v. Eldridge, namely the
“private interests at stake, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural
requirements in determining what process is due.” 123 In this case, the Court held that Mr.
Helms’s private interest was “not one of great consequence,” because he was “merely transferred
from one extremely restricted environment to an even more confined situation.” 124 The majority
considered that, unlike disciplinary confinement, no stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct
applied to placement in administrative segregation, and it would not impact Mr. Helms’s parole
prospects.125 It attached weight to the fact that administrative segregation was a “catchall”
category to describe the confinement of people for their own safety, to protect other incarcerated
people, to break up “potentially disruptive groups,” or for placement pending classification or
transfer.126 The Court’s reasoning that administrative segregation does not carry the stigma
associated with disciplinary segregation does not accurately reflect all of the collateral
consequences associated with placement in solitary confinement.
In contrast to its view that Mr. Helms’s interests were not of great consequence, the Court
regarded the governmental interests as significant. It attached weight to prison officials’ belief
that Mr. Helms might pose a threat to the safety of others if he remained in the general
population, and their view that it was necessary to separate him from the general population until
the investigation had concluded. 127 The majority found that the safety of the staff and other
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incarcerated people was “perhaps the most fundamental responsibility of the prison
administration.”128
The majority determined that the grounds for confining Mr. Helms to administrative segregation
did not involve “decisions or judgments that would have been materially assisted by a detailed
adversary proceeding.”129 It echoed the reasoning in Wolff that prison disciplinary proceedings
take place in a “volatile atmosphere” where incarcerated people might pose an “unacceptable
threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards.” 130 It went on to find that a perceived threat to
security would not be “appreciably fostered” by allowing “trial-type procedural safeguards.” 131
Instead, the Due Process Clause required only an informal, non-adversarial review of the
evidence.132 The majority held that Mr. Helms was entitled to receive notice of the charges
against him and an opportunity to respond, but a written statement would suffice unless officials
decided it would be useful to allow an oral presentation. 133 Therefore, Mr. Helms had been
accorded all the process that was due after being confined to administrative segregation.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
described the conditions in administrative segregation as “significantly more restrictive than
those experienced … in the general prison population.”134 The dissenting justices disagreed with
the majority’s conclusion that Mr. Helms’s liberty interest existed only because of
Pennsylvania’s regulations.135 They suggested that this holding was “dramatically different”
from Wolff, where the Court “squarely held that every prisoner retains a significant residuum of
constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration.” 136
Justice Stevens considered that the question for the Court was whether placement in
administrative segregation constituted a “sufficiently grievous change in a prisoner’s status to
require the protection of due process.” 137 In his view, the benchmark against which such a
128
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change should be measured was confinement in the general prison population. 138 In comparing
the two, he concluded that “not only is there a disparity, the disparity is drastic [and] concededly
as serious as the difference between confinement in the general prison population and
‘disciplinary segregation.’”139 While the state’s regulations were relevant because they
suggested that placement in administrative segregation affected a constitutionally-protected
liberty interest, the regulations themselves did not create that interest. Instead, due process
safeguards were required whenever a person’s liberty was “further curtailed” by being placed in
administrative segregation.140
The dissenting justices also took a different view from the majority as to the adequacy of the due
process protections accorded to Mr. Helms. Justice Stevens considered that due process required
an opportunity to present views orally to the prison officials. Limiting the right to present only a
written statement did not provide a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,” in light of the fact that
many incarcerated people had received limited education.141 The dissenting justices were of the
view that the same right should arise at each periodic review of the decision to keep a person in
administrative segregation, and officials should be required to provide a written statement
explaining the reasons for the decision each time. 142 By receiving a written statement, Justice
Stevens wrote, people might have an opportunity to improve their conduct. 143 In the dissenting
justices’ view, neither the right to allow oral presentations nor the provision of written reasons
would impose an undue burden on prison officials. 144
In 1985, the Court addressed another aspect of due process in prison disciplinary proceedings,
namely the evidentiary threshold required to revoke good-time credits. In Superintendent v. Hill,
two people faced disciplinary charges for allegedly assaulting another incarcerated man. 145 The
assault was not witnessed by prison officials, but a guard found the injured person and observed
three others running away. He gave evidence at the disciplinary proceedings, including
testimony that the prison medic told him that the man had been beaten. Both men facing
138
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disciplinary charges denied their involvement, and the victim provided a written statement in
which he said the others had not caused his injuries. 146 The board found both men guilty of
assault, revoked 100 days of good-time credits each, and ordered they be confined in isolation
for fifteen days.147
The Court recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty
interest violated due process if that decision was not supported by any evidence. 148 The
requirements of due process are met, it held, if there is “some evidence” to support the
disciplinary board’s decision.149 It did not require evidence that prevented any conclusion except
the one reached by the disciplinary board, and the Court upheld the “meager” evidence in this
case as sufficient to satisfy due process. 150
In Luna v. Pico, the Second Circuit held that hearing officers failed to afford due process because
their findings were not supported by some evidence. 151 However, the court found that the right
was not clearly established such that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Mr. Luna
had been charged with stabbing another man, even though a prison officer who witnessed the
stabbing did not see Mr. Luna at the time, and she observed him in his cubicle immediately after
the incident.152 Mr. Luna was placed in solitary confinement pending determination of the
disciplinary charges against him. Two hearings were conducted, and he was found guilty at
both; the findings were overturned by officials on review due to insufficient evidence. 153 The
only evidence against Mr. Luna was an allegation made by the victim alleging that he was the
perpetrator. The victim refused to testify at the disciplinary hearings. Mr. Luna spent 204 days
in solitary confinement while the disciplinary process was conducted. 154
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The court explained that it had not construed Hill to require consideration of whether there was
“any evidence that could support the disciplinary decision.” 155 Rather, in previous cases, the
court had sought to determine whether there was “reliable evidence” of guilt. 156 On the facts of
this case, the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt. The letter from the victim (who refused
to testify) and a misbehavior report restating the victim’s assertion were the only pieces of
evidence; the author of the misbehavior report had not been called to give oral evidence at the
disciplinary hearing.157 The court held that the evidence consisted only of “a bare accusation by
a victim who then refused to confirm his initial allegations.” 158 No effort was made to establish
the victim’s credibility or to verify his assertion that Mr. Luna had been the perpetrator. While it
was unnecessary, in the court’s view, for a victim to testify, prison officials were required to
conduct an independent credibility assessment of the evidence. 159
Despite there being no reliable evidence on which the prison officials could have reached their
findings, they were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not objectively unreasonable
for the officials to have found Mr. Luna guilty. The court reasoned that the “some evidence”
standard was “less than precise,”160 there were no previous Second Circuit or Supreme Court
decisions involving disciplinary findings based solely on accusations made by victims, and state
law “arguably support[ed] defendants’ position.” 161 However, the suggestion that state law
supported the prison officials is misguided given that a different evidentiary standard
(“substantial evidence”) applied to prison disciplinary proceedings under New York state law. It
is troubling that the unclear parameters of the “some evidence” standard meant that Mr. Luna
spent nearly seven months in solitary confinement for infractions for which there was
insufficient evidence to meet this low standard, yet the prison officials were not held accountable
for violating his due process rights.
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In 1995, the Court limited the circumstances in which people are entitled to due process prior to
placement in solitary confinement. In Sandin v. Conner, the plaintiff, Mr. Conner, had been
found guilty of misconduct and subjected to thirty days in solitary confinement in a prison in
Hawaii after he retorted with “angry and foul language” during a strip search and rectal cavity
search.162 The disciplinary committee denied his request to call witnesses at the hearing because
the prison was short-staffed.
The Court retreated from its approach in Hewitt v. Helms, holding that the focus on the language
of prison regulations had resulted in people searching for mandatory language in regulations to
claim “entitlements to various state-conferred privileges.” 163 Hewitt had thus created
disincentives for states to codify prison management procedures in regulations, and had led to
“the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons.” 164 Instead of
focusing on mandatory language in prison regulations, the Court preferred to focus on the nature
of the deprivation in issue. It posed a new test for determining whether due process applied to
the deprivation by asking whether it was an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 165
The Court compared conditions in disciplinary segregation with those in other forms of solitary
confinement and held that Mr. Conner’s segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship
that required due process.166 It reasoned that people in the prison’s general population were
subjected to lengthy periods of lockdown and Mr. Conner’s segregation did not constitute “a
major disruption to his environment.”167 The Court regarded as significant the fact that Mr.
Conner was serving an indeterminate prison sentence so the sanction did not affect the duration
of his sentence.168 Thus the benchmark adopted by the Court for comparing conditions in
disciplinary segregation was other types of solitary confinement and lockdown of the general
population. By holding that disciplinary segregation – or indeed any form of solitary
confinement – was not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
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prison life, the Court discarded its finding in Wolff that solitary confinement “represents a major
change in the conditions of confinement … [and] there should be minimum procedural
safeguards” prior to imposing the sanction.169 The Sandin Court did not elaborate on the reasons
for taking such a different view of solitary confinement. Its adoption of other forms of solitary
confinement as a benchmark significantly narrowed the circumstances in which due process
rights applied. It also creates a perverse incentive to maintain restrictive conditions in the
general prison population to support the position that solitary confinement, by comparison, is not
an atypical or significant hardship.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, dissenting, considered that Mr. Conner did have a liberty interest
in avoiding disciplinary segregation. They recognized that the deprivation of privileges
associated with such confinement, combined with the stigma and potential effect on parole
prospects, gave rise to a liberty interest requiring due process. 170 In a separate dissent, Justices
Breyer and Souter also found that disciplinary segregation was an atypical and significant
hardship. They explained that the punishment “worked a fairly major change in Conner’s
conditions,” which involved being confined to his cell alone for the entire day, save for fifty
minutes for brief exercise and showers, during which time he remained isolated from others and
was constrained by leg irons and waist chains. 171
Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s justification for its interpretation on the grounds that the
federal courts had become involved in day-to-day prison administration. He accepted that
broader application of the Due Process Clause to prison disciplinary cases would require courts
to separate “the unimportant from the potentially significant” deprivations of liberty. 172
However, in his view, it was no more difficult for the courts to undertake this task than any other
judicial task, and it was entirely possible for courts to distinguish:
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“less significant matters such as television privileges, ‘sack’ versus ‘tray’ lunches, playing the
state lottery, attending an ex-stepfather’s funeral, or the limits of travel when on prison furlough
… from more significant matters such as the solitary confinement at issue.”173

In 2005, the Supreme Court applied the atypical and significant hardship test in the case of
Wilkinson v. Austin and held that indefinite placement in an Ohio supermax, in conditions that
were “more restrictive than any other form of incarceration” in the state, did give rise to a liberty
interest.174 People incarcerated at the supermax were confined for twenty-three hours a day in
isolation cells measuring seven by fourteen feet, the light remained on at all times, and during the
one hour per day that they were allowed to leave their cells, they only had access to a small
indoor recreation cell.175 The Court found these conditions were “synonymous with extreme
isolation,” and people were denied “almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and almost all
human contact.”176 In the court of appeals, Ohio conceded that people in the supermax had a
liberty interest in avoiding placement in that prison, but the US government, appearing as amicus
curiae, disagreed with this concession before the Supreme Court.
The Court accepted that assignment to the supermax constituted an atypical and significant
hardship “under any plausible baseline.” 177 Unlike the conditions at issue in Sandin, two
additional factors were determined to support a liberty interest in this case: the fact that
placement was of indefinite duration with only an annual review, and that people were
disqualified from consideration for parole. 178 The Court acknowledged that the “atypical and
significant hardship” test formulated in Sandin had generated divergence and difficulty in
locating “the appropriate baseline,” but it did not resolve the point because it was satisfied that
assignment to the supermax was atypical and significant “under any plausible baseline.” 179
Even though the conditions gave rise to a liberty interest, the Court found there was no due
process violation.180 The state’s process for assigning people to the supermax included notifying
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them of the factual basis for placement and providing a fair opportunity for rebuttal. 181 The state
also allowed people to submit objections prior to the final review, which, the Court held, reduced
the possibility of erroneous placement. 182 Such a risk was further reduced through the fact that a
review was conducted within thirty days of transfer to the supermax. 183 Applying Matthews v.
Eldridge, the Court held that the procedural protections were sufficient to comply with the Due
Process Clause.184 It noted the state’s dominant interest in proper prison management,
particularly the need to ensure “the safety of guards and prison personnel, the public, and the
prisoners themselves.”185 The Court amplified the issue of prison safety in the following terms:
“Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides the backdrop of the
state’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility and committed to fear and
violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rival gangs seek nothing less
than to control prison life and to extend their power beyond prison walls.” 186

The Court also emphasized the need for deference to prison officials, noting “the problem of
scarce resources is another component of the State’s interest.” 187 Whereas the cost of confining a
person to a maximum-security prison was $34,167 annually, that amount rose to $49,007 for
placement in the supermax.188 The Court assumed that it was therefore difficult for the state to
fund “more effective education and vocational assistance programs to improve the lives of
prisoners.” In the Court’s reasoning, it followed that prison officials were entitled to substantial
deference before requiring “additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when
correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.” 189
On remand, the district court found in Austin v. Wilkinson (Austin VI) that Ohio’s actual
procedures did not comport with its due process obligations, the state having never implemented
the proposed procedures that formed the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision. 190 Having
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ordered the state to comply with its due process requirements, the district court had occasion
once more to assess such compliance in Austin v. Wilkinson (Austin VII). The court found that
people were being held in the supermax on a permanent or semi-permanent basis and their due
process rights were still being violated by prison officials’ failure to notify them of the actions
required for eligibility to leave supermax.191 Instead, officials were simply informing people that
their prior offense was of such severity that they would remain in the supermax regardless of
their subsequent behavior while in solitary confinement. 192

3.2.2 The Liberty Interest and Solitary Confinement
The lack of guidance from the Court regarding the appropriate baseline for assessing what
constitutes an atypical and significant hardship has generated a divergence of approaches, as the
Wilkinson Court recognized. Circuit courts have approached the question of whether a liberty
interest exists with reference to a range of factors. The Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
all relied on the duration of the solitary confinement placement. While the Second Circuit has
held that solitary confinement of 305 or more days gives rise to a liberty interest, 193 and the
Ninth Circuit recognized a liberty interest in solitary confinement of twenty-seven months, 194 the
Tenth Circuit has held that supermax placement of twenty years does not give rise to such an
interest.195 Judicial acceptance of such long periods of confinement is a far cry from the 1977
decision of the Second Circuit in McKinnon v. Patterson, where the court held that two weeks in
keeplock represented a “substantial deprivation” that required due process procedures. 196
Duration is not the only factor that the circuit courts consider. Other circuits also examine the
conditions in solitary confinement. In Beverati v. Smith, the Fourth Circuit compared conditions
in administrative segregation with those in the general prison population and held that
administrative segregation was “similar in most respects” to the general population and
conditions were “not particularly onerous” such that there was no liberty interest. 197 The court
reached this conclusion in spite of evidence that the administrative segregation cells were
191
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“infested with vermin, … smeared with human feces and urine; and were flooded with water
from a leak in the toilet on the floor above.” 198 People in administrative segregation did not
receive clean clothing, linen, or bedding with the frequency required by prison regulations, they
were only able to leave their cells three or four times per week, no educational or religious
services were available, and food was served in “considerably smaller portions.” 199
The Third Circuit has adopted a two-factor test that examines both duration and the nature of the
conditions to determine whether atypical and significant hardship. 200 The Fifth Circuit likewise
considered both duration and conditions in Bailey v. Fisher, explaining that the courts “employ a
sliding scale, taking into account how bad the conditions are and how long they last … truly
onerous conditions for a brief period of time may not be atypical; less onerous conditions for an
extended period of time may be.” 201 Though the conditions were found to be similar to those in
the Ohio supermax in issue in Wilkinson, the court regarded as significant the fact that the
plaintiff’s administrative segregation did not affect his release date, and it remanded the case for
further evidence about how long he had been in solitary confinement.
Referring to a previous decision where the Fifth Circuit had suggested that two-and-a-half years
in solitary confinement posed a “a threshold of sorts for atypicality,” the court in Bailey
concluded that “18-19 months of segregation under even the most isolated of conditions may not
implicate a liberty interest.”202 The court did not explain why the two-and-a-half-year
benchmark was the threshold for declaring a liberty interest. The case cited in Bailey to support
this conclusion was Wilkerson v. Goodwin, which concerned the solitary confinement of Albert
Woodfox in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. At the time of the Wilkerson decision, Mr.
Woodfox had spent thirty-nine years in solitary confinement. 203 In Wilkerson, the court declared
that it “need not dwell on duration” due to the exceptional length of time that Mr. Woodfox had
been in isolation. That period of confinement, combined with the restrictive conditions, was held
to give rise to a liberty interest requiring due process. The Wilkerson court therefore had no
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reason to address why two-and-a-half years constituted a suitable threshold for a liberty interest
when a shorter period did not.
The justifications for placement in solitary confinement also feature in circuit courts’
assessments of whether a liberty interest exists, in contrast with the time threshold used by other
circuits. In Jones v. Baker, the Sixth Circuit held that placement in administrative segregation
for two-and-a-half years was not atypical and significant because it was for the “extraordinarily
good reason” of investigating the plaintiff’s involvement in a prison riot. 204 While the length of
time itself was “atypical,” the court decided there was no liberty interest because the state’s
administrative code allowed for indefinite segregation.
In Rezaq v. Nalley, the Tenth Circuit applied a four-part test to assess whether conditions in the
federal supermax prison created a liberty interest.205 The test considered whether: the
segregation related to and furthered a legitimate penological interest, conditions were extreme,
the segregation increased the duration of confinement, and the segregation was indeterminate. 206
While the conditions in the supermax were “undeniably harsh” in comparison to conditions
“routinely imposed in the administrative segregation setting,” the court determined that they
were not extreme and therefore placement in the supermax did not give rise to a liberty
interest.207 The court compared the conditions to those in the Ohio supermax examined in
Wilkinson and observed that, unlike in that prison, people in the federal supermax were permitted
to shout through cell doors to communicate with one another, and they were allowed outdoor
exercise.208 In any event, the court noted, the conditions in the federal supermax were
“comparable to those routinely imposed in the administrative segregation setting.” 209 In this
context, then, the court imposed an extremely high threshold for conditions to give rise to a
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liberty interest by introducing an “extreme” requirement that must exceed the highly restrictive
conditions ordinarily associated with administrative segregation.
In the course of the litigation, the FBOP had issued revised procedures for wardens to follow
before referring anyone to the supermax.210 The FBOP then implemented these revised
procedures and conducted retroactive hearings for people already placed in the supermax. Every
hearing resulted in a recommendation of continued placement in supermax. 211 Thus, even where
some kind of procedure is mandated, it appears to be perfunctory rather than meaningful.
Rather, it is the challenge itself that in some instances provides relief to the plaintiffs. In the
Rezaq case, the three people challenging their placement in supermax were transferred to lessrestrictive “communication management units” after filing their lawsuit. 212

3.2.3 Due Process Protections
In the few cases where people facing solitary confinement are held to have a liberty interest, the
due process protections to which they are entitled are limited. They consist of: advance written
notice of the alleged violation; a fair opportunity to rebut the charge(s); determination by an
impartial committee; the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence where doing so does
not pose a risk to institutional safety; and a written statement of the committee’s findings with
the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the result.
Despite the Wolff Court holding that the procedures it prescribed were not “graven in stone,” in
the four decades since Wolff was decided, processes have not evolved to reflect that solitary
confinement today is used for extremely long periods of time and often in harsher conditions.
While the Wolff Court recognized that solitary confinement represented a “major change in the
conditions of confinement,” the stringent test for identifying a liberty interest has had the result
that courts now treat solitary confinement as an “ordinary, expected and permissible incident of
prison life.”213

210

Id. at 1005.
Id. at 1006.
212
Id. at 1005.
213
Bailey v. Fisher, 647 Fed. Appx. 472, 474 (5th Cir. 2016).
211

139

The combination of the “some evidence” standard, deference to prison officials, and the limited
opportunity to present a meaningful defense to disciplinary charges or changes in security
classifications has resulted in the Due Process Clause providing little protection to people facing
solitary confinement. Since Wilkinson, due process obligations only arise where the confinement
implicates other factors such as the duration of the prison sentence or eligibility for parole.
Federal jurisprudence has eroded the holdings of earlier judgments that recognized solitary
confinement itself presents a significant intrusion on the liberty interest of people whose rights
are already curtailed.
Moreover, the limited due process procedures offer little protection to people with cognitive
impairments, limited education or literacy skills, or non-English speakers who may have
difficulty understanding a written notice and preparing a response within twenty-four hours. The
Court in Wolff acknowledged that illiterate people should be able to seek assistance from another
incarcerated person or a staff member.214 However, in light of the Court’s statements about the
hostility between prison staff and incarcerated people, this approach is unlikely to be meaningful.
Given the courts’ repeated holdings that people subject to disciplinary hearings do not have an
unqualified right to call witnesses due to security reasons, prison officials may not willingly
permit the attendance of another incarcerated person at the hearing.
In Powell v. Ward, the Southern District of New York held that the Due Process Clause required
officials to provide a Spanish translator for non-English speakers. 215 No cases have addressed
the question of due process protections for people who speak languages for which no translator is
readily available. Nor have the courts considered how due process protections may need to be
tailored to accommodate people with disabilities, including impairments that are caused or
exacerbated by solitary confinement.
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3.3 Equal Protection
Despite the pronounced disparities that are prevalent throughout the use of solitary confinement,
there have been few successful challenges to solitary confinement based on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3.3.1 Race
Equal protection jurisprudence indicates that the clause has had limited impact in terms of the
pronounced racial disparities in the use of solitary confinement. While the Court has held that
the use of race to determine housing placements for people entering prison is subject to strict
scrutiny,216 the requirement to prove discriminatory intent may defeat an equal protection
challenge to the disparate impact of solitary confinement on particular racial groups. 217
One successful challenge involving solitary confinement that alleged racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause arose in the case of Santiago v. Miles.218 Incarcerated
people at the Elmira Correctional Facility in New York brought a class action alleging that
various policies and practices at the prison were racially discriminatory. The District Court for
the Western District of New York found that the plaintiffs proved “the existence of a pattern of
racism” at the prison which was evident in job placements, housing assignments, and
discipline.219 Statistical evidence showed that Black and Hispanic people were disciplined more
frequently than white people, and they were more likely than white people to receive severe
punishments including solitary confinement or loss of good time credits. 220 Preferable housing
assignments and prison jobs were also granted to white people at disproportionately higher rates.
In concluding that race was an important factor that influenced the prison’s decisions, the court
noted that disparate impact alone was insufficient to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.221 If statistics were the sole basis for inferring discriminatory intent, the court held, the
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disparity must be “so large and significant that [it] could not be caused by chance.” 222 Here, the
statistical evidence revealed “gross” deviations that were “so great that they could not be
explained by chance or some other benign reason.”223 In addition to the significant and
unrebutted statistical evidence, the court heard evidence from more than twenty witnesses,
including current and formerly incarcerated people and staff, who testified about “an entrenched
attitude of discrimination and racism.” 224 This evidence established that prison officials knew
that white people were receiving preferential treatment, but did nothing to address the imbalance
until the lawsuit was filed.225 Thus the combination of persuasive statistical evidence and
witness testimony was sufficient to establish proof of discriminatory intent to support a finding
that the defendants’ conduct violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The finding in Santiago was a result of significant evidence of racial discrimination in several
areas of the prison’s operation. It was not focused solely on disciplinary infractions or solitary
confinement; the racial animus was also evident in other areas such as broader housing
assignments and prison jobs. Because of the broad scope of the plaintiffs’ claim, they were able
to call numerous witnesses to testify about the racist practices at the prison which, in
combination with the statistical evidence, was sufficient to prove an Equal Protection violation.

3.3.2 Gender
Much like equal protection challenges alleging racial discrimination, the clause has only been
invoked successfully in one case involving solitary confinement concerning unequal treatment
based on gender. In Casey v. Lewis, the District Court for the District of Arizona held that
Arizona’s Department of Corrections violated the Equal Protection Clause by providing fewer
mental health services for women in the state’s prison system than it did for men. 226 The case
involved several allegations of inadequate medical treatment and mental health care across the
state’s facilities for incarcerated women. One of the matters in issue was the use of lockdown

222

Id. at 798 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1987); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494
n.13 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 at 265-66 (1977); Hillery v.
Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1238-39 (E.D. Cal. 1983) aff’d, 733 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 474 U.S. 254
(1986)).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 800.
225
Id. at 800-01.
226
834 F. Supp. 1477 (D. Ariz. 1993).

142

and solitary confinement to manage seriously mentally ill women due to a lack of mental health
staff.227 To uphold different treatment based on gender, the court observed, the state had to show
an exceedingly persuasive justification.228 Any classification based on gender must serve
important governmental objectives and be “substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”229 In accordance with this standard, therefore, the court held, females in the state’s
prisons must be treated in parity with males. 230 The court found that fewer mental health
services were provided for women than men, and the lack of those services resulted in more
egregious cases of deliberate indifference to the women’s needs. 231 The court also held that the
various inadequacies in the provision of medical and mental health treatment violated the Eighth
Amendment.
As was the case in Santiago v. Miles, Casey v. Lewis concerned a wide range of practices across
the prison system that were not limited to the use of solitary confinement. As a result, there was
a larger body of evidence to establish the equal protection violation based on gender. There have
been no successful individual challenges to solitary confinement alone that allege gender-based
equal protection violations.

3.3.3 Other People Similarly Situated
The only other federal case in which an equal protection violation has been upheld in relation to
solitary confinement is that of Reynolds v. Arnone.232 Mr. Reynolds, who spent twenty-three
years in solitary confinement in a Connecticut prison, sought summary judgment on the basis
that his conditions violated the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. His equal
protection claim was not based on an allegation that he had been placed in solitary confinement
due to his membership of a protected class; rather, he alleged that he had been treated differently
from others similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for the differential treatment. 233
To establish this claim, Mr. Reynolds had to show an “extremely high degree of similarity” with
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the people to whom he compared himself. 234 He identified two other people who, like himself,
had been convicted of capital crimes prior to Connecticut’s repeal of the death penalty and had
subsequently been resentenced to life imprisonment. Unlike Mr. Reynolds, however, these two
people were not held in “level five” security facilities, but instead were housed in the general
prison population.235
The court found that Mr. Reynolds had shown an extremely high degree of similarity to the other
two people, because all three had been sentenced to death after being convicted of murder, had
had their death sentences vacated, and were now serving life sentences without the possibility of
release.236 Furthermore, no rational basis supported Mr. Reynolds’ placement in solitary
confinement. The court noted that the other two men received a lower score in a risk assessment
for their “length of sentence” classification which allowed them to live in the general population,
even though all three were serving sentences of the same duration. 237 The court rejected the
defendants’ claim that Mr. Reynolds’ higher security classification could be justified by the risk
that he might attempt to escape, noting that a separate review had assessed his risk of escape as
low. Thus Mr. Reynolds’ higher security classification and placement in solitary confinement
was irrational and served no legitimate purpose, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 238

3.4 Barriers to Relief
Incarcerated people face various constraints in pursuing federal litigation and obtaining relief.
Those barriers are discussed in this section.

3.4.1 Prison Litigation Reform Act
Enacted in 1996, the PLRA imposes a set of barriers on incarcerated people that drastically limits
their access to the federal courts. The PLRA bars recovery of damages for mental and emotional
harm without a prior showing of physical injury; limits actions by indigent people seeking to
proceed in forma pauperis; and requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the
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commencement of court proceedings. It also limits the scope of relief that courts can order in the
event a violation of rights is established with respect to prison conditions.
Proponents of the PLRA claimed it would curtail an alleged flood of frivolous litigation. 239
Senators cited erroneous statistics showing an increase in litigation relating to prisons in previous
years to support their claims, while failing to acknowledge the dramatic increase in the size of
the country’s prison population during that same period. 240 The rate of court filings per 1,000
incarcerated people actually decreased seventeen percent between 1980 and 1996. 241 The PLRA
was enacted quickly, with little debate, as a part of an omnibus appropriations bill for farmers. 242
The courts have criticized its “sloppy drafting.” 243 In McGore v. Wigglesworth, the Chief Judge
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that the statute is riddled with “typographical
errors, … creates conflicts with the rules of Appellate Procedure …; and is internally
inconsistent.”244
The claimed justification for the PLRA – to reduce the amount of “frivolous” litigation –
overlooked the fact that the federal courts already had mechanisms for dismissing such lawsuits
or imposing sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 245
3.4.1.1

Bar on Claims for Mental and Emotional Harm

One of the limitations imposed by the PLRA that affects people in solitary confinement is set out
in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e):
“no federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior
showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”
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The statute does not define “physical injury,” “mental injury,” or “emotional injury.” This
provision limits federal lawsuits based solely on the psychological harm caused by solitary
confinement absent proof of separate physical injury. This barrier, however, is inconsistent with
the neuroscience research which demonstrates that there is a physical basis for the mental harm
caused by isolation and sensory deprivation.246 The PLRA’s distinction between mental and
physical harm is therefore an artificial one which limits the ability of incarcerated people to seek
recourse for certain types of harm.
The courts have held that § 1997e(e) does not preclude all remedies for mental and emotional
injuries suffered while in custody; it merely bars compensatory damages. In Zehner v. Trigg, the
Seventh Circuit dismissed a claim for damages for mental and emotional injuries suffered as a
result of exposure to asbestos, but noted that injunctive relief remained available. 247 The court
conceded that an injunction was of little value to the plaintiffs because it could not “save them
from the fear that they might one day become ill,” and “if these plaintiffs are to be compensated
for that fear at all, it must be by damages.”248 However, the court noted, Congress had decided
that damages for such harm should not be awarded, and the court held that the statute was
constitutional.249 Other courts have indicated that nominal and punitive damages and declaratory
relief are not barred by § 1997e(e).250
Significantly for people in solitary confinement, courts have found that physical injuries arising
because of psychological harm do not overcome the bar on civil actions imposed by § 1997e(e).
In Davis v. District of Columbia, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of a claim by
a man whose HIV-positive status was disclosed by a prison official to other incarcerated people
without his consent.251 Mr. Davis claimed mental and emotional harm, but he also produced an
affidavit from a psychiatrist explaining that Mr. Davis had suffered from weight loss, loss of
appetite, and insomnia after the unauthorized disclosure. Mr. Davis contended that these
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symptoms qualified as physical injury for purposes of § 1997e(e). 252 The court rejected this
assertion, holding that the statute required the physical injury to arise prior to the mental or
emotional harm. The court also noted the “statutory purpose of discouraging frivolous suits
preclude[s] reliance on the somatic manifestations of emotional distress Davis alleges.” 253
Moreover, in Adnan v. Santa Clara Cty Dep’t of Corr., the District Court for the Northern
District of California held that a plaintiff could not claim compensatory damages for mental or
emotional distress resulting from his placement in solitary confinement while being held in
pretrial detention, because he did not allege any physical injury in connection with those
conditions.254
However, other courts have held that § 1997e(e) does not preclude a challenge to solitary
confinement based on the Eighth Amendment because proof of mental or emotional injury is not
required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. In Waters v. Andrews, the District Court
for the Western District of New York applied this reasoning in declining the defendants’
application for summary judgment, observing that the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim did
not require proof of mental or emotional distress. 255 The plaintiff had been strip-searched and
placed in an observation cell in a special housing unit. She was given a thin, translucent paper
gown to wear which did not fully conceal her body. She had no undergarments, personal
hygiene items, toilet paper, or a replacement gown, and she was not allowed to take a shower. 256
The cell in which she was held was dirty and the mattress was blood-stained and smelled of
urine. The court considered there was a material issue of fact as to whether the conditions in
which the woman was held constituted a physical injury under the statute, because a reasonable
jury could find that exposure to noxious odors such as body odors, as well as “dreadful
conditions of confinement,” amounted to physical injury. 257
The scope of the bar on actions for mental and emotional injuries under § 1997e(e) is unclear and
courts have taken different approaches to defining physical injury. Although the statute does not
absolutely prohibit constitutional challenges to solitary confinement conditions, it certainly
252
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creates an additional impediment to such challenges, particularly where mental and emotional
injury is alleged. Moreover, by removing the ability of incarcerated people to claim damages for
mental and emotional injuries that they sustain due to dehumanizing prison conditions, the
statute appears to grant prison officials “carte blanche to impose all the mental and emotional
injury they want.”258 As the Seventh Circuit recognized in Zehner, injunctive relief cannot
remedy the harm that has already been caused by the infliction of mental or emotional distress.
Thus § 1997e(e) removes a form of judicial redress from people in prisons solely because of their
incarceration, despite the incarceration being the cause of the mental or emotional harm that
would otherwise be actionable.
3.4.1.2

Exhaustion of Remedies

The second burdensome aspect of the PLRA is the requirement in § 1997e(a) that all available
administrative remedies be exhausted before any federal action is brought with respect to prison
conditions. Under a prior statute enacted in 1980, district courts could stay civil rights actions
brought by incarcerated people for up to 180 days while “plain, speedy, and effective
administrative remedies” were exhausted.259 The Supreme Court described this provision as a
“limited exhaustion requirement.”260 The new provision imposed by the PLRA “invigorated the
exhaustion prescription” by mandating exhaustion of all available remedies and removing any
requirement that such remedies be plain, speedy, or effective. 261 Though it has been asserted that
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement promotes efficiency by reducing the quantity of lawsuits and
affording prison officials an opportunity to address complaints internally, this claim is not
supported by the legislative history.262 By removing the express requirement that administrative
remedies be plain, speedy, and effective, and mandating exhaustion of internal administrative
remedies, Congress has made it significantly more difficult to pursue complaints about prison
conditions.
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The exhaustion requirement “invites technical mistakes resulting in inadvertent non-compliance
… and barring litigants from court because of their ignorance and uncounseled procedural
errors.”263 Given the complexity of administrative processes, incarcerated people are certainly
not encouraged or supported to pursue administrative complaints. Indeed, by doing so, they face
the risk of retaliation from staff.264
Predictably, § 1997e(a) has resulted in complex and lengthy court proceedings to determine what
constitutes exhaustion of all administrative remedies. For example, in Amador v. Andrews, a
complaint was filed in 2003 by seventeen women in New York prisons alleging sexual abuse and
rape by prison officials.265 In 2007, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
prison officials as to some of the plaintiffs’ claims, on the basis that not all the plaintiffs had
followed the state’s three-step grievance procedure for reporting sexual abuse. While all the
plaintiffs had made complaints, some had communicated them to the inspector-general, the
immediate supervisor of the alleged abuser, or other prison officials they felt comfortable
approaching.266 The plaintiffs asserted that the usual administrative remedies were unavailable
to them due to the threat of retaliation and because the three-step grievance process was difficult
for victims of sexual abuse to initiate.267
The district court rejected these submissions, holding that the fact that some plaintiffs had been
able to pursue the formal grievance process “cut[] against these plaintiffs’ argument,” and
finding that there was no evidence that attempts to pursue the formal grievance process were
thwarted by officials.268 Four years later, on appeal, the Second Circuit partially reversed the
district court’s holding and observed also that it was clear that the inspector-general’s
investigation of alleged acts of sexual abuse was an “integral part of the internal grievance
procedure.”269 Because of the length of time that had elapsed since the filing of the original
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complaint, the Second Circuit also had to address questions about the mootness of some claims.
The substantive claims brought by the plaintiffs in Amador have never been resolved by the
courts.
3.4.1.3

In Forma Pauperis Actions

The PLRA limits the extent to which indigent people can pursue litigation without paying filing
fees. The PLRA requires partial payment of court fees by incarcerated people, calculated with
reference to the balance of their prison accounts.270 Filing fees owed by incarcerated people
cannot be discharged in bankruptcy.271 These restrictions affect all incarcerated people, but they
are particularly burdensome for people in solitary confinement who are usually unable to get
prison jobs.272
The PLRA imposes a “three-strikes” provision that prohibits incarcerated people from pursuing
lawsuits in forma pauperis if they have already brought three actions or appeals that have been
dismissed for being frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim. 273 Dismissal on any of
these grounds, even if an appeal of the dismissal is pending, counts as a strike. 274 There is no
time limit on the accrual of strikes. Thus, in one case, a person was barred from proceeding in
forma pauperis in a 1997 claim because of strikes he was said to have accrued between 1981 and
1984.275
Courts have differed as to whether failure to exhaust all administrative remedies counts as a
strike, despite the opacity of internal administrative procedures. 276 The resulting confusion
comes at the expense of incarcerated people, who must decide whether to risk pursuing litigation
and accruing a strike in the absence of clear guidance. Though the PLRA was ostensibly
intended to promote efficiency and resolution of complaints within prison systems, the statute
instead operates to keep claims out of federal courts.
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3.4.1.4

Narrowly Drawn Relief

18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the relief that federal courts can grant in civil actions relating to prison
conditions so that relief must be narrowly drawn and extend no further than necessary to correct
the violation of the right. The relief must be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation, and courts must give substantial weight to “any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system” that might result from the relief. Not only, therefore, do
the federal courts afford deference to prison officials when determining whether there was a
violation; they must also afford deference when determining the scope of relief.
This provision limits not only preliminary injunctive relief, but also settlements and consent
decrees.277 In the rare event that a court decides to make a release order, the statute imposes
further restrictions by mandating that a three-judge panel be convened, and requiring that the
panel be satisfied that such an order is necessary because overcrowding is the primary cause of
the violation and no other relief will suffice. 278 No release order can be made unless the court
has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the violation,
and the department of corrections has had a reasonable amount of time to comply with that prior
order.279
In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court upheld such a remedial order in a 5:4 decision. 280 The
case concerned overcrowding in California’s prisons, which had operated at nearly 200 percent
capacity for over eleven years. A three-judge court ordered the state to reduce the prison
population to 137.5 percent of capacity. Describing the overcrowding in the state’s prisons as
“exceptional,” the Supreme Court affirmed the order, noting that people in the prisons were
“crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house inmates.” 281 The reduction order
was made after the governor had declared a state of emergency in the prisons. It followed
failures to comply with other remedial orders entered by the district court to address various
Eighth Amendment violations. While the order required the state to reduce capacity to 137.5
percent within two years, the state submitted a proposed plan that would achieve the required
277
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reduction over five years. This proposal was rejected, although the Supreme Court suggested
that the three-judge panel give “serious consideration” to other modifications proposed by the
state.282 The Plata litigation encapsulates the ways in which federal jurisprudence and statute
combine to prolong challenges to prison conditions and ultimately delay meaningful
improvements for as long as possible. In contrast, as discussed in chapter 4, state courts are not
subject to these same restrictions in granting relief.

3.4.2 Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity presents another barrier to meaningful relief for people seeking to hold
prison officials accountable for constitutional violations. The federal courts have developed this
defense which applies to government officials in civil actions for deprivation of rights where
their acts do not violate clearly established law. 283 If it is raised by prison officials prior to trial,
the burden then shifts to the incarcerated person to establish lack of immunity. 284 The qualified
immunity test imposes a “heavy two-part burden.” 285
A recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the application of qualified immunity in a case
concerning conditions of confinement. In Taylor v. Riojas, the Court overturned the Fifth
Circuit’s decision to grant qualified immunity to prison officials who placed a man in “a pair of
shockingly unsanitary cells.”286 One of the cells was covered in feces and the other was “frigidly
cold … [and] equipped with only a clogged drain in the floor to dispose of body wastes.” Mr.
Taylor was forced to sleep naked on the floor, which was covered in sewage. 287
In the Fifth Circuit, the court explained that, to overcome the qualified immunity defense, Mr.
Taylor had to show, first, that the officials violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and second, that this right was clearly established at the time of the violation. 288
The court found that the first part of the test had been met given the “paltry conditions” of the
cells which exposed Mr. Taylor to a substantial risk of harm and denied him a minimal civilized
282
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measure of life’s necessities.289 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit found that Mr. Taylor’s claim
failed on the second element because the right to be exempt from such conditions was not clearly
established at the time of the violation. The court reasoned that:
“Taylor stayed in his extremely dirty cell for only six days. Though the law was clear that
prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste for months on end … we hadn’t
previously held that a time period so short violated the Constitution.”290

The Fifth Circuit determined that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
the lack of established precedent had deprived them of fair warning that their specific acts were
unconstitutional.291
The Supreme Court took the opposite view. It held that “no reasonable correctional officer could
have concluded that, under the extreme circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally
permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period
of time.”292 It went on to state that “any reasonable officer should have realized that … [the]
conditions of confinement offended the Constitution.” 293 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
reliance on the specific period of time in which Mr. Taylor was held in these conditions as the
basis for granting qualified immunity and focused instead on the egregious conditions of
confinement. Taylor is significant because it signals a move away from the practice adopted by
federal courts to date of requiring specific, similar facts – here, the precise period of confinement
in squalid conditions – to give rise to a “clearly established right.”
In cases challenging placement in solitary confinement that do not involve quite the same
appalling conditions to which Mr. Taylor was subjected, it remains to be seen whether the
requirement of a “clearly established right” will continue to favor prison officials. To date,
courts have imposed a high standard to show that a right is clearly established. For example, in
Grissom v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit granted qualified immunity to prison officials in a case
involving a man who was held in solitary confinement for twenty years. 294 Although Mr.
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Grissom cited four federal cases that recognized that the harm of long-term solitary confinement
could violate the Eighth Amendment, the court held these cases were insufficient to show a
clearly established right because none of them were decided by the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme
Court.295

295

Id. at 1174.

154

CHAPTER 4. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Introduction
This chapter examines state jurisprudence as it relates to solitary confinement. While many state
courts apply federal jurisprudence in both cruel and unusual punishment claims and due process
challenges, there is a range of different approaches. This is aided by the wider array of state
constitutional provisions and the willingness of some courts to interpret provisions identical to
their federal counterpart in different ways. Indeed, as Justice Brennan has observed, state
constitutions are “a font of individual liberties.”1
State constitutional provisions and judgments provide various alternatives for challenging
solitary confinement. Although scholars have commented on the jurisprudence of particular
states regarding individual rights, and some have discussed the rights of incarcerated people,
there has been no specific focus on solitary confinement. 2 This chapter contributes to the
scholarly literature by examining how solitary confinement may be scrutinized by state courts
and state constitutions, the alternative avenues that depart from federal precedent, and the
reasons why state constitutional jurisprudence relating to solitary confinement remains
underexplored.

4.1

The Role of State Courts

In 1973, the Court of Appeals of Ohio recognized that state courts serve an important function in
articulating the rights of incarcerated people. In the case of In Re Lamb it was alleged that
1
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placing people in punitive detention (solitary confinement) violated the Ohio Constitution and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution.3 The court observed that “primary
responsibility for the delineation of prisoners’ rights in state and local custodial institutions ought
properly to fall upon the state judiciary.”4 It went on to explain that
“it is both eminently sensible and infinitely less strain on the delicate balance of federal-state relations
in the administration of our federal system of criminal justice to posit such primary responsibility on
the state judiciary. Rather than viewing the state judicial system as a delaying but necessary obstacle
to be overcome in the exhaustion of state remedies before the consideration of federal constitutional
questions is undertaken in the federal courts, … it is especially important that both prisoners and
prison administrators recognize that the conflict between prison disciplinary action and prisoners’
constitutional rights will receive careful scrutiny in the first instance at the state, as well as the federal
level.”5

The court characterized “the failure of the state courts to come to grips with problems in their
own custodial institutions” as “astonishing.” 6 Due to their role in sentencing, the court observed,
state courts “cannot evade their continuing responsibility to protect [incarcerated people’s] basic
rights after conviction.”7 Although a separate analysis of the state and federal provisions that
were allegedly violated was not conducted, the court concluded that the petitioners had been
illegally held in solitary confinement in violation of both the Ohio Constitution and the US
Constitution.8
The Ohio court’s recognition of the need for state courts to take “primary responsibility” for
defining state and federal constitutional rights has been recognized elsewhere. In 1977, Justice
Brennan wrote:
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“State courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal
Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” 9

Justice Brennan suggested that state courts were increasingly “construing state constitutional
counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing … even more protection than the
federal provisions, even those identically phrased.”10 The justice linked state courts’ increasing
recognition of these rights with the Supreme Court’s turn away from protecting individual
rights.11 He indicated that the Supreme Court’s decisions on individual rights are not
“mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and the members of the bar
seriously err if they so treat them.”12
In line with Justice Brennan’s comments, many state courts have recognized that their
constitutions need not be interpreted in the same manner as the Federal Constitution. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut held in State v. Rizzo that it may find that the state constitution
provides greater protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitution, subject to six
factors: persuasive federal precedents, the text of the relevant provision of the state constitution,
the intent of the drafters of the constitution, related state precedents, persuasive precedents from
other state courts, and current understanding of economic and sociological norms or public
policies.13 Other courts also look to textual differences and matters of particular state interest in
ruling on the scope of constitutional protections.14 These approaches give state courts some
latitude to interpret state constitutions in a way that can improve conditions in solitary
confinement, or even restrict or eliminate the practice altogether.
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4.2

Conditions of Confinement

State constitutional jurisprudence reflects a broader range of different approaches to challenges
to prison conditions than federal jurisprudence. This can be seen not only from different
interpretations of prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments, but also from
interpretations of additional constitutional provisions such as prohibitions against unnecessary
rigor or abuse, requirements for safe and comfortable prisons and the humane treatment of
incarcerated people, the requirement of rehabilitation or reformation, and recognition of
individual dignity. State courts can exercise greater flexibility in challenges to prison conditions,
including solitary confinement, by interpreting these constitutional provisions with reference to
state statutes, common law, and practices.

4.2.1 Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Forty-seven state constitutions contain some form of prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.15 Some courts have held state provisions offer greater protection than the Eighth
Amendment, though the parameters are rarely specified with precision. In other cases, courts
have simply adopted the two-part test that governs Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
4.2.1.1

State Provisions Different from the Eighth Amendment

The Supreme Court of Indiana has recognized that “the language of each provision of the
Constitution must be treated with particular deference, as though every word had been hammered
into place.”16 Presumably other state courts apply the same attention to the wording of their own
constitutions. Nevertheless, most of the states whose constitutions are worded differently from
the Eighth Amendment have not, to date, interpreted prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment differently from the federal courts.
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Louisiana’s Constitution prohibits laws that subject any person to “torture …, cruel, excessive, or
unusual punishment.”17 Interpretations of this provision have largely focused on the meaning of
“excessive punishment,” which is broader than the prohibition on “excessive fines” in
Louisiana’s previous constitution.18 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held in State v.
Sepulvado, a 1979 decision concerning an excessive sentence, that “the deliberate inclusion of a
prohibition against ‘excessive’ as well as ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment adds an additional
constitutional dimension to judicial imposition and review of sentences.” 19 Louisiana’s courts
have reviewed sentences for alleged excessiveness since Sepulvado.20
Though Louisiana’s prohibition against torture has not been tested in any challenge to solitary
confinement, that provision is more relevant to the practice than the prohibition on excessive
sentences which the courts have reviewed. The reference to torture was new to the 1974
constitution: its predecessor prohibited only “treatment designed … to compel confession of
crime.”21 The current constitution was initially drafted to prohibit “cruel, unusual or excessive
treatments,” but the word “treatments” was removed “not because of any concern related to
questioning procedures or punishment, but because of fear that it might be construed as
preventing physicians from using novel or unusual methods.” 22 A member of the Louisiana
House of Representatives wrote in 1975 that the prohibition against torture
“outlaws virtually all forms of corporal punishment and treatment … Clearly this forbids some
methods of administering the death penalty, long periods of confinement in isolation, highly
restrictive diets, forced administration of drugs and, of course, physical abuse of all sorts.”23

Nevertheless, there has been no holding that solitary confinement violates the prohibition against
torture under the Louisiana Constitution.
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In the Maryland Constitution, the relevant provision is entitled “Avoidance of … Cruel and
Unusual Punishment,” but the provision itself provides that “no Law to inflict cruel and unusual
pains and penalties ought to be made.”24 Despite the clearly different wording, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland held in Walker v. State that the Eighth Amendment and the state
provision are in pari materia, “because both of them were taken virtually verbatim from the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.”25 The court has not addressed whether the phrase “pains and
penalties” could be interpreted differently from the federal courts’ restrictive definition of the
word “punishment.”
New Hampshire’s Constitution does not explicitly prohibit cruel and unusual punishment. It
provides that “all penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense … Where the
same undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are led to forget the real
distinction in the crimes themselves.”26 In interpreting the provision, the courts have focused on
proportionality between the offense and the sentence, rather than the character of the
punishment. In State v. Enderson, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that fines imposed
for gambling convictions were not disproportionate to the offense and remarked that the state
provision offers “at least as much protection against disproportionate punishment as does the
Eighth Amendment.”27 The court had previously observed in State v. Dayutis that the Federal
Constitution need only be addressed “insofar as federal law would provide greater protection.” 28
In that case, a sentence was held to be disproportionate in violation of the state constitution, and
the court therefore did not address the federal prohibition.29 The state provision has not been
invoked in any challenge to conditions of confinement although such conditions also raise the
question of proportionality.
South Carolina’s Constitution states that neither “cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment”
shall be inflicted.30 However, the courts have never interpreted that provision differently from
the Eighth Amendment and there are few cases in which both the Eighth Amendment and the
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state prohibition were considered. 31 The lack of case law on the state prohibition is unfortunate
because the explicit reference to corporal punishment could suggest a broader interpretation of
the term “cruel and unusual” to include forms of punishment other than corporal.
Examination of these differences in wording between the Eighth Amendment and state
constitutions relating to cruel and unusual punishment might allow for a closer alignment of
decisions with the intent and purpose of state constitutions and provide a wider view regarding
the constitutionality of solitary confinement.
4.2.1.2

State Provisions Similar to the Eighth Amendment

Paradoxically, some states with provisions similar to the Eighth Amendment have interpreted
their constitutions as conferring broader protection against cruel and unusual punishment than
the federal provision.
In California, that was accomplished through emphasis on a small difference in wording. The
state constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment,” in contrast to the federal prohibition
of “cruel and unusual punishment.”32 In People v. Anderson the state supreme court, in holding
that the death penalty violated the state constitution, noted that the drafters of the prohibition
“modified [it] before adoption to substitute the disjunctive ‘or’ for the conjunctive ‘and’ in order
to establish their intent that both cruel and unusual punishments be outlawed in [the] state.” 33
Likewise, the state’s court of appeals has held that California’s provision provides greater
protection by prohibiting cruel or unusual punishment.34 As a result, the courts separately assess
violations of the state and federal prohibitions.35 Nevertheless, the courts have never found that
a punishment violates the state constitution but not the Federal Constitution. 36 Interpretation of
the state prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment in a manner different from federal
jurisprudence is precluded by a separate constitutional provision that states that while the rights
31
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guaranteed by the state constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, the right not to suffer cruel or unusual punishment (as well as other rights relating
to criminal procedure) “shall be construed by the courts of this State in a manner consistent with
the Constitution of the United States.”37
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts signaled in Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex Cty that
the rights guaranteed under the state prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments are “at
least equally as broad as those guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment.” 38 In Michaud, the
court affirmed an order holding that unsanitary jail conditions violated both the Eighth
Amendment and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The evidence before the court
established that cells in a local jail did not have flush toilets or running water. One bucket (with
no lid) was provided for each cell, including those that housed more than one person. 39 The
buckets were only emptied once per day and rinsed with cold water. The odor was described as
“unbearable.”40 People confined in the cells ate their meals and slept near the unemptied
buckets.41 The court had regard to federal decisions that held similar conditions violated the
Eighth Amendment but it went on to acknowledge that these cases were not the sole basis for
determining if the conditions violated standards of human decency. 42 The court held that state
regulations, which imposed “minimum standards of human habitation in prisons,” also provided
“an objective standard for assessing whether sanitary conditions at the jail fall below minimum
standards of decency.”43
The view that the state constitutional provision is broader than its federal counterpart was also
adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Benton, though the issue was tested
under the state constitution first. The court remarked that if a punishment “passes muster under
37
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the state constitution, then it necessarily passes muster under the Federal Constitution.” 44 It went
on to hold that a mandatory twenty-five-year minimum sentence for sex offenses did not violate
either the state or the Federal Constitution. Michigan’s provision, like those of California and
Massachusetts, prohibits “cruel or unusual punishments.”45
Minnesota’s Constitution also prohibits “cruel or unusual punishments.”46 In State v. Vang, the
Minnesota Supreme Court described the difference in language from the Eighth Amendment as
“not trivial.”47 In contrast with the approach taken by the US Supreme Court, the court in Vang
conducted separate analyses of whether a sentence imposed for crimes committed by a person
when he was fourteen years old was cruel or unusual. The court first held that the question of
cruelty required comparison of the gravity of the offense with the severity of the sentence. 48
Then next it considered whether the sentence was unusual by asking whether “a consensus exists
among the states that the sentence offends evolving standards of decency.” 49 A finding that a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was neither cruel nor unusual led to the conclusion that
there was no violation of the state constitution or the Eighth Amendment.
The Constitution of Washington prohibits “cruel punishment” with no reference to “unusual
punishment.”50 Nevertheless, this provision has been held to provide more protection than the
Eighth Amendment. In State v. Witherspoon, the court upheld a sentence of life without parole
and reasoned that if a sentence did not violate the “more protective state provision,” no analysis
of the Eighth Amendment was required. 51
New York’s constitutional provision is identical to the Eighth Amendment. 52 However, the two
constitutions were analyzed separately by a lower court in a case challenging the capital
punishment statute then in effect. 53 In People v. Hale, the court first conducted “an interpretive
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analysis of the constitutional provision in question, focusing on whether the text of the state
constitution specifically recognizes rights not enumerated in the Federal Constitution.” 54
Because the provisions are identical, this analysis provided no reason to interpret the state
prohibition differently from the Eighth Amendment. 55 That conclusion was followed by a “noninterpretive” analysis, requiring “judicial perception of sound policy, justice, and fundamental
fairness.”56 It explored whether any state statute or the common law had defined the right at
issue, the history and traditions of the state, evidence that the right was of particular state
concern, and state attitudes toward the definition, scope or protection of the right. 57 The court’s
non-interpretive analysis also required a review of the history of the state’s use of the death
penalty. The conclusion reached, informed by “New York’s contemporary values,” was that the
death penalty did not violate the state constitution.58
Tennessee’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is also identical to the Eighth
Amendment but the courts have indicated that the state provision may have broader meaning. 59
In State v. Black, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a “more expansive” interpretation of
the state provision was not foreclosed merely because the two provisions are “textually
parallel.”60 However, after analysis of the death penalty under the state constitution, the court
reached a result consistent with decisions of the US Supreme Court and some other state courts,
finding that the death penalty did not violate the state constitution. 61
Though there has not been a finding to date that solitary confinement constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under a state constitution, the state courts’ broader interpretation of
language similar to the Eighth Amendment may permit a challenge to the practice in the future.
Moreover, some state statutes provide that solitary confinement may only be used for the limited
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purposes of punishment or the protection of vulnerable people. 62 State courts might draw on
these provisions to inform interpretation of prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
4.2.1.3

Deliberate Indifference

In contrast to the approach adopted by the federal courts, some jurisdictions have treated solitary
confinement as punishment without requiring proof of deliberate indifference. In 1983, the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma described solitary confinement as “institutional
punishment,” but nevertheless held it did not violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.63 In Cootz v. State, a concurring opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court remarked that
the placement of a person in solitary confinement for sixty days was at odds with the principle
that people convicted of criminal offenses “are not sent to prison with directions while
incarcerated that they are to have punishment inflicted upon them.” 64 While these decisions
predate Wilson v. Seiter’s requirement of deliberate indifference, they nevertheless demonstrate
that different definitions of the meaning of punishment are available.
Other courts have, however, applied the same deliberate indifference standard applied by the
federal courts. In Faraday v. Comm’r of Corr., for example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held there was no deliberate indifference on the part of prison medical staff who refused to refer
a man to a specialist despite his complaining of back pain and an old CT scan showing evidence
of a herniated disc.65 The court held that even if the evidence established that medical treatment
had been inadequate, it did not show that the staff knew their refusal to arrange for the man to be
examined by a specialist created an undue risk of harm. Furthermore, while a specialist
examination might have been useful, that fact alone was held to be insufficient to constitute
deliberate indifference.66 Even if the official’s belief was objectively unreasonable, it could still
be nonculpable, according to the court.67
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In Roberson v. TDCJ-Brad Livingston, the Court Appeals of Texas held that officials did not act
with deliberate indifference when they placed a man in administrative segregation in a cell that
was infested with cockroaches, rats, blood, and feces. 68 Mr. Roberson alleged that he was denied
toilet paper, cleaning supplies, and eating utensils for six days, and he was forced to eat with
dirty hands.69 In finding no deliberate indifference on the part of officials, the court stated that
while the cell conditions were “filthy,” there was no evidence in the record that Mr. Roberson
had made anyone aware of them “during his short confinement in the administrative segregation
cell.”70
Recent cases concerning the coronavirus also show that the high threshold for deliberate
indifference has prevented incarcerated people from obtaining compassionate release from prison
despite the heightened risk due to the public health emergency. In Montana, New York, and
Washington, courts have declined to grant compassionate release because no deliberate
indifference could be shown on the part of prison officials. 71 The Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court in Carroll v. Keyser overturned a lower court’s decision ordering release
because while the man was incarcerated under conditions “posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,” he failed to provide evidence “from anyone with firsthand knowledge” to establish
deliberate indifference.72 Arguably the proposal of imputing knowledge of the risk of harm
caused by solitary confinement to demonstrate deliberate indifference in that context could
equally apply to these cases.73 It is unclear how courts can assert no deliberate indifference
exists when prison officials fail to take steps to mitigate the risk of harm that the coronavirus
poses to incarcerated populations.74
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Other state courts have recognized deliberate indifference in egregious cases of mistreatment but
many of these cases reinforce the high threshold of the test. In Florida, for example, the District
Court of Appeal reversed dismissal of a claim against prison officials for failing to provide
gluten-free meals to a man with celiac disease and diabetes. 75 Because the man required highcalorie meals in order to manage his diabetes, he was forced to eat meals containing gluten,
which, due to his celiac disease, “caused vomiting, stomach pains, headaches, fatigue, and skin
irritation.”76 The court described all of these symptoms as “a mere inconvenience.” 77 However,
it determined that the man’s diabetes elevated his condition to a “serious medical need.” 78 The
court found that medical staff were aware of the man’s celiac disease but nevertheless refused to
provide gluten-free meals. They therefore failed to respond to his medical needs despite his
ongoing symptoms, thus establishing deliberate indifference sufficient to withstand dismissal of
the claim.79
In Williams v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., the Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed summary
judgment in favor of prison officials in a claim brought by the estate of a woman who died from
complications of lupus and a blood clotting disorder. 80 Prison medical staff had allowed the
woman’s prescription for lupus medication to lapse and did not follow up on problems with her
blood tests. The woman complained of symptoms, but her prescriptions were not restarted, and
no specialist referral was made. Her condition deteriorated over the course of several months
and included her suffering bleeding gums, nose bleeds, and eventually becoming bedbound and
unable even to write requests for medical assistance.81 The court found that the medical staff
were aware of the woman’s serious medical conditions and a reasonable fact-finder could readily
conclude that their responses were “so plainly inappropriate as to permit the inference that [they]
intentionally or recklessly disregarded [her] needs.”82 Indeed, the record showed “systemic and
gross deficiencies in her medical care” which could amount to deliberate indifference. 83
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In Williams v. Hudson Cty Corr. Center, the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed a finding of
deliberate indifference on the part of corrections officials stemming from the death of a man who
had been arrested on narcotics charges. 84 The man was doubled over in pain, vomiting, and
asked to go to the infirmary, but the staff ignored his request and locked him in a cell. When the
man was eventually moved to the infirmary, he was not physically examined and the on-call
doctor was not notified.85 An infirmary worker found the man unresponsive the following day
and he was pronounced dead shortly afterwards. 86 Medical experts testified that the man would
have been in acute pain due to peritonitis for at least thirty-six hours. 87 The court affirmed the
trial court’s conclusion that a jury could reasonably conclude that the failure to make any effort
to diagnose or treat the man constituted deliberate indifference. 88
Unlike the holding of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Faraday that an objectively
unreasonable belief that treatment was not required supported a finding of no deliberate
indifference, the New Jersey court took the opposite view in this case. It held that despite a good
faith belief that the man was suffering from heroin withdrawal, the officials’ failure to examine
the man, provide treatment, and contact the on-call doctor constituted deliberate indifference. 89

4.2.2 Requirement of Safe and Comfortable Prisons and Humane Treatment
In contrast to the US Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Federal Constitution “does not
mandate comfortable prisons,”90 Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wyoming all have
constitutional provisions requiring safe and comfortable prisons and/or the humane treatment of
incarcerated people.91
The only substantive case law to discuss any of these provisions is contained in a federal court
decision from Tennessee. In Grubbs v. Bradley, a federal district court held that Tennessee’s
84
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provision, requiring the humane treatment of incarcerated people, does not provide any
protection beyond that available under the Eighth Amendment. 92 The court determined that the
well-established federal principle that incarcerated people must have their basic needs met in
accordance with evolving standards of decency is equivalent to Tennessee’s provision. 93 This
reasoning, however, fails to take into account the fact that Tennessee’s Constitution has a
separate provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment so that, taken together, the two
provisions support broader rights than are afforded by the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore,
although the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit inhumane
conditions, such conditions violate the Constitution only if they satisfy the two-part test of a
sufficiently serious deprivation and deliberate indifference. 94 There is no justification for this
test to determine the parameters of a separate provision that calls for the humane treatment of
incarcerated people.
Other courts have recognized a requirement to provide humane treatment even in the absence of
an express constitutional provision. In 1908, the Supreme Court of Michigan implicitly
recognized such a right in Leah v. Whitbeck, which concerned a sheriff’s decision to keep a man
in solitary confinement in a jail where he was being held for failure to pay a debt. 95 The court
found that the conditions in which the man was held were illegal and “contrary to every
sentiment of justice and humanity.”96 It is uncertain whether the court would have reached this
conclusion, however, if the man had been incarcerated for a criminal offense rather than a civil
matter.
Though the provision of safe and comfortable prisons or humane treatment might appear to be
enhanced by explicit constitutional language, jurisdictions without these provisions have honored
the same obligations by interpreting standards of decency with reference to statutes. In Good v.
Comm’r of Corr., a case involving a claim that a prison’s water supply was contaminated with
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carcinogens, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted constitutional standards
with reference to regulations concerning the quality of drinking water. 97 Although those
regulations were not “constitutionally required,” the court held that “they reflect the public
attitude that contemporary society’s standards of decency include the availability of safe drinking
water.”98
Like Massachusetts, Wisconsin’s Constitution does require the humane treatment of incarcerated
people. However, a statute directs prison wardens, superintendents, and officials to “uniformly
treat the inmates with kindness.”99 The courts have held that this provision, which is entitled
“humane treatment and punishment,” does not create a private right of action, but merely
authorizes various state regulations.100 It has not been used successfully in any challenge to
prison conditions.
To date, no challenge to solitary confinement has been brought in any of the jurisdictions with a
constitutional provision requiring safe and comfortable prisons or humane treatment.
Nevertheless, considering the evidence about the risk of harm from solitary confinement, these
rights offer a different basis for challenging the practice.

4.2.3 Requirement of Reformation and Rehabilitation
Seven state constitutions refer explicitly to reformation or rehabilitation as principles of criminal
law and administration.101 Courts have considered the right to rehabilitation in challenges to
prison sentences and in relation to the provision of programs and education in prison.
The right to rehabilitation has been construed narrowly in challenges to the length of sentences.
While Indiana’s State Supreme Court held in Fointno v. State that the criminal justice system
“must afford an opportunity for rehabilitation where reasonably possible,” 102 in Henson v. State
it concluded that the reformation clause applies to the penal code as a whole and provides no
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basis for challenging the duration of sentences. 103 Though the issue has not been litigated,
presumably the same reasoning would extend to challenges to conditions of confinement that
result from those sentences.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the state’s reformation clause 104 requires that
rehabilitation be considered as one objective of sentencing; it will not suffice simply to consider
“rehabilitative factors in imposing a sentence.” 105 In People v. Wendt, the court upheld a
sentence of probation to run consecutively with a prison sentence, holding that the elimination of
this approach would “unnecessarily restrict courts in fashioning a sentence” aimed at
rehabilitation.106 In People v. Thompson, the court held that a person’s potential for
rehabilitation should not be accorded greater weight at sentencing than the seriousness of the
offense.107 This approach suggests that rehabilitation is regarded as one of many factors to be
considered rather than as the objective of the sentence.
In four states, the right to rehabilitation has informed interpretations regarding prison programs.
In State v. Evans, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that “recognition of rehabilitation
as a goal of confinement does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that inmates have a right to
rehabilitation.”108 The court overturned an order by a lower court that directed a prison warden
to develop a plan for state-funded college-level programs at the prison. Adopting the same
deferential approach to prison administrators as the federal courts, it held that the judiciary is
“ill-suited to assume the responsibilities of prison administration.” 109
In Oregon, the Court of Appeals described the reformation clause then in effect as “significant as
a hortative philosophical base for Oregon’s penal code and correctional programs.” 110 The court
went on to state that, absent “extraordinary circumstances of cruel and unusual punishment,” the
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judiciary did not have authority to require implementation of rehabilitation programs. 111 As well
as recognizing the principle of reformation, Oregon’s Constitution requires that incarcerated
people be “actively engaged full-time in work or on-the-job training,” with certain exceptions. 112
However, this separate provision does not provide “a legally enforceable right to a job or to
otherwise participate in work, on-the-job training, or educational programs,” 113 and the purpose
of the clause is designed to generate income for prisons rather than to address the rehabilitative
needs of incarcerated people.
On the other hand, Alaska’s reformation clause has been held to create an affirmative right. 114 In
Ferguson v. State, Dep’t of Corr., the state supreme court reasoned that the constitutional
reference to reformation is “not a meaningless guarantee; rather, it creates a right to
rehabilitation.”115 Therefore, a plaintiff who had been excluded from a prison rehabilitation
program could not be barred from the program without due process. 116 In Rathke v. Corr. Corp.
of Am., Inc., the court reiterated that holding.117 The Rathke case involved a man who lost his
prison job when he was placed in solitary confinement for failing a drug test. He was informed
that he would have to pay $45 for the sample to be retested. He was also told that he would
remain in solitary confinement for a further sixty to ninety days while his appeal challenging the
drug test was considered.118 The court found that he had established a colorable claim based on
the right to rehabilitation. In 2020, the court held in Antenor v. Dep’t of Corr. that visitation was
part of rehabilitation, and that telephone contact was a “crucial component of visitation” because
families may find “travel to the correctional facility for in-person visitation prohibitively
expensive.”119 The case was remanded for further evidence to ascertain whether the price
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charged for making prison phone calls was unconstitutionally burdensome on the right to
rehabilitation.120
Though West Virginia’s Constitution does not have a reformation or rehabilitation clause, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held in Cooper v. Gwinn that incarcerated people
have a statutory right to rehabilitation which is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the state
constitution.121 The Department of Corrections was required by statute to “establish, maintain
and direct a varied program of education for inmates in all institutions.” 122 The Due Process
Clause was deemed to require that incarcerated people “enjoy the benefit of this legislatively
enacted rule of law.”123 It was evident, the court found, that the legislature required
rehabilitation to be a primary goal of the state’s correctional system. 124 The evidence established
that the Department had not made a “real and substantial effort to implement appropriate
rehabilitative programs” at the state’s prison for women. 125 The court ordered the Department to
consult standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association and the Commission
on Accreditation for Corrections and to prepare a plan to implement education, rehabilitation,
and treatment programs.126
No challenge has yet been asserted to solitary confinement as such. Recognition of the right to
rehabilitation and its application to visitation, as in the case of Alaska, and to prison programs, as
in the case of Alaska and West Virginia, would certainly ameliorate some of the sensory
deprivation and isolation caused by solitary confinement. It may also ultimately be used to
invalidate solitary confinement itself, since evidence about the detrimental effect of the practice
on life skills and emotional capacity could support a claim of violation of that right.
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4.2.4 Prohibition of Unnecessary Rigor
Six state constitutions prohibit unnecessary rigor 127 or abuse during arrest or incarceration.128
While some of the prohibitions refer to jails rather than prisons, the titles of the provisions, and
judicial interpretations, indicate that the protections apply to people in prisons as well.
Oregon’s Supreme Court has adopted the broadest interpretation of unnecessary rigor. In
Sterling v. Cupp, the court held that the clause is violated where “a particular prison or police
practice would be recognized as an abuse to the extent that it cannot be justified by necessity.” 129
In that case, the court held that the unnecessary rigor clause prohibited the practice of subjecting
men in prison to pat-down searches by female prison officers. Recognizing that the claim
involved a privacy interest, the court reasoned that the guarantee against unnecessary rigor was
“a more cogent premise than a federal right of privacy.” 130 While the prohibition was not
restricted to “beatings and other forms of brutality,” it did not encompass all methods and
conditions of punishment.131 In the instant case, the court’s interpretation did not “disregard the
numerous and pervasive conditions intrinsic to the life of prisoners,” finding that “even
convicted prisoners retain claims to personal dignity, and [that] … under the conditions of arrest
and imprisonment the relation between the sexes poses particularly sensitive issues.” 132 Women
in Oregon prisons were not subjected to frisk searches by male officers and therefore, the court
reasoned, men in prison should not be denied the same proprieties. 133 Necessity, which might
have justified the practice, was not established by the employment of male or female corrections
officers.134
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As one scholar has observed, the Sterling court’s view that the unnecessary rigor clause
incorporates harm to human dignity is “significant because it implicitly recognizes the legitimacy
of psychological pain.”135 Psychological damage could thus support an unnecessary rigor
challenge to solitary confinement.136 However, the clause has rarely been invoked in challenges
to prison conditions and has not yet been considered in relation to solitary confinement. 137
In Bott v. DeLand, the Utah Supreme Court approved the Sterling court’s unnecessary abuse
standard in its interpretation of Utah’s unnecessary rigor clause. 138 Mr. Bott alleged negligence
and unnecessary rigor on the part of Utah prison officials due to inadequate medical care. He
had reported blurred vision and was placed on a waiting list to see an optometrist. His vision
continued to deteriorate over the course of four weeks to the point where he lost sight in both
eyes and began suffering from severe headaches, nausea, dizziness, and body aches. Despite
repeatedly reporting these symptoms to the staff, he was not examined or referred to the prison
physician. When Mr. Bott was finally assessed six weeks later, he was diagnosed with malignant
hypertension and severe renal failure. By the time of the trial, he was dependent on hemodialysis
and his life expectancy was greatly reduced. 139 One of the issues on appeal was whether
damages were available for violations of the unnecessary rigor provision. The court emphasized
that “unnecessary rigor must be treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified,
not merely the frustrations, inconveniences and irritations that are common to prison life.” 140
In Dexter v. Bosko, the Utah Supreme Court overturned the dismissal of a claim of unnecessary
rigor in a case stemming from a vehicle accident in which a man being transported in custody
became paralyzed and died five years later due to complications from his injuries. 141 The court
held that the unnecessary rigor clause
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“protects persons arrested or imprisoned from the imposition of circumstances on them during
their confinement that demand more of the prisoner than society is entitled to require. The
restriction on unnecessary rigor is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and
conditions of confinement.”142

The court compared the unnecessary rigor clause to the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. While the two provisions overlap, the court noted, their purposes are different:
“torture may be cruel and unusual but strict silence during given hours may not. Strict silence,
however, may impose unnecessary rigor or unduly harsh restrictions.” 143 This interpretation
indicates that the prohibition of unnecessary rigor is broader than that against cruel and unusual
punishment, and may cover conditions common to solitary confinement.
In both Bott and Dexter, the Utah Supreme Court held that money damages were available for
violations of the unnecessary rigor clause. Dexter narrowed the holding of Bott by confining the
availability of damages to cases where officials act with flagrant culpability. 144 The flagrancy
standard is similar to the test for qualified immunity because it requires “the contours of the right
[to] be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”145 Where the official is unaware of a clear prohibition, the court requires
proof that an obvious and known serious risk of harm exists and that the official acted with
knowledge of that risk without reasonable justification. 146
In State v. Houston, the Utah Supreme Court held that the unnecessary rigor provision did not
apply to a seventeen-year-old’s challenge to a sentence of life without parole. 147 Adopting an
interpretation different from the Oregon court’s, State v. Houston held that Utah’s provision
focuses on prison conditions, whereas a challenge to the length of a sentence is more
appropriately considered under the cruel and unusual punishment clause. 148
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Indiana’s courts have taken a rather narrower view of unnecessary rigor as applied to conditions
of confinement, despite dictum in an 1860 decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana which
described solitary confinement as a form of unnecessary rigor:
“The very essence of punishment, and the sole use of the prison walls, is the confinement of the
convict within them; his real exclusion from the rest of the world, rendering him for the time
civiliter mortuus. Humanity indeed forbids, as unnecessary rigor, that his confinement should be
absolutely solitary, or that all his natural and civil rights should be temporarily annihilated …” 149

More recently, that court held in Ratcliff v. Cohn that the placement of a fourteen-year-old in a
special needs unit within an adult prison did not violate Indiana’s unnecessary rigor clause. 150
The plaintiff contended that her placement in the unit was inappropriate because she was living
with adults with severe psychological disorders who were incapable of functioning in the
prison’s general population.151 The court held that the clause prohibited only physical abuse and
that placement in the restrictive and difficult conditions of an adult special needs unit did not rise
to the level of unnecessary rigor.152
Smith v. Dep’t of Corr. followed the Ratcliff decision and narrowly construed the concept of
physical abuse.153 In that case, Mr. Smith, who was incarcerated in the Westville Correctional
Facility in Indiana, had complained to prison staff that his cell was flooding because other people
had blocked their toilets, so that the floor of his cell was covered in water and fecal matter. He
kicked his cell door to attract prison officers’ attention and requested a mop. The staff told him
to remove his shoes, but when he refused to do so they entered his cell, shot mace pellets at him,
stripped him down to his underwear, and placed him in full restraints for two hours. 154 Upon
returning to his cell, Mr. Smith found the mace had not been cleaned up and caused him further
harm.155 Without providing any explanation, the court concluded that the actions of the prison
officers did not constitute physical abuse.156 The court then found that the prison officials were
149
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justified in telling Mr. Smith to remove his shoes because he had kicked his cell door and thus
the officials were “acting to maintain order and discipline” in a volatile situation. 157
The courts of Georgia, Tennessee, and Wyoming have not had occasion to issue substantive
rulings on the unnecessary rigor and abuse clauses in their constitutions. In 1898, however, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming referred to the prohibition against unnecessary rigor as one of
several clauses underpinning the “fundamental law that the Penal Code shall be founded upon
the humane principles of reformation and prevention.” 158
Unnecessary rigor and abuse prohibitions offer another avenue for additional challenges to
conditions within solitary confinement and to the practice itself. This is so particularly in
jurisdictions that view the provisions as applicable to conditions of confinement.

4.2.5 Recognition of Dignity
The constitutions of Montana and Puerto Rico announce that “the dignity of the human being is
inviolable.”159 The Puerto Rico courts have not had occasion to interpret the provision.
In Montana, the principle has informed the interpretation of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. In Walker v. State, Montana’s Supreme Court held that conditions imposed
on a mentally ill man incarcerated in the Montana State Penitentiary were “an affront to the
inviolable right of human dignity” and constituted cruel and unusual punishment by exacerbating
his mental illness.160 Mr. Walker had bipolar disorder and his condition deteriorated after he
stopped taking his prescribed medication due to side effects. The prison staff placed him on a
series of “behavior management plans,” which were described as “tools using a ‘carrot-and-stick
approach’ of withdrawing and returning privileges based on conduct.” 161 In accordance with
these plans, Mr. Walker was placed in isolation in a bare cell, deprived of all of his clothing and
bedding for several days at a time, and the water to his sink and toilet was turned off. 162 He was
not given hot meals and was instead provided slices of meat and cheese served with bread. 163
157
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Though the behavior plans were intended to last for a maximum of two days, Mr. Walker was
required to have at least twenty-four hours of “clear conduct” before his clothing and other items
were returned.164 Due to his illness, he was unable to comply.
A psychiatrist testified that the restrictive behavioral plans were counter-therapeutic, punitive,
and cruel.165 He told the court that “leaving an inmate in a bare cell, naked, and forced to sleep
on a concrete slab is humiliating, degrading, and extremely painful physically.” 166 Evidence was
presented that prison staff ignored complaints about the unhygienic state of the unit where Mr.
Walker was segregated; the cell walls were said to be encrusted with blood, feces, and vomit. 167
The court held that the right to dignity was fundamental and triggered “the highest level of
scrutiny and … protection.”168 While cases alleging cruel and unusual punishment were usually
decided without reference to the right to dignity, in this case the court found the right especially
relevant, holding that the state constitution
“forbids correctional practices which permit prisons in the name of behavior modification to
disregard the innate dignity of human beings, especially in the context where those persons suffer
from serious mental illness.”169

In such circumstances, the court held, the prison had “crossed into the realm of psychological
torture.”170 While the cruel and unusual punishment provision did not guarantee that Mr. Walker
would not suffer “some psychological effects from incarceration or segregation,” the treatment
he experienced violated the dignity clause and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
The right to personal dignity was also acknowledged in Stirling v. Cupp, discussed above, in the
interpretation of Oregon’s unnecessary rigor clause, even though Oregon’s Constitution does not
mention personal dignity.171 Other state courts have also referred to dignity in relation to aspects
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of criminal punishment.172 The absence of an express constitutional reference to dignity has not
prevented it from influencing constitutional interpretations. Even in federal courts, though the
right to dignity is not explicitly recognized by the Federal Constitution, the principle has been
referred to in various Eighth Amendment challenges though its parameters have never been fully
articulated.173 The US Supreme Court has held that dignity is “the basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment.”174 Thus dignity can inform interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment
and courts have the opportunity to invoke the principle in all cases concerning conditions of
confinement. The harm and deprivations of solitary confinement call for even greater
recognition of dignity in constitutional interpretation.

4.3

Due Process

Unlike state jurisprudence concerning cruel and unusual punishment, there is less divergence
among the states regarding the due process protections available to people facing solitary
confinement. Most states’ due process clauses are identical or similar to the federal Due Process
Clause. This section discusses state jurisprudence that has adopted different interpretations. As
is the case with scholarship discussing solitary confinement as cruel and unusual punishment,
little has been written about the role of state courts and state due process protections in relation
to solitary confinement.
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4.3.1 Broader Due Process Protections
4.3.1.1

Alaska

In 1975, the Supreme Court of Alaska held in McGinnis v. Stevens that the state constitution
required greater due process protections in prison disciplinary proceedings than those imposed
by the US Supreme Court in Wolff.175 The court agreed with the Wolff Court that people
involved in prison disciplinary proceedings were not entitled to “the full panoply of rights due an
accused in a criminal proceeding.”176 However, it differed from the Wolff majority by holding
that the state’s Due Process Clause included the right to call witnesses, present documentary
evidence, and conduct cross-examination.177 The court rejected the suggestion that allowing
incarcerated people to call witnesses and present evidence would create disciplinary problems
that outweighed “the fundamental value these rights provide as vehicles for ascertaining the
truth.”178 Confrontation and cross-examination, the court held, were “fundamental prerequisites
to a fair hearing.”179 If the disciplinary committee had “compelling reasons” not to allow
witnesses and cross-examination, it was required to record its decision and to provide reasons. 180
The court’s finding that the state’s Due Process Clause called for additional procedures beyond
those available under the Federal Constitution aligns with the concurrence in Wolff in which
Justice Marshall observed that due process required the right to call and cross-examine witnesses
and present documentary evidence to avoid disciplinary hearings becoming “little more than a
swearing contest … with only the prisoner’s story subject to being tested.” 181
The court in McGinnis also differed from Wolff by holding that Alaskan people were entitled to
counsel in disciplinary hearings where the alleged misconduct constituted a felony, and requiring
that the hearing be recorded for the purposes of appeal. 182 These broader due process
protections, the court held, were available to people facing “major deprivations” of liberty and
did not apply to minor infractions or classification decisions that were unrelated to disciplinary
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findings.183 The court explained that whether a disciplinary matter was major or minor required
consideration of the relative gravity of the offense and the nature of the consequences that would
result.
In 2011, the state supreme court held in James v. State, Dep’t of Corr. that a person from Alaska
who was incarcerated in Arizona under an inter-state corrections compact had been deprived of
due process because he was prevented from confronting and cross-examining witnesses, and the
hearing was not recorded.184 The court clarified its holding in McGinnis regarding the
application of due process to “major disciplinary proceedings.” It explained that major
disciplinary proceedings included those alleging “low-moderate offenses” that resulted in
“serious punishment such as solitary confinement and loss of good time credit.” 185 The court
repeated the finding made in McGinnis that solitary confinement was “one of the most severe
punishments” that could be imposed at a disciplinary hearing and it held here that twenty days of
punitive segregation for a “low-moderate infraction” required due process. 186 In confirming the
due process protections to which Mr. James was entitled, the court noted that Alaska’s
Administrative Code provides incarcerated people with the right to confront accusers in
disciplinary hearings.187 The court referred to case law from New Jersey that recognized the
confrontation right in disciplinary proceedings. 188
In 2013, the Supreme Court of Alaska reaffirmed in Barber v. State that punitive segregation is a
liberty deprivation that triggers the state’s due process guarantee. 189 Mr. Barber sought to appeal
his placement in punitive segregation but failed to pay the filing fee for the appeal. He
contended that the filing fee exceeded his means and unconstitutionally deprived him of an
appeal. The court observed that while due process did not encompass the right to an automatic
appeal of a disciplinary action, there nevertheless existed a fundamental right to court access to
challenge the proceeding because it implicated a liberty interest in avoiding punitive
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segregation.190 Inability to access the court due to the filing fee was held to constitute a denial of
Mr. Barber’s procedural due process rights.
4.3.1.2

Michigan

In Dickerson v. Warden, Marquette Prison, the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that two
people placed in administrative confinement for eight months (during an investigation into an
infraction) were entitled to receive a hearing, present evidence, and speak in their own defense
prior to the placement.191 At the conclusion of the eight-month segregation, the men were then
held in solitary confinement for a further seven days as a disciplinary sanction for the infraction.
The court rejected the warden’s submission that the hearing conducted prior to the placement in
administrative segregation was a “security classification hearing,” as distinct from a disciplinary
hearing, such that due process rights did not apply.192 It held that, under newly-amended
legislation, the men were entitled to the same due process protections that applied to disciplinary
hearings.193 The court remarked that administrative segregation at the prison was identical to
solitary confinement and “in either situation, all privileges and rights are identical.” 194 It
emphasized that the length of time in administrative segregation was a factor in its decision.
While circumstances might arise where “administrative segregation for a short period of time
would be proper and necessary … without first providing notice or a hearing,” here, the “sham”
hearing prior to the long placement in administrative segregation violated due process. 195
In Tocco v. Marquette Prison Warden, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the due process
rights articulated in Wolff had broader application in Michigan. Unlike Wolff’s holding that due
process rights applied to disciplinary determinations involving only serious misconduct, in
Michigan, such rights attached to “any situation in which a prisoner may be deprived of a right or
significant privilege.”196 The court reiterated that the due process protections to which people
were entitled were the same as those identified in Wolff. In Tocco, a misconduct report alleged
that the plaintiff participated in a prison riot. He was found guilty at a disciplinary hearing. Mr.
190
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Tocco contended that his due process rights were violated because he was not provided with the
misconduct report or documents referred to therein, and he did not learn of the existence of the
report until the hearing. In holding that failure to provide the report violated due process, the
court concluded that the document was relevant and there was no legitimate basis for
withholding it.197
Michigan’s Court of Appeals had occasion to consider due process rights in relation to prison
disciplinary proceedings again in Casper v. Marquette Prison Warden. 198 Mr. Casper was found
guilty of major misconduct due to his participation in a prison riot. The prison disciplinary
committee reached its finding based on evidence from confidential informants. The court
referred to various federal decisions that held that procedural due process required that the
evidentiary record contain the underlying factual information from which the disciplinary board
could determine the credibility and reliability of confidential informants. 199 Although it was
unnecessary for the informant to appear before the committee, their credibility and reliability had
to be established by sufficient evidence.200 Here, the court held there was inadequate evidence in
the record to show that the confidential informant was credible and reliable. 201
Though the Michigan courts initially took a broader view of due process than Wolff, in the 1995
case of Martin v. Stine, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied Sandin v. Conner.202 The court
held here that the plaintiff had no liberty interest in a five-day loss of privileges and confiscation
of his property.203 Consistent with Sandin, the Michigan court concluded that the loss of
privileges did not constitute an atypical or significant deprivation because it was not a “dramatic
departure” from the conditions of the sentence, nor did it affect its duration. 204
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4.3.1.3

New Jersey

One year after the Court handed down its judgment in Wolff, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Avant v. Clifford considered whether the state’s prison disciplinary standards complied with
the requirements laid out by Wolff.205 The plaintiffs in Avant had been placed in administrative
segregation following disciplinary hearings relating to a riot at a state prison. Though the court
did not examine due process rights with reference to the state constitution, it held that the state’s
disciplinary standards provided broader due process protections than those set forth by Wolff.
Specifically, the court found that while the composition of the disciplinary committee satisfied
Wolff, the state’s “rightness and fairness standard” would be “better satisfied” by ensuring that
two members of the disciplinary committee were not selected from the prison officer staff. 206 In
holding that there should not be more than one corrections official on the committee, the court
referred to “the pervasive and understandable friction between correctional officers and
prisoners.”207
Second, while the court recognized that the disciplinary committee had discretion to conduct
hearings “within reasonable limits,” people were to be given the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine witnesses where necessary for adequate presentation of the evidence. 208 The
court emphasized that this right was particularly important where serious issues of credibility
existed. It held that if the committee denied the right of confrontation and cross-examination, it
was required to explain its reasons orally and in writing.
Next, the court addressed the potential risk that the privilege against self-incrimination could be
violated in the face of the threat of solitary confinement or loss of good time. It found that a
person exercising the right to silence was likely to be “stripped of his most valuable defense”
with the result that they would be prevented from “making a free and rational choice.” 209 The
court considered it was “intolerable” that one constitutional right should be surrendered in order
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to assert another, and therefore held that any testimony given in prison disciplinary proceedings
could not be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 210
In Jacobs v. Stephens, the Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed the violation of broader due
process rights guaranteed by state regulations in a case where a man was placed in administrative
segregation for 180 days after an argument with a prison officer. 211 Although Mr. Jacobs was
supposed to receive written notice of the charges against him at least twenty-four hours prior to
the hearing, he received only twenty-two hours’ notice. The court held that deviation from the
twenty-four-hour rule should be permitted “only in extreme circumstances,” but nevertheless
found here that Mr. Jacobs was not prejudiced by the reduced notice period. 212 Mr. Jacobs also
contended that he was unable to present a proper defense because he was not informed of his
right to confrontation and cross-examination. The court held that in the future, people should be
informed of these rights, but it determined that Mr. Jacobs was not prejudiced because the
testimony of other witnesses did not support his position.213
In 2003, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held in Jones v. Dep’t of
Corr. that due process rights were violated when a man was denied the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses in a disciplinary hearing. 214 Mr. Jones testified to a different version of
events from a prison officer, and further clarification of the officer’s testimony was only
provided in a written statement. The court held that Mr. Jones’s opportunity to develop and
present evidence supporting his position had been unduly curtailed and the hearing officer’s
decision was based on a credibility finding favorable to the prison officer. 215 It concluded that
the hearing officer’s findings could not have been fairly reached without offering Mr. Jones the
opportunity to cross-examine the prison officer, noting that “in-person confrontation and crossexamination have traditionally been regarded as the best ways to test credibility.” 216 The court
found no basis for denying Mr. Jones’s request to call the prison officer, described the failure as
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“distressing,” and warned that future violations of the right might lead the court to reverse
disciplinary decisions without remanding the matter for a new hearing. 217
Although New Jersey’s regulations offer broader due process protections than those provided by
the federal courts, the case law demonstrates that even these broader rights have been diminished
in some instances, such as in the Jacobs case. However, the Jones case indicates that the state’s
courts take seriously violations of the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses in
disciplinary hearings, particularly where there are conflicting issues of credibility between
witnesses.

4.3.2 “Some Evidence” Standard
Most states have followed the federal “some evidence” standard imposed by Hill as the threshold
for a guilty finding in prison disciplinary proceedings. Exceptions to this general approach can
be found in the statutes and regulations of Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania.
In Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals held in Bryant v. Dep’t of Public Safety and Corr.
Service that the appropriate threshold was whether there was “substantial evidence” in the record
to support the finding.218 This case predated Hill. Maryland’s regulations now require the
hearing officer to reach a finding as to whether the evidence proves “more likely than not” that
the violation was committed.219 The relevant statutory provision of Nevada imposes the same
standard.220
The Massachusetts Appeals Court has applied a “substantial evidence” test, requiring that there
be evidence in the record that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”221 This standard has since been changed by regulations which impose a
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“preponderance of the evidence” standard. 222 The same preponderance standard applies under
Pennsylvania’s regulations.223
New Jersey’s regulations similarly impose a different standard, requiring “substantial
evidence.”224 Likewise, New York’s Civil Practice statute applies a “substantial evidence”
standard to decisions of all administrative agencies.225 The courts have defined the test as
requiring “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion or ultimate fact.”226 In Brown v. Annucci, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court held that substantial evidence did not support a prison disciplinary committee’s decision,
because the record did not contain the confidential information upon which the hearing officer
based the finding of guilt.227 Moreover, the hearing officer did not independently assess the
reliability of other confidential information in connection with the charged violations. 228
In other states that follow the “some evidence” standard, the courts have generally followed the
federal courts’ interpretation of this threshold as requiring only “meager evidence.” The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has held in four different cases that the standard is not met
where the only evidence relied upon are hearsay statements in disciplinary reports. 229 In each of
these cases, the court held that the hearing committee failed to establish the credibility of the
underlying evidence relied upon to sustain the disciplinary charges.
In California, the Court of Appeal held in the case of In Re Gomez that the “some evidence”
standard was not met in a case in which prison officials concluded that a man had engaged in
behavior which might lead to violence or disorder based on his alleged participation in a threeday hunger strike.230 Officials claimed to have reached their decision based on testimony from a
prison officer, but the court found that no-one had testified at the disciplinary hearing. Other
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evidence that officials relied upon included a review of Mr. Gomez’s segregation record, which
noted that he had refused nine meals, and the fact that Mr. Gomez pleaded guilty to the
disciplinary infraction.231 Mr. Gomez disputed the latter claim.232 Applying Hill, the court noted
that prison disciplinary action would not be disturbed as long as some evidence supported the
decision.233 Nevertheless, the “exceedingly deferential nature” of the standard did not “convert a
court … into a potted plant.”234 Though there was evidence that Mr. Gomez had refused nine
consecutive meals, this did not establish that he had engaged in behavior that might lead to
violence or disorder in violation of the regulation. 235
The Supreme Court of Idaho likewise found that the “some evidence” standard was not satisfied
in the case of Cootz v. State.236 Mr. Cootz was charged with violating prison rules for kicking a
prison officer. The only evidence presented against him was an offense report from the officer.
Mr. Cootz requested that four witnesses testify in his defense at the hearing. Two gave evidence
while two others did not, and Mr. Cootz was found guilty and placed in disciplinary detention for
sixty days.237 The court noted that while the scope of the state’s due process clause is not
necessarily the same as its federal counterpart, the “some evidence” standard was appropriate. 238
Nevertheless, the standard was not met here because the hearing officer failed to record in
writing the evidence on which he relied. The court regarded this failure as significant
considering later testimony from the hearing officer that he believed that the sergeant overseeing
the unit where the officer worked would not have allowed the offense report to be filed if he did
not believe it to be accurate.239
Furthermore, the court noted that the hearing officer claimed to have relied on testimony from
Mr. Cootz despite the fact that he did not testify at the hearing. 240 The court reasoned that it was
“not a heavy burden” to require prison officials to state the evidence upon which they relied in
231

Id. at 129.
Id.
233
Id. at 133 (citing In Re Zepeda, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
234
Id. at 133-34 (citing In Re Lawrence, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting In Re Scott, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004))).
235
Id. at 136-37.
236
785 P.2d 163 (Idaho 1989).
237
Id. at 164.
238
Id. at 165.
239
Id. at 166-67.
240
Id.
232

189

reaching disciplinary decisions.241 In a concurring opinion, Justice Bistline urged the adoption of
a higher threshold than the “some evidence” standard, referring to the “substantial evidence”
standard then in effect in Maryland.242 The justice expressed doubt as to the majority’s adoption
of Hill, observing that that case concerned the revocation of good time credits, and it did not
consider “the liberty interests which are implicated by numerous days of isolated
confinement.”243
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held in Ramirez v. Nietzel that the “some evidence”
standard was not met in a disciplinary hearing where the hearing officer refused to allow Mr.
Ramirez to call the victim of an alleged assault and declined to view surveillance camera footage
of the incident.244 At first glance, the court stated, it was difficult to conclude that the evidence
against Mr. Ramirez failed to meet the evidentiary standard. The investigating officer found that
Mr. Ramirez had participated in a fight, and the disciplinary committee accepted that report.
However, the court observed that “any examination for due process must amount to more than a
glance.”245 It found the presentation of “some evidence” against Mr. Ramirez to be
“fundamentally flawed” due to the failure to review the surveillance footage. 246 The court
reasoned that “due process, even inside prisons, requires more than simply parroting
‘institutional safety,’” and it remarked that an incarcerated person’s attempt to deny a
disciplinary charge “begins on an uphill climb because his credibility is already severely
downgraded.”247 Documentary evidence is therefore critical in order to address issues of
credibility and obtain an “unvarnished version of the facts.” 248 The court held that the hearing
officer must review security footage if requested to do so, and that such a review can take place
in camera if necessary.
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4.3.3 Other Due Process Issues
4.3.3.1

Access to Writing Materials

The courts in Idaho and Wisconsin have considered the issue of incarcerated people not having
writing materials while in solitary confinement which can affect their access to the courts. In
Free v. State, the Court of Appeals of Idaho held that depriving a person in administrative
segregation of writing materials was a violation of due process because it prevented him from
preparing a rebuttal statement or notes for the hearing committee. 249 As a consequence, Mr. Free
had been effectively denied access to the courts. If he wanted to appeal the hearing committee’s
decision, the only material that the court would consider would be the committee’s report and
Mr. Free’s rebuttal statement; no further evidence or argument would be received. 250 The court
referred to US Supreme Court precedent holding that the constitutional right of access to the
courts necessitates the provision of writing tools. The court concluded that Mr. Free was
deprived of a fair opportunity to make an effective rebuttal statement that was inherently
prejudicial in violation of due process. 251
In Wisconsin, however, the Court of Appeals held in Kirsch v. Endicott that people in a severely
restrictive form of solitary confinement who were denied pens and provided with only crayons
and “paper products in quantities equal to what is kept in a shoebox” for one afternoon or
evening per week were not deprived of due process.252 The court reasoned that “so long as
plaintiffs are furnished with writing instruments, they are not denied their right of access to the
courts.” Being restricted to the use of crayons, the court held, did not completely prevent people
from drafting legal documents.253 The court did not consider whether limiting access to paper to
only one day per week might interfere with the right of access to the courts. Thus, the due
process protection available to these people was significantly curtailed.
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4.3.3.2

Solitary Confinement while Investigation or Classification Pending

State courts have taken different positions on the legality of placement in solitary confinement
while an investigation is underway, or a security classification is pending.
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court held in LaChance v. Comm’r of Corr. that prison
officials violated due process rights by holding a man in administrative segregation for ten
months pending a decision on his transfer or reclassification. 254 Mr. LaChance was moved to
administrative segregation after he threw food at another person. He was granted only informal
reviews of his segregation, rather than the more formal reviews conducted for people in
disciplinary segregation. The court described the conditions in administrative segregation as
“synonymous with extreme isolation,” like those in Wilkinson v. Austin.255 It held that the tenmonth detention “exceeded the bounds of reasonable confinement” and gave rise to a liberty
interest.256 The informal review procedures followed by prison staff were deemed insufficient to
safeguard Mr. LaChance from abuse. He had no opportunity to speak or test the basis for his
placement in administrative segregation and he was not informed of the steps he needed to take
to mitigate the perceived risk he posed. 257
Although the court accepted that prison officials have broad discretion in matters of prison
management, it expressed concern about their use of administrative segregation pending
classification as a pretext to confine people indefinitely without any meaningful opportunity for
review.258 However, the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because Mr.
LaChance’s due process rights were not clearly established at the time of the violation. 259
The Supreme Court of Oregon held in Bekins v. Cupp that a man placed in solitary confinement
for ninety days prior to a hearing was entitled to due process. 260 The court considered that there
was a difference between placing a person in solitary confinement for disciplinary purposes
rather than an investigation, reasoning that confinement for disciplinary reasons would be
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“substantially longer than for investigation.” 261 It held that prison officials should be able to
confine people in solitary pending investigation “if they reasonably suspect [the person to]
present a threat to the order of the institution.”262 The due process rights of people placed in
solitary confinement while an investigation was conducted, the court determined, required a
supervisory official to have a reasonable suspicion, supported by evidence, that the person would
constitute a threat to security if they were not placed in segregation. 263 That finding had to be
recorded in writing and provided to the person. 264 The court emphasized that its decision was
limited to solitary confinement only, and it did not apply to other penalties. It also indicated that
if the confinement was for seven days or less, then written reasons did not need to be
provided.265
In contrast, the Appellate Court of Illinois held in Durbin v. Gilmore that the plaintiff was not
denied due process by being placed in solitary confinement while he was under investigation. 266
In accordance with the Illinois Administrative Code, Mr. Durbin could be held in “investigative
status” for up to thirty days, or longer if the period was extended. 267 Prison officials were
entitled to interview him during this time and the court held that this did not implicate any due
process rights, which only arose during the resulting disciplinary hearing at the conclusion of the
investigation.268

4.4

Barriers to Relief

Many states have provisions similar to the PLRA that seek to limit challenges brought by
incarcerated people. The most common restrictions are limitations on claims in forma pauperis,
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and the three-strike provision.269 The requirement that all administrative remedies be exhausted
before pursuing court action is also a feature of some state statutes. 270
Notably, only six states limit incarcerated people from recovering damages for mental or
emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury as the PLRA does. 271 Of these six
statutes, two impose narrower bars than their federal counterpart. In Alabama, the statute limits
the bar on recovery to actions filed pro se, although the majority of claims filed by incarcerated
people are so filed.272 Idaho’s statute, meanwhile, limits civil actions for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody, but it allows such actions to be pursued upon a showing of
either physical injury or a “diagnosed severe and disabling mental illness.” 273 This provision
therefore avoids the artificial distinction between physical and mental harm created by the
PLRA.
Some state restrictions on challenges to prison conditions are more onerous than the PLRA. For
example, courts are empowered in some states to deduct good time credits for in forma pauperis
applications that are deemed frivolous, in bad faith, or deficient in material information. 274 Other
statutes authorize courts to impose fees and costs on incarcerated people for filing frivolous or
malicious actions and even to revoke access to property such as televisions, radios, and
stereos.275
However, state courts can limit the impact of these statutory barriers through constitutional
interpretation. The Supreme Court of Alaska held in Barber v. State, Dept. of Corr. that while
the state may have a legitimate interest in reducing frivolous litigation by incarcerated people,
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the Due Process Clause in the state’s constitution prevents that interest from barring an indigent
individual’s challenge to a disciplinary penalty. 276 The court held that an erroneous outcome of
the disciplinary proceedings was of such importance as to override the interest in preventing
frivolous litigation.277
Notably, state statutes do not impose the same limitations on relief as those that constrain the
federal courts.278 Therefore state courts may grant broader and prompter relief than their federal
counterparts in cases involving prison conditions. In Harrah v. Leverette, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia found prison officials violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment by placing people in solitary confinement and committing severe physical abuse. 279
In considering the appropriate remedy, the court indicated its preference was not to interfere with
prison management, but it then stated that:
“Prison does not strip an individual of all human dignity. This court is dedicated to the
preservation of the rights vested in every person by our constitution and the federal constitution.
Any attempt by the government to abridge those rights is anathema to us; repeated infractions,
despite clear proscriptions by this court and federal courts, are unforgivable.”280

Referring to a previous opinion concerning Eighth Amendment violations at a juvenile detention
facility, the court remarked that
“when the state is guilty of extraordinary dereliction, discharge is a remedy. We warned prison
officials about its possible use in previous opinions … We will not continue to witness cruel and
unusual punishment and blatant due process violations by prison officials and respond with
injunctions and admonitions.”281

Emphasizing that the Department of Corrections “must understand that abuse of the
constitutional rights of prisoners may result in release of the victims,” the court ordered the
creation of plans tailored to each person affected by the violations that would reduce the degree
of restraint to which they were subject. It was suggested by the court that these plans might
276
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include release from parole restrictions, release on parole, reduction in sentence length, or
transfer to a less restrictive facility. 282 The court described this remedy as a “compromise …
between unconditional release and continuation of present status.” While it was reluctant to
release people for constitutional deprivations unrelated to the charges for which they were
incarcerated, the court reiterated that the prison’s activities “must be permanently corrected or
else the government may be enjoined from putting any convicted criminals in jail or prison.” 283
Though Harrah v. Leverette was decided prior to the enactment of the PLRA’s limitation on the
scope of federal courts’ remedies, that statute would not have restricted the West Virginia court
in any event.
A more recent example of a state court being in a position to order relief that is broader than that
which would be possible if constrained by the PLRA can be found in the decision of In re Von
Staich, where the California Court of Appeal ordered a fifty percent reduction in the population
at San Quentin State Prison in order to manage the coronavirus pandemic. 284 Such an order
would have been impossible for a federal court to make without first ordering less intrusive relief
and giving the CDCR the opportunity to comply; a prospect that would place incarcerated people
at San Quentin at serious risk given the high rates of coronavirus among the population at the
prison.
Qualified immunity is available in most states to counter claims alleging violations of state
constitutional rights.285 In 2020, Colorado enacted a statute to abolish the defense. 286 State
courts can decide not to recognize the defense to claims of violations of state civil rights. In
2007, the California Court of Appeal declined to allow qualified immunity as a defense to a state
civil rights claim on the basis that the doctrine was “entirely a creation of the United States
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Supreme Court.”287 The court held that if the state legislature had intended to incorporate
qualified immunity into state law, it would have done so. 288

4.5

The Case for State Constitutional Jurisprudence

The jurisprudence and constitutional provisions discussed in this chapter show that state courts
and state constitutions offer different avenues to pursue challenges to solitary confinement that
have been largely unexplored to date. There are different justifications for state courts to
develop their own constitutional jurisprudence separate and apart from federal jurisprudence. In
his analysis of Justice Brennan’s 1977 article that called on state courts to increase constitutional
protections for individual rights, California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu suggests that
the legitimacy of state constitutional jurisprudence “does not primarily depend on the
development of a distinctive, state-centered jurisprudence.” 289 Rather, in Justice Liu’s view,
state courts may depart from federal precedent because of distinctive constitutional language, or
because they disagree with federal constitutional reasoning. 290 The precise contours of
constitutional provisions, Justice Liu writes, are “open to vigorous debate, often with no easy
resolution.”291 Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has suggested that some state courts
diminish their constitutions by interpreting them in lockstep with the Federal Constitution. He
describes as “inexplicable” the notion that “the meaning of a federal guarantee proves the
meaning of an independent state guarantee.” 292
There are good reasons to support the development of state constitutional jurisprudence relating
to solitary confinement that does not simply follow the federal jurisprudence. The first is the
locus of incarceration and the dominant role played by state courts in sentencing, as recognized
by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in the case of In Re Lamb.293 As of December 2018,
approximately eighty-eight percent of people incarcerated in prisons in the US were held in state
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custody.294 Given their central role in sentencing the vast majority of incarcerated people in the
country, state courts should therefore scrutinize the conditions of confinement in which these
people are held.
A second reason is that state courts may be better fora than federal courts for pursuing claims for
violations of constitutional rights specifically relating to prison conditions. Justice Liu and Judge
Sutton both address this issue in the context of claims for violations of any constitutional right.
Justice Liu contends that federal courts may decline to enforce constitutional rights to their “full
conceptual boundaries” because of the concern that such an interpretation would bind not only
the Federal Government but also the states.295 Of course, the same concern does not apply in
reverse to state courts’ interpretations.
Further, Justice Liu notes that while most state court judges face greater electoral accountability,
in contrast to the life tenure of federal judges, the evidence to suggest that state courts are less
responsive than federal courts to individual rights claims is mixed. 296 This can certainly be seen
in the context of constitutional claims relating to prisons, where both state and federal courts
vary in terms of receptivity to claims concerning the rights of incarcerated people. While there is
an argument that “majoritarian pressures are thought to make state courts less responsive,” it
could also be said that recent moves toward reforming solitary confinement in some state
legislatures (discussed in the next chapter) may influence state judges to be more receptive to the
need for closer scrutiny of the practice.
Finally, as both Justice Liu and Judge Sutton acknowledge, nearly all state constitutions are
easier to amend than their federal counterpart. 297 While Justice Liu suggests that the prospect of
a constitutional decision being overruled, in effect, by an electoral initiative, could lead to
judicial restraint, on the other hand, he recognizes that such accountability “may aid rather than
diminish the legitimacy of countermajoritarian decision-making by state courts.” 298 Describing
the different methods by which constitutional amendments may take place, Judge Sutton notes
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that the most common method of amending a state constitution is legislative, but constitutional
conventions and popular initiatives are also used in some states, all subject to different
requirements and limitations.299 State constitutional amendments may offer another avenue for
furthering solitary confinement reform, though, as explained in this chapter, there is broad scope
for courts to interpret existing constitutional provisions in such a way as to find the practice
unconstitutional.
A further reason for state courts to continue developing their own constitutional jurisprudence
separate from the federal jurisprudence is the role of state-specific influences on interpretation
and the fact that the drafters of the Federal Constitution looked to the language of states’
constitutions and states’ experience. Some state provisions, for example, predate the Eighth
Amendment or its application to the states.
Given these justifications that weigh in support of state courts developing their constitutional
jurisprudence that does not simply adopt the federal jurisprudence, the question arises as to why
so few challenges concerning solitary confinement have been pursued in state courts to date. It
may simply be the case that, as Justice Liu observes, judges, and indeed law school graduates,
“are primarily trained in federal law and find it familiar.” 300 The body of federal case law
relating to solitary confinement is certainly “abundant and well-developed,” albeit flawed. There
may be further practical reasons as to why cases concerning solitary confinement are not based
on state constitutional arguments. Many challenges to prison conditions are brought by pro se
litigants who rely on litigation handbooks that are based on federal jurisprudence. In addition,
state constitutional challenges to excessive sentences that allege violations of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause (or equivalent) have largely resulted in state courts adopting federal
precedent, with the result that few sentences are overturned on the basis of disproportionality. 301
Given that there have been significantly more state constitutional challenges to excessive
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sentences, and these challenges have often been unsuccessful, litigants seeking to challenge
prison conditions may consider that they are unlikely to prevail in such challenges in state courts.
This is not to say that state courts and state jurisprudence are unworthy of further exploration as
an alternative avenue for future challenges. The absence of the PLRA’s limitations on the scope
of relief that state courts can grant weighs in favor of pursuing litigation in state courts,
particularly in those jurisdictions discussed in this chapter that have adopted broader
interpretations of constitutional provisions that may be favorable to people seeking to challenge
solitary confinement. Recent state court decisions relating to prison conditions stemming from
the coronavirus pandemic may raise awareness of the potential for incarcerated people to obtain
broader and quicker relief in these venues than they otherwise might obtain in federal courts.
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CHAPTER 5. RECENT AND CURRENT REFORMS
Introduction
This chapter explores recent attempts to reform solitary confinement through legislation and
regulations, bills, litigation settlements and consent decrees, and administrative measures. These
reforms have not received the same scholarly attention as the federal constitutional
jurisprudence. However, if successful, some of these measures are substantially more likely to
result in changes to the use of solitary confinement. The chapter explores common issues that
arise throughout the various approaches to reform, and the ways that different legislatures,
courts, and administrators have addressed or failed to address problems. Further analysis of the
reform measures follows in chapter 6.

5.1

Legislation and Regulations

As of April 2021, thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Congress have enacted
legislation or regulations that impose some limits on solitary confinement. 1 The range of
reforms across legislation and regulations is significant: some greatly reduce the circumstances
in which the practice may be used, while others do little more than require minimal data
collection.

5.1.1 Comprehensive Reform Statutes
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, and New York have all enacted relatively comprehensive
reform legislation that purport to reduce the circumstances in which people can be held in
solitary confinement. Common features among these statutes, which are discussed in more detail
in this section, include bans on solitary confinement except in limited circumstances, maximum
limits on the length of time that a person can be held in solitary confinement, reporting
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obligations, and bans on placing vulnerable populations in solitary confinement. Montana and
Minnesota have also passed reform legislation, but it is less comprehensive.
5.1.1.1

Massachusetts

In 2018, Massachusetts enacted legislation that limited the circumstances in which solitary
confinement can be used. Under the statute, restrictive housing is authorized as a form of
discipline or where a person’s continued presence in the general prison population poses an
unacceptable risk to the safety of others, the damage or destruction of property, or to the
operation of the facility.2 Such authorization of course still leaves significant discretion to prison
officials to place people in disciplinary segregation because a wide range of conduct can be
construed as posing an “unacceptable risk” to other people, property, or the operation of a prison.
The statute requires that all restrictive housing units provide people with the same meals as those
given to the general population; people must receive showers at least three times a week; they are
afforded rights of visitation and communication with approved people, access to reading and
writing materials, a radio or television if in restrictive housing for more than thirty days, periodic
mental and psychiatric examinations and access to treatment as required; the same access to
canteen purchases and right to retain property in their cells as people in the general population;
and the same access to disability accommodations as people in the general prison population. 3
The statute prohibits the placement of people with serious mental illness in restrictive housing
unless the person cannot be held safely in the general population and there is no available
placement in a secure treatment unit.4 If a person with a serious mental illness is placed in
restrictive housing, the state must find more appropriate housing for them and record the
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qualified mental health professional of 1 or more of the following disorders described in the most recent edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: (i) schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders; (ii)
major depressive disorders; (iii) all types of bipolar disorders; (iv) a neurodevelopmental disorder, dementia or other
cognitive disorder; (v) any disorder commonly characterized by breaks with reality or perceptions of reality; (vi) all
types of anxiety disorders; (vii) trauma and stressor related disorders; or (viii) severe personality disorders; or a
finding by a qualified mental health professional that the prisoner is at serious risk of substantially deteriorating
mentally or emotionally while confined in restrictive housing, or already has so deteriorated while confined in
restrictive housing, such that diversion or removal is deemed to be clinically appropriate by a qualified mental health
professional.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 1 (2018).
3
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anticipated timeframe for resolution in writing. Mental health treatment must be provided while
the person is held in restrictive housing. 5
Pregnant people are also excluded from placement in restrictive housing. 6 However, unlike
some other states, Massachusetts’ prohibition does not extend the exemption to people in the
postpartum period or to people who have had a miscarriage or termination. The statute also
states that the fact that a person is lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex, or has a
gender identity or expression, or sexual orientation uncommon in the general population cannot
be grounds for placement in restrictive housing, effectively removing the commonly relied upon
basis for placing LGBTQI people in protective custody. 7
Placement reviews must be conducted for people expected to be held in restrictive housing for
more than sixty days and must follow the due process protections guaranteed by the federal
courts. The person must be notified within fifteen days of the hearing of the behavioral
standards and program participation goals that will increase their chances of being moved to a
less restrictive placement at their next review. 8
The Commissioner of Corrections is required to compile and report monthly data regarding the
number of people held in restrictive housing to a “Restrictive Housing Oversight Committee,”
which consists of various officials appointed by the Governor. 9 Members of the committee
include a corrections administrator, a member of a correctional officers’ union, a person with
experience in criminal justice or corrections policy research, the President of the Massachusetts
Sheriffs Association or a designee, a former judge, the Executive Director of the Disability Law
Center or a designee, the Executive Director of the Prisoners’ Legal Services or a designee, the
Executive Director of the Massachusetts Association for Mental Health or a designee, and a
licensed social worker.10
The committee is authorized to collect information about the use of restrictive housing and is
required to report annually to the House and Senate with recommendations to minimize the use
5

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39A(a) (2018).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39A(d) (2018).
7
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39A(c) (2018).
8
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39B(c) (2018).
9
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39D (2018).
10
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39G(a) (2018).
6
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of the practice.11 The commissioner must provide quarterly data to the committee that include:
the number of people in restrictive housing who have been diagnosed with a serious mental
illness or attempted acts of self-harm or suicide; the total number of people in restrictive housing
and the reasons for their placement; a breakdown by race, age, gender, ethnicity, and disability;
the number released directly to the community from restrictive housing or within thirty days of
their release from restrictive housing; and the number of mental health professionals working in
restrictive housing.12 The committee is empowered to access correctional institutions and
interview incarcerated people and staff, but the statute does not explicitly require inspections. 13
Thus, while its report to the House and Senate must address conditions in restrictive housing, the
reliability of these reports may depend on information provided by prison officials and
incarcerated people who are able to speak freely to members of the committee without fear of
retaliation.
People with an anticipated release date of under 120 days may not be held in restrictive
housing.14 This prohibition, however, is subject to two exceptions: restrictive housing for fewer
than five days is allowed, or if the person poses “a substantial and immediate threat.” 15 Any
person in restrictive housing with fewer than 180 days until their release from prison must
receive reentry programming that includes:
“substantial re-socialization programming in a group setting, regular mental health counseling to
assist with the transition, housing assistance, assistance obtaining state and federal benefits,
employment readiness training and programming designed to help the person rebuild
interpersonal relationships … [including] anger management and parenting courses and other reentry planning services offered to inmates in a general population setting.”16

While it is important that people in solitary confinement are at least offered these services to
assist them in advance of their release, this provision also demonstrates the extent to which
solitary confinement cannot be justified for people who are soon to leave prison. It is also

11

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39G(b)-(d) (2018).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39D(b) (2018).
13
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39G(c) (2018).
14
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 39F (2018).
15
Id.
16
Id.
12
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questionable whether programs such as job preparation and interpersonal skills training will be
effective within the isolated environment of solitary confinement.
Massachusetts’ regulations impose limited obligations regarding the amount of time people in
restrictive housing are allowed out of their cells. The superintendent of each facility must assess
whether and to what extent out-of-cell activities “over and above five hours per week” will be
available “consistent with the safety and security of staff and inmates in that restrictive housing
unit.”17 The regulation indicates that additional out-of-cell activities might include additional
recreation periods or programs, and the assessment as to whether additional out-of-cell time is to
be granted will depend on the number of people in the unit, the number of staff, the physical
space available, the nature of the threat posed by particular people, and “the climate of the
restrictive housing unit.”18 Depending on the determinations made by different superintendents,
therefore, in some units, people may only be allowed out of their cells for activities for five hours
per week.
As is the case in many states, there are limits on the use of solitary confinement for young people
in Massachusetts. The “involuntary room confinement” of youth committed to the Department
of Youth Services is prohibited as a form of punishment, harassment, as a consequence for
noncompliance, or in retaliation for any conduct. 19 Assuming room confinement is not used for
any of these purposes, no time limit exists on the period that room confinement may last.
Massachusetts’ regulations require that each use of room confinement be recorded and reviewed
internally, and failure by staff to follow the policy regarding involuntary room confinement can
result in disciplinary or corrective action. 20
5.1.1.2

Nebraska

Nebraska’s most recent legislation limiting the use of solitary confinement, enacted in 2019,
follows legislation passed in 2015 that required an annual report to the Governor and legislature
setting out a long-term plan “with the explicit goal of reducing the use of restrictive housing.” 21

17

103 MASS. CODE REGS. 423.14.
Id.
19
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 120, § 10b (2018).
20
109 MASS. CODE REGS. 5.03.
21
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-173.02.
18
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The existing statute provides that no person shall be held in restrictive housing unless it is in the
least restrictive manner consistent with maintaining order in the facility. 22 From March 2020, no
member of a vulnerable population, namely, anyone who is under the age of eighteen, pregnant,
or diagnosed with a serious mental illness, developmental disability, or traumatic brain injury,
can be placed in restrictive housing.23
Juvenile detention facilities cannot place young people in room confinement as punishment or
for a disciplinary sanction, in response to a staffing shortage, or as retaliation. 24 No one may be
placed in room confinement unless all less restrictive alternatives have been exhausted and the
person poses “an immediate and substantial risk of harm” to themselves or others. People may
only be kept in room confinement for the minimum period necessary to eliminate the risk of
harm.25 The facility must notify the person’s parent or guardian and attorney of record of any
placement in room confinement.26 People in room confinement must receive the same access as
those in the general facility to meals, contact with parents or guardians, legal assistance, and

22

NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-173.03(1).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-173.03(3). “Serious mental illness” is defined as “any mental health condition that current
medical science affirms is caused by a biological disorder of the brain and that substantially limits the life activities
of the person with the serious mental illness. Serious mental illness includes, but is not limited to (i) schizophrenia,
(ii) schizoaffective disorder, (iii) delusional disorder, (iv) bipolar affective disorder, (v) major depression, and (vi)
obsessive compulsive disorder.” NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-792(5)(a) (1999). “Developmental disability is defined
to mean “a severe, chronic disability, including an intellectual disability, other than mental illness, which: (1) is
attributable to a mental or physical impairment unless the impairment is solely attributable to an emotional
disturbance or persistent mental illness; (2) is manifested before the age of twenty-two years; (3) is likely to
continue indefinitely; (4) results in substantial functional limitations in one of each of the following areas of
adaptive functioning: (a) conceptual skills, including language, literacy, money, time, number concepts, and selfdirection; (b) social skills, including interpersonal skills, social responsibility, self-esteem, gullibility, wariness,
social problem solving, and the ability to follow laws and rules and to avoid being victimized; and (c) practical
skills, including activities of daily living, personal care, occupational skills, health care, mobility, and the capacity
for independent living; and (5) reflects the individual’s need for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary, or generic services, individualized support, or other forms or assistance that are of lifelong or
extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.” NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-1107 (2017).
“Traumatic injury” is defined as ““[A]n acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force, resulting
in total or partial functional disability or psychosocial impairment, or both, that adversely affects a child's
educational performance. Traumatic brain injury applies to open or closed head injuries resulting in impairments in
one or more areas, including cognition; language; memory; attention; reasoning; abstract thinking; judgment;
problem solving; sensory, perceptual, and motor abilities; psychosocial behavior; physical functions; information
processing; and speech. Traumatic brain injury does not include brain injuries that are congenital or degenerative or
brain injuries induced by birth trauma.” NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-1118.01(15) (1993).
24
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 134.01(2).
25
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 134.01(3)-(5).
26
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 134.01(6).
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access to educational programs.27 They must be continuously monitored and consecutive periods
of room confinement are prohibited.28
Nebraska’s regulations emphasize the goal of reducing restrictive housing by prioritizing
programs, initiatives, incentives, and “mission specific housing” (discussed below) in place of
sanctions.29 Programs must be offered in congregate classrooms, where space allows, and
programs and behavioral health resources must be directed at the reduction of risks and
addressing incarcerated peoples’ needs.30
Where punitive sanctions are necessary, the regulations state that alternatives to restrictive
housing must be used wherever possible. Such alternatives include short-term cell restrictions,
loss of privileges, work or restitution assignments, and assigned programming. 31 Under the
statute, restrictive housing must be used primarily as a short-term intervention for the purpose of
managing risk, rather than as a form of punishment or incapacitation. 32 The “guiding focus” of
restrictive housing, according to the regulations, is goal planning, behavior change, and treatment
to enable the person to live successfully in the general prison population and return to the
community.33
“Mission specific housing” encompasses alternative placements for people with serious mental
illness, those in need of protective custody, and others with special needs. The regulations direct
that people held in such housing should receive treatment and be subject to the least restrictive
conditions possible.34 Mission specific units operate as general population units with out-of-cell
programs and opportunities for people to interact with others during meals and in recreation,
dayrooms, and activities.35
The regulations require implementation of re-entry and discharge protocols prior to a person’s
release to the community, with the goal of returning people to the general prison population, or
27

NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 134.01(8).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-4, 134.01(10)-(11).
29
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-003.01.
30
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-004.06.
31
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-004.01.
32
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1-004.01-02.
33
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-004.03.
34
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-003.06.
35
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-004.08.
28
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to mission specific or treatment-based and behaviorally-focused housing prior to their release. 36
Where possible, people are not to be released directly from restrictive housing to the community,
and if a person in restrictive housing has 120 days or fewer remaining on their sentence, a multidisciplinary review team must liaise with the facility to arrange release planning consistent with
that offered to people in the general prison population. 37
5.1.1.3

New Jersey

In 2019, New Jersey’s Isolated Confinement Restriction Act was passed. The state legislature
had been endeavoring to enact solitary confinement reform legislation for some time; in 2016, a
reform bill was passed by both houses of the legislature but was vetoed by the then-Governor. 38
The 2019 statute, which took effect in August 2020, defines “isolated confinement” as
confinement alone or in a cell with others for approximately twenty or more hours per day in a
state correctional facility, or twenty-two hours or more per day in a county correctional facility,
with severely restricted activity, movement, and social interaction. 39 The definition of isolated
confinement excludes “confinement due to a facility-wide or unit-wide lockdown that is required
to ensure the safety of inmates and staff.”40
The statute sets out principles on the use of isolated confinement, citing reforms adopted by the
Obama Administration in January 2016 to reduce solitary confinement in federal facilities and
the “devastating and lasting psychological consequences of solitary confinement on persons
detained in correctional facilities.”41 Under the statute, isolated confinement may only be used
where corrections officers have reasonable cause to believe there is a substantial risk of serious
harm, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 42 No-one may be placed in
isolated confinement for non-disciplinary reasons.43 Except in the case of lockdowns, the
maximum period that anyone can be held in isolated confinement is twenty consecutive days, or
thirty days in any sixty-day period. 44 Correctional facilities must maximize the time that people
36

72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-003.07.
72 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 1-008.03.
38
S.B. 51, 217th Leg., Governor’s Veto (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2016/Bills/S0500/51_V1.PDF.
39
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82-7.
40
Id.
41
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.6(d).
42
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(1).
43
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(2).
44
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(9).
37
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in isolated confinement spend outside their cells by providing access to recreation, education,
therapy, activities, and social interaction with staff and other incarcerated people. 45
Vulnerable people may not be placed in isolated confinement under any circumstances. 46 Under
the statute, vulnerable populations include people aged twenty-one or younger, sixty-five or
older, those with serious medical conditions that cannot be treated effectively in isolated
confinement, people who are pregnant, in the postpartum period (up to forty-five days after
childbirth), or who have recently suffered a miscarriage or terminated a pregnancy, people with
significant auditory or visual impairments, and people who are perceived to be lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, or intersex. 47 The definition also includes people with mental illness, a
history of psychiatric hospitalization, or recent manifestation of conduct that indicates the need
for observation or evaluation to determine the presence of mental illness, and people with
developmental disabilities.48
The due process procedures set forth in the statute are broader than those guaranteed by the
federal courts. Under the legislation, people are entitled to an initial hearing within seventy-two
hours of their placement, periodic reviews, the right to be represented (though the statute does
not specify who the representative may be), an independent hearing officer, and a written
statement of reasons for the placement decision. 49

45

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(11).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(b).
47
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.7.
48
“Mental illness” includes “[A] current, substantial disturbance of thought, mood, perception, or orientation which
significantly impairs judgment, capacity to control behavior, or capacity to recognize reality, but does not include
simple alcohol intoxication, transitory reaction to drug ingestion, organic brain syndrome, or developmental
disability unless it results in the severity of impairment described herein. The term mental illness is not limited to
“psychosis” or “active psychosis,” but shall include all conditions that result in the severity of impairment described
herein.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.2. The definition of “developmental disability” is similar to that contained in
Nebraska’s statute: “a severe, chronic disability of a person which: (1) is attributable to a mental or physical
impairment or combination of mental or physical impairments; (2) is manifest before age 22; (3) is likely to continue
indefinitely; (4) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life
activity, that is, self-care, receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, self-direction and capacity for
independent living or economic self-sufficiency; and (5) reflects the need for a combination and sequence of special
interdisciplinary or generic care, treatment or other services which are of lifelong or extended duration and are
individually planned and coordinated. Developmental disability includes, but is not limited to, severe disabilities
attributable to an intellectual disability, autism, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, spina bifida and other neurological
impairments where the above criteria are met.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-25(b).
49
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(4).
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The statute requires the promulgation of regulations (which have not yet been finalized) that will
establish less restrictive alternatives to isolated confinement, require training of staff working in
solitary confinement, and impose documentation requirements relating to decisions, procedures,
and reviews of all people placed in isolated confinement. 50 The regulations will also require the
Department of Corrections to publish quarterly reports on its website detailing the use of isolated
confinement, broken down by age, sex, gender identity, ethnicity, mental illness, and type of
confinement status at each facility. The reports must set out the isolated confinement population
on the last day of each quarter and a non-duplicative cumulative count of people placed in
isolated confinement for each fiscal year.51
Another statute enacted by the New Jersey legislature in August 2020 may also be relevant to
solitary confinement reform, though it is not directly targeted at the practice. The Dignity for
Incarcerated Primary Caretaker Parents Act requires the Department of Corrections to provide
parenting classes to incarcerated parents, establish policies that encourage and promote visitation
for primary caretaker parents by reducing restrictions on visiting hours and the number of minor
children allowed to visit at any one time and authorizing contact visits, and strengthens the
functions of the Corrections Ombudsperson to enforce the rights of incarcerated people. 52 The
Corrections Ombudsperson was already authorized to inspect prisons and investigate conditions
of confinement, but the 2020 legislation extends that authority by requiring the provision of
information to incarcerated people and their families, the identification of systemic issues and
responses upon which the Governor and legislature may act, and the promotion of public
awareness and understanding of the rights of incarcerated people. 53 The oversight of the
ombudsperson may be of assistance in ensuring that any systemic issues arising out of the
solitary confinement reform legislation can be addressed.
5.1.1.4

New York

New York’s Humane Alternatives to Long-Term Solitary Confinement (“HALT”) Act was
signed by the Governor in March 2021. The Governor has signaled an intention to negotiate
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.11.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.11(e).
52
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:1B-6.6 - 6.9.
53
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27EE-26 - 28.
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changes to the legislation, but at the time of writing, these changes have not been publicly
announced. The new law will take effect in March 2022.
The legislation limits the circumstances in which people may be placed in “segregated
confinement,” which constitutes any form of cell confinement for more than seventeen hours per
day. The definition excludes such confinement during a facility-wide emergency or when it
involves the provision of medical or mental health treatment. 54 No person can be held in
segregated confinement for more than fifteen consecutive days or twenty days in any sixty-day
period.55 The legislation directs that de-escalation, intervention, informational reports, and the
withholding of incentives are the preferred methods of responding to misbehavior unless it is
determined that non-disciplinary interventions have failed or that they would not succeed.
Segregated confinement sanctions are to be used as a last resort. 56
“Special populations,” namely, anyone aged twenty-one or younger, fifty-five or older, with a
disability, who is pregnant or in the postpartum period for up to eight weeks after giving birth, or
caring for a child in a correction institution, cannot be placed in segregated confinement at all. 57
They may, however, be held in keeplock for up to forty-eight hours prior to a disciplinary
hearing. If placed in keeplock, they must be given at least seven hours of out-of-cell time per
day, and if they are to be held for more than forty-eight hours, they must be transferred to a
residential rehabilitation unit or a residential mental health unit. People with serious mental
illnesses must be diverted or removed from segregated confinement and transferred to a mental
health treatment unit.58 If a person with a serious mental illness is held in a residential
54

2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 1.
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(i).
56
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 6.
57
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), §§ 2 and 5(h). The definition of “disabled” in the legislation is
taken from N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21)(a) (McKinney 1998): “(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting
from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily
function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of
such an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such an impairment …”
58
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 4(d). “Serious mental illness” is defined as “a current diagnosis
of … one or more of the following types of Axis I diagnoses, as described in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, … : schizophrenia (all sub-types), delusional disorder,
schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder, substance-induced psychotic disorder
(excluding intoxication and withdrawal), psychotic disorder not otherwise specified, major depressive disorders,
bipolar disorder I and II; or is actively suicidal or has engaged in a recent, serious suicide attempt; or diagnosed with
a mental condition that is frequently characterized by breaks with reality, or perceptions of reality, that lead the
individual to experience significant functional impairment involving acts of self-harm or other behavior that have a
seriously adverse effect on life or on mental or physical health; or diagnosed with a severe personality disorder that
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rehabilitation unit for more than thirty days, they must be moved to a mental health treatment
unit.
The residential rehabilitation units are intended to house people deemed to require more than
fifteen days of segregated confinement in separate housing where they will receive therapy,
treatment, and rehabilitation programs. 59 These units must provide at least six hours out-of-cell
time per day for congregate programs, and an additional hour for recreation. 60 All of these
services and the recreation time must be congregate unless there is a significant and unreasonable
risk to safety and security. People held in segregated confinement must be given at least four
hours’ out-of-cell time per day.61 Out-of-cell time in both segregated confinement and
residential rehabilitation units may be reduced in limited circumstances, but such restrictions can
only be imposed for a maximum of fifteen days. 62 People in residential rehabilitation units
cannot be placed in restraints unless they are deemed necessary due to an unreasonable risk to
safety or security.63 No equivalent prohibition applies to people in segregated confinement.
The legislation prohibits limitations on services, treatment, or basic needs (including clothing,
food, and bedding) as punishment, absent a significant and unreasonable risk to safety and
security. People in residential rehabilitation units must be given access to all their personal
property unless a specific item is deemed to pose unreasonable risk. 64 They must also be
assessed for an individual rehabilitation plan and have access to programs and work assignments
equivalent to those offered in the general prison population. 65 Segregated confinement may not
be used for protective custody; if necessary, people requiring protection can be placed in
conditions that must conform, at a minimum, to those of the residential rehabilitation units. 66

is manifested by frequent episodes of psychosis or depression, and results in a significant functional impairment
involving acts of self-harm or other behavior that have a seriously adverse effect on life or on mental or physical
health; or determined to have otherwise substantially deteriorated mentally or emotionally while in segregated
confinement and is experiencing significant functional impairment indicating a diagnosis of serious mental illness
and involving self-harm or other behavior that have a serious adverse effect on life or on mental or physical health.”
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW, § 137(e) (McKinney 2019).
59
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 2.
60
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(j)(ii).
61
Id.
62
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(j)(vi).
63
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(j)(vii).
64
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(j)(iii).
65
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § (5)(j)(iv) and (v).
66
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(k)(iv).
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A hearing must be convened prior to placement in segregated confinement or within five days of
the placement. People are entitled to be represented by an attorney, law student, paralegal, or
another incarcerated person at the hearing. The Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (“DOCCS”) can object to the paralegal or other incarcerated person if they
reasonably disapprove based on objective written criteria. Meaningful periodic reviews of
people held in residential rehabilitation units must occur at least every sixty days. Once a person
is released from a residential rehabilitation unit, any time remaining on a disciplinary sanction
must be dismissed.67
Staff working in special housing, keeplock, and residential rehabilitation units must receive
thirty-seven-and-a-half hours of training prior to their assignment and twenty-one hours annually
thereafter. The training must cover topics such as the purpose and goals of non-punitive
therapeutic environments, trauma-informed care, restorative justice, and dispute resolution
methods. Hearing officers must also receive thirty-seven-and-a-half hours of training on the
physical and psychological effects of segregated confinement, due process rights, and natural
justice remedies.68
The legislation imposes new reporting obligations that include the publication of monthly reports
on the DOCCS website, together with semi-annual and annual cumulative reports showing the
total number of people in segregated confinement and residential rehabilitation units
disaggregated by age, race, gender, mental health treatment level, special health
accommodations, need for and participation in substance abuse programs, pregnancy status,
continuous length of time spent in such units, all incidents resulting in sanctions, and the number
of people held in such units in each facility.69 The Justice Center for the Protection of People
with Special Needs is empowered to investigate DOCCS’s compliance with the legislative
provisions relating to segregated confinement and residential rehabilitation units and report
annually to DOCCS and the legislature. 70 The State Commission of Correction is also required
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2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(l) and (m).
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(n).
69
2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 5(o).
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2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 11.
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to assess compliance and report at least annually to local correctional facilities, the governor, and
the legislature.71
5.1.1.5

Minnesota

Enacted in 2019, Minnesota’s statute allows for people to be placed in disciplinary segregation
for rule violations, or administrative segregation where their presence in the general prison
population poses “a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates, or to the security
or orderly running of the institution.”72 This is the standard set of justifications used by prisons
across the country for placing people in solitary confinement. The statute does not restrict the
use of solitary confinement except to require that conditions in restrictive housing units
approximate those in the general population, “including reduced lighting during nighttime
hours.”73
The statute requires minimal reviews of people in disciplinary segregation. The Commissioner
of Corrections must be notified of all people held in restrictive housing for more than thirty days
and the reasons for placement. A behavior management plan is required for any person held in
restrictive housing for more than 120 days. 74
The most reform-oriented provision in the statute is one requiring the Commissioner to design
and implement a “continuum of interventions” that include informal sanctions, administrative
segregation, formal discipline, disciplinary segregation, and step down management for
disciplinary infractions.75 Unlike the reform statutes which emphasize that solitary confinement
should be used as a last resort and require other non-punitive sanctions instead, Minnesota’s
statute merely provides for punitive measures based on restrictive housing. The only attention
paid by the statute to conditions in such units relates to lighting; there is no requirement for
increased time out-of-cell, activities, social interaction, or therapy. The Commissioner must
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2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney), § 12.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.521.
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design and implement a system of incentives so that people who demonstrate “appropriate
behavior” can earn privileges and accelerate their return to the general population. 76
The statute directs that people in restrictive housing who exhibit serious symptoms of mental
illness must be screened by mental health staff for appropriate treatment and placement, but there
is no prohibition on placing or keeping mentally ill people in solitary confinement. 77 No
definitions are provided of “serious symptoms of mental illness” or “mental illness.” If the
mental health staff consider that a person’s behavior may be treated more appropriately through
alternative interventions or programs, or that the behavior that resulted in a person being placed
in restrictive housing was due to mental illness, such information “must be considered during the
disciplinary process.”78 However, the requirement to consider this information does not extend
to a directive that people should not be placed in disciplinary segregation. Notably, there is no
prohibition on placing vulnerable populations in solitary confinement.
The statute prohibits the release of people directly into the community who have been in
restrictive housing for more than sixty days “absent a compelling reason.” 79 No examples of
compelling reasons are provided.
In terms of oversight, the Commissioner of Corrections must report annually to the legislature on
the number of people in restrictive housing and their age and race, the number transferred from
restrictive housing to the mental health unit, and the length of time served in restrictive housing,
including consecutive terms.80 The provision does not call for any information regarding efforts
to reduce restrictive housing or to improve conditions in restrictive housing units.
To date, no regulations have been promulgated that give effect to the legislation.
5.1.1.6

Montana

Montana also enacted restrictive housing legislation in 2019. Though it imposes more limits on
solitary confinement than Minnesota’s statute, this legislation also does not offer the same level
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of comprehensive reform as that introduced in Massachusetts, New Jersey, or New York. The
minimal protections of people in restrictive housing are subject to the discretion of prison
officers, as evidenced by exceptions throughout the statute for security or safety considerations.
No reporting or oversight obligations are imposed. None of the provisions in the statute are
aimed at rehabilitating people in solitary confinement or offering incentive-based programs to
model behavior change. In other words, the statute largely provides a framework for operating
solitary confinement as it is already used in many states, with some limited restrictions.
The statute indicates that restrictive housing should be used only as a response to the most
serious and threatening behavior, for the shortest amount of time, and in the least restrictive
conditions possible.81 However, the legislation does not impose a maximum time limit on the
period that a person can be held in restrictive housing, and it stipulates only that people so held
may not be kept in their cells for more than twenty-two hours in any twenty-four hour period. 82
The statute also requires that people in restrictive housing be allowed a minimum of one hour of
exercise outside of their cell on five days each week, unless safety or security considerations
dictate otherwise.83
Pregnant people and those in the first six weeks of the postpartum period may not be placed in
restrictive housing “unless exigent circumstances exist,” although the precise circumstances are
not defined in the statute.84 Thus prison officials retain discretion to place pregnant and
postpartum people in restrictive housing, but their placement may not exceed twenty-four hours
in total.85 There is no ban on placing other vulnerable groups in restrictive housing, although
some provisions limit the circumstances relating to placements of people with mental disorders. 86
Specifically, those with mental disorders cannot be kept in restrictive housing for more than
fourteen days unless a multidisciplinary team determines the presence of an “immediate and
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present danger to others or to the safety of the institution.” 87 The statute envisages situations in
which these people will remain in restrictive housing for more than fourteen days, because it
requires mental health assessments for people diagnosed with a behavioral or mental health
disorder who are confined beyond thirty days. 88
The basic requirements for conditions in restrictive housing are minimal and leave discretion to
prison officials. People in restrictive housing must be given prescribed medication and medical
treatment, clothing that is not degrading, access to basic personal items (unless there is imminent
danger that the item will be destroyed or used to induce self-injury), the opportunity to shower
and shave three times per week, laundry, barbering and hair care services, and the same
opportunity to exchange bedding, clothing, and linen as people in the general prison
population.89 Exceptions to these allowances may be permitted if deemed necessary by a
supervisor.90 The statute does not enumerate reasons why supervisors may decide to withhold
these basic necessities.
People in restrictive housing must also be allowed: to write and receive letters on the same basis
as people in the general prison population, opportunities for visitation unless there are
“substantial reasons for withholding visitation privileges” (again, no reasons are listed in the
statute), access to personal legal documents and available reference material, and access to
reading material from the prison library. 91 The services to which people in restrictive housing
are entitled include educational programs, the commissary, the library, social services,
counseling, religious guidance, and recreational programs. 92 However, the statute provides that
these services need not be identical to those offered to people in the general prison population,
although there should not be major differences for any reasons other than “danger to life, health,
or safety.”93 Given that the statute allows people in restrictive housing to be kept in their cells
for twenty-two hours per day, however, it is difficult to envisage how some of these services
could be provided in a similar way to those provided to the general population. The statute also
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states that people with disabilities should not be denied reasonable accommodations simply
because they are in restrictive housing “unless safety or security concerns render the
accommodation unreasonable.”94
Prisons are required to “attempt to ensure” that no-one is released directly into the community
after spending more than thirty days in restrictive housing, and when such releases do occur, a
tailored release plan must be prepared which notifies the person of community resources. 95
Prisons must also establish step down programs, defined as an “individualized program that
includes a system of review [with] criteria to prepare an inmate for transition to the general
population or community and that involves a coordinated, multidisciplinary team approach that
includes mental health, case management, and security practitioners.” 96 At a minimum, step
down programs must provide monthly evaluations that assess individuals’ compliance with the
program’s requirements, and provide gradual increases in out-of-cell time, group interaction,
education, programs, privileges, and pre- and post-screening evaluations. 97
For youth facilities, restrictive housing must not exceed twenty-four hours and it may only be
used to protect the youth or others. Youth facilities must allow people at least two hours out of
their cells during the twenty-four-hour period, and they must arrange for administrative, clinical,
social work, religious, and medical staff to visit youth in protective custody at least daily. 98

5.1.2 Partial Reforms
Many states have enacted legislation or regulations that impose partial limits or restrictions on
aspects of solitary confinement.
5.1.2.1

Young People

In addition to Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Montana, twenty-six other states, the
District of Columbia and the Federal Government have all enacted legislation or regulations
relating to the solitary confinement of young people, commonly referred to as “room

94

MONT. STAT. ANN. § 53-30-717(4).
MONT. STAT. ANN. § 53-30-725(2).
96
MONT. STAT. ANN. § 53-30-725(1).
97
Id.
98
MONT. STAT. ANN. § 53-30-720.
95

218

confinement” or “room restriction.”99 Although this dissertation does not focus on reforms of
solitary confinement at youth facilities, a brief examination of the legislation and regulations
pertaining to these reforms is called for due to the quantity of legislation enacted and the
significant variance between jurisdictions. As shown in this section, even in an area that has
received greater attention, significant gaps remain in terms of reforming the practice, and the fact
that corrections officials continue to exercise considerable discretion.
Of the jurisdictions discussed in this section, only New Mexico has enacted legislation that
prohibits the placement of any person under the age of eighteen in restricted housing with no
exceptions.100 The only other jurisdiction with legislation that has a near-total prohibition is
New Hampshire, where room confinement is only allowed as part of “a routine practice
applicable to substantial portions of the population at the [youth detention center],” and it may
not be imposed as a consequence for individual behavior.101 Though it does not expressly state
that solitary confinement cannot be used in any other circumstances, the effect of this statute
appears to limit the practice to facility-wide lockdowns.
Nineteen of the jurisdictions covered in this section have imposed maximum time limits on the
period that a young person can spend in solitary confinement or room confinement. The shortest
maximum periods can be found in the regulations of Colorado, Kentucky, and Maine, which all
limit room confinement for minor violations to sixty minutes.102 Kentucky’s regulations increase
the maximum period to twenty-four hours for a major rule violation. 103 The regulations of
Kentucky and Maine, which are based on standards recommended by the American Correctional
Association, stipulate that room confinement is only to be used for the purpose of “cooling off.”
The federal statute states that where a young person is placed in room confinement, they must be
released as soon as they have “sufficiently gained control so as to no longer engage in behavior
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that threatens serious and immediate risk of physical harm.” 104 If they do not regain control,
then, if the person has been placed in room confinement solely because they present a risk of
physical harm to themselves, they must be released thirty minutes after the placement. 105
The longest period allowed by any of the statutes that impose a maximum limit is five days. 106
However, maximum time limits do not of themselves provide a complete picture, because many
statutes and regulations allow extensions with supervisory approval. 107 Furthermore, the
legislation and regulations in Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, New York, and West Virginia
impose no time limits at all. On the other hand, irrespective of whether they impose time limits,
some statutes and regulations direct that the solitary confinement of young people is to be used
for the briefest time possible and they require that the person be released as soon as they no
longer present any risk, or once the desired behavioral outcome has been achieved. 108
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The stated purpose of solitary confinement for young people also varies among jurisdictions. In
its 2020 statute, Washington’s legislature made the following legislative findings which
emphasized that the practice should not be used for punitive purposes:
“(1) [P]rolonged isolation for juveniles may cause harm. [It] has also been shown as ineffective
at reducing behavioral incidents and may increase anxiety and anger in youth.
(2) Creating alternative solutions to solitary confinement for juveniles will further protect the
wellbeing of juveniles in all detention facilities and institutions and enhance the rehabilitative
goals of Washington’s juvenile justice system. This act seeks to end the use of solitary
confinement in juvenile facilities when used as a form of punishment or retaliation …
(3) The legislature intends to prevent the use of solitary confinement and, in the limited instances
of isolation, ensure that the use advances the rehabilitative goals of Washington’s juvenile justice
system, and that it is not used as a punitive measure.”109

Some other statutes and regulations similarly state that solitary or room confinement should not
be used for the purposes of punishment, coercion, administrative convenience, or retaliation. 110
In some jurisdictions, the statement that solitary confinement is not to be used as punishment for
young people seems to leave open the possibility that it may nevertheless be used for other
purposes, or that it may sometimes be an acceptable form of punishment. For example, Illinois’
regulation provides that policies and procedures should be reviewed periodically to ensure
segregation is not “routinely used as punishment.”111 Ohio’s regulation provides that room
confinement should not be used for punishment, administrative convenience, retaliation, or
staffing shortages “absent exigent circumstances,” thus leaving some discretion to facility
officials.112
New York’s regulation states that room confinement must not be used as punishment, and it is
only authorized in cases where a child presents a serious and evident danger to him or herself or
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others.113 However, a separate regulation provides for “juvenile separation units” within
correctional facilities which are designed for people under the age of eighteen who would
otherwise be placed in disciplinary segregation in a SHU. 114 According to the regulation, these
units must not be operated as disciplinary housing units, but the young people confined in them
“may be subject to limitations on the quantity and type of property they are permitted to have in
their cells and may receive access to programs that are more restrictive than those afforded
general population inmates.”115 The regulation allows six hours of out-of-cell time on weekdays
and two hours per day on weekends, which can be withheld if the person “presents an imminent
risk of danger” to themselves or others. While this regulation states that these units do not
operate as disciplinary housing units, it is difficult to view their conditions as anything other than
punitive. Whether these provisions will be amended in light of the enactment of the HALT Act
remains to be determined.
Other jurisdictions’ statutes and regulations impose more limited rationales on the purpose for
which room confinement or solitary confinement may be used, directing that it must be limited
only to situations where behavior presents the risk of physical harm or threatens security. 116 In
Nevada, corrective room restriction is only allowed for the purpose of modifying negative
behavior, holding a child accountable for a rule violation, or ensuring safety or security. 117
Oklahoma’s regulation states that solitary confinement is “a serious and extreme measure to be
imposed only in emergency situations.”118
The statutes and regulations in California, the District of Columbia, Idaho, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Washington, and the federal statute, all require that before room confinement or solitary
confinement is imposed, less restrictive measures must be attempted to resolve the problem. 119
The alternative measures suggested in the federal statute include talking to the person to attempt
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to de-escalate the situation and arranging a mental health consultation. In some jurisdictions, the
requirement to exhaust other less restrictive measures does not apply where doing so might “pose
a threat to the safety or security of any minor, ward, or staff.” 120
Some jurisdictions also provide formal or informal due process to young people prior to their
placement in room confinement. In Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, and Wyoming, the
person must be told the reason(s) for their placement and be given an opportunity to explain their
behavior.121 In Colorado, this requirement extends to informing the person that the duration of
their confinement will depend on their interaction with staff and their participation in counseling
during the restriction period. In Maine, the regulation states that the person in confinement
“participates in determining the end of the timeout.” Under the federal statute and the District of
Columbia’s regulation, the staff must inform the person of the reasons for room confinement, but
they are not required to give the person the opportunity to explain their behavior. 122 Louisiana,
Michigan, and Wisconsin provide formal due process rights for young people facing room
confinement as a disciplinary sanction. All three jurisdictions require a hearing before an
impartial decisionmaker, assistance from a staff member to prepare a defense, and the right to
appeal the decision.123
Another area with significant variance in legislation and regulations among jurisdictions
concerns the conditions in room confinement. Twelve states and the District of Columbia
impose some minimal requirements. Some guarantee only basic necessities, such as Louisiana,
which prohibits any reduction in food or calorie intake, and requires that youth have access to
bathroom facilities;124 Mississippi, where people must have “reasonable access to water, toilet
facilities and hygiene supplies;”125 and New York, where people must be provided with at least
“a bed, chair, desk or chest, mattress, pillow, sheet and blanket.” 126 Others require conditions

120

See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 208.3(b)(1).
12 COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-8:7.713.2(F)(1); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 05.02.02.222.01(b); 505 KY. ADMIN.
REGS. 2:120(6)(b); 03-201-12 ME. CODE R. subs 15.3, § VII; 049.0029.11 WYO. CODE R. § 9(c)(iii)(B).
122
18 U.S.C. § 5043(b)(2)(ii); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-912(b)(2)(B).
123
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 7515(E)(4)(b); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.4132; WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 346.48.
124
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 7515(E)(2)(g)-(h).
125
31 MISS. ADMIN. CODE Pt. 9, R 4.5(11).
126
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 180-1.9(c)(11)(iv).
121

223

that approximate those of the general facility population, but items may be withheld if they are
deemed to pose risk.127
The more reform-oriented provisions include those of the District of Columbia, which requires
that room confinement involve “the least restrictive conditions practicable and consistent with
the individualized rationale for treatment,”128 and Florida and Idaho, which both require that the
door to the room in which the person is held remains open or unlocked. 129 Florida’s regulation
goes further still by requiring staff to “attempt to engage in productive interactions at least every
thirty minutes,” and to use techniques such as “conflict resolution, behavior management, and
constructive dialogue” to facilitate the person’s reintegration back into the general facility
population. Washington’s statute similarly requires that staff attempt to communicate with the
person “to evaluate and encourage [them] on the goals and objectives [they] need to achieve in
order to be released from isolation or room confinement.” 130 Maine’s regulation states that room
confinement must be of short duration so as not to restrict or deny the person’s participation in
programs.131 Many statutes and regulations also require the staff to conduct visual checks of
people in room confinement at least every fifteen or thirty minutes. 132
Though most statutes and regulations require internal record-keeping, few impose reporting
requirements regarding the use of room confinement, whether internally or externally. Of
course, some reporting obligations may be covered in other statutory obligations addressing
general reporting requirements for facilities that use solitary confinement. 133 Only the District of
Columbia and Washington require external reports specifically about the use of room
confinement. In the District of Columbia, the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services and
the Department of Corrections must provide an annual report to the Mayor and the Council
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regarding the use of room confinement (with data about the total number of people in room
confinement, the average and longest length of placement, and the greatest number of times that
any person was placed in room confinement), and explaining the steps taken to reduce
unnecessary room confinement.134
Washington’s statute requires monthly reports showing the number of times that isolation and
room confinement is used, the circumstances leading to its use, the duration of each confinement,
whether supervisory review occurred, the race and age of each person placed in confinement,
whether a medical or mental health assessment was conducted, and whether the person was
denied access to medication, meals, or reading material. This information must be reported to
the Department of Children, Youth and Families for inclusion in a report to the legislature in
December 2022. From November 2022, the department must also publish this information
annually on its website. From January 2023, the department is required to conduct periodic
reviews of policies, procedures, and the use of solitary confinement, isolation, and room
confinement, and report its findings to the legislature every three years. 135
Nevada and New York both require internal reporting on the use of room confinement to the
relevant departments. In Nevada, facilities must report monthly to the Division of Child and
Family Services on the number of children subjected to corrective room restriction, the length of
time held, and the reason that any attempt at returning the child to the general population was
unsuccessful.136 New York’s facilities must provide monthly reports to the Office of Children
and Family Services on the number of children placed in room confinement, the length of
placement, the official who authorized the placement, and the names of any officials who visited
the child.137 Such reports do not, however, include data regarding people held in the “juvenile
separation units” operated by the Department of Corrections. Thus the data collected in New
York (which are not publicly available) do not provide a complete account of all young people in
isolated conditions in the state’s correctional facilities.
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5.1.2.2

Pregnant People

While the shackling and use of physical restraints on pregnant people has been the subject of
legislative and policy reform in more than half of US states, less progress has been made in
relation to solitary confinement despite the recognized harm associated with placing pregnant
people in isolation.138 Only eight states currently have statutes or regulations that specifically
relate to the placement of pregnant people in solitary confinement. 139 All eight have introduced
these restrictions in the last two years.
Georgia’s statute prohibits the use of solitary confinement, administration segregation, or
medical observation in a solitary setting for any pregnant woman or woman in the six-week
period following childbirth (which may be extended by a physician if there are complications). 140
In New Mexico, a person who is known to be pregnant may not be placed in restricted
housing.141 These are the only two states to impose total prohibitions with no exceptions.
In the remaining states, prohibitions on placing pregnant people (and in most instances, people in
the postpartum period) in solitary confinement are subject to the exception that it may be used
where necessary for the health and safety of the person, others, or to preserve the security of the
institution.142 Texas’s prohibition refers only to administrative segregation; the state eliminated
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reasonable belief that “the inmate will harm herself, the fetus, the newborn child, or any other person, or poses a
substantial flight risk.”).
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disciplinary segregation in 2017 but pregnant people and those in the postpartum period could
presumably still be placed in solitary confinement for protective reasons.
In contrast, Florida’s statute provides greater protection to pregnant people and those in the
postpartum period, despite the exception that still allows placement in restrictive housing. It
provides that placement in restrictive housing may only occur if “there are no less restrictive
means available.”143 Any corrections official who places a pregnant or postpartum person in
restrictive housing must justify the necessity for the placement and explain why less restrictive
means are not available and whether a qualified healthcare professional objects to the placement.
A copy of the official’s report must be provided to the incarcerated person within twelve hours of
the placement.144 Furthermore, people placed in restrictive housing under this provision must be
seen by a healthcare professional at least once every twenty-four hours, observed hourly by a
correctional officer, housed in “the least restrictive setting consistent with the health and safety
of the pregnant prisoner,” and given a medical treatment plan approved by a healthcare
professional.145
Maryland’s provisions offer similar protections to Florida’s. Any decision to place a pregnant or
postpartum person in restrictive housing must record the reason, including an explanation as to
why no less restrictive housing is possible. The decision must be reviewed at least every twentyfour hours, and a copy of the written decision must be provided to the person. 146 Anyone placed
in restrictive housing must be medically assessed every eight hours, held in the least restrictive
setting consistent with the person’s health and safety, and provided with an intensive treatment
plan that is approved by the official overseeing women’s health and services. 147
The relevant statutory provision in Virginia is less protective. It requires the preparation of a
report justifying the reason for placing a pregnant or postpartum person in restrictive housing or
solitary confinement.148 The report must be provided to the official in charge of the facility, but
the person placed in solitary confinement is not entitled to receive a copy. There are no
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provisions requiring restrictive housing to be in the least restrictive setting possible, nor
mandating periodic review of the placement.
Florida’s statute is the only one to contain an enforcement provision. Any pregnant or
postpartum person placed in restrictive housing in violation of the statute may file a grievance
with the correctional institution and be granted an extension to file their grievance. The
enforcement provision is separate from any other right to relief or claim under federal or state
law.149 Corrections officials in Florida must also inform incarcerated females of the rules
adopted pursuant to the statute and post the rules in common areas of the prison. 150
None of the statutes impose external reporting obligations and only two require the compilation
of data for internal reporting purposes. In Maryland, any facilities that authorize the placement
of a pregnant person in restrictive housing must submit a report within thirty days to the
Commissioner of Correction, the Commissioner of Pretrial Detention and Services, and the
person responsible for overseeing women’s health and services in the facility. The report must
contain the reason for and details about the placement, including medical assessments, date and
time of the placement and release, and any physical or mental effects on the person or fetus. 151
In Virginia, the warden must compile a monthly summary of all written reports regarding
restrictive housing placements and submit them to the director of the Department of
Corrections.152 Virginia’s statute also requires training of correctional officers and juvenile
correctional officers who may have contact with pregnant people. This training must include,
among other things, “the impact of being placed in restrictive housing or solitary confinement on
pregnant inmates.”153 Virginia’s is the only statute to impose staff training obligations in this
regard.
The statutes vary in their application to people in the postpartum period. The provisions in
Maryland’s statute and New Mexico’s statute make no reference to the postpartum period.
Florida’s statute defines the “postpartum recovery period” as twenty-fours following delivery
unless a physician recommends a longer period, but the prohibition on placing people in
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restrictive housing only applies to pregnant people. 154 South Carolina’s prohibition applies to
pregnant people and anyone who has given birth within the previous thirty days; 155 Georgia’s
extends to six weeks following childbirth; 156 and Louisiana and Virginia’s both apply for eight
weeks following childbirth.157 Unlike New Jersey’s statute and some bills, none of the other
currently-enacted statutes prohibit the solitary confinement of a person whose pregnancy has
been terminated or who has suffered a miscarriage.158
5.1.2.3

People with Mental Illnesses and Developmental Disabilities

In addition to the statutes discussed in section 5.1.1, five other state statutes and regulations
impose some restrictions on placing people with mental illnesses in solitary confinement. These
restrictions are all limited to people with serious or significant mental illnesses or disabilities.
In 2014, Colorado passed a statute prohibiting the placement of any person with a “behavioral or
serious mental health disorder in long-term isolated confinement except when exigent
circumstances are present.”159 The statute does not define “behavioral or serious mental health
disorder” and while it remains current, it has in effect been subsumed by Colorado’s
administrative reforms that have resulted in the prohibition of long-term solitary confinement of
all incarcerated people.160
In Nevada, there is a prohibition on placing people with serious mental illnesses or significant
mental impairments in solitary confinement solely based on their illness or impairment. People
may still, however, be placed in solitary if officials consider it necessary “for the safety of the
offender, staff, or any other person.” If placed in solitary confinement, people with serious
mental illnesses or mental impairments must receive a daily health and welfare check. 161
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New Mexico’s statute prohibits solitary confinement for people with a “serious mental
disability,” who have received a diagnosis, or who are exhibiting “self-injurious behavior,
grossly abnormal and irrational behaviors, delusions, or suicidal behavior,” unless a health care
professional determines that the behavior is not related to a serious mental disability. 162 The
prohibition on placing people with serious mental disabilities in solitary confinement does not
apply during the first five days of the person’s confinement in the prison. 163 The warden or
person in charge of the prison may place people with serious mental disabilities in solitary
confinement to prevent an imminent threat of physical harm. Such placements cannot exceed
forty-eight hours and the warden or person in charge must record the circumstances giving rise to
the placement, prepare a written plan for moving the person out of solitary confinement at the
earliest opportunity, and notify the prison’s health services administrator in writing of the
placement.164 If the person continues to pose an “ongoing and realistic threat of physical harm to
another person,” the forty-eight hour period may be extended for a further forty-eight hours.
However, an extension is only authorized where: other methods for ensuring the safety of the
threatened person are insufficient, impractical, or inappropriate; the person in solitary
confinement is held for the shortest period and under the least restrictive conditions practicable;
and the person receives regular access to medical and mental health care. If the period is
extended, a written record is required, and the prison’s health services administrator must be
notified.165
Under Texas’s regulations, people may not be placed in administrative segregation until a mental
health assessment is conducted. If the assessment indicates that administrative segregation is not
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appropriate, the person may not be so held. 166 The regulation does not apply to other forms of
solitary confinement.
Vermont’s statute required the adoption of rules relating to the segregation of people with
“serious functional impairments.” 167 Under the statute, people with serious functional
impairments cannot be held in solitary confinement for more than fifteen days if the reason for
the placement is disciplinary segregation; and not more than thirty days for any other reason
(including at the request of the person).168 The thirty-day period may be extended with the
approval of a mental health professional and physician. The statute requires the Department of
Corrections to report monthly to the Joint Legislative Justice Oversight Committee on each
person in solitary confinement with a serious functional impairment, including the reason for and
length of the placement. The report must also record any incidents of self-harm or attempted
suicide. A copy of the report is provided to Vermont’s Defender General. The Department of
Corrections must also report annually on all people in solitary confinement who received mental
health services.169
5.1.2.4

Conditions in Solitary Confinement

In addition to the reform statutes discussed in section 5.1.1, three other states impose minimum
requirements for conditions in solitary confinement through legislation or regulations.
Maine’s statute requires that people in segregation receive sufficient and wholesome nutritious
food, and adequate sanitary and other conditions necessary for their health. 170 In Nevada, people
placed in disciplinary segregation must receive the same meal rations as people in the general
prison population, visits, mail, a minimum of five hours of exercise per week (except where it
poses a threat to the safety or security of the prison), and access to reading and legal material
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from the library.171 These allowances are only applicable to people held in disciplinary
segregation.
Ohio’s regulation provides that people in restrictive housing are entitled to legal material and
services; mail and kites (written messages sent internally within a prison or jail); reading
materials; out-of-cell exercise for one hour per day, five days per week; a toothbrush, toothpaste,
deodorant, feminine hygiene products, and soap; hair care services; a toilet, wash basin, running
water, bunk, mattress, pillow, sheets, and blankets; state-issued clothing; adequate light for
reading; access to medical and mental health services; adequate food; telephone calls to access
the judicial process and family emergencies as approved by the managing officer; cleaning
materials approved by the managing officer; and access to educational services, the commissary,
library, social services, behavioral health and treatment services, religious guidance and
recreational programs.172 Any of these allowances, with the exception of medical, mental health
care, legal services, and kites, may be withheld when deemed necessary for the safety or security
of the institution or the wellbeing of the person, or for “abuse of cell privileges.” 173
5.1.2.5

Direct Release to the Community

In addition to the statutes discussed in section 5.1.1, only one other state imposes limitations on
releasing people held in solitary confinement directly to the community. In Illinois, the
Department of Corrections must make “every attempt” to ensure people are not directly released
from disciplinary segregation to the community. The effect of the regulation is limited since it
makes no reference to other forms of solitary confinement. It provides that, within 180 days
prior to release, the Deputy Director of the Department of Corrections must decide if the person
“may transition through a less secure placement option.” If, however, the Deputy Director
decides that continued placement in disciplinary segregation is appropriate, a “transition and
stabilization plan” must be developed. The plan must incorporate “appropriate programming,
based on safety and security concerns.”174 The regulation provides no guidance on the content of
the transition plan, and the emphasis on safety and security concerns suggests that its primary
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focus is not the individual needs of the person in solitary confinement or their imminent return to
the community.
5.1.2.6

Reporting and Oversight

Twelve states and the Federal Government impose reporting obligations regarding the use of
solitary confinement.175
The federal reporting obligation was introduced as part of the First Step Act of 2018. It requires
the Director of the FBOP to include the number of people placed in solitary confinement at any
time during the previous year in the data provided for the National Prisoner Statistics Program. 176
The data for this program are then submitted in a report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the
Senate and the House of Representatives. 177
The reporting obligations in California’s statute derive from a 2012 report by the CDCR entitled
“The Future of California Corrections: A Blueprint to Save Billions of Dollars, End Federal
Court Oversight and Improve the Prison System.” The Inspector General is required to conduct
periodic reviews of various aspects of the state’s prison operations addressed by that report,
including the use of and conditions within security housing units. 178 The most recent report,
published in August 2020, merely states that “the Ashker settlement resulted in a substantial
decline in both the number of step-down program participants and the SHU population,” and it
does not provide any details about the number of people held in solitary confinement or the
conditions therein.179
In Colorado, a 2011 statute requires the Director of the Department of Corrections to report
annually to the Judiciary Committees of the State Senate and House of Representatives on “the
status of administrative segregation; reclassification efforts for offenders with mental health
disorders or intellectual and developmental disabilities, including duration of stay, reason for
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placement, and number and percentage discharged; and any internal reform efforts.” 180 The
statute further instructs that any cost savings resulting from the reduction of administrative
segregation placements must be redirected to support behavior-modification programs, incentive
programs, mental health services or programs, or similar efforts designed as viable alternatives to
administrative segregation.181
Connecticut’s statute requires the Department of Correction to collate and publish detailed data
regarding people in restrictive housing. The Department must publish on its website the formula
for calculating mental health scores as well as descriptions of all forms and phases of housing at
facilities with people in restrictive housing.182 It must also submit an annual report to the
Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division containing aggregated and anonymized data
showing the number of people in restrictive housing as of the first day of the twelve months
preceding the date of the report. The data must be disaggregated by age, gender identity,
ethnicity, mental health score, and the form and phase of restrictive housing. The report must
contain equivalent data regarding people in administrative segregation. Finally, it must describe
the actions taken during the previous twelve months to reduce reliance on administrative
segregation and to mitigate the harmful effects of the practice. 183 In January 2019, the
Commissioner of Correction was required to submit a report to the General Assembly regarding
the use and oversight of all forms and phases of housing for people in restrictive housing. 184
The reporting obligations imposed by Illinois’ regulations are less onerous than those contained
in Connecticut’s statute. The Department of Corrections must collect and report data on the
average length of stay in segregation, secured housing, and restrictive housing; and data per 100
people released directly from segregation, secured housing, or restrictive housing to the
community. These data are included in the Department’s quarterly report to the General
Assembly and must be reviewed by the Director of Corrections’ executive team on a quarterly
basis.185 The primary focus of the data collection is on violence reduction and incentivizing
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good conduct within correctional facilities, rather than implementing reforms of restrictive
housing.
In Maryland, data are collected annually and submitted to the Governor’s Office of Crime
Prevention, Youth and Victim Services showing, among other things, the number of people
placed in restrictive housing in the preceding year by age, race, gender, housing classification,
and the basis for placement; the number of people with a serious mental illness placed in
restrictive housing; the definition of “serious mental illness”; the number of people known to
have been pregnant when placed in restrictive housing; the average and median lengths of stay;
the number of incidents of death, self-harm, and attempted self-harm; and the number of people
released directly from restrictive housing to the community. The report must also include any
other data that the Department of Corrections considers relevant to the use of restrictive housing
and any changes to written policies or procedures relating to restrictive housing, including steps
taken to reduce the practice. The information submitted in this report is then made available on a
public website and provided to the General Assembly. 186
New Mexico’s transparency and reporting provision requires correctional facilities to report
every three months on the age, gender, and ethnicity of every person placed in restricted housing,
the reason for the placement, and the dates of placement and release. Reports prepared by
prisons must be submitted to the legislature, while those prepared by jails are submitted to the
Board of County Commissioners. The Department of Corrections must post all reports on its
website.187
New Mexico’s statute also requires separate reports from private prisons and jails. Every three
months, these facilities must submit reports of all monetary settlements paid to incarcerated
people, formerly incarcerated people, or their estates resulting from lawsuits relating to the use of
restricted confinement or any other matter. Like the general transparency and reporting
provision, private jails must submit their reports to the Board of County Commissioners, while
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private prisons report to the legislature. There is no requirement for these reports to be made
public.188
In Virginia, the Department of Corrections must compile an annual report to the General
Assembly and the Governor with data for the previous fiscal year that include the number of
people placed in and released from restrictive housing; the age, sex, race, ethnicity, mental health
status, medical status, security level, and custody level of each person placed in restrictive
housing or SAM units;189 the disciplinary offense history preceding the placement; the number of
days each person spent in restrictive housing; the number of people released directly from
restrictive housing to the community; the number of full-time mental health staff; and any
changes made to written policies or procedures regarding restrictive housing and SAM units.
The report must also be provided to the House of Delegates and the Senate, posted on the
General Assembly’s website, and published on the Department’s website. 190
Virginia’s statute also requires the Board of Corrections to consult with a “stakeholder work
group” to review standards governing the use of solitary confinement. The work group
comprises representatives of affected groups, including sheriffs, regional superintendents, public
defenders, formerly incarcerated people, mental health experts, disability rights advocates, and
civil liberties advocates. The group must present its findings to the legislature and publish them
on the Department of Corrections’ website, and then the Board has discretion to promulgate
standards consistent with the findings of the report. 191
5.1.2.7

Employees

In addition to New Jersey and New York, Connecticut and Oregon also require training of
employees who work in solitary confinement. In Connecticut, the training must cover the long
and short-term psychological effects of administrative segregation, and de-escalation and
communication techniques to divert people from situations that may result in their being placed
in administrative segregation. Employees must also receive training in symptoms of mental
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illness, risks and side effects of psychotropic medications, de-escalation techniques for managing
people with mental illness, and the consequences of untreated mental illness. 192
Oregon’s regulations set out a series of selection criteria for employees who wish to work in
disciplinary segregation units. Potential candidates must complete a trial period, undergo mental
health training, and achieve a satisfactory result on their most recent performance appraisal. At a
minimum, they must demonstrate maturity and tolerance, a constructive interest in working with
people in disciplinary segregation, good judgment, and conflict-reduction skills. 193 Assignments
to disciplinary segregation are reviewed twice annually and rotations take place as necessary “in
the best interest of the employee or the facility.” Staff working in disciplinary segregation must
be rotated out of the units after a maximum of two years and they must work in another unit (not
a SHU) for at least six months.194
5.1.2.8

Statutory Punishment Provisions

Although not reform-oriented, Delaware, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin all incorporate
solitary confinement as a form of punishment within their statutory regimes. 195 People placed in
solitary confinement pursuant to such provisions could, in theory, overcome the problems
presented by the federal courts’ narrow definition of punishment that requires proof of deliberate
indifference where it is not imposed by statute or a sentencing judge. 196 If solitary confinement
is instead imposed as part of a statutory or sentencing regime, arguably the requirement to prove
deliberate indifference to establish an Eighth Amendment violation is not necessary. All four
statutes are old but remain in existence, although none appear to be invoked in sentencing today.

5.2 Recent Bills
Over the last two years, bills have been introduced in twenty-two state legislatures and in
Congress that present a wide range of potential reforms. 197 Some bills propose substantive
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overhauls, while others address only single issues such as the solitary confinement of pregnant
people or the creation of new oversight mechanisms. The series of reform bills follows nearly a
decade of such proposals being introduced in state legislatures around the country. In 2013, state
legislatures in New Hampshire, Florida, and Texas were considering various proposals that
would limit youth solitary confinement, impose time limits, or require annual reports on the
number of people in solitary confinement affected by mental illness. 198 Earlier bills in Texas and
Kentucky proposed policy reviews and studies that were to consider abolishing solitary
confinement.199 While none of these proposals were enacted at the time, some were incorporated
into later statutes. In some states, like New Hampshire, reform bills have been introduced for
years but have never been enacted, while in New Jersey, New York, and Nebraska, the
legislatures have eventually passed reform bills after repeated attempts to do so.
The following section discusses thematic issues arising from the bills introduced between 2019
and 2021. As is the case with existing legislation, a range of approaches have been adopted.
The bills show the different views of legislators as to what may be required to reduce or
eliminate solitary confinement, or at least improve oversight of the practice.

5.2.1 General Limits
Thirteen bills introduced in the last two years impose general limits and restrictions, either on the
purpose of placement or on the length of time spent in solitary confinement. 200
5.2.1.1

Purpose of Solitary Confinement

In Arizona, two bills were introduced in 2020 that proposed to prohibit and restrict isolated
confinement respectively.201 One bill would prohibit isolated confinement unless there is
reasonable cause to believe there exists a “substantial risk of immediate and serious harm as
evidenced by recent threats and conduct and any less restrictive intervention would be
insufficient to reduce that risk.” The other bill contains the same proposal, and also requires the
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prison to establish the risk by clear and convincing evidence. That bill further proposes a
prohibition on solitary confinement for nondisciplinary reasons.
Two federal bills also introduced limits on the purpose for which solitary confinement may be
used. Senate Bill 719, introduced in March 2019, proposed to limit administrative segregation to
situations where it is necessary to control a “substantial and immediate threat that cannot be
addressed through alternative housing,” or to hold someone temporarily pending transfer,
classification, or resolution of another temporary administrative matter. 202 Disciplinary
segregation would be limited to situations where it is necessary to punish significant and serious
disciplinary infractions where alternative sanctions would not adequately regulate the behavior in
issue.203 The use of SMUs would be restricted to situations where segregation is required for the
temporary housing of people whose “history, behavior, or circumstances require enhanced
management approaches that cannot be addressed through alternative housing.” 204 Placement in
an administrative maximum facility like the Florence supermax would be allowed where the
Attorney-General determines that special administrative measures are necessary, or to house
people who pose an “ongoing significant and serious threat to the safety of other inmates, staff,
or the public that cannot be addressed through alternative housing.” 205
Congressional House Bill 8155, introduced in September 2020, would restrict solitary
confinement to situations where there is reasonable cause to believe that people pose a
substantial risk of serious harm to others, as evidenced by recent threats or conduct, and a less
restrictive intervention would not reduce the risk. Both federal bills therefore emphasize that
solitary confinement should not be used where other, less restrictive alternatives are available.
The correctional facility would bear the burden of establishing this standard by clear and
convincing evidence.206
A bill introduced in Connecticut’s Senate in March 2021 would substantially limit the use of
isolated confinement, which is defined as confinement in a cell, alone or with others, for more
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than sixteen hours per day.207 Under this bill, only senior employees would be able to authorize
placements in isolated confinement, and only for up to seventy-two hours in any given
situation.208 A physical and mental examination would be required prior to a person’s placement
in isolated confinement and the Department of Corrections must have attempted to defuse the
situation leading to the placement through de-escalation techniques and less restrictive
measures.209 The Department would be required to continue de-escalation efforts after placing
the person in isolated confinement. The bill bans isolated confinement for reasons relating to
race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, sex, gender identity, or expression. 210
A Senate Bill introduced in Florida would prohibit solitary confinement, defined as the
placement of a person in a cell, alone or with others, in substantial isolation, for more than
twenty-two hours per day.211 It states that, absent exigent circumstances, people may only be
placed in “restrictive confinement,” meaning placement in a cell in substantial isolation for more
than twenty hours per day, if the placement would reduce the safety threat posed by those
circumstances.212 The bill defines “exigent circumstances” as those which present “an
immediate and substantial threat to the safety of an inmate or a correctional staff member.” 213
Restrictive confinement may not be used as a consequence for noncompliance, punishment,
harassment, or retaliation.214
The legislative findings in a Senate Bill introduced in Hawaii acknowledge that people with
mental health issues are more likely than other incarcerated people to be placed in solitary
confinement. The bill also refers to analysis conducted between 2008 and 2012 by the
University of Cincinnati Corrections Institute that found “higher rates of recidivism among those
incarcerated individuals who were subjected to more severe punishments.” 215 The bill proposes
that administrative and disciplinary segregation should only be used where “less severe forms of
punishment are not available and when a committed person commits an offense involving
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violence; escapes or attempts to escape or poses a serious threat to the security of other
committed persons or correctional facility staff, or both.” 216
Nevada’s Senate Bill would require the Director of the Department of Corrections to adopt
regulations to ensure that solitary confinement can only be used as a last resort, in the least
restrictive manner, and for the shortest period safely possible. The requirement that solitary
confinement be utilized in the “least restrictive manner” stands in conflict with the bill’s
definition of solitary confinement as placement in a cell for twenty-two or more hours per day. 217
The bill also contemplates that long-term solitary confinement will continue to be used, as
evidenced by a requirement that a multidisciplinary classification committee will review each
person’s placement at least every seven days for the first sixty days, and at least once every thirty
days thereafter.218 The bill would limit the class of offenses for which people may be placed in
disciplinary segregation to serious offenses only, although the definition of “administrative
segregation” is sufficiently broad as to encompass lesser violations. 219
A bill introduced in both the House and Senate in Pennsylvania provides that people could not be
placed in solitary confinement unless there is reasonable cause to believe there is a substantial
risk of immediate serious harm, evidenced by recent threats or conduct, and a less restrictive
intervention would be insufficient to reduce that risk. 220 The correctional institution or facility
bears the burden of establishing this standard by clear and convincing evidence. People may also
be placed in solitary confinement for disciplinary sanctions. Any decision to place a person in
solitary confinement must be made by the chief administrator. 221
In Virginia, the Senate (but not the House) passed a bill in 2021 that would largely eliminate
isolated confinement, defined as confinement in a cell alone or with another person for twenty or
more hours per day.222 Under this bill, isolated confinement would only be allowed for the
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purpose of providing medical or mental health treatment for up to forty-eight hours to prevent
“an imminent threat of physical harm,” and a further forty-eight hours to investigate “an ongoing
and realistic threat of imminent physical harm to another.” 223 The bill also requires that in the
event of a facility-wide lockdown, the facility administrator must specify in writing the
justifications for the lockdown and explain why less restrictive interventions are insufficient. It
also retains the possibility of placing people in protective isolation for their own safety, but such
placements require the informed consent of the person or, absent consent, clear and convincing
evidence that the placement is necessary to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm.
The bills introduced in Arizona, Congress, Pennsylvania, and Virginia all impose the same
burden of requiring the prison to establish the need for solitary confinement by clear and
convincing evidence of the risk of harm based on recent threats or conduct. By requiring
specific evidence, less discretion is left to prison officers to decide of their own volition that
there is a sufficient risk of harm to justify solitary confinement. Most of the bills also treat
solitary confinement as a last resort, to be used only if less restrictive alternatives are
insufficient.
5.2.1.2

Time Limits

Arizona’s House and Senate Bills, Florida’s Senate Bill, Nebraska’s Legislative Bill,
Pennsylvania’s House and Senate Bills, and the Federal House Bill, would all limit solitary
confinement to a maximum of fifteen consecutive days or no more than twenty days during any
sixty-day period.224 The fifteen-day limit is consistent with the “Nelson Mandela Rules” adopted
by the United Nations, which recommend the prohibition of indefinite and “prolonged solitary
confinement,” defined as any period exceeding fifteen consecutive days. 225
Arizona’s Senate Bill would limit isolated confinement to a maximum of ten consecutive days or
twenty days during any sixty-day period during a facility-wide lockdown. 226 Had it been
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enacted, such a provision might have been significant in terms of the measures adopted to
manage the coronavirus response in the state’s prisons.
A Federal Senate Bill proposes that administrative segregation be limited to a maximum of
fifteen consecutive days or no more than twenty days in a sixty-day period unless an individual
asks to remain in administrative segregation, or a multidisciplinary staff committee approves a
temporary extension of up to fifteen days, which must be reviewed every three days. 227 That bill
then proposes that disciplinary segregation should be limited to thirty consecutive days, or forty
days in a sixty-day period. This period can be extended if a disciplinary hearing officer
considers that the infraction was of “such an egregious and violent nature that a longer sanction
is appropriate.”228 No maximum time limit is proposed for placement in the administrative
maximum prison or in a SMU.
Connecticut’s Senate Bill would limit isolated confinement to a maximum of seventy-two
hours.229 Isolated confinement could be used only in response to certain “serious incidents,” or
to address a substantial threat of imminent physical harm evidenced by recent conduct. 230 The
definition of “serious incidents” includes events that impact the normal operation of a facility,
such as health emergencies, thereby suggesting that lockdowns such as those implemented in
response to the coronavirus pandemic would still be authorized. 231
Georgia’s House Bill sets out time limits that correspond to the number of previous disciplinary
infractions. For a first infraction, solitary confinement could not exceed fifteen days; a second
infraction would result in placement for nonconsecutive periods not exceeding thirty days; and
subsequent infractions could lead to placement for nonconsecutive periods of up to forty-five
days.232 For solitary confinement unrelated to disciplinary infractions, that is, where a person
poses an immediate and substantial risk of physical harm, the confinement could not exceed
fifteen consecutive days or more than a total of ninety days during a rolling one-year period. 233
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Hawaii’s Senate Bill also proposes different time limits for administrative and disciplinary
segregation. Administrative segregation would be limited to a maximum of fourteen days during
any thirty-day period, while the maximum period of disciplinary segregation could not exceed
sixty days during any 180-day period. 234

5.2.2 Vulnerable Populations
Numerous bills focus on vulnerable populations, whether proposing substantive reforms to all
aspects of solitary confinement or smaller, targeted reforms. Many seek to protect additional
categories of vulnerable populations beyond those currently identified in existing legislation.
5.2.2.1

Young People

A number of bills include young people in their definitions of the vulnerable populations that
may not be placed in solitary confinement.235 Arizona’s Senate Bill includes people who are
twenty-one years or younger within the definition of “vulnerable population.” 236 One federal bill
refers to people aged twenty-five or younger in its definition of vulnerable people. 237 Other bills
prohibit the solitary confinement of young people whether or not they are defined as members of
vulnerable populations.238
Some bills do not prohibit solitary confinement but would instead restrict its use for vulnerable
populations. Georgia’s reform bill includes people who are eighteen or younger in its definition
of “vulnerable incarcerated person.” 239 Under this bill, except during facility-wide lockdowns,
vulnerable people may not be placed in restrictive housing unless alternative disciplinary
sanctions have been attempted and have failed, and there is a risk of physical harm or a risk to
the security of the facility that has not been mitigated. A bill introduced in Hawaii similarly
234
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states that people aged twenty-one or younger may not be placed in solitary confinement unless
all less restrictive forms of punishment have been attempted, and medical and mental health
clearance is granted.240
A bill passed by the Senate in Virginia limits “isolated confinement” for juveniles. “Isolated
confinement” is defined as placement in a cell alone or with someone else, for seventeen or more
hours per day.241 Under this bill, young people could only be placed in isolated confinement for
the purpose of receiving medical or mental health treatment for up to twenty-four hours to
prevent an imminent threat of physical harm, and for a further twenty-four hours if there is an
ongoing and realistic threat of imminent physical harm to another person. The bill retains the
possibility of placement in isolated confinement for protective reasons, but it would require that
activities, programming, movement, and social interaction be offered. Placements in protective
confinement would be reviewed every forty-eight hours and must consider whether a less
restrictive setting could be utilized.
Numerous bills propose limits on the length of time that young people can be held in solitary
confinement and require that it only be used as a last resort once all less restrictive alternative
measures have been exhausted.242 Some approach room confinement in similar terms, stating
that it may only be used as a temporary response to behavior that poses an immediate and
substantial danger, or a serious and immediate threat to the orderly operation of the facility. 243
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5.2.2.2

Older People

Five bills include older people in their definitions of vulnerable populations that may not be
placed in solitary confinement or may only be placed in solitary confinement under limited
circumstances.244 Only New Jersey and New York currently have such a prohibition in existing
legislation, and the protection of older people from solitary confinement has received less
attention in bills than the protection of young people.
All the bills that propose protections of older people seek to make substantive reforms of solitary
confinement; none are standalone bills targeting older people only. One bill proposes protections
for people who are fifty-five and older; 245 three apply to people sixty-five or older;246 and one to
people seventy or older.247 The actual protections vary. Only Arizona’s bill prohibits placement
in solitary confinement altogether.248 The federal bill and Pennsylvania’s bill both direct that
older adults should be placed in other units instead of solitary confinement, at the determination
of prison administrators.249 No definitions are provided as to what these separate units (referred
to as “specialized units” in the Pennsylvania bill) must comprise. It is assumed that the
conditions in such units do not allow for solitary confinement. Nevertheless, in the absence of
regulations, the bills would leave some discretion to prison officials to determine the conditions
in these units which could end up resembling conditions akin to solitary confinement. The bills
introduced in Georgia and Hawaii both direct that older people must not be placed in solitary
confinement until alternative sanctions or less restrictive forms of punishment have been
attempted.250
5.2.2.3

Pregnant People

The protection of pregnant and postpartum people has attracted greater attention in recent bills
than in previously enacted legislation. Fourteen bills either treat pregnant people and those in the
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postpartum period as members of vulnerable populations whose placement in solitary
confinement should be subject to restrictions, or such requirements are addressed in standalone
bills.251
Five bills include pregnant people or those in the postpartum period in the definitions of
vulnerable populations that are exempt from solitary confinement or subject to restrictions on
such placement.252 Bills introduced in Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, and Congress include people
who had a miscarriage or a termination in the definition of vulnerable people that are subject to
protection. The Arizona and Pennsylvania bills would prohibit the placement of pregnant and
postpartum people in solitary confinement without any exceptions. The others all allow for
placement in solitary confinement under the same limited circumstances applicable to other
vulnerable populations, as discussed above in relation to older people.
Seven other bills propose restrictions on the placement of pregnant and postpartum people in
solitary confinement, but do not treat pregnant people as members of vulnerable populations. 253
None of these bills include provision for people who have had a miscarriage or termination.
Most of the restrictions mirror those proposed for other vulnerable people. They only allow
placement in extraordinary circumstances, or where the person poses a substantial and immediate
threat of harm and all less restrictive options to de-escalate the situation have been exhausted.
Two bills, one introduced in Congress and the other in Florida, direct that pregnant and
postpartum people may only be held in solitary confinement for a maximum of five days, after
which time they must be released to the general prison population or to protective custody. 254
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Tennessee’s bill is the only one to propose a total ban on solitary confinement for pregnant
people and those in the postpartum period. It would prohibit such placements regardless of
whether they are for punishment or safekeeping. 255
Four bills would also require training for prison officials, either on the rules regarding solitary
confinement for pregnant and postpartum people, or on the impact of solitary confinement on
these people.256
5.2.2.4

LGBTI People

Seven bills include protections for people who are, or are perceived to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, or intersex.257 In bills introduced in Arizona, Congress, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania,
protections would apply to people who are “perceived to be” LGTBI, while Georgia’s bill
applies to people who are, or are perceived by the facility to be, LGBTI.
Florida’s bill states that people may not be placed in solitary confinement solely because of their
identification or status as a member of a vulnerable population. The definition of vulnerable
population includes people who are LGBTI or gender non-conforming. A second federal bill
also includes gender non-conforming and LGBTI people in the definition of vulnerable people.
It states that these people may not be placed in solitary confinement only by reason of their being
LGBTI.258
5.2.2.5

People with Mental Illnesses and Developmental Disabilities

Ten bills incorporate protections for people with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities.
They either limit the circumstances in which people can be placed and held in solitary
confinement or prohibit placement altogether. 259 Five offer protection by including such people
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within the definition of vulnerable populations. 260 Five others expressly refer to people with
mental illnesses or developmental disabilities and propose limits on solitary confinement. 261
Arizona’s bill would prohibit solitary confinement without exception for people with mental
illnesses or developmental disabilities. A federal bill would require that people be placed in
alternative units instead of solitary confinement. 262 The remaining bills impose limits on the
circumstances in which people can be placed in solitary confinement or require mental health
assessments prior to placement.
In addition to the bills that propose some form of protection for people with mental illness, two
others call for studies or evaluations on the use of solitary confinement for this population.
These bills have been introduced in Nevada and North Carolina. 263 Nevada’s bill would require
an evaluation of the conditions and use of disciplinary segregation for vulnerable populations,
including people with mental illness. The evaluation would include “analysis of efforts to
eliminate the use of solitary confinement for people with severe mental illness.” North
Carolina’s bill proposes that the Department of Public Safety “study the issue of confinement of
persons with mental illness.” The study would examine, among other issues, the types of
confinement used for people diagnosed with mental illness and their average length of stay in
restrictive housing.
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5.2.2.6

People with Physical Disabilities

Six bills incorporate protections for people with physical disabilities. 264 Most include people
with physical disabilities within the definition of vulnerable populations. The bills vary in their
definitions of “physical disability.” Two refer simply to “physical disability” without any
explanation of the conditions covered. 265 Two describe “serious medical condition[s] that cannot
effectively be treated in isolated confinement” and “significant auditory or visual
impairment[s].”266 Two refer to physical disabilities that “a licensed medical health professional
determines is likely to be exacerbated” by solitary confinement. 267
In contrast to the six bills that expressly incorporate protections for people with disabilities, a bill
introduced in Nevada does not propose any protections, but merely directs an examination of the
conditions and use of disciplinary segregation for this group. 268

5.2.3 Conditions in Solitary Confinement
Nine bills address conditions in solitary confinement. 269 The most limited provisions require
only that cells be adequately ventilated, lit, temperature-controlled, clean, and equipped with
properly functioning sanitary fixtures; 270 or that people in solitary confinement may not be
denied food, water, medical care, or any other basic necessity. 271 Four bills require prisons to
maximize out-of-cell time by offering recreation and educational programs, therapy, activities,
and opportunities for social interaction with staff and other incarcerated people. 272 A federal bill
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specifies that the out-of-cell time must be at least four hours per day; a bill introduced in Nevada
would require at least two hours of out-of-cell recreation; while bills introduced in Pennsylvania
and Arizona are silent on the amount of out-of-cell time that must be provided. Nevada’s bill
also requires that people in solitary confinement be allowed weekly contact visits, subject to
individualized safety concerns.
Connecticut’s bill would require out-of-cell time of at least eight hours per day, subject to an
exception where people are held in isolated confinement due to a serious incident, threat of
imminent physical harm, or a request for protective segregation. 273 The bill also directs that
people in isolated confinement must be continuously monitored to ensure their safety and
wellbeing, and they must have sufficient and regular access to toilets, water, food, light, air, and
heat.274
A bill introduced in Georgia requires that people in solitary confinement receive the same access
as people in the general prison population to telephones, visits, mail, reading materials, food and
water, showers, clothing and bedding, feminine hygiene products, and medical care. 275 Hawaii’s
bill, which sets out minimum standards for administrative segregation only, requires that people
receive in-cell programs, face-to-face interaction with staff, a television or radio (or both),
reading materials, outdoor exercise (although no minimum time is specified), and basic
furnishing in their cells.276

5.2.4 Release to the Community
Seven bills address the issue of direct release from solitary confinement to the community. 277
Three provide that people may not be directly released unless it is necessary for the safety of the
person, staff, other incarcerated people, or the public.278 Although not expressly stated in any of
these bills, it appears that the intent of these provisions is that people be moved out of solitary
confinement in the six-month period prior to their release. A fourth bill simply states that, unless
273
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necessary for safety reasons, an incarcerated person may not be released directly to the
community.279 However, it does not specify any particular time period prior to release when
people should be moved out of solitary confinement.
Two bills require transitional processes for people in solitary confinement who have an
anticipated release day of 180 days or less. A federal bill provides that people should not be held
in solitary confinement in the final 180 days unless it is limited to a maximum of five days, or
the person poses a “substantial and immediate threat.” 280 Anyone held in solitary confinement
during this period must be provided with “re-socialization programming in a group setting,”
mental health counseling, and re-entry services. The second bill, introduced in Maryland, does
not impose any restriction on placing or keeping people in solitary confinement during the final
180 days of their sentence, but it imposes similar obligations with respect to services to assist
with the transitional process.281 These measures include group programs, mental health
counseling, assistance in finding and obtaining state and federal benefits, and re-entry planning,
continuum of care, and referral services.
Nevada’s bill would require that people be placed in the general population for at least thirty
days prior to their release, and that they receive priority for step down programs. People in
solitary confinement must receive the same types of re-entry preparation as people in the general
prison population, and these programs must begin at least one year before their scheduled release
date.282

5.2.5 Reporting and Oversight
Eleven bills introduce reporting requirements about the use of solitary confinement. 283 The
majority require periodic, public reporting of data disaggregated by age, sex, ethnicity, and
mental illness (without revealing any personal identifying information). Most reports must be
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published on departmental websites and submitted to legislatures. Two bills only require
collection of data about young people.284 A bill introduced in Nevada would require that reports
include data from both state and private facilities. 285
Eight bills propose new oversight functions, seven of which are not specific to solitary
confinement but include the power to investigate its use. Many of the oversight roles take the
form of corrections ombuds offices or correctional oversight committees. 286 The scope of
authority granted to these positions varies. In Arizona’s bill, the new office would be
empowered to monitor conditions and issue periodic reports and recommendations. 287
Mississippi’s bill includes similar provisions, but it would also allow the ombudsman to initiate
investigations itself or in response to complaints, conduct scheduled and unannounced
inspections of facilities, interview incarcerated people and staff, conduct public hearings, and
subpoena witnesses and documents.288 A New York bill would grant the ombudsman similar
authority, and in addition, require the ombudsman to interview and review all candidates for
appointments as superintendents at any state correctional facility. 289 If the ombudsman
concluded that the commissioner had appointed a candidate who was not qualified, the
ombudsman would be required to notify the candidate and make a public statement to that
effect.290
Connecticut’s bill would establish a “Correction Accountability Commission” and require the
Correction Ombuds, among other things, to conduct a study on conditions in correctional
facilities and halfway houses and report the findings to the General Assembly. 291
Pennsylvania’s bill is the only one to propose oversight specific to solitary confinement. It
would require the appointment of an independent investigator within the Department of
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Corrections to monitor prisons’ compliance with rules restricting the use of solitary
confinement.292 The investigator would be required to conduct interviews with people in solitary
confinement, review documents regarding solitary confinement placements, and report any abuse
of the rules to the Department. The bill also would also require the Department to conduct
misconduct hearings to investigate the misuse of solitary confinement. 293 The hearing review
board would consist of a psychologist or psychiatrist, a mental health professional with a
counseling background, and a licensed social worker. If the board found that solitary
confinement had been misused, the prison would be required to return the affected person to the
general prison population.
Two federal bills would establish commissions or work groups to develop new standards for
solitary confinement.294 A third bill requires the FBOP to submit a report to the legislature with
recommendations to reduce solitary confinement in federal prisons “to near zero over the 10-year
period beginning on the date of the submission of the report.” 295
One of the federal bills would also establish a Civil Rights Ombudsman within the FBOP. 296
The ombudsman would be appointed by the Attorney-General and report to the Director of the
FBOP. Their functions would include reviewing and investigating complaints of civil rights
violations, referring violations to the Department of Justice, and identifying areas for
improvement to policies and practices to reduce solitary confinement. The ombudsman would
submit an annual report to Congress. Reports made to the ombudsman would not constitute an
administrative remedy for the purposes of the PLRA.297
The same bill would also establish a National Resource Center on Solitary Confinement
Reduction and Reform.298 This center would coordinate with state, local, and federal
correctional systems to reduce solitary confinement; facilitate the exchange of information
between different facilities, national experts, and researchers; evaluate jurisdictions that have
reduced solitary confinement and identify best practices; research the effectiveness of
292
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alternatives to solitary confinement; develop self-assessment tools for jurisdictions to examine
their use of solitary confinement; and conduct public webinars to inform facilities of new and
promising practices.299 The center would be administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance
and would report annually to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
A Congressional House Bill proposes a new National Solitary Confinement Study and Reform
Commission to conduct a “comprehensive legal and factual study of the penological, physical,
mental, social, fiscal, and economic impacts of solitary confinement” on federal, state, and local
governments, and communities and social institutions generally. 300 The commission would
report on its findings within two years, and recommend national standards to reduce solitary
confinement.301 Within two years of receiving the report, the Attorney-General would then
publish a final rule adopting national standards to reduce solitary confinement. 302 The standards
would be based on the independent judgment of the Attorney-General, taking into account the
recommendations of the commission as well as “such data, opinions, and proposals that the
Attorney-General determines appropriate to consider.” 303 However, the bill contains a limitation
which provides that the Attorney-General shall not establish standards “that would impose
substantial additional costs compared to the costs presently expended by federal and state
correctional systems.”304 The bill would link states’ compliance with the new standards to the
receipt of federal funding. It proposes that the Attorney-General would reduce by five percent
the amount that a state or local government receives under the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets
Act from the second year of the standards’ operation for any state or local government that is not
in compliance.305

5.2.6 Employees
Four bills address the training of employees working in solitary confinement. 306 Hawaii’s bill
would merely require that staff undergo “appropriate training … to develop the skills necessary
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to protect the mental and physical health” of people in solitary confinement. 307 A bill introduced
in Pennsylvania would require training on when solitary confinement may be imposed, the
maximum time a person may be held in solitary confinement, less restrictive interventions, and
the identification of developmental disabilities, symptoms of mental illness and trauma disorders,
and methods of safely responding to people in distress. 308
A federal bill would require that employees be trained to recognize symptoms of mental illness,
risks and side effects of psychiatric medications, de-escalation techniques for managing people
with mental illness, consequences of untreated mental illness, the long- and short-term
psychological effects of solitary confinement, and de-escalation and communication techniques
to divert people from situations that might result in their being placed in solitary confinement. 309
A bill introduced in Nevada proposes regulations that would require employees working in
solitary confinement to complete training on effective communication, crisis intervention, and
de-escalation.310
Though not specific to solitary confinement, the training provisions in Connecticut’s bill would
be relevant to people held in isolation. It proposes that, in addition to existing training on
symptoms and consequences of mental illness and placement in administrative segregation,
employees would also receive training on the recognition of and techniques for mitigating
trauma and vicarious trauma.311 Existing programs and support for employees would also be
extended to include the development and use of strategies to prevent and treat the effects of
trauma on employees.312

5.2.7 Due Process Protections
Six bills propose due process protections that are broader than those articulated by the federal
courts.313 In all six, the protections apply when a person faces placement in solitary confinement
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or the continuation of such placement, thereby avoiding the need to consider the atypical and
significant hardship test.314
Four bills would provide the right to representation at disciplinary or classification hearings. 315
A federal bill proposes that the right to representation be pursuant to the Defender Services
Program administered by the Department of Justice; while Pennsylvania’s bill provides that
people would be represented by legal counsel.
Other protections proposed in the bills include rights of appeal; 316 periodic and ongoing review
processes;317 private, face-to-face interviews with multidisciplinary staff committees; and the
imposition of a clear and convincing evidentiary standard instead of the some evidence
standard.318 None of the bills propose to allow confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses.

5.3 Settlements and Consent Decrees
Solitary confinement reform has also been pursued through litigation. This section explores a
sample of settlement agreements and consent decrees reached in different cases. The cases
discussed in this section have been selected for the range of issues they address; geographic
diversity; and due to their relative recency in terms of settlement, subsequent proceedings, and
developments.

5.3.1 Mississippi
5.3.1.1

Presley v. Epps

In 2005, a class action was filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi on
behalf of people confined in a solitary confinement unit, Unit 32, at the Mississippi State
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Penitentiary at Parchman.319 Unit 32 held nearly 1,000 people in five buildings. Describing the
conditions in Unit 32 as “barbaric,” the complaint alleged a range of Eighth Amendment
violations, including that people were subject to profound isolation and confined to their cells for
twenty-three or twenty-four hours per day, except for five-minute showers three times per
week.320 Their “sporadic” exercise took place in cages only slightly larger than the cells, and
people remained fully shackled in handcuffs, leg-irons, and waist-chains during their exercise
period. Most people in Unit 32 had no access to programs, jobs, religious services, social
interaction, or pastimes. At best, they were allowed to exchange two books from the library
every three to four months.321 The complaint also alleged that the physical conditions in Unit 32
were unsanitary, insect infestations were pervasive, excessive force was deployed routinely,
security staffing was “dangerously inadequate,” and medical, mental health, and dental care was
lacking.322
The complaint in Presley v. Epps resulted in a relatively prompt consent decree, which was
approved by the court in April 2006.323 Most of the terms in the decree related to physical
conditions, with the state agreeing to improve hygiene standards, provide adequate lighting,
implement a mosquito and pest control program, and ensure proper cleaning and sanitizing of
food trays and that food be served at appropriate and safe temperatures. 324 The only provision in
the consent decree specific to solitary confinement stipulated that the state would allow people
out-of-cell exercise “consistent with ACA Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions [and] …
have new exercise pens completed no later than July 1, 2006.” 325 The consent decree also
required the state to formulate a plan to enable people to “earn their way to less restrictive
housing” through good behavior and a step down program. 326
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Pursuant to the decree, the plaintiffs’ counsel and experts had access to Unit 32, the prison
hospital, records, incarcerated people, and staff in order to monitor compliance. 327 In the course
of ongoing monitoring, various deficiencies were identified, leading to supplemental consent
decrees relating to the provision of medical and mental health care, use of force, and the
classification of people in administrative segregation. 328 A supplemental consent decree
regarding classification provided that people with severe mental illness could not be held in
administrative segregation for more than fourteen days. 329
It was also agreed that people who were not “high-level gang members” would no longer be held
in long-term administrative segregation (defined as sixty days or more) solely because of their
gang affiliation. Furthermore, people in administrative segregation who did not commit any
serious rule violations and who completed rehabilitative programs would be released from
administrative segregation and transferred to the general prison population within two years.
This provision would not apply to anyone who murdered another person while incarcerated,
planned or participated in a major riot, escaped from custody and caused serious physical injury
to another person, or posed a significant risk of physical injury to others if they were to be
moved to the general population.330 The state agreed to provide program space and staffing to
facilitate the use of dayrooms and a dining hall, and provide education, rehabilitative services,
and recreational activities (congregate and individual) for “eligible Unit 32 inmates” within
seven months of the date of the decree. 331
In accordance with the consent decree, a step down unit would transition people with mental
illnesses out of administrative segregation.332 The step down unit consisted of thirty-two cells,
and people would progress through two phases of intensive mental health treatment. Preference
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for admission into the program was given to “motivated prisoners.” 333 During the first phase,
people were still housed in segregation, while in the second, they were moved to a more open
environment.334 In the first phase, people participated in group therapy in ankle restraints that
were secured to bolts in the floor. Once they progressed to the second phase, treatment and
congregate activities took place without cuffs or restraints. 335
By February 2009, the number of people in solitary confinement in Unit 32 had decreased from
over 900 to below 100 (with approximately eighty additional people in administrative
segregation remaining in the unit on death row). As of March 2009, the statewide number of
people in administrative segregation (excluding those on death row) was 181. 336
In August 2010, the court issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice by agreement of
the parties.337 This agreement was reached after the state agreed to close Unit 32, relocate the
population remaining in Unit 32 to other facilities, and correct deficiencies in the provision of
medical and mental health care. 338 The state agreed that people with serious mental illnesses
who had been held in Unit 32 would be transferred to the East Mississippi Correctional Facility
(“EMCF”).339
In June 2012, the Commissioner of Mississippi’s Department of Corrections, Christopher Epps,
testified before the US Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human
Rights in a hearing entitled “Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and
Public Safety Consequences.”340 At that hearing, Commissioner Epps discussed the closure of
Unit 32. In his written statement, he explained that the Department of Corrections had
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“developed specific administrative housing units for the mentally ill [from Unit 32] with
specially trained correctional officers.” 341
5.3.1.2

Dockery v. Hall

In 2019, the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi ruled on a challenge to
conditions of confinement in a separate case alleging cruel and unusual conditions at EMCF. 342
The complaint was filed in 2013 and alleged various Eight Amendment violations, including the
misuse of solitary confinement. The plaintiffs contended that they were being denied their one
hour of out-of-cell time per day to shower and exercise, sometimes for weeks on end. They also
asserted that EMCF’s solitary confinement units held “dozens of seriously mentally ill prisoners
who are locked down in filthy cells for days, weeks, or even years at a time.” 343 Some people in
solitary confinement had not been permitted to shower for weeks and were only allowed to do so
on the day before a visit from plaintiffs’ counsel. 344 It was also alleged that the physical
conditions in the solitary confinement units were inadequate due to non-functioning plumbing,
vermin infestation, lights that did not operate, and deafening noise levels. 345 Some people had
been held in these conditions for years.
A bench trial was held in 2018 and the district court issued a judgment in 2019, finding no
violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court rejected the submission that the Mandela Rules’
fifteen-day standard constituted the maximum period that a person should be held in solitary
confinement. The judge stated that the Rules did not create “a benchmark for determining
whether any constitutional rights have been violated.” 346 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’
claims that their placements in solitary confinement were unjustified, that the conditions were
inhumane, or that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to these conditions. 347
The judgment referred to the fact that Christopher Epps, the former Commissioner of
Mississippi’s Department of Corrections, had since pleaded guilty to federal charges of money
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laundering and fraud in connection with the awarding of certain contracts relating to EMCF.
After his conduct came to light, various changes were implemented at the facility. The judgment
stated that between the date that the complaint was filed (when Mr. Epps was still
Commissioner) and the trial,
“the manner in which the prison was being operated did not remain stagnant. Instead, multiple
changes were made at the prison that impacted staffing, physical and mental health care, and
environmental conditions.”348

The judgment made no reference to any improvement in conditions in the solitary confinement
units. It found that “the prison that existed at the time of trial was not the same as the one that
had existed when this lawsuit was filed.”349 Indeed, the judge expressed “surprise[] with respect
to the cleanliness and condition of the prison in particular after seeing photographs of the facility
that were taken prior to the lawsuit’s having been filed before trial, and hearing the anecdotal
evidence presented by the prisoners who testified at trial.” 350
In February 2020, the US Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division announced it had opened
an investigation into conditions of confinement in four Mississippi prisons, including
Parchman.351 The investigation will focus on various issues, one of which is the “appropriate use
of isolation at Parchman.”

5.3.2 Indiana
5.3.2.1

Mast v. Donahue

In 2005, a class action complaint was filed in federal court in Indiana on behalf of mentally ill
people confined within the SHU at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. 352 The complaint
alleged that the Department of Correction was violating the Eighth Amendment by confining
mentally ill people to conditions of extreme social isolation and sensory deprivation. People in
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the SHU at Wabash were held in windowless single cells for twenty-four hours per day except
for the occasional opportunity to exercise in a solitary, walled-off exercise area. 353 Though
people were offered showers daily, they would be locked in the shower and left there for more
than an hour at a time. There was no maximum time limit on placement in the SHU, and the
mental health treatment was described as “systemically inadequate.” 354 Mentally ill people were
often placed in four-point restraints and strapped to beds, stripped to their underwear, placed in
their cells with nothing but a blanket, and forcibly removed from cells by extraction teams
consisting of up to five prison officers wearing body armor. 355 Due to symptoms of mental
illness, some people continued to accumulate disciplinary infractions leading to additional time
in the SHU. As a result, “the more severe a prisoner’s mental illness, the more likely he is to
become “stuck” in the SHU, where the harsh conditions will exacerbate his mental illness still
further.”356
Following two years of settlement discussions, the parties reached a private settlement agreement
in 2007.357 They chose to enter a private settlement agreement because the PLRA limits the
scope of prospective relief in civil actions relating to prison conditions. Under the PLRA, relief
must be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation.” 358 The
PLRA allows parties to enter into private settlement agreements that are not subject to these
limitations, but such agreements cannot be enforced unless the proceedings are reinstated, or
remedies are pursued in state court under state law.359
The parties agreed to the following definition of “seriously mentally ill” for the purposes of the
private settlement agreement:
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“prisoners who have a current diagnosis, or evidence, of any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV
(DSM-IV) Axis I diagnosis or who are receiving treatment for such a diagnosis, or prisoners who
have been diagnosed with a mental disorder that is worsened by confinement in the SHU.” 360

This definition is important because a narrower definition was adopted in subsequent litigation
(discussed below).361
Under the settlement agreement, the state agreed that seriously mentally ill people would not be
held in the Wabash SHU, and that the Department of Correction would provide “a continuum of
services” for people requiring psychiatric treatment. 362 The agreement required face-to-face
screening of all people placed in the SHU within two business days of their placement, and, if
they were determined to be seriously mentally ill, they were to be transferred elsewhere within
seventy-two hours. Everyone held in the SHU would receive a weekly mental health evaluation.
Because the agreement resulted in the removal of seriously mentally ill people from the SHU, it
did not address the conditions for other people who remained there.
The agreement allowed for two years of monitoring by the plaintiffs’ counsel. The Department
of Correction was required to provide monthly information regarding everyone in the SHU who
was prescribed psychotropic medications, the names of everyone in the SHU with an DSM Axis
I diagnosis, the names of people who had been admitted to the SHU after being in the state’s
psychiatric facility, and details about anyone removed from the SHU upon being found to be
seriously mentally ill.363
The court approved the private settlement in November 2007 and ordered a stay of proceedings
for two years.364 In 2009, the case was dismissed without prejudice, subject to reinstatement by
the parties pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. 365
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In 2019, the parties agreed to terminate the private settlement agreement due to a separate
settlement reached in Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services v. Indiana Department of
Correction.366 After receiving a report from the plaintiffs’ counsel recording objections to the
termination of the agreement, the court closed the case. 367
5.3.2.2

Indiana Protection & Advocacy Services Commission. v Indiana Department of
Correction

The Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission (“IPAS”) filed a lawsuit in 2008 on
behalf of seriously mentally ill people incarcerated in all Indiana prisons. It alleged that the
Department of Correction was holding people in “excessively isolated and harsh conditions
which exacerbate their illnesses.”368 In an amended complaint, IPAS sought to bring the action
on its own behalf and on behalf of “current and future mentally ill prisoners committed to the
Indiana Department of Correction and who are housed in settings … that feature extended
periods of time in cells, including, but not limited to, prisoners in disciplinary segregation,
administrative segregation, or in the New Castle Psychiatric Unit.” 369 That complaint alleged
that a “significant number” of people with serious mental illnesses were confined in segregation
units where they were subject to severe isolation and lack of environmental stimulation. 370 Many
of the allegations in the complaint are similar to those made in the Mast complaint. For example:
mentally ill people frequently experienced violent extractions from their cells by armored
corrections officers; mental health assessments were conducted infrequently; and people were
confined in their cells for at least twenty-three hours per day and handcuffed whenever they left
their cells.371
A bench trial was held in 2011 and the court ruled that the plaintiffs had prevailed on their
Eighth Amendment claim.372 The court identified three ways in which segregation was harmful
366
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to people with serious mental illness: lack of social interaction, sensory deprivation, and
enforced idleness.373 The court found that the Department was aware of the “pernicious effects
of segregation” on people with serious mental illness. It referred to the Mast settlement and a
Mental Health Services Plan from 2008 in which the Department acknowledged the need to
“prevent decompensation secondary to confinement in segregation housing.” 374 Noting that a
preponderance of the evidence supported the claim that the effect of segregation on mentally ill
people was “toxic to their welfare,” the judge concluded that, without appropriate treatment and
relief, the effects of segregation would continue to cause serious injury. 375 The court also found
that the Department had been deliberately indifferent in failing to provide minimally adequate
mental health care.376
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to “the
delivery of mental health care which is within the bounds of the Eighth Amendment.” 377 The
case was remanded for further proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy. The parties
conferred to develop a plan to remedy the constitutional violations, and in 2016 proposed a
private settlement agreement which was subsequently approved by the court. 378 This agreement
defined “serious mental illness” more narrowly than the Mast agreement:
“a. Prisoners determined to have a current diagnosis or recent significant history of schizophrenia,
delusional disorder, schizophreniform disorder, schizoaffective disorder, brief psychotic disorder,
substance-induced psychotic disorder (excluding intoxication and withdrawal), undifferentiated
psychotic disorder, bipolar I or II disorders;
b. Prisoners diagnosed with any other validated mental illness that is clinically severe, based on
evidence-based standards, and that results in significant functional impairment; and
c. Prisoners diagnosed with an intellectual or developmental disability or other cognitive disorder
that results in a significant functional impairment.
d. As used above:
(i) “Recent significant history” refers to a diagnosis made at any time in the last 12 months.
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(ii) “Significant functional impairment” includes one of the following as determined by qualified
mental health staff:


Within the previous 6 months, the prisoner has either made a suicide attempt that mental
health staff considers serious, inflicted self-injury that mental health staff considers
serious, or both;



The prisoner has demonstrated difficulty in his/her ability to engage in activities of daily
living including eating, grooming and/or personal hygiene, maintenance of housing area,
participation in recreation, ambulation.



The prisoner has demonstrated a pervasive pattern of dysfunctional or disruptive social
interactions, bizarre or disruptive behavior, etc., as a result of mental illness.

(iii) A misdiagnosis does not qualify as a diagnosis or determination of mental illness for
purposes of this settlement, once the error has been determined by a qualified mental health
professional.”

Under the agreement, people with serious mental illness would be placed in settings where they
would receive at least ten hours of therapeutic programming each week and time out-of-cell for
recreation, showers, and other purposes. During group therapy sessions, people would not be
restrained unless it was deemed necessary for security reasons. 379 Individual therapy was to be
provided at least once per month and would take place in a setting that provided aural privacy
unless it was unsafe to do so.380 Additional out-of-cell time would be provided “where possible
and appropriate.”381
The parties also agreed, however, that people with serious mental illness could remain in
restrictive housing for up to thirty days, during which time they would not receive therapeutic
programming.382 People held under this thirty-day exception would have, at a minimum, face-toface contact with a mental health professional “multiple times a week, with no more than three
non-contact days between contact.”383 During a facility-wide lockdown, the Department was to
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continue to provide minimally adequate treatment unless it posed an unacceptable risk to the
safety and security of the facility, staff, incarcerated people, or the public. 384
The agreement contained oversight provisions requiring the provision of information to the
plaintiffs’ counsel; the filing of status reports with the court every six months; and permitting the
plaintiffs’ counsel to tour each or any of the mental health units every six months. 385
The private settlement agreement remained in effect for three years from the date of the court’s
approval in March 2016, after which time the case was to be dismissed without prejudice.
However, shortly before the settlement agreement was due to expire, the parties agreed to an
extension, on the proviso that the Mast case would be closed.386
A report from the plaintiffs’ counsel regarding the closure of the Mast case noted that opposition
from the plaintiff class to the proposed dismissal focused on two points: the potential for
seriously mentally ill people at Wabash to be returned to the SHU; and the fact that segregation
was “inappropriate for all prisoners, regardless of their mental health, and the unit at Wabash …,
which does not have windows, is particularly problematic.” 387 As to the second point, plaintiffs’
counsel noted that the Mast decree did not address the segregation of people who were not
mentally ill and therefore that objection was deemed irrelevant. Regarding the first point,
counsel agreed that the definitions of “seriously mentally ill” in the Mast and IPAS agreements
differed, and that the IPAS agreement did not include every Axis I DSM-IV diagnosis. 388
However, counsel reported that the IPAS agreement required ongoing monitoring of the medical
records of people who were reclassified as no longer being seriously mentally ill. The report
stated that counsel would continue to monitor whether anyone was improperly placed in
restrictive housing, including in the SHU at Wabash.389
In an order closing the Mast case, the court explained that:
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“termination of the Mast Agreement in exchange for a one-year extension of the IPAS Agreement
is more beneficial to the intended [Mast] class members than allowing the IPAS Agreement to
immediately lapse so the Mast Agreement can continue indefinitely.”390

The court observed that the plaintiff class in Mast did not appear to have any members at the
time the order was made, because “all seriously mentally ill prisoners have been removed from
the [SHU] at Wabash.”391 Moreover, the court noted that the IPAS Agreement was broader in
scope because it applied to all of Indiana’s facilities, not just Wabash. It therefore prevented all
seriously mentally ill people from being housed for extended periods of time in segregation or
restrictive housing, “subject to the limited exceptions based on dangerousness and
voluntariness.”392
The IPAS settlement agreement was extended to July 2020. In a joint status report filed in March
2020, the parties informed the court that one of the units used to treat mentally ill people was
destroyed by a fire in September 2018, and there had been a delay in rebuilding it. 393 Because
there was insufficient space, the requirement to provide ten hours per week for out-of-cell
treatment was not being met.394 The plaintiffs proposed a further extension of the settlement
agreement to July 2021 in order to allow the state to comply fully with the settlement agreement.
According to the report, the Department was considering this proposal at the time that the report
was filed.395

5.3.3 California
In 2009, two people incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison filed a pro se lawsuit against the
state of California in Ashker v. Governor, alleging various constitutional violations in connection
with their indefinite placement in solitary confinement in the Pelican Bay SHU. 396 They were
held indefinitely in the SHU because the CDCR had designated them as gang members. The
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complaint alleged that the CDCR violated due process through its approach to “validating”
people’s status as gang members.397
An amended complaint was filed in September 2012 on behalf of all people in indeterminate
SHU placements in Pelican Bay on the basis of gang validation, and a subclass of people who
were or would be held for more than ten years in the Pelican Bay SHU. 398 The complaint alleged
that people in the SHU were confined in cramped, windowless cells for between twenty-two and
twenty-four hours per day, denied telephone calls, contact visits, and vocational, recreational, or
educational programming.399 The SHU contained 1,056 individual cells, and approximately 500
people had been confined there for more than ten years. 400 Many of the class members had been
incarcerated in Pelican Bay since the facility was opened in 1989 and thus had spent over
twenty-five years in isolation. The complaint detailed the “unrelenting and crushing mental
anguish, pain and suffering” that the plaintiffs experienced from living in such restrictive
conditions.401 It also described the hunger strikes that were coordinated in 2011 to protest these
conditions, and the subsequent retaliation against the people who led the strikes. 402
Class certification was granted in 2014, following an unsuccessful application by CDCR to
dismiss the claim as moot in 2013.403 Discovery and production of expert reports followed, and
in September 2015, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. 404 The settlement was
approved by the court in January 2016. 405
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the CDCR agreed that people would not be placed in
administrative segregation, a SHU, or step down program solely on the basis of gang
validation.406 The CDCR agreed to modify eligibility for the step down program so that it would
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be based on individual behavior rather than gang validation status. 407 The step down program
was intended to be a “rehabilitative, gang behavior diversion program” whereby people would
receive incremental increases in privileges and freedom of movement. 408 The CDCR was also
required to review all gang-validated people currently in the SHU. Anyone who had not been
found guilty of a SHU-eligible rule violation with a gang connection within the previous two
years would be released to a “general population institution consistent with his case factors.” 409
The agreement also provided for the establishment of a “Restrictive Custody General Population
Housing Unit” or “RCGP.”410 The RCGP is a high-security housing unit designed to
accommodate people from the SHU to provide “increased opportunities for positive social
interaction with other prisoners and staff,” including education, yard or out-of-cell time in “small
group yards” in groups approved by a classification committee, access to religious services,
support services, job assignments, and leisure time activity groups. 411
The CDCR agreed that it would not house anyone in the Pelican Bay SHU for more than five
continuous years. Anyone deemed to require ongoing SHU placement beyond this time would,
however, be transferred to another SHU in the state.412 The CDCR was required to provide
plaintiffs’ counsel with data and documentation for two years following the court’s approval of
the settlement to monitor compliance with the agreement. 413
In November 2017, the plaintiffs sought an extension of the settlement agreement, alleging that
the CDCR continued to violate the due process rights of people incarcerated at Pelican Bay by
relying on confidential information to validate gang affiliations and return people to solitary
confinement.414 The motion further alleged that the CDCR’s procedural protections for the
placement of people in the RCGP were inadequate, and that the CDCR had continued to use
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gang validations as a basis to deny parole. A twelve-month extension to the agreement was
ordered, effective from January 2019. 415
Prior to the court’s issuing the order extending the settlement agreement, in December 2018, the
district court made separate orders to address problems identified in the parties’ joint status
reports.416 These orders concluded that the CDCR had violated the settlement agreement in two
respects. First, the court found that members of the plaintiff class were not offered out-of-cell
time beyond that which they received in the SHU. Nor did such allowances comport with the
CDCR’s regulations and practices with respect to people in the general prison population with
the same security status.417 The plaintiffs had made various suggestions to increase out-of-cell
time, including measures such as allowing meals in the dining hall; or work, education, or
vocational programs, but they did not seek to include these proposals in the court’s order, in light
of the PLRA’s requirement that relief be narrowly tailored. 418 The plaintiffs did, however, seek
an order directing the CDCR to comply with increased monitoring requirements relating to outof-cell time, and to allow the plaintiffs to appoint an expert to conduct visits and access data and
documentation. The court accepted the monitoring requests, concluding that they were
minimally intrusive, narrowly tailored, and consistent with the settlement agreement. 419
The CDCR’s second violation of the settlement, the court found, arose from a failure to provide
some class members with exercise and leisure activities in groups. 420 The CDCR had designated
these individuals, who were confined in the RCGP, as “walk-alone status,” meaning that they
were allowed to exercise, but not with other people. The court concluded that this approach
violated the requirement that the CDCR provide “increased opportunities for social interaction”
that included “time in small group yards … and leisure time activity groups.” 421 The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the inclusion of the word “group” in the settlement agreement
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required that such activities must involve more than one person. The court ordered the prison’s
institutional classification committee to determine whether people in the RCGP should be
classified as “walk-alone” or not. If necessary, the court noted, the committee could allow for
the formation of groups comprising only two people.422 The committee was ordered to provide
anyone designated as “walk-alone” and plaintiffs’ counsel with reasons for the decision, and to
explain why any person could not exercise in a group, even a group of two. 423
The CDCR appealed these two orders. In August 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s finding and held that the CDCR had not violated the settlement agreement. 424 In relation
to out-of-cell time, the court determined that the settlement agreement did not limit the CDCR’s
discretion for people who had been removed from the SHU, and the CDCR was not required to
provide any specific amount of out-of-cell time for this group of people. 425
As to people designated in walk-alone status, the court described the settlement’s language
requiring increased opportunities for social interaction as “aspirational,” but held it did not
impose a strict requirement for greater social interaction. 426 The court rejected the lower court’s
interpretation of “small group yards,” noting that the settlement agreement did not state “how
many, … if any, other prisoners need be in the same group yard.” The court determined that the
plain meaning of the clause was to give the institutional classification committee discretion to
limit the number of people in the small group yards. It concluded that the plaintiffs “cannot now
complain about how the [committee] has exercised that discretion.” 427 While people on walkalone status might be limited in their physical contact with others in group activities and in the
yard, the court noted that they were still able to interact through meetings with teachers (through
cell doors), job assignments, phone calls, and contact and no-contact visits. Thus, the court
found that the walk-alone status limitations were “only minor deviations” from the requirements
of the settlement agreement.428

422

Id. at 11.
Remedial Order 3, supra note 416, at 2.
424
Ashker et al. v. Newsom et al., 968 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2020).
425
Id. at 945.
426
Id.
427
Id.
428
Id. at 946.
423

273

The plaintiffs have petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc. 429 They have also
filed a motion to extend the settlement agreement based on the same systemic due process
violations.430 The petition to the Ninth Circuit is pending. Separately, in April 2021, the district
court extended the settlement agreement for a further twelve months due to ongoing due process
violations.431

5.3.4 New York
In 2016, the Southern District of New York approved a settlement in Peoples v. Annucci, a class
action brought on behalf of people in New York prisons who were, or would in the future, be
subject to disciplinary confinement in a SHU. 432 The lawsuit alleged that the DOCCS violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by placing people in long-term solitary confinement
without due process.
The first complaint was filed pro se in 2011 by a man who received a disciplinary infraction for
possessing legal documents in his cell.433 He was held in the SHU for three years. The
complaint was later broadened to seek relief on behalf of a class of people placed in disciplinary
segregation. The lawsuit alleged that, as of 2012, 4,300 people were locked in tiny concrete cells
for twenty-three hours a day for minor infractions, and that DOCCS’s policies encouraged
sentences to the SHU for behavior that presented no risk of harm to others or to the security of
the prison.434 SHU sentences had been imposed for infractions that included having an untidy
cell, littering, possessing unauthorized jewelry, unreported illness, and “correspondence
violations.”435 Furthermore, DOCCS’s policies granted the staff broad discretion to impose long
SHU sentences without mandatory upper limits, guidelines, or protocols, nor was there any limit
on the number of consecutive sentences to the SHU. 436 The complaint also alleged that Black
429
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people were more likely to receive sentences to the SHU than others: in June 2011, Black people
constituted sixty-two percent of the individuals held at the Upstate and Southport correctional
facilities, where people with the longest SHU sentences were held, while, in contrast,
approximately forty-nine percent of the general prison population was Black. 437
The conditions in the SHU were like those described in other cases: people were confined in
small cells furnished with only a toilet, sink, and bed. Exercise took place in empty pens that
were much larger than cells. People in the SHU were deprived of all meaningful human contact
and interaction, unable to participate in activities, programs, or classes, allowed to shower only
twice per week, unable to make telephone calls, and subject to the threat of “deprivation orders,”
whereby DOCCS officials would withhold exercise, showers, clothing, bedding, or toilet paper
as punishment.438
The parties reached a settlement in December 2015.439 Pursuant to an interim agreement in
January 2014, DOCCS was required to offer alternatives to SHU placements for young people
and people with special needs; a presumption against SHU placements for pregnant people was
established; the oversight of DOCCS’s disciplinary system was strengthened through the
creation of a new Assistant Commissioner role; guidelines were implemented for all disciplinary
confinement sanctions; and some steps were implemented to improve SHU conditions by
increasing outdoor exercise time and providing headphones and in-cell study packets “in
specified circumstances and locations.”440 The study packets were intended to address topics
including behavior modification and substance abuse, and people would be expected to complete
them alone with some assistance in the form of a cell-side visit from an instructor.
The final settlement agreement contained detailed provisions requiring the creation of several
“SHU-Alternative Programs” that would be established at various facilities. These programs
established progressive increases in out-of-cell time, beginning with a maximum of four hours
(two for programs and two for exercise) for four days a week, and two hours on the remaining
three days. Restraint chairs would be used for programs, and participants would also move in
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restraints during the early phases of the program. 441 Provisions requiring the establishment of
“Step Down to Community Programs” created two new programs aimed at people in the SHU
with between forty-five and sixty days remaining until their release date. The goal of the step
down program was to assist people to prepare for release through “social skills practice, relapse
prevention, family reintegration and employment readiness.” 442 Such programs would be offered
for three hours per day, five days per week. During the first phase of the program, participants
would be confined to restraint chairs.443
The agreement created new keeplock units as alternatives to the SHUs. People confined in these
new units would be allowed one hour of daily congregate recreation, access to telephone calls,
and the same personal property allowances and access to visitors as the general population. 444
Conditions in the SHUs were to be improved through the provision of shower curtains, trialing a
tablet program, and allowing telephone calls, books from a library cart, and enrolment in
approved correspondence courses (at individuals’ own expense). 445
The settlement agreement did not preclude the continued use of administrative segregation or
protective custody.446 It also did not address the racial disparities raised in the complaint. The
agreement is effective for five years and DOCCS must comply with various monitoring and
reporting obligations, including by providing quarterly reports, notifying plaintiffs’ counsel of
proposed regulations that may affect the terms of the agreement, facilitating tours and
assessments of facilities twice each year, and meeting annually to discuss compliance issues. 447
The district court approved the settlement in March 2016. Judge Shira Scheindlin described it as
“historic” and stated that it would “greatly reduce the frequency, duration, and severity of
solitary confinement in New York state prisons.” 448 While acknowledging that there was
“undoubtedly more work to be done, both with respect to solitary confinement and with the

441

Id. at 7-9.
Id. at 19.
443
Id. at 19-20.
444
Id. at 30-31.
445
Id. at 38-40.
446
Id. at 28.
447
Id. at 49-56.
448
Opinion and Order at 2-3, Peoples et al. v. Annucci et al., No. 1:11 Civ. 2694 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2016).
442

276

conditions of prisons in general,” Judge Scheindlin remarked that the settlement would end the
use of and conditions in solitary confinement as they had existed in New York for decades. 449
The judge also expressed hope that the contours of the settlement agreement and the
“collaborative process by which it was reached” would provide a “model for other states that are
addressing issues of prison reform.”450 In considering objections from the plaintiffs’ class, Judge
Scheindlin noted that many comments expressed concern about DOCCS’s ability to implement
the settlement. Some objections addressed issues not covered by the settlement, including:
requests for more cameras in SHUs; better mental health diagnoses and treatment; placing date
and time stamps on incoming mail; improving the quality and quantity of food; improving
conditions in administrative segregation; improving access to religious services; providing
warmer clothing and cells; and implementing reforms to protect people from physical and sexual
abuse.451 Notwithstanding these objections, the judge concluded that the settlement was fair and
reasonable, and the majority of the plaintiff class supported the settlement. 452 While the
settlement could not address every problem in prisons or in solitary confinement, Judge
Scheindlin remarked that
“further reforms are likely to follow, especially when the Governor, Attorney-General, and
Commissioner of DOCCS, representing the people of New York, have all demonstrated their
strong commitment to improving the conditions of confinement for prisoners within the state’s
custody.”453

Further reforms did not eventuate until March 2021, when the HALT Act was passed. 454
Peoples v. Annucci is ongoing with continued enforcement of the settlement agreement.

5.3.5 Georgia
In May 2019, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia approved a settlement in
Gumm v. Ford, a class action brought on behalf of people who were or would be confined in the
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SMU in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison. 455 The initial complaint was filed pro
se in February 2015. The plaintiff alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from his
being held for five years in solitary confinement in the SMU without meaningful review of his
placement, contrary to policy and state regulations.
An amended complaint filed in 2017 also challenged the conditions of confinement in the SMU
under the Eighth Amendment.456 People in the SMU were confined to cells for twenty-three to
twenty-four hours per day and deprived of almost all human contact and sensory stimulation.
Cell doors and windows were covered with metal shields, and recreation was only allowed for up
to five hours per week, divided into two segments of two-and-a-half hours. 457
The amended complaint alleged that the state described the SMU as a “behavior modification
program” that incentivized people to return to the general prison population. In practice,
however, people were placed in the SMU indefinitely, regardless of their behavior. 458 Different
policies governed the processes for assignments to and transfers out of the SMU. The complaint
alleged that prison officials provided no information about what was required for eligibility to
leave the SMU.459 For example, the named plaintiff was informed in a placement review that he
would remain in the SMU because he posed a threat to “the operation of safe and secure facilities
[due to] being an escape risk.”460 Another placement review simply contained the word
“remain,” and no further information was provided.461 At the time the amended complaint was
filed, Mr. Gumm had been in the SMU for seven years.
The parties entered into a settlement agreement in December 2018. 462 To address the alleged
Eighth Amendment violations relating to conditions, the agreement required increased out-ofcell time of at least four hours per day on weekdays (subject to security or safety
considerations).463 Three hours of that time would be spent in a common area using restraint
455
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tables while the fourth hour would be spent in an exercise cage. The agreement allowed for outof-cell time to be withheld for up to fourteen days as a punishment for serious disciplinary
offenses.464 There was no requirement under the agreement that people be allowed out of their
cells at all on weekends.465
Other conditions addressed in the settlement included improved access to book carts (at least
once per week), tablets, two hours of programs or classes per week, access to chaplaincy
services, and a requirement that food be of the same quality and quantity as that provided to
people in the general prison population.466 The state also agreed that people in the SMU would
be provided with medication, clothing, and basic personal items, the same opportunity to clean
their cells as people in the general prison population, and showers three times per week. 467
The agreement imposed a maximum two-year limit on placement in the SMU, unless the person
had committed a serious offense while incarcerated (such as murder, assault causing grievous
bodily injury, taking another person hostage, or escaping outside the facility); their offense that
resulted in their prison sentence was “so egregious that they were placed in the SMU
immediately” upon arrival at the prison; or the person posed “such an exceptional, credible, and
articulable risk to the safe operation of the prison system or to the public” due to their “unique
position of influence and authority over others.” 468 The state agreed to implement formal
hearings prior to assignment to the SMU with at least forty-eight hours’ notice, a right to attend
and be heard, to submit written objections, and to appeal. 469 Review hearings would be
conducted every sixty to ninety days once people were assigned to the SMU, and mental health
evaluations would be conducted in advance of hearings. 470 Every person placed in the SMU
would receive a management plan explaining the review process and detailing the goals and
steps necessary to qualify for transfer out of the SMU.471
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The parties agreed to limited monitoring and reporting requirements, including four meetings
during the three-year term of the agreement, access to records and data, and three onsite visits
over the term of the agreement with at least seven business days’ notice in advance. 472
In its order approving the settlement, the court noted that the Department of Corrections had
expressly stipulated that the terms of the agreement satisfied the requirements of the PLRA. 473
The court therefore did not conduct a provision-by-provision review of the agreement to
determine whether each clause complied with the PLRA.474 While concluding that the
agreement complied with the PLRA, the judge noted that
“a remedial order narrowly tailored to preventing future violations of certain class members’
federal rights is not overbroad even though its ‘collateral effects’ may improve conditions for
prisoners generally.”475

Most of the plaintiff class’s objections to the settlement agreement, the judge noted, expressed
concerns about the state’s prior failure to implement settlement terms, particularly in relation to
out-of-cell time and adequate staffing numbers. Concerns were also expressed about the lack of
progress in improving conditions in the SMU and implementing agreed procedures for placement
and retention in the SMU.476 Many class members reported that, due to a lack of staff, people
were being denied the requisite out-of-cell time, and some also complained about having no
access to programs or library services. The judge concluded that none of these objections
provided a basis for rejecting the settlement, and the court would address any failure to comply if
it arose. The court noted also that the Department of Corrections had agreed that it was required
to dedicate the resources necessary to implement the settlement’s terms. 477 The judge described
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the two-year limit on placement in the SMU (with exceptions) and the use of restraint tables for
out-of-cell time as fair and reasonable solutions to the issues raised in the complaint. 478

5.4

Administrative Reforms

Some states have introduced solitary confinement reforms through administrative policy changes
alone, though in most cases, these changes were prompted by litigation or the threat of litigation.
Colorado and Maine provide two examples of successful policy reform. The approaches taken in
these two states, together with examples of policy reform in other states, are discussed in this
section.

5.4.1 Colorado
In 2011, a study conducted by the National Institute of Corrections concluded that the number of
people in long-term solitary confinement in Colorado was increasing and people were held in
such conditions for an average of two years. 479 Colorado’s Department of Corrections then
implemented a series of reforms over the next six years. The Department first reviewed all
people held in solitary confinement for more than twelve months and reassigned some to step
down units with the intention of preparing them to return to the general population. It then
reduced the list of infractions punishable by solitary confinement and eliminated indefinite
placement in administrative segregation. The Department also developed a residential treatment
program for mentally ill people in solitary confinement, which included ten hours of out-of-cell
treatment and ten hours of out-of-cell recreation per week, again with the objective of returning
people to the general population.480 A statute was enacted in 2014 that banned long-term solitary
confinement for people with serious mental illness except in exigent circumstances. 481
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Between November 2011 and May 2015, the Department reduced the number of people in
administrative segregation from 1,505 to 131, and it reported that the average length of time
spent in administrative segregation dropped from twenty-eight months to eight months. 482
The Department continued to implement administrative reforms, introducing a fifteen-day
maximum on solitary confinement placements in October 2017. 483 Violations could not be
stacked such that consecutive sentences were no longer allowed. 484 The state’s policies also
prohibit the placement of pregnant and young people in solitary confinement. 485 The current
practice remains that people may only be held in solitary confinement for a maximum of fifteen
days. CLA-Liman’s 2018 report stated that, as of fall 2017, Colorado held ten people, or 0.1
percent of its prison population, in restrictive housing, and that number dropped to zero as of
July 2019.486
In 2018, the Department’s then-Executive Director reported that people formerly held in solitary
confinement would, from that time forward, be allowed out of their cells for at least four hours
per day, and they would spend their time at restraint tables with others where they could engage
in programs and other activities.487 The reduction of the solitary confinement population led to
the closure of one of the state’s supermax prisons, though it was reopened in 2020 as part of the
state’s plan to close private prisons.488 The Director of the Department has reportedly
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acknowledged that “retro-fitting” the supermax prison so that people can be accommodated
without being held in solitary confinement will be difficult.489
The Department’s narrative about implementing solitary confinement reforms is framed in terms
of the state recognizing that it was “simply the right thing to do.” 490 However, the state had also
been subject to litigation concerning its use of solitary confinement prior to the implementation
of the reforms. In 2010, a plaintiff in one of the state’s supermax prisons filed a lawsuit alleging
violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
the Rehabilitation Act, arising from the denial of access to outdoor exercise during his twelve
years in solitary confinement, lack of mental health treatment, and barriers to progression out of
administrative segregation.491 The district court issued a final judgment in August 2012 which
found the Department had unconstitutionally denied the plaintiff access to outdoor exercise. 492
Because the Department did not implement any changes in response to this litigation but instead
transferred the plaintiff to another prison where he would have access to outdoor exercise, a
second lawsuit was initiated in 2013.493 This class action complaint alleged that the Department
still failed to provide outdoor exercise at the supermax prison. As demonstrated by the 2010
litigation, when people complained about the lack of outdoor exercise, they were transferred to
other prisons.494 A settlement agreement was reached in November 2015 and it was approved by
the court in 2016.495 The Department agreed to complete the construction of outdoor yards and
to permit all incarcerated people to exercise outdoors for one hour per day, three days per week,
subject to safety and security concerns or exigent circumstances. It also agreed to increase
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exercise time to four hours per day, seven days per week (most of which would still be spent in
the indoor exercise cells).496
While the administrative reforms were broader than the issues raised in these two cases, it is
notable that the reforms took place after this litigation was commenced.

5.4.2 Maine
In 2011 and 2012, Maine’s Department of Corrections implemented a series of administrative
reforms to reduce the number of people held in solitary confinement. Prior to these reforms,
people incarcerated in the SMU in Maine State Prison were isolated alone for twenty-three hours
per day with limited human contact, and there was no maximum limit on the time they could be
kept there.497 The administrative reforms were prompted by a legislative resolve passed by the
Maine Legislature in 2010 which directed the Department of Corrections to review its policies
relating to the placement of people in the SMU. 498 According to the ACLU, the reforms were
also motivated by the threat of litigation.499
In accordance with the resolve, the State’s Board of Corrections established a focus group to
review relevant policies and external submissions. A report by the focus group identified various
problems with the use of solitary confinement and recommended changes. 500 The Department of
Corrections then implemented those recommendations. The first major change was to reduce
disciplinary segregation by providing other options that did not involve moving people to the
SMU and limiting segregation as a response to serious offenses. Administrative segregation was
allowed only for “extreme circumstances,” and a third category of “high risk segregation status”
was eliminated altogether.501
In addition, the Department of Corrections introduced a new requirement that whenever a person
was moved to the SMU, their usual bed had to be retained in the general population.
Consequently, placement in the SMU could not be used to transfer people permanently out of
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their units. The staff were given additional training in methods and techniques for managing
people, and limits were imposed on the use of segregation while investigations were
conducted.502 Finally, new processes were implemented to limit the amount of time people could
be assigned to the SMU. Each person would receive an individual plan detailing specific
requirements and goals with the objective of returning them to the general population. These
plans were developed in consultation with corrections and mental health staff. 503
As a result of these reforms, the Department of Corrections closed one of the two solitary
confinement units at the Maine State Prison. By 2012, the SMU’s population had halved in size
to approximately forty-six people.504 Maine appears to have sustained these reductions: CLALiman’s 2020 report showed that twenty people, or 0.9 percent of the state’s prison population,
were held in restrictive housing as of July 2019. 505
In March 2021, a reform bill was introduced in the Maine legislature that prohibited all solitary
confinement and required that the commissioner be notified of any person held in segregation for
more than five days and the reasons for the confinement. 506

5.4.3 New Mexico
New Mexico has implemented some administrative-level reforms to solitary confinement, but
they have not been as comprehensive as those introduced in Colorado and Maine, nor do they
appear to apply consistently across all prisons in the state. In 2012, New Mexico’s Corrections
Department worked with the Vera Institute of Justice to evaluate its use of segregation. 507 At
that time, the Department reported that approximately eleven percent of the state’s incarcerated
population was in solitary confinement, and Vera considered that the practice was overused for
disciplinary purposes. Approximately 75 percent of the people in solitary confinement were
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inactive gang members held in protective custody. 508 The Department stated that it reduced the
use of segregation for protective custody and eliminated long-term protective custody. 509 A
thirty-day limit was imposed on disciplinary segregation, and a “Restoration to Population
Program” was introduced to place inactive gang members in a separate general population
setting where they could participate in programs and “safely renounce their gang affiliations.” 510
The Department also established a transition program called the “Predatory Behavior
Management Program” to prepare people in long-term solitary confinement to return to the
general population. In 2015, the Department reported that its solitary confinement population
had dropped from eleven percent to below seven percent. 511 However, a 2019 report by the
ACLU of New Mexico casts doubt on these statistics. 512 That report concluded that New
Mexico’s policies and procedures use inconsistent definitions and terminology. 513 It also noted
that while the ACLU regards people in the first three stages of the Predatory Behavior
Management Program as being in solitary confinement due to the restrictive living conditions,
the Department does not count all three of these stages within its solitary confinement
statistics.514 Furthermore, the report casts doubt on the Department’s statement that people are
not released directly from solitary confinement to the community. 515

5.4.4 Washington
Like New Mexico, Washington has also worked with Vera to implement administrative
reforms.516 Between 2011 and 2016, the Washington Department of Corrections instituted a
series of cognitive behavioral and skill-building programs designed to increase congregate
activity and reduce the solitary confinement population. It modified its sanctioning guidelines
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and reduced the length of time that people could be held in administrative segregation from sixty
days to forty-seven days.517 The state also implemented a step down program. 518
In May 2019, the Department of Corrections issued a press release announcing a second
partnership with Vera.519 In October 2020, the Department said it was working towards
eliminating restrictive housing for vulnerable people, particularly those with serious mental
illness; improving living conditions; and significantly reducing the length of time that people
spend in restrictive housing.520 According to that update, the maximum period that a person can
be held in administrative segregation has been reduced from forty-seven to thirty days, and the
Department has implemented changes in its maximum custody units to help people return to the
general population more quickly.
The Office of the Washington Corrections Ombuds issued its first Annual Report in November
2019 which referred to the partnership with Vera. 521 That report noted that, at that time, there
were “no specific initiatives that recognize the disparate impact of the disciplinary system and
restrictive housing and provide for special and different treatment of individuals on the mental
health caseload.”522 The report recommended a number of changes that the Department should
implement to address the solitary confinement of people with serious mental illnesses,
emphasizing that “sanctions should only be imposed after review with a mental health lens and
written consideration of the potential impact on the person.” 523 More broadly, the report
observed that the Department’s efforts at policy reform were
“directly impeded by its policy office, which is at best sclerotic, with policy changes sometimes
taking over a year and some policies not having been updated for a decade. This results in staff
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either feeling disincentivized to try to create change or they create workarounds that may or may
not reflect the written policy.”524

In November 2019, a state court lawsuit was filed after corrections officials reportedly placed
people in solitary confinement for initiating a hunger strike. 525
A Department of Corrections fact sheet published in October 2020 reports that a “Restrictive
Housing Steering Committee” was established in February 2018 to monitor restrictive housing
and make recommendations regarding reform of policies and procedures. 526 The fact sheet lists
different programs that are offered to people in restrictive housing, though it is not clear which
programs are available at which facilities, nor whether eligibility requirements apply. According
to the fact sheet, as of October 2020, 518 people were in administrative segregation and 423
people were in “MAX Custody,” another form of solitary confinement.

5.4.5 North Carolina
In 2015, North Carolina’s Department of Public Safety also began working with Vera to reduce
the use of solitary confinement. According to a report by Vera, the Department had started to
implement several administrative reforms. A new policy prohibited solitary confinement for
people under the age of eighteen.527 The Department changed its policies regarding solitary
confinement for people with mental illness so that it could only be used as a last resort and for a
maximum of thirty days in any calendar year. 528 New therapeutic diversion units were
established for people with mental illness to provide at least ten hours per week of out-of-cell
treatment and ten hours of unstructured time in “a more therapeutic environment.” Staff working
in those units were trained in crisis management and in managing people with intensive mental
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health needs. At the time of Vera’s report, the Department was in the process of amending its
disciplinary policy so that acts of self-harm would not be treated as disciplinary infractions. 529
To reduce long-term segregation, the Department established a “rehabilitative diversion unit” to
operate as a step down program and transition people from solitary confinement to the general
population. The program was intended to take eighteen months to complete, and people would
earn increased privileges as they progressed through it. During their first three months in the
program, however, they were confined to their cells in conditions identical to solitary
confinement. Vera recommended that this initial three-month period be abolished. 530
Vera’s report noted the nationwide racial discrepancies in the use of solitary confinement.
Among other recommendations, the report suggested that the Department should establish a
committee to study, monitor, and address the disproportionate “minority contact with the
disciplinary process and representation in the restrictive housing units.” 531 The report
recommended that such a committee could explore the reasons for racial disparities in the use of
solitary confinement and monitor the effects of reform in this respect. It also advised the
Department that its data collection and reporting on restrictive housing should include
breakdowns by race.532
In June 2019, North Carolina’s Senate Select Committee on Prison Safety issued a report to the
legislature with eight recommendations.533 The eighth recommendation was that the Department
of Public Safety should develop methods to provide better mental health services to people in
prisons and reduce the use of solitary confinement.534
In October 2019, a class action complaint was filed in the Superior Court of North Carolina
challenging the state’s use of solitary confinement. 535 The complaint alleged that while the state
had attempted to reduce the number of people in solitary confinement through the introduction of
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therapeutic diversion units, only a small number of people had access to these units. 536
According to the complaint, as of July 2019, approximately 3,000 people were held in solitary
confinement units in the state’s prisons, and many had been in those units for months or years. 537
The data contained in the CLA-Liman reports show that North Carolina’s restrictive housing
population has not decreased since the reforms were implemented. According to the CLALiman 2018 report, as of fall 2017, 1,109 people, or three percent of the state’s prison population
were held in restrictive housing.538 By July 2019, however, the number of people in restrictive
housing had increased to 1,654, or 4.7 percent of the total prison population. 539

5.4.6 Federal Bureau of Prisons
In July 2015, President Obama asked the Attorney-General to review solitary confinement in
American prisons. The Department of Justice conducted a review and published a report in 2016
that described the use of restrictive housing in federal facilities and made recommendations to
reduce the practice.540 President Obama then announced in January 2016 that the
recommendations contained in the report would be adopted to “reform the federal prison
system.”541 At the time the report was published, the FBOP held 9,914 people in solitary
confinement, approximately 6.1 percent of the total population of people incarcerated in federal
prisons.
The Department of Justice’s report made recommendations to address conditions and the use of
restrictive housing for people with serious mental illness, juveniles and young people, LGBTI
and gender non-conforming people, and pregnant and post-partum women. On the topic of
conditions, the report observed that people received five hours of out-of-cell recreation per week.
It noted that the FBOP “hopes to increase this minimum number of hours and aspires to
eventually provide [people] at least two hours out-of-cell time per day.” 542 To increase the
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amount of time people could spend outside of their cells, however, the FBOP would need to
increase the number of staff working in solitary confinement or reduce the number of people
held in these units. Assessing the estimated costs of hiring sufficient staff to facilitate an
additional two hours out-of-cell for every person in solitary confinement at $47.6 million per
year, the report concluded that it would be “more prudent” to reduce the number of people in
solitary confinement.543 It noted that the ability to increase time out-of-cell would “vary
somewhat by institution” and thus merely recommended that “the Bureau adopt a policy that
encourages Wardens to increase out-of-cell time in a manner consistent with the resources and
staffing constraints at their facilities.”544
One policy change that drew significant attention, in part because of President Obama’s
announcement, was the decision to prohibit solitary confinement for people under the age of
eighteen. Under a new policy, juveniles could be placed in “restrictive settings” as a temporary
measure only to address behavior that posed “a serious and immediate risk to any individual.” 545
However, the report acknowledged that the FBOP was only responsible for a very small number
of people under eighteen; as of December 2015, only forty-five people under eighteen were
incarcerated in federal custody, comprising a miniscule proportion of the 161,517 people in
federal prisons at the time.546 Of these forty-five people, thirteen were held in solitary
confinement between September 2014 and September 2015. 547 Therefore the prohibition on
placing people under eighteen in solitary confinement had very limited impact.
The report summarized scientific literature on brain development in young people and noted that
young adults (people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four) are more likely to “engage
in risk-seeking behavior, have difficulty moderating their responses in emotionally charged
situations, or not have fully developed a future-oriented method of adult-quality decisionmaking.”548 As of November 2015, young adults constituted five percent of the FBOP’s
population but more than eight percent of the solitary confinement population. However, the
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report did not recommend a total prohibition on solitary confinement for young adults. Rather,
correctional systems were encouraged to
“incorporate developmentally responsive policies and practices for young adults, and as resources
allow, implement modified therapeutic housing communities with wrap-around programming in
order to reduce the number of incidents that result in placement in restrictive housing.”549

The report described people with serious mental illness who are violent or disruptive as “pos[ing]
a special challenge [because] their behavior often requires removal from the general population,
and yet “traditional” forms of restrictive housing … present challenges to ensure that an inmate’s
mental health does not deteriorate.”550 In 2014, the FBOP revised its mental health treatment
policy to require the provision of appropriate services to people in solitary confinement. As a
consequence, two secure mental health units were established, and people with very serious
mental illnesses were diverted from some solitary confinement units. 551 The report
recommended that people with serious mental illness should not be placed in restrictive housing
unless: they presented “such an immediate and serious danger that there is no reasonable
alternative,” a qualified mental health practitioner determined that the person was not at risk of
suicide or experiencing symptoms of psychosis; and, if the placement was for disciplinary
reasons, that lack of responsibility for misconduct due to mental illness did not undermine the
reason for the placement.552 The report also called for daily screening for signs of serious mental
illness, and removal of people for treatment in medical facilities or other treatment centers if
recommended by mental health staff.
The report also recommended that LGBTI and gender-nonconforming people not be placed in
solitary confinement solely due to their status or identification. 553 Where such people were
placed in solitary confinement for protective reasons, their conditions should be “comparable to
those of the general population to the extent possible.” 554 Similarly, the report recommended
that people who were pregnant, post-partum, or who had recently had a miscarriage or
549
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terminated a pregnancy should not be placed in solitary confinement. Again, this
recommendation was subject to the proviso that solitary confinement might still be appropriate
as a “temporary response to behavior that poses a serious and immediate risk of physical
harm.”555
In February 2021, Senator Dick Durbin acknowledged that the Federal Government was trailing
behind states in making progress on solitary confinement reform. During the Senate
confirmation hearing for Attorney-General Merrick Garland, Senator Durbin (who chaired the
Senate Subcommittee hearings to investigate solitary confinement in 2012 and 2014), remarked
that “many states are way ahead of the federal prison system” in this regard. 556
Notably, the Federal Government recognizes the human rights implications associated with longterm solitary confinement when it is used in other countries. A State Department report in 2021
on Human Rights Practices in Cuba describes various “human rights issues” in that country. One
of the issues raised in the report is the common practice of solitary confinement as punishment in
Cuban prisons, with some people subjected to isolation for “months at a time” and being “unable
to contact friends or family until they were released.”557
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS OF REFORMS
Introduction
Chapter 5 describes the many and varied approaches that have been taken to attempt to reform
solitary confinement. This chapter examines those measures in more detail, first, by reviewing
the different methods of reform, and second, by critiquing issues common to all types of reform.
The analysis of the reforms in this chapter includes consideration of issues raised by abolition
scholars, particularly the concept of “non-reformist reforms.” Professor Dorothy Roberts
describes non-reformist reforms as “transformative changes in carceral systems with the
objective of demolishing those systems rather than fixing them.” 1 Harsha Walia’s “guiding
question” on non-reformist reforms is whether they increase the possibility of freedom. 2 It is
helpful to analyze solitary confinement reforms through this lens because it enables an
examination not only of whether proposed reforms are likely to reduce or eliminate solitary
confinement, but it also requires consideration of what happens once reforms are implemented.
While reform is an ongoing project, it is necessary to consider whether there is a risk that current
reforms might be undermined by the institutional operations of prisons. 3 As discussed in this
chapter, many reforms have not resulted in greater freedoms for people in prison, and they do
little to reduce the amount of discretion granted to prison officials. There is a tension between
the need to push for continuous oversight and improvement, on the one hand, and the risk that
the language of reform simply becomes a part of the prison’s operation without resulting in

1

Dorothy Roberts, Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 114 (2019).
Id.
3
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 234 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (“The
movement for reforming the prisons, for controlling their function, is not a recent phenomenon. It does not even
seem to have originated with a recognition of failure. Prison ‘reform’ is virtually contemporary with the prison
itself: it constitutes, as it were, its programme. From the outset, the prison was caught up in a series of
accompanying mechanisms, whose purpose was apparently to correct it, but which seem to form part of its very
functioning, so closely have they been bound up with its existence throughout its long history.”).
2

294

meaningful change. As Mariame Kaba wrote in 2014, “with every successive call for ‘reform,’
the prison has remained stubbornly violent, brutal, and inhumane.” 4
With a few exceptions, the more comprehensive reforms implemented to date tend to impose a
maximum fifteen-day limit on placements in solitary confinement. While this limit is consistent
with international guidelines including the United Nations’ Mandela Rules, the recommendation
to limit time in solitary confinement to no more than fifteen days has existed for decades. As
early as 1959, the American Correctional Association’s Manual stated that solitary confinement
should be used as a last resort and for no longer than fifteen days. 5 Although it is promising that
this recommendation is finally being implemented in some states, it is long overdue, and it is still
far from commonplace among the reforms being proposed and implemented.

6.1

Types of Reform

6.1.1 Legislation and Regulations
Chapter 5 outlines the range of different legislative approaches to attempt solitary confinement
reform to date, whether through comprehensive statutes or incremental changes that address
aspects of the practice. Of the comprehensive reform legislation that has been enacted, the
statutes of Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, and New York address more aspects of solitary
confinement and impose greater constraints on its use than those enacted in Minnesota and
Montana. The latter leave significant discretion to prison officials, for example, by allowing
solitary confinement where a person is deemed to pose a threat to themselves, others, or the
security of the institution; and by not imposing maximum time limits on solitary confinement. 6
Those statutes also do little to address conditions in solitary confinement, in contrast to the more
comprehensive reform statutes that require that people in solitary confinement at least receive
minimum periods of time out-of-cell each day. 7
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Some existing legislation and regulations seek to limit or reduce solitary confinement but do not
offer alternatives, aside from other punitive measures, to replace the practice. One exception can
be found in Nebraska.8 The regulations in that state require the management of behavior through
programs, initiatives, incentives, and mission-specific housing instead of relying on sanctions;
and implementation of comprehensive reentry and discharge protocols with the goal of returning
all people in restrictive housing to the general population, or to treatment-based or behaviorallyfocused housing prior to their release from prison. Minnesota’s statute also requires the
Commissioner of Corrections to design a system of incentives so that people in solitary
confinement can earn additional privileges and accelerate their return to the general prison
population.9
Where there is sufficient political support to secure the passage of legislation, it can result in
significant changes within a relatively short period. However, as shown by the number of bills
that have been introduced but not enacted in many different states, gaining the necessary political
support is difficult and slow. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that Nebraska’s
statute was enacted in 2019 after a law was passed in 2015 requiring annual reports on long-term
plans to reduce restrictive housing; and in New Jersey, where reform legislation was finally
passed in 2019 after a 2016 veto of a previous bill by the then-Governor. New York’s solitary
confinement reform legislation was eventually enacted in 2021 following many years of activism
and the repeated introduction of reform bills.10
Once enacted, moreover, all reform legislation, whether comprehensive or partial, requires
ongoing oversight and dedicated resources if the provisions are to be fully effective.
Massachusetts’ legislation, enacted in 2018, imposed a range of limits on solitary confinement,
including the prohibitions of solitary confinement for people with serious mental illness. In
November 2020, however, the US Department of Justice announced that after a two-year
investigation, it had reasonable cause to believe that the Massachusetts Department of
Corrections was violating the Eighth Amendment in numerous respects, including by placing
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people experiencing mental health crises in restrictive housing. 11 The Department of Justice has
reportedly notified the state of the minimum remedial measures required to address the
violations, and its investigation into the use of restrictive housing for people on mental health
watch remains open.

6.1.2 Litigation
While the time-consuming nature and potential problems with compliance are drawbacks to
reform legislation, these difficulties increase when litigation is used to seek reform. As
demonstrated by case law, settlements, and consent decrees, it can be difficult for plaintiffs even
to commence litigation, given efforts by prisons to avoid such claims by transferring potential
plaintiffs to other facilities. Once commenced, the litigation can take years to resolve, followed
by more time in court for appeals or issues relating to compliance with the settlement or decree.
In many jurisdictions, however, litigation remains the most feasible option for pursuing any type
of reform due to the lack of political interest in legislative or administrative change. 12 As shown
in chapter 5, some states and prisons seem content with the prospect of diverting resources into
ongoing litigation and appeals rather than directing those resources into the implementation of
measures that could resolve those court proceedings.
Of the many problems with relying on litigation to achieve reform, one is that the scope of relief
is limited in several ways. First, relief applies only to the plaintiff or plaintiff class, and does not
lead to improvements for other people in similar conditions who are held in different prisons, or
who are not part of the plaintiff class. Second, most litigation is brought in federal court despite
the problems with federal jurisprudence and the underexplored avenues for challenging solitary
confinement in state courts. Consequently, relief must comport with the PLRA’s requirements
that it be narrowly tailored, extend no further than necessary, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the right.13 This provision limits meaningful reform. It
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allows prisons and states to alter practices that violate the Constitution and substitute them with
practices that are still punitive and do little to improve conditions or reduce the use of solitary
confinement. It certainly does not incentivize prisons or states to find new and innovative
alternatives to solitary confinement, particularly if those measures are likely to require any
significant expenditure or reorganization of prison facilities. The Ashker settlement provides an
example of the limited steps that prisons must take to comply with a settlement agreement.
While Pelican Bay officials were required to offer “small group yards” and group activities, the
appeals court held that the groups could consist of only one person and the CDCR would still be
in compliance with the agreement. 14
While parties can enter into private settlement agreements to avoid the limitations imposed by
the PLRA, these agreements are not enforceable except by reinstatement of the proceeding or by
bringing a state court action for breach of contract; both of which require further litigation. 15
Ongoing litigation requires significant resources, which most incarcerated people do not have.
They are therefore reliant on the limited resources of pro bono legal services or non-profit
organizations.
The limitations of settlements and consent decrees are reflected in some plaintiffs’ objections.
The courts have tended to diminish the significance of these objections by characterizing them as
representing only a small proportion of the overall class of plaintiffs, 16 but it is worth considering
how many people in solitary confinement, particularly members of classes defined by mental
health diagnoses, can raise objections. Fear of retaliation may also contribute to a reluctance to
object.
Many objections reflect the limited scope of settlements, noting, for example, that solitary
confinement is inappropriate for anyone regardless of their mental health status, or that a
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settlement only addresses disciplinary but not administrative segregation. In addition, the
objections foreshadow concerns about departments’ failure to comply with the terms of
settlement agreements. The courts’ only response to these valid concerns is to state their
expectation that plaintiffs’ counsel will monitor compliance and bring any failures to the court’s
attention. Some plaintiffs’ objections, while outside of the scope of the issues covered by the
litigation, illustrate the reasons for concern about non-compliance. People objecting to the
Peoples v. Annucci settlement, for example, raised various issues that suggested an environment
of fear, distrust, and inhumane conditions within solitary confinement units. This can be seen
through requests for additional cameras, greater protection from physical and sexual abuse,
improved food quality and portions, warmer clothing and cells, improved mental health
diagnoses and treatment, and requiring date and time stamps to record receipt of incoming mail
to incarcerated people.17 The courts cannot remedy these systemic and serious concerns within
the limited confines of deciding whether to approve a settlement agreement. Rather, these issues
must be addressed either in separate litigation or in another forum such as by legislation or an
independent ombuds office. Nevertheless, the objections raise genuine concerns about the extent
to which compliance with a settlement agreement is realistic and whether conditions will in fact
improve for the plaintiff class.
Despite the problems associated with using litigation to achieve reform, bringing these cases can
increase public awareness of prison practices and eventually contribute to impetus for wider
reform. As demonstrated by the historical experiments with solitary confinement, it was only
when public opinion began to shift away from supporting the practice that it came to an end.
Many states that have implemented legislative or administrative reforms have only done so after
being involved in protracted litigation.18
Professor Malcolm Feeley has described litigation as “probably the most important source of
change in prisons and jails during the past forty years.” 19 His 2004 article, which is not specific
to solitary confinement, describes judicial intervention in prison conditions cases as a “distinct
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and singular success,” despite the limitations of litigation. 20 One of the reasons for this success,
it is suggested, is that judges presiding over litigation have “abandoned their traditional role as
‘interpreters’ of preexisting norms and explicitly embraced a policy-making role.” 21 This
approach can be seen in some solitary confinement litigation, where courts and special masters
have, to varying degrees, overseen detailed implementation plans and compliance issues.
Professor Feeley observed that judicial decrees in prison conditions cases had “not been
uniformly effective,” noting that problems re-emerged when courts terminate jurisdiction or
focus on other problems, and prison officials have responded to litigation with “symbolic rather
than real responses.”22 These issues have featured in solitary confinement litigation, as can be
seen from the settlements reached in cases such as Ashker v. Governor, where extensions to
settlement agreements and further hearings on issues of non-compliance have continued since the
settlement agreement was reached in 2015.
Professor Feeley’s article praises the “bureaucratization of American corrections,” though he
describes the bureaucracy resulting from litigation as a “double-edged sword.” 23 In his opinion,
the reforms that flowed from litigation have improved protections and services for incarcerated
people while also increasing the “efficiency and effectiveness of prison administrators.” 24 For
solitary confinement litigation, the latter might be true, but it is far from clear that improved
protections or services have resulted. Increasing bureaucracy and court approval of prison
conditions may be “a mixed blessing” because “bureaucratic form can easily be mistaken for
substance.”25 By lending legitimacy to the practices of departments of corrections, courts may
have simply made it harder to challenge the underlying violations that gave rise to the litigation
in the first place. As shown by the settlements and consent decrees discussed in chapter 5,
litigation has not achieved significant improvements for many people in solitary confinement.
In any event, litigation is nevertheless valuable in terms of keeping courts involved in the
oversight of prison conditions. Courts are reluctant to become involved in the day-to-day
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management of prisons, but solitary confinement litigation necessarily requires more detailed
examinations of policy and administrative decisions.

6.1.3 Administrative Measures
At first glance, successful administrative reforms, such as those implemented in Colorado and
Maine, appear to be the most efficient and effective way to reduce solitary confinement.
However, closer examination suggests that most administrative reforms are not as successful as
those introduced in Colorado or Maine.
As is the case with legislative reform, administrative changes do not tend to arise solely on the
initiative of state or prison officials acting in the best interests of incarcerated people. Rather,
they often result from litigation, the threat of litigation, or investigations into problematic
practices. In this regard, it is too simplistic to describe the administrative reforms of states like
Colorado or Maine as “quick fixes” that led to swift improvements without the need for
legislative or judicial intervention. Of course, it is preferable that states decide to act proactively
rather than engaging in protracted litigation. By doing so, these states have implemented some
meaningful changes that improved conditions for more incarcerated people than would otherwise
have been the case.
Colorado and Maine are unusual in that their administrative reforms resulted in substantial
reductions in the use of solitary confinement across the board. Caution is required, however,
when determining the weight to attribute to Maine’s reforms, given the small size of the state’s
solitary confinement population even prior to the implementation of its reforms. In Colorado,
though the reforms have undoubtedly been successful, they were the result of a years-long
project, and it is of some concern that even since their implementation, the state is now
reopening the supermax prison and that officials have acknowledged that it will be difficult to
retrofit this facility.26
In other states that have implemented administrative reforms, their success has been more mixed.
It is difficult to test states’ claims of success due to variations in terminology, conflicting reports,
and unreliable data. Unless other oversight functions exist (such as the Corrections Ombuds now
26

See supra section 5.4.1.
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established in Washington), states’ claims that they have reduced solitary confinement will likely
only be challenged in litigation.
Administrative reforms are typically incremental and require long-term commitment. In the
states that have attempted administrative reform, many have worked with external institutes such
as the Vera Institute more than once over a period of several years.
As is the case with legislative reform and most litigation, most administrative reforms have not
taken into account the racial disparities inherent in the use of solitary confinement. Even where
the Vera Institute has recommended measures to address systemic racism, no changes have yet
been made. The primary focus of administrative reforms to date has rather been on protecting or
removing people with serious mental illness from solitary confinement.
While there are only a few examples of successful administrative reform, one promising aspect
of this approach comes from the fact that there is willingness at the executive level of
departments of corrections to implement changes. However, one of the difficulties in
implementation is the need for support from prison officers and their unions. The Executive
Director of Colorado’s Department of Corrections has indicated that no such issues arose in the
implementation of their reforms, though only brief remarks were made on this topic. 27 While
some unions and corrections officers may oppose reforms in whatever format in which they are
proposed, the difficulty with administrative-level reforms is that departments may have less
leverage to force corrections officers to implement changes that are not mandated by a court or a
legislature.

6.2

Thematic Issues

This section analyzes thematic issues common to all types of solitary confinement reform, some
of which require further examination if future reform efforts are to succeed.
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6.2.1 Terminology
Different definitions apply to solitary confinement, restrictive housing, administrative
segregation, disciplinary segregation, and other terminology.28 The variations differ in each
jurisdiction, and sometimes within the same jurisdiction. While the occasional reference can be
found to indicate that “different terminology does not exempt a practice from being solitary
confinement,”29 it is more often the case that solitary confinement (or equivalent terminology) is
defined very specifically. Consequently, states and prisons may be able to make relatively minor
changes to their practices and declare significant reductions in the use of solitary confinement.
For example, if the statutory definition of solitary confinement means confinement in a cell for
twenty-two hours or more per day, as is the case in Massachusetts, and in bills introduced in
Nebraska and Nevada, then merely allowing people to spend three hours per day out of their
cells would mean that those states could continue to hold people in isolated conditions for the
majority of the day but still record reductions in the use of solitary confinement. In contrast,
allowing people only three hours per day outside of their cells would constitute isolated
confinement in New Jersey, where the statute defines the term to mean approximately twenty
hours per day in a cell.30
A related issue is the use of alternative terminology to describe solitary confinement-like
conditions without actually categorizing them as such. The Virginia Department of Corrections’
use of “intensive management,” where people are ostensibly regarded as part of the general
prison population despite being held in complete isolation with severe restrictions on their
movement and activity, is one such example. 31 While these types of interpretations enable states
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to produce promising reports about their reduced use of solitary confinement, in practice, they
are not reforms.
It is also notable, particularly in light of the coronavirus pandemic, that many definitions of
solitary confinement and related terminology explicitly exclude lockdowns. 32 While most
definitions predated the pandemic, the exclusion of lockdowns is problematic. Although many
lockdowns are intended to be of short duration, for the purposes of quelling a potential
disturbance or riot, not all have been short. The lockdown of the Marion Penitentiary, for
example, lasted for twenty-three years, and lockdowns imposed to manage the coronavirus have
lasted for many months.33 In any event, it would indeed be unfortunate if future legislative and
administrative reforms did not take the lessons of the pandemic into account by failing to
regulate lockdowns more closely.
Variation in definitions can also be seen in other important terminology, particularly in the
identification of vulnerable groups. No specific policy reasons have been found for the
differences in identifying these categories of people. With the exception of New Jersey, New
York, and Washington, most existing legislation defines young people as those under eighteen,
or eighteen and under.34 However, some more recent bills extend the definition of young people
to those twenty-one or younger, or twenty-five or younger. 35 In similar vein, with the exception
of New Jersey, existing legislation providing protection for pregnant people does not extend to
people who terminate a pregnancy or who have a miscarriage, whereas some more recent bills do
include such provisions.36 Definitions of “serious mental illness” also vary as to whether or not
they include developmental disabilities and functional impairments; and existing legislation
affords less protection to people with physical disabilities than the proposed protections
contained in recent bills.37
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The development of definitions, particularly in legislation and bills, demonstrates that reform of
solitary confinement must be viewed as an ongoing project that reflects developing information
about the harm that the practice causes to vulnerable groups. 38

6.2.2 Conditions
Few reform measures make significant changes to improve conditions. Most existing legislation
merely guarantees people the same access to basic amenities and services provided to the general
prison population (such as food, medication, and disability accommodations). 39 Some statutes
require that time out-of-cell be maximized but do not specify time allowances. As a result, outof-cell time is likely to be determined based on prior practice, the availability of prison staff, and
resource or space constraints. In some cases, even these basic rights are subject to a proviso that
allows staff to withhold services for unspecified security reasons, or they are not guaranteed for
all solitary confinement populations. For example, in some states, the basic conditions only
apply to people in disciplinary segregation and not administrative segregation. Only New York’s
new legislation mandates at least six hours’ out-of-cell time per day for people in residential
rehabilitation units and four hours for people in segregated confinement. The law also requires
that people in residential rehabilitation units be allowed all their personal property unless specific
items are deemed to pose an unreasonable risk to safety or security. 40
A limited number of bills address conditions in solitary confinement, and few indicate that
conditions will improve markedly. 41 Once again, some bills merely direct that people in solitary
confinement must receive the same services as people in the general population; others offer
even less, directing, for example, that food, water, and medical care may not be denied, or that
cells must be clean, temperature-controlled, and equipped with properly functioning sanitary
fixtures. Only one bill requires that people in solitary confinement be allowed at least two hours
out-of-cell time each day. The remainder either make no reference to out-of-cell time or simply
stipulate that such time must be offered, without specifying how long that period should be. A
bill passed by the Senate (but not the House) in Virginia in February 2021 initially proposed that
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people placed in solitary confinement be offered at least three hours of activities intended to
promote personal development, but that provision was deleted from the final version of the bill
after discussions with the Virginia Department of Corrections. 42
Some of the settlements and consent decrees contain more explicit requirements about conditions
in solitary confinement, including provisions to allow people to spend time outside of their cells
and to interact with others.43 However, as shown by subsequent litigation alleging noncompliance with settlement agreements, and by objections submitted by members of plaintiffs’
classes to proposed settlements, the plaintiff classes did not always receive these minimal
allocations.
Other provisions in settlement agreements relating to conditions, like those in legislation and
bills, guarantee only basic amenities and services, such as shower curtains, and allowing people
to clean their cells, have showers three times per week, and to receive food of the same quality
and quantity as that offered to the general population. In addition, the impact of provisions
targeted toward people with psychological impairments is limited to minimal therapy and written
tasks.44
Though it is more difficult to assess the conditions that result from administrative reforms, it
appears that in many cases, they too, are limited. Colorado’s Department of Corrections
introduced restraint tables to facilitate social interaction between people outside of their cells,
and in Washington, various programs were reportedly developed to “increase congregate
activity.” North Carolina’s therapeutic diversion units, meanwhile, offer alternative
accommodation so people with mental illnesses receive ten hours per week out-of-cell for
treatment and ten hours of unstructured time in a “more therapeutic environment.” Presumably
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the people confined in these units must still spend the remaining 148 hours each week in their
cells.
While some of the proposed reforms may address minor issues that contribute to the risk of
physical harm associated with solitary confinement (such as requiring the provision of meals that
are of the same quality and quantity as those provided to the general population), this risk is not
adequately addressed by most reforms. For example, allowing increased out-of-cell time does
not guarantee that people will be able to spend that time outside, where they may be exposed to
sunlight that might counteract the risk of vitamin D deficiency. Nor do any of the reforms allow
for exercise in areas larger than a cell or exercise cage or mandate the provision of equipment so
that exercise can act as a meaningful preventive measure to address risks to physical health.
Given that so few states have, to date, imposed a maximum time-limit on the period that people
can be held in solitary confinement, it is troubling that so few reform efforts require any
substantial improvements to conditions. Such changes could ameliorate the harm caused by
sensory deprivation and social isolation as well as risks to physical health. Unless states and
prisons allocate the necessary resources to improve conditions, people in solitary confinement
will continue to be exposed to these risks of harm.

6.2.3 Data Collection and Reporting
Existing and proposed legislation and regulations, as well as litigation settlements and consent
decrees, impose a range of data collection and reporting obligations on prisons and states. Given
the issues with defining solitary confinement and subpopulations held in solitary confinement,
there may be reasons to be skeptical about the reliability of some data. In addition, there are
differences in the ways that jurisdictions count the length of time a person spends in solitary
confinement. For example, Virginia counts each placement in solitary confinement separately
even if the person is held continuously in solitary confinement. 45 Such an approach undermines
genuine efforts to achieve reform, because it suggests that people are being held in restrictive
conditions for shorter periods than is actually the case. Though the bill has not made any
progress since its introduction, the federal proposal to establish a National Solitary Confinement
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Study and Reform Commission and to standardize definitions used for data about solitary
confinement, would, if enacted, address some existing problems with data collection and
reporting.46
Some jurisdictions have reportedly been collecting data about people in solitary confinement for
some time. According to the 2020 CLA-Liman Report, Minnesota began tracking the length of
time that people were held in restrictive housing in 1950, Connecticut in 1970, North Carolina in
1974, and Colorado in 1985.47 While some of these states have made significant progress toward
reducing the use of solitary confinement, others have not. In contrast, Nebraska and Maine only
began collecting information more recently (from 2016 or later), yet both jurisdictions have
made more significant progress toward reform. It is not clear what other data have been
collected, or how reliable they are. Of course, it is too simplistic to assume that data collection is
only valuable if it results in legislative or administrative reform and indeed, in jurisdictions
where there is little political support for reform, the availability of data may be more valuable
than in states with greater political support for reform, because it might contribute to public
pressure or support litigation efforts.
It is not always clear, however, what prisons and states do with the data that are collected. For
example, as discussed further below, the data consistently show that solitary confinement is used
disproportionately on Black, Latino, and Native American people, yet no reforms to date reflect
any attempt to address these disparities.
Data are provided to external sources for various reasons. In the context of litigation settlements
and consent decrees, they enable plaintiffs’ counsel to track placements in solitary confinement
and to question the bases for assigning or retaining people in such conditions. Data provided to
legislative bodies may fulfil different purposes. These include the provision of information for
budgets, infrastructure, or possibly to address potential exposure to litigation; as well as to make
progress toward reform. The latter is most evident from statutes and bills that explicitly require
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that reports include information about steps being taken to reduce the use of solitary
confinement.48

6.2.4 Oversight
Existing reforms largely leave the oversight of solitary confinement to internal and external
reporting obligations. A number of bills propose new oversight functions, particularly through
the creation of corrections ombuds offices or oversight committees. Though in some cases it is
too early to assess whether such functions will be effective in overseeing solitary confinement
and their influence on reforms, they certainly offer potential for greater scrutiny of the practice.
These oversight functions may be particularly important in jurisdictions that do not implement
comprehensive reforms. For example, the first annual report of the Washington Corrections
Ombuds contained several recommendations for the state to implement to address the use of
solitary confinement. The report’s overall assessment of the Department of Corrections and its
ability to implement reforms was direct in its critique of the impediments created by the
Department’s “sclerotic” policy office.49
The effectiveness of ombuds offices or equivalent inspectorate roles depends on their
independence, scope of authority, resources, and bipartisan support for their functions. The
value of these roles derives not only from their perceived independence but also the public
pressure that can result from investigative findings. 50 While granting additional functions to
ombuds offices may provide additional oversight, such as the proposal in a New York bill to
require their approval of superintendent appointments, including the ombudsman in this process
may undermine their perceived independence. For example, if the ombuds office were to
approve the appointment of a particular superintendent and later decline to investigate practices
at the prison where that superintendent worked, the ombuds’ impartiality would be called into
question. There is also a question of the sufficiency of resources, that is, whether it is preferable

48

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-614; H.R. 8155, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 3 (2020); S.C.R. 161,
30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020).
49
See supra section 5.4.4.
50
See, e.g., Howard Gadlin, The Ombudsman: What’s In a Name, 16 NEGOT. J. 37, 40 (2000); M. Brophy, The
Ombudsman as a Means of Dispute Resolution, Address to the International Bar Association, Canada (1998).
309

for resources to be dedicated solely to investigating prison conditions and practices rather than
being used to vet candidates for employment.
Of the various jurisdictions that have established or propose to establish these oversight
functions, it is important that they remain separate from, and are not regarded as, administrative
remedies that must be exhausted in accordance with the PLRA before an incarcerated person can
bring a federal lawsuit. New Jersey’s statute states that the submission of complaints to the
corrections ombudsman shall not be deemed to constitute part of the administrative exhaustion
process.51 Bills introduced in Mississippi and Congress contain similar provisions. 52 Absent this
clarification, additional oversight functions may simply present a further impediment to
incarcerated people seeking to challenge conditions of confinement by delaying their ability to
commence litigation until their complaint is investigated by the independent office.
Some of the other oversight functions proposed but not implemented are worthy of further
consideration. The proposal in Pennsylvania to establish a review board to convene “solitary
confinement misconduct hearings” for the purpose of investigating wrongful placements in
solitary confinement would offer an additional check on the practice. 53 The hearing board’s
composition, comprising a psychologist or psychiatrist, mental health professional with a
counseling background, and a licensed social worker, suggests that its focus will be the misuse of
solitary confinement for people with mental illness. One promising aspect of the proposed
composition of this board is that it does not include any corrections officials, nor is the board
required to consider issues such as the safety and security of the institution, or punitive
justifications for solitary confinement. The only relief available, if the board were to find there
had been a wrongful placement, is an order directing the person’s release to the general
population. Ideally, the provision would also require a review of the decisions that led to the
wrongful placement and an investigation into the steps that need to be implemented to avoid
recurrence. While the current proposal, if enacted, would at least offer immediate relief for
individuals, its impact on systemic change appears more limited.
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Aside from settlements and consent decrees, the courts do not play any role in the oversight of
reforms. One bill introduced in Hawaii would change this by requiring juvenile detention
facilities to notify the senior family court judge and the presiding judge who ordered the child’s
placement at the facility of any child placed in room confinement and the reasons for the
placement.54 This approach could be valuable in terms of increasing judicial awareness of the
use of solitary confinement in facilities. In jurisdictions where solitary confinement is used
frequently, if judges were notified of each such placement, these notifications could lead them to
consider more carefully the justifications for incarcerating people (especially young people) in
the first place.
Various bills propose, and existing statutes have already established, commissions and work
groups to examine solitary confinement. In some cases, these commissions and groups have
contributed to further reforms, including in Colorado, Maine, Montana, and Nebraska. In other
states, the call for studies and commissions may offer a preliminary step toward reform. In
North Carolina, for example, a 2019 bill proposed a study by the Department of Public Safety
into the use of solitary confinement of people with mental illness, and to report its findings to the
legislature.55 An earlier version of that bill proposed a prohibition on placing people with serious
mental illness in solitary confinement except in exigent circumstances. The latter version of the
bill was not enacted, which indicates a lack of political support for even minimal investigation
into the state’s use of solitary confinement let alone the imposition of restrictions on the practice.
There is a risk that by establishing various commissions and work groups – or indeed collecting
data without clear plans for how those data will be used – states can appear to be taking steps
toward reform without intending to do so. For example, legislation was passed in Texas in 2013
to appoint a third party to make recommendations to reduce the use of administrative
segregation, and a commission was established to review solitary confinement in Rhode Island in
2016.56 Neither of these measures resulted in those states implementing changes based on those
reviews.
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A federal bill proposes the establishment of a National Solitary Confinement Study and Reform
Commission.57 The Commission would conduct a comprehensive study of the
“penological, physical, mental, medical, social, fiscal, and economic impacts of solitary
confinement … on federal, state and local governments; and communities and social institutions
generally, including individuals, families, and businesses within such communities and social
institutions.”

Some of this work has already been carried out: for example, one topic the Commission would
address is “the general relationship between solitary confinement and mental illness.” However,
there would be value in having a national commission conduct an overarching review for the
purpose of making findings and recommendations to reduce solitary confinement so it is used
“only under extreme emergency standards.” 58 The purpose of the Commission’s work is to
develop national standards that would then be adopted by the Attorney-General. 59 By connecting
compliance with the national standards to the receipt of federal funding, state and local
governments would be incentivized to comply. If it were enacted, the proposal would therefore
offer real potential to effect reform. The extent of the reform would of course depend on the
scope of the final standards. It bears mentioning that the bill currently states that the
Commission shall not propose standards that would impose “substantial additional costs
compared to the costs presently expended by correctional facilities, and shall seek to propose
standards that reduce the costs of incarceration at such facilities.” 60 Though it has been
acknowledged that reducing solitary confinement can result in cost-savings for states and
prisons, it is expected that upfront expenditure would be required to repurpose solitary
confinement units and create alternative housing. It is not clear from the bill whether or to what
extent the Commission could weigh future cost-savings against immediate expenditure in order
to require implementation of measures to reduce solitary confinement.
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6.2.5 Less Restrictive Alternatives
Various statutes, bills, administrative reforms, and litigation settlements require less restrictive
alternatives be attempted.61 Most statutes and bills do not specify what constitutes a “less
restrictive alternative,” though indications can be found in some statutes and from prisons’
practices. For example, New Jersey’s statute calls for the promulgation of regulations to
establish less restrictive alternatives that include separating the person from others, transfer to
another facility, any non-isolated confinement sanction, or restrictions on privileges. 62
Some so-called reforms merely allow the continuation of solitary confinement in different
facilities. The Ashker settlement in California imposed a five-year maximum period for
placement in the Pelican Bay SHU, but it nevertheless allowed for people to be transferred to
other state SHUs at the end of this period.63 Other reforms would increase alternative punitive
measures in place of solitary confinement. Some such measures, however, are not dissimilar to
solitary confinement. For example, the keeplock cells used in New York state, whereby people
are confined to their own cells instead of being placed in a solitary confinement unit, still involve
restricted movement and isolation, although greater time out-of-cell is allowed.
In some jurisdictions, “less restrictive alternatives” have encompassed more, however, than
merely the use of different punitive methods in place of solitary confinement. To facilitate
groups and social interaction between people held in solitary cells, some prisons physically
restrain people. In his written testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Human Rights in 2012, the then-Commissioner of Mississippi’s Department of
Corrections, Christopher Epps, described the process for providing group counseling to people
held in solitary confinement units. Such groups, Commissioner Epps testified, were conducted

61

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-4, 134.01(2) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.11; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
208.3(b)(1); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-912(b)(2)(A); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 05.02.02.222.01(c); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 62B.215(1); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 377:3-13-144(I)(1)(A); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.22.030(1)(a); 18 U.S.C. §
5043(b)(2)(A); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.214(4)(b) (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 9-601.1(c)(2) and
(3) (West 2019); H.B. 2691, 54th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2020); S.B. 1617, 54th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz.
2020); H.R. 8155, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 2(a) (2020); H.B. 497 and S.B. 832, 203rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., §
5102(a)(1) (Pa. 2019); H.B. 714, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 42-5-58(h) (Ga. 2019); S.B. 2520, 30th Leg., §
2(e) (Haw. 2020); S.B. 1301, Special Sess. I, § 1 (Va. 2021); Consent Decree at 4, Presley et al. v. Epps et al., No.
4:05 Civ. 148 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 15, 2006).
62
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.11.
63
See supra section 5.3.3.
313

“outside the cells by using an innovative method of attaching leg restraints to a floor restraint.
This provided the necessary security to allow face-to-face interaction between offenders.” 64 One
component of the Settlement Agreement reached in Peoples v. Annucci in New York involved
groups that would be conducted with people confined in restraint chairs. 65 New York’s HALT
Act will prohibit the use of restraints on people in residential rehabilitation units, but that
prohibition does not apply to people in segregated confinement. 66 Colorado and Virginia have
also used restraint tables and chairs to enable people otherwise held in solitary confinement to
socialize with others.67 In its 2016 report, the Department of Justice indicated that the FBOP
intended to purchase 610 “secure programming chairs,” so that people in restrictive housing
could “receive in-person educational and mental health programming in a less restrictive manner
than currently used.”68
While the use of restraints might facilitate opportunities for greater social interaction, thus
ameliorating the harm caused by social isolation and lack of environmental stimulation, it is
questionable whether the act of physically restraining people for hours at a time can truly be
regarded as a less restrictive alternative. There is a risk in this approach that prisons are merely
swapping one form of control for another, particularly where the replacement method carries its
own potential to cause harm. The Vera Institute has recommended to states seeking to reduce
solitary confinement that the use of restraints be kept to a minimum. 69 Moreover, while
standards govern the use of restraints in clinical settings, such standards have not been uniformly
adopted for their use in the correctional context. The Code of Federal Regulations allows for
restraints to be used on people in administrative or disciplinary segregation with the warden’s
approval.70 When the warden determines that four-point restraints are necessary, certain
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procedures must be followed: soft restraints must be used where possible, the person must be
dressed in appropriate clothing, staff must check the person at least every fifteen minutes and
periodically rotate them if they are restrained to a bed, and a review must be conducted every
two hours to determine whether the person can be released. 71 The American Bar Association’s
Criminal Justice Standards recommend that restraint mechanisms, including handcuffs and
restraint chairs, should not be used as a form of punishment or retaliation. They also suggest that
the least restrictive forms of restraint should be used, for the shortest time necessary. 72
There are physical risks associated with the use of restraints in non-health care settings where
prison staff are not adequately equipped to ensure such measures are used safely. 73 For example,
people whose movement is restricted by arm and leg restraints face an increased risk of falls. 74
In March 2021, officials in St. Francois County, Missouri, settled a wrongful death lawsuit with
the family of a man who died in the county jail after being held in a restraint chair for twentyfour hours.75 Prior to his arrest, the man had swallowed various drugs, but he was not evaluated
by the jail’s medical staff, nor was he given his prescription anti-seizure medication. According
to another class action lawsuit filed against St. Francois County officials in December 2020,
people confined in the jail’s restraint chair – who were often experiencing mental health crises –
were unable to use bathroom facilities, and were denied medical care, food, or water while
restrained.76 Similar lawsuits have been brought against jail officials in at least nine places since
2013, and The Marshall Project has reviewed lawsuits and press reports regarding the use of
restraint chairs in county jails and concluded that such chairs have been linked to twenty jail
deaths between 2014 and 2020.77
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While restraints may have a place in facilitating temporary transitions of people from solitary
confinement to environments with greater social interaction, such mechanisms are vulnerable to
abuse. The blanket availability of physical restraints also cannot be justified on the grounds of
safety or security in light of the fact that many people in solitary confinement do not present
specific safety risks. Few of the reform measures implemented or proposed to date contain
explicit standards governing the use of restraints.78
The risks associated with less restrictive alternatives require further exploration and
consideration. Closer oversight will certainly be necessary if restraints are to become a longterm or entrenched practice in place of solitary confinement, as opposed to a short-term
transition measure for individuals who pose specific safety concerns. Any broader use of
restraints does not constitute the “non-reformist reform” envisioned by abolition scholars
because these measures certainly do not increase the possibility of freedom.

6.2.6 Step Down Programs
While the objectives of step down programs might appear to be a promising step towards
reducing solitary confinement, they can also be problematic. There is a risk that step down
programs simply constitute solitary confinement by another name, and people assigned to such
units are held there on a long-term basis with little or no opportunity to return to the general
population. The experience in Virginia, as detailed in the lawsuit concerning the Red Onion and
Wallens Ridge State Prisons, demonstrates that some people have been kept in permanent
solitary confinement in step down programs with no meaningful opportunity to progress to less
restrictive environments.79
Furthermore, closer scrutiny is required to assess the programs offered in step down programs to
determine whether they offer genuine assistance and resocialization to incarcerated people. As
evidenced by the experience of people who participated in the step down program at Pelican
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Bay, such programs may do little to prepare people to return to the general prison population. 80
Measures such as in-cell study packets and written assignments or group discussions facilitated
by correctional officers where there is no rapport or trust between participants and officers may
be unlikely to result in behavior change for people in the programs. Such measures may be
particularly limited in their impact for people with limited literacy skills, cognitive difficulties,
and mental or physical illnesses.81 Participation in groups may also be challenging for people
who have been held in solitary confinement for long periods because they may experience
anxiety in new surroundings and find it difficult to interact with others. 82 In addition, given the
ongoing problem of exercise time being canceled in solitary confinement units, concern arises as
to whether increased out-of-cell time will actually be granted to people in step down programs.

6.2.7 Partial Reforms and Vulnerable Populations
Many reforms are partial in nature and focus primarily on vulnerable populations, particularly
young people, pregnant people, and those with serious mental illnesses, as groups that should be
granted special protection. The rationale for offering such protection is clearer for some groups
than it is for others, but none are without problems. Where vulnerable groups are more likely to
suffer harm, or greater harm, than the general population, the justification for offering special
protections for these groups is clear. However, the variance in definitions means that many
people with similar characteristics to members of vulnerable groups do not receive the same
protection. For instance, in one jurisdiction, a twenty-year-old may be placed in solitary
confinement while in another jurisdiction, he or she would qualify as a member of a vulnerable
population.
Similar issues arise with respect to definitions of mental illness. There is a concern with respect
to mental illness that only those people with existing “serious” diagnoses may receive protection,
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while people with diagnosed conditions who are not regarded as exhibiting sufficiently serious
symptoms can still be placed in solitary confinement. Furthermore, the reform measures
introduced to date do not address the wider group of people who may not be formally diagnosed
with a serious mental illness but who may have a history of trauma or other characteristics that
make them more vulnerable to the harm of solitary confinement. Under current reform
measures, most of these people can still be placed in solitary confinement, where their condition
may deteriorate and become serious. At this point, they might qualify for removal and return to
the general population or to a specialized treatment unit to the extent such units exist, but harm
may have already occurred. In addition, some prisons have undermined definitions by rediagnosing people who were formerly classified as having a serious mental illness so that they
could be returned to solitary confinement. 83
The current and proposed reforms fail to address the significant need identified by healthcare
professionals for increased mental health screening and treatment of all incarcerated people.
While bans on placing people with serious mental illness in solitary confinement may protect
some people from having their symptoms exacerbated, the reforms do not protect those who
have not received a diagnosis. Moreover, the conditions in which mental health staff must
provide treatment in solitary confinement units are inadequate. 84 They place healthcare
practitioners in difficult ethical positions in terms of their obligations to ensure the welfare of
their patients within environments where security interests take precedence. Furthermore, none
of the reforms address issues of harm resulting from solitary confinement once people are
released.
A further issue regarding vulnerable populations concerns LGBTI people. Some statutes and
bills include LGBTI people in the definition of vulnerable populations. However, some
definitions refer to people who are “perceived to be” LGBTI or even “perceived by facility staff”
as LGBTI. These definitions could therefore exclude people who are LGBTI and include others
who are not. Only some statutes allow people to request protective custody in solitary

83

Amy Fettig, How Do We Reach A National Tipping Point in the Campaign to Stop Solitary? 115 NW. U. L. REV.
311, 332 (2020) (“[A]dvocates have found that prisoners who were previously diagnosed as seriously mentally ill in
New York prisons were mysteriously and somewhat miraculously rediagnosed with a much less severe mental
illness so that they could be placed in isolation.”).
84
See supra section 2.4.2.3.
318

confinement. The reasons for including LGBTI people in the vulnerable population require
further examination. Such people are often placed in solitary confinement on the basis that it is
necessary for their own safety, but they may also be overrepresented in solitary confinement due
to victimization and targeted disciplinary infractions, for example, by expressing their gender
identity in ways that do not conform with prison rules. 85 However, none of the reform measures
consider other options to protect LGBTI people in the general population, and few address the
issue of targeted disciplinary infractions.
Professor Margo Schlanger has examined the competing tensions between “maximalist” and
“incrementalist” approaches to criminal justice reform.86 In the context of solitary confinement,
she writes, maximalists argue that modest reforms, such as those that only protect vulnerable
groups, imply that solitary confinement is acceptable in certain circumstances, such as when it is
“imposed on the right populations.”87 Furthermore, modest reforms use up the limited attention
available to support advocacy efforts directed at helping the wider solitary confinement
population. In contrast, incrementalists contend that modest approaches can lead prison officials
to develop solutions to implement further reforms. Once the most vulnerable people are
removed from solitary confinement, officials can direct their attention to the wider solitary
confinement population. Incrementalists suggest that once solitary confinement units are
sufficiently depopulated, the elevation in cost-per-person may become unsustainable
politically.88 This argument of course assumes that prisons will allow solitary confinement units
to remain unfilled once vulnerable populations are removed from them, which may not be the
case. Given the general embrace of solitary confinement in response to the coronavirus
pandemic and the reopening of closed supermax facilities, it seems unlikely that prison officials
would leave units empty unless reform legislation or policy was so restrictive that they were
unable to move new people into them. Rather, once solitary confinement cells and units are
available, they are likely to be used. As the chair of the Texas Senate’s Criminal Justice
Committee remarked in 2017,
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“I know part of the problem – they overbuilt the damn number of ad seg cells … The number for
how many we need was just pulled out of the air. But when you build them you gotta use
them.”89

There is not a straightforward answer to the tensions Professor Schlanger identifies. While it is
important to mitigate the heightened risk of harm to the more vulnerable people in solitary
confinement, the prospect that reform efforts may end at that point is troubling. This can be
seen, for example, from the fact that many jurisdictions have implemented measures to address
the solitary confinement of young people, but few of those jurisdictions have done anything
similar in relation to adults. Given that young people constitute a small proportion of the overall
number of people held in solitary confinement, these partial reforms alone will not result in
significant reductions in the use of solitary confinement. 90 Similarly, reforms targeted at
pregnant women will have limited impact on the numbers of people in solitary confinement, as
demonstrated by the data that show the majority of people in solitary confinement are men. 91
Other partial reforms not directed at vulnerable groups, such as Texas’s elimination of
disciplinary segregation, have also had limited impact because much larger numbers of people
are still held in administrative segregation in that state. 92 Moreover, advocates in Texas
expressed concern that people previously held in disciplinary segregation would simply be reclassified and placed in administrative segregation.93
The overarching issue remains that solitary confinement is harmful to everyone, and for reform
to be truly successful, the practice must be reduced to the point that no-one is exposed to the risk
of harm. From a broader abolition perspective, the same tensions between incrementalism and
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maximalism can be applied to solitary confinement reform as compared with the overall project
of prison abolition.

6.2.8 Race and Ethnicity
The racial disparities in the use of solitary confinement are evident from available data, and no
significant improvements in this area have resulted even in jurisdictions that have implemented
reforms.94 Little attention is paid to the issue of race in any reforms introduced to date. A bill
introduced in Connecticut prohibits placement in solitary confinement on the basis of race, creed,
color, national origin, nationality, or ancestry. 95 Other reforms require the collection of data that
are disaggregated by (among other things) race. These limited measures will not address the
systemic racism in the overuse of solitary confinement among Black, Latino and Native
American people. It is unclear whether Vera’s recommendation to North Carolina to establish a
commission to study racial disparities in the use of solitary confinement has been implemented. 96
Absent proper examination of racial disparities and development of protocols to address them,
racial and ethnic disparities are likely to remain even if solitary confinement populations are
reduced. In jurisdictions where the practice is eliminated entirely, there is no reason to expect
that Black, Latino, and Native American people will not continue to be overrepresented in the
receipt of disciplinary infractions and resulting sanctions used in place of solitary confinement,
unless reforms address systemic racism in disciplinary infractions and classification decisions.
The prevalence of racism in disciplinary and classification decisions is underexplored; while a
small number of studies have examined racial disparities in solitary confinement, they do not
consider the issue of race in the underlying infractions that led to placement in solitary
confinement.97 In 2016, the New York Times revealed that a review of 60,000 disciplinary cases
in New York state prisons showed pronounced racial disparities. Following publication of that
report, the Governor ordered the state’s inspector general to investigate racial disparities in
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discipline in the state’s prisons.98 As of November 2020, that investigation remained open. 99 No
public updates have been made regarding the status or progress of the investigation since it was
announced in 2016.
Furthermore, to the extent that reforms offer protection for vulnerable populations such as people
with serious mental illness or physical disabilities, the issue of racial and ethnic disparities must
also be considered. A 2017 report by the Department of Justice, drawing on self-reported
symptoms of “serious psychological distress,” noted that more white people met the threshold for
serious psychological distress than Black or Hispanic people in prisons and jails. 100 White
people in prison were also more likely than Black people to have ever been told they had a
mental disorder.101 Therefore, white people may be more likely than Black, Latino, or Native
American people to be eligible for protection from solitary confinement, or alternative
therapeutic forms of housing, under new reform measures.

6.2.9 Training of Employees
Some statutes and bills require basic training related to solitary confinement for the staff working
in those units.102 The training requirements proposed by bills and recent statutes are slightly
more extensive than earlier legislation in that they generally require staff receive training on
matters including the identification of symptoms of mental illness and developmental disorders,
methods of safely responding to people in distress, techniques to divert people from situations
that would cause them to be placed in solitary confinement, restorative justice, trauma-informed
care, and dispute resolution methods.
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Hawaii’s bill proposes that staff receive training “to develop the skills necessary to protect the
mental and physical health” of people in solitary confinement. While it is important that
corrections officers receive such training, it is concerning that no reform measures – whether
legislative or otherwise – require training of more senior officials who are responsible for
decisions about resource allocation, staffing, and conditions in solitary confinement. Absent
changes made by management and supervisory staff, it is questionable whether the training of
correctional staff alone will be beneficial beyond improving some individual responses to people
in immediate distress.
Moreover, as reported by both incarcerated people and researchers, there are significant cultural
problems within solitary confinement units that mean that corrections officers do not treat mental
health concerns with appropriate sensitivity or seriousness. The long-established view among
correctional officers that people exhibiting symptoms of mental illness are malingering might not
be overcome by intermittent training on the symptoms of mental illness. This leads to a broader
concern that, unless states and prisons commit to providing the necessary financial resources to
improve solitary confinement facilities, corrections officers working in these units will have
limited impact on reform. This is particularly the case in many states where the basic conditions
in solitary confinement are not improved by reforms.

6.2.10 Corrections Employees and Reform
People employed by departments of corrections experience stress and trauma from working in
solitary confinement units. A counselor in Connecticut’s New Haven Correctional Center
described the frustration of trying to help people in solitary confinement, describing the practice
as “heap[ing] trauma on top of trauma,” and forcing her to devote her time to helping people in
crisis rather than treating their underlying mental health problems. 103 Remarking that “nothing
good comes out of solitary confinement,” she now supports its abolition. A reform bill
introduced in Connecticut seeks to address the risk of harm to departmental employees by
extending workers’ compensation benefits for mental health treatment.
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Despite the experiences of employees, some unions oppose reforms, typically citing safety
concerns. Litigation settlements have been one target of unions’ opposition. The New York
State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association (“NYSCOPBA”) criticized the
Peoples v. Annucci settlement agreement.104 The president of NYSCOPBA asserted that the
reforms resulting from that settlement created “dire circumstances and unhealthy environments
for the rest of the inmate population, and more importantly, the staff.” 105 The California
Correctional Peace Officers Association (“CCPOA”) similarly opposed the settlement agreement
in Ashker v. Governor.106 Having been denied leave to intervene in the litigation, the CCPOA
criticized the CDCR for reaching the settlement “in glaring opposition” to the concerns of
corrections officers. The CCPOA contended that the agreement would “further exacerbate gang
activity and prison violence, … threaten[] the security of our institutions, and exponentially
increase[] risks to the safety of both correctional officers and inmates.” 107
Unions have also opposed attempts at legislative reform. For example, the NYSCOPBA
expressed opposition in 2019 to a reform bill. 108 Their position was based on the view that the
bill failed to take account of an increase in prison violence after the state entered into the Peoples
v. Annucci settlement. They also asserted that the bill would undermine the need for staff to
“utilize effective disciplinary measures when necessary.” More recently, the same union has
criticized the HALT Act, asserting that the reduction of punitive segregation is “reckless”
because it increases safety concerns for prison staff and incarcerated people. 109 This claim,
however, stands in contrast to the legislative justification that accompanied the bill:
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“Despite claims that segregated confinement is used in response to the most violent behavior, five
out of six disciplinary infractions that result in SHU time in New York prisons are for non-violent
conduct.”110

In similar vein, the Nebraska Fraternal Order of Police opposed a 2020 bill that proposed some
limits on solitary confinement. They were joined in their opposition by the Director of the
Department of Corrections, who claimed that the bill would compromise the safety of staff and
prisons.111
Some national unions have supported limited solitary confinement reform. 112 In 2014, Lance
Lowry, the President of Local 3807 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees wrote an open letter on behalf of corrections officers in Texas to oppose changes to
conditions of confinement on death row which resulted in the placement of more people in
solitary confinement.113 The letter stated that housing people in such conditions was “a waste of
valuable security personnel and money.” It called for the provision of privileges (such as
television and tablets) to incentivize positive behavior, noting that “lack of visual or audio
stimulation result[s] in increased psychological incidents and results in costly crisis
management.” That same year, Mr. Lowry submitted written testimony to the Senate
Subcommittee’s hearing on solitary confinement. He testified that the intended purpose of
administrative segregation was to reduce violence, but no such reduction had resulted from its
“greatly increased” use in Texas since the 1990s. Mr. Lowry expressed concern about releasing
people in solitary confinement directly into the community when they had received “little or no
treatment to correct the behavior which led to their incarceration in solitary conditions.” He also
suggested that the over-use of solitary confinement in Texas might be explained by a lack of
trained and experienced staff. He believed that if this issue were addressed, staff could better
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manage the increased number of people with mental illnesses and reduce reliance on solitary
confinement.114 When Texas prisons eliminated disciplinary segregation in 2017, Mr. Lowry
told the Houston Chronicle that the change did not pose any major security concerns and that he
supported the development as a move to “modernize the prison system.” 115 A representative
from the TDCJ also addressed the issue of safety and noted that there had been “no dramatic
change” in major prison violence from 2012 onwards, when the state began to reduce
disciplinary segregation.116
It bears noting that the complexity of intra-departmental dynamics is such that different
employees or groups of employees within departments of corrections hold opposing views about
the need for reform. Some mental health staff working in solitary confinement units perceive
that their professional concerns are ignored or undermined by prison officers. 117 When a
representative from the CDCR met with incarcerated people to discuss ending the hunger strike
at Pelican Bay and agreed to review the procedures for assigning people to solitary confinement,
he was criticized by prison officials for agreeing to the requests and accused of being
manipulated by the group involved in the strike.118 In Virginia, the ACLU reports that food
portions allocated to people in solitary confinement increase when officials from the Department
of Corrections’ headquarters visit the supermax prisons. 119 Senior officials not employed day-today at the prisons may therefore be misinformed about some aspects of the treatment of people in
solitary confinement.
Though some unions have voiced opposition to proposed legislative and court-ordered reforms,
it is likely that the same sentiments arise in relation to administrative reforms. Because such
reforms generally attract less publicity, however, it is more difficult to examine the positions
taken by unions and corrections officers in this context. Such opposition could undermine
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administrative reforms because they are not generally subject to the same oversight or scrutiny as
those imposed by a court or legislature.
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CHAPTER 7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
7.1

Recommendations

7.1.1 More Attention Must be Directed at Improving Conditions
Given that few reform measures impose a fifteen-day limit on solitary confinement consistent
with international guidance and generally accepted standards, it is troubling that most reforms do
not significantly improve conditions in solitary confinement. Furthermore, in many states,
prison officials can still withhold basic services and amenities from people in solitary
confinement if they decide it is necessary under the broad justification of institutional security.
In the limited circumstances where some units offer improved conditions, most people are not
eligible for those placements; rather, the units are designed only for people needing intensive
mental health treatment or those eligible for step down programs. Within the “improved”
alternative accommodations, out-of-cell time, social interaction, and necessary support is not
always available. Some step down units have been revealed to constitute nothing more than
solitary confinement by a different name. 1
Certain improvements, such as increased time outside of one’s cell and access to telephone calls,
may address some of the harm associated with sensory deprivation. However, not everyone in
solitary confinement can benefit from these measures. Better access to library book carts or
provision of in-cell programs, for example, may offer little to people who struggle with mental
health issues, vision or hearing disturbances, or literacy problems. Very few reforms even allow
people in solitary confinement to have a television or radio in their cells. Given that scientific
research suggests that the risk of adverse psychiatric experiences may vary depending on the
degree of sensory deprivation, which is influenced by factors such as whether a cell door is solid
or barred, whether people receive visitors, or have access to televisions, greater resources should
be dedicated to improvements in these areas to mitigate risks to mental health. 2 Even so,
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however, such measures do not mitigate the risk of harm to physical health. 3 This risk could be
ameliorated by requiring, at a minimum, that all cells have natural light, lights do not remain on
for twenty-four hours per day, people be granted meaningful amounts of outside recreation time,
and the provision of exercise equipment and other amenities consistent with the
recommendations of medical experts.
In addition, legislation or regulations should prescribe minimum requirements for the provision
of medical and mental health treatment for people prior to, during, and following placement in
solitary confinement. Such treatment should be consistent with standards agreed by medical and
mental health experts. For example, mental health consultations should not take place at cell
doors where there is no opportunity for privacy or for the consultant to develop rapport with their
patient. At present, most reforms fail to address this unmet need despite the extensive evidence
of the harm that solitary confinement causes, and the potential for lasting harm after a person is
released from solitary confinement. Merely banning the placement of people with serious mental
illness from solitary confinement is insufficient to address the risk of harm in light of evidence
showing that other people without such diagnoses may develop symptoms during or after
placement in isolation.
Even if these basic needs are addressed, greater emphasis is required to address the importance
of facilitating social interaction and improving the environment within solitary confinement
units. While some states have sought to introduce these measures through the implementation of
group programs and the like, most have not. To counter the risk of harm that solitary
confinement poses, the conditions in solitary confinement units require urgent attention in all
reform measures. Some of the costs associated with improving conditions could be covered by
savings resulting from the reduction of solitary confinement populations, as implemented by
Colorado in 2011.4
Attention must also be directed to the use of physical restraints as less restrictive alternatives to
facilitate greater social interaction and out-of-cell time for people in solitary confinement and
step down units. Few reform measures impose any limitations around the use of such restraints,
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despite the risks of physical and emotional harm that may be associated with them. There is a
troubling risk that restraint devices could be substituted for solitary confinement without any
meaningful justification or oversight such that people will continue to be exposed to harm.

7.1.2 Prioritize Meaningful Independent Oversight
Whether reform results from legislation, litigation, or administrative measures, meaningful
independent oversight is important, among other things, to ensure:
(a) Any less restrictive alternatives are genuinely less restrictive, do not simply replace one
form of control or harm with another, and that proper account is taken of the risks
associated with using physical restraints in correctional settings;
(b) Members of vulnerable populations are correctly identified and protected from solitary
confinement, and any reassessment of their status is conducted fairly and objectively, so
that they are not wrongly reclassified and returned to solitary confinement;
(c) Step down programs operate as genuine transition units with the objective of returning
people to the general prison population or preparing them for release from prison, and do
not become long-term solitary confinement units under a different name;
(d) Meaningful improvements in the conditions in solitary confinement units; and
(e) People in solitary confinement can lodge complaints without the risk of retaliation from
prison staff.
In some states, the most effective means of oversight may be in the form of an independent
inspectorate or ombuds office; in other states, different roles such as legislative commissions,
reports to the legislature, or judicial oversight, may suffice. However, ombuds officers or
inspectors with authority to conduct visits to prisons are likely to be better placed to observe
conditions firsthand and to speak directly with people in solitary confinement.
For these functions to be genuinely effective, adequate resources are required to facilitate
thorough investigations and appropriately tailored recommendations that will result in
meaningful changes. Inspections and prison visits would be of greater value if significant notice
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is not required in advance of such visits.5 To counter the risk of retaliation against anyone who
raises concerns with the ombuds officer or inspector, people could be visited at random (with the
officer ensuring that different people are identified at each inspection). Conversations would
need to take place in a room or cell without the presence of any prison staff, and aural privacy
would need to be ensured. Furthermore, in assessing conditions, it would be prudent to seek
information regarding standard practices on days when no visitors are expected, and not merely
rely on what is presented on the day of the inspection. Review of documentary records (or
noting the absence of such records) is also essential to develop an accurate picture of conditions.
Furthermore, the families of incarcerated people might offer additional information about
problems within solitary confinement units.
The effectiveness of independent oversight functions will also depend on their not becoming
another administrative remedy that incarcerated people must exhaust within the meaning of the
PLRA before they can bring a lawsuit. This issue has been addressed by some legislation and
bills and it must be standard practice in all states. 6
There are several promising examples of ombuds offices that have the potential to act as
independent checks on departments of corrections. It is important that these offices operate
independently from the departments that they are charged with investigating. In terms of
progressing reform, there is greater value in having independent oversight offices than internal
committees to review individual solitary confinement placement decisions. While these bodies
might offer a useful check on placement decisions and ensure individuals are not wrongly placed
in solitary confinement, they are less likely to influence systemic changes that will lead to wider
reform.
Though few reform measures have taken this approach, the courts can provide a separate venue
to improve oversight. One example can be found in Hawaii’s proposal to require notification to
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family court judges when a young person is placed in room confinement. 7 There is some merit
in involving the courts in this process given that they are the institutions responsible for
sentencing people to prisons and detention facilities. However, in light of the judiciary’s
reluctance to become involved in day-to-day prison operational matters, the barriers imposed by
the PLRA, and the length of time it takes courts to resolve complaints about prison conditions, it
may be preferable that oversight be confined to separate, independent functions solely dedicated
to the task of investigating prisons and departments of corrections.

7.1.3 Limit the Discretion of Corrections Officers
Decisions about placing people in solitary confinement and how long they will remain there
should not be left to the individual discretion of prison officers. To that end, legislatures should
limit as much as possible the use of language that allows solitary confinement to be used where
necessary in the interests of maintaining order or protecting the safety of the institution. All
placement decisions should be made according to specific, measurable criteria, and determined
in consultation with medical and mental health staff. Where solitary confinement practices are
justified on the broad claim of institutional security, specific, identifiable concerns must be
required to support the assertion.8 This is particularly important in light of the fact that
proponents of solitary confinement contend that it is necessary to protect staff and other
incarcerated people from violence, even when most placements in solitary confinement do not
arise from violent infractions.9 Proposals to require that senior employees approve all solitary
confinement placements would also curtail the discretion of prison officers. 10
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State legislatures and courts should ensure due process protections apply to all people facing
solitary confinement, regardless of the length of the placement. 11 These rights should not be
limited in application only to circumstances where there is deemed to be “atypical and significant
hardship” as required by the federal courts. 12 It is of note that many states provide at least
informal due process protections to young people facing potential room confinement. These
rights range from the opportunity to explain one’s behavior through to formal hearings with
assistance from staff to prepare a defense and to appeal. 13 Given that room confinement
placements are usually of shorter duration than adult solitary confinement placements, at least
the same due process rights should be extended to adults.
The due process procedures themselves should also extend beyond the protections articulated by
the federal courts to ensure that people facing solitary confinement have a genuine opportunity to
contest the placement. Therefore, the protections should include: the right to attend the hearing
in person, to call witnesses and present relevant documentary evidence, to confront and crossexamine witnesses, to be represented or accompanied by another person, ideally someone with
legal training, but at the very least, another incarcerated person, and a right of appeal. In
addition, following the precedent of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Avant v. Clifford, any
statements made by a person at a prison disciplinary hearing should not be admissible against
them in any subsequent criminal prosecutions.14
One further reform already adopted in some states that should be included in all reform measures
is to depart from the “some evidence” standard to require a higher evidentiary threshold to justify
placement in solitary confinement. The “some evidence” rule affords prison officers significant
discretion because only meager evidence is required to satisfy due process obligations.
Imposition of a higher threshold is consistent with stricter control on the use of solitary
confinement and the need for sufficient evidence to support the placement. 15

11

See supra sections 5.1.1.1 (due process obligations in Massachusetts’ statute); 5.1.1.3 (due process obligations in
New Jersey’s statute); and 5.2.7 (proposed due process provisions in reform bills).
12
See supra section 3.2.2.
13
See supra section 5.1.2.1.
14
See supra section 4.3.1.3.
15
See supra sections 4.3.2, 5.1.1.3 and 5.2.1.1 (referring to existing statutes and regulations that have departed from
the “some evidence” standard; New Jersey’s reform statute’s requirement of reasonable cause to believe there is a
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Oversight functions will serve an important role in ensuring that due process protections are
meaningful and not merely symbolic.

7.1.4 Reforms Must Reflect and Address Racial and Ethnic Disparities
Aside from collecting data about the racial and ethnic composition of solitary confinement
populations, almost all reform measures currently fail to address the pervasive racial and ethnic
disparities in the use of solitary confinement. The collection of data, by itself, is unlikely to
resolve this entrenched problem unless the data show such gross deviations that cannot be
explained by chance.16
Reform measures must examine the underlying reasons that result in solitary confinement
placements and the systemic racism underpinning these decisions. This requires analysis of
racial and ethnic bias in the exercise of discretion in finding disciplinary infractions, and in
determining penalties for disciplinary infractions. Removing disciplinary infractions that rely
solely on discretionary judgments by prison officers from the infractions that are punishable by
solitary confinement may help to reduce racial and ethnic bias in disciplinary segregation
placements.17
Race must also be considered when assessing non-punitive solitary confinement classifications,
particularly administrative segregation. With prison gang membership (or suspected
membership) frequently relied upon as the basis for placing people in administrative segregation,
reforms must target the process by which prison gangs are identified and the basis for
determining that people are members of such gangs. It is also necessary to address the use of
tenuous and unreliable evidence often deemed sufficient to support a finding that a person is a
member of a prison gang.18

substantial risk of serious harm on the basis of clear and convincing evidence; and bills introduced in Arizona,
Pennsylvania and Congress that all propose a clear and convincing evidentiary standard).
16
See discussion supra section 3.3.1 (in Santiago v. Miles a federal district court found Equal Protection violations
on the basis of race based on significant statistical disparities and unrebutted witness testimony).
17
See supra section 2.5.4.4 (describing the New York Times’ investigation of prison disciplinary decisions in New
York state which revealed that racial disparities were most pronounced in the case of infractions involving the
exercise of discretion by prison officers and less apparent in the case of infractions requiring physical evidence).
18
See supra sections 2.1 (describing the TDCJ’s identification of twelve prison gangs; eight of which are
predominantly Latino in membership, while two are predominantly Black and two are predominantly white); and
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Furthermore, the impact of race on mental health classification and treatment decisions, and its
relevance to eligibility for alternate programs in place of solitary confinement, must be
addressed.19 The trauma of systemic racism as one component of the harm that results from
solitary confinement should be considered in support of broadening the categories of people who
are to be protected from solitary confinement. 20
With many states now requiring collection of data disaggregated by race and ethnicity, among
other factors, greater understanding of systemic racism in solitary confinement placement
decisions could be achieved through requiring racial and ethnic breakdowns of the data showing
the reasons why people are placed in solitary confinement, as well as the continuous length of
each placement.
While some states now require training for prison officers working in solitary confinement units,
none of the proposed or recently implemented reforms identify systemic racism or bias as topics
that must be covered by training. While training is not a panacea, greater awareness of systemic
racism in solitary confinement, particularly on the part of disciplinary hearing officers and
people responsible for classification decisions, might also contribute to a reduction in the
pronounced racial and ethnic disparities.

7.1.5 Utilize Legislative Findings and Training Material to Show Deliberate
Indifference
State legislatures can address the high threshold imposed by the federal courts’ deliberate
indifference test by making legislative findings that emphasize the harm caused by solitary
confinement.21 Such findings, combined with the “extensive scholarly literature describing and
quantifying the adverse mental health effects of prolonged solitary confinement” could establish
deliberate indifference and show that the harm is “so obvious that it had to have been known.” 22
Further evidence of the obvious risk of harm could also be demonstrated through the topics

5.3.3 (describing the CDCR’s use of tenuous evidence to justify placing people in solitary confinement because they
were deemed to be members of prison gangs as one of the issues addressed in the Ashker settlement).
19
See supra section 6.2.8.
20
See supra section 2.4.2.1.
21
See supra sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.2.1.1 (describing findings in legislation enacted in Washington and in a bill
introduced in Hawaii describing some of the harm caused by solitary confinement).
22
See supra section 3.1.2.3 (referring to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Porter v. Clarke).
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addressed in training provided to corrections officers. Specifically, legislation or regulations can
direct that training materials include information about the psychological and physical effects of
solitary confinement.23
Furthermore, a reduction in the use of solitary confinement could be achieved by limiting
solitary confinement for use only as a punitive measure in response to the most serious of
infractions. This approach would require prisons to eliminate solitary confinement for
administrative segregation or protective custody which may not be politically feasible in those
states that are unwilling to enact comprehensive reform that limits solitary confinement to a
maximum of fifteen days. Imposing solitary confinement for punitive reasons only, in
accordance with legislation, might overcome the obstacle created by the federal courts’ narrow
definition of punishment and the requirement for proof of deliberate indifference on the part of
the inflicting officer.

7.1.6 Federal Legislative Reform
Although at present it seems unlikely that any of the bills introduced in Congress will be passed,
there are several measures that, if enacted, would contribute meaningfully to genuine reform.
7.1.6.1

National Solitary Confinement Standards

The proposed National Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Commission to develop national
standards on the use of solitary confinement may be valuable if the standards recommended by
that Commission and adopted by the Attorney-General are sufficiently rigorous. 24 It is of some
concern, however, that the bill would require that the standards do not impose substantial
additional costs on federal or state correctional systems. Further examination of such a provision
is needed to ensure that the standards would not be so weakened by this requirement as to be
ineffective. The real value of this proposal, if it were enacted, would lie in the incentives for
states to comply with the new national standards through the reduction in federal funding for
failure to adhere to the standards. If this proposal were not included in the legislation, it seems
unlikely that establishing a Commission to study solitary confinement and make
23

See supra section 5.1.2.7 (describing Connecticut’s statute that requires training on the long and short-term
psychological effects of administrative segregation).
24
See supra section 5.2.5 (explaining the proposed National Solitary Confinement Study and Reform Commission).
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recommendations on best practice would, on its own, be particularly helpful without the ability
to link compliance to federal funding.
7.1.6.2

PLRA Repeal

Repeal of the PLRA could have a significant influence on solitary confinement reform. Absent
the limitations of the PLRA, people held in solitary confinement would face fewer restrictions in
seeking to challenge their conditions of confinement and the psychological and emotional harm
that results. The removal of the requirement to exhaust all administrative remedies and the limits
on bringing actions in forma pauperis would improve access to courts, judicial oversight, and
scrutiny of prison conditions. It could force prisons and states to act more promptly to improve
conditions rather than rely on the delays that result from the barriers created by the PLRA.
Furthermore, repeal of the PLRA would remove the limits on the scope of relief that could be
granted by federal courts which might lead to more meaningful improvements in conditions that
violate federal rights as opposed to the narrowest and least intrusive relief possible.

7.1.7 Areas for Further Research
Much of the research into the harm caused by solitary confinement, particularly harm to physical
health, focuses on long-term placements. In light of the fact that some reforms have limited
solitary confinement to fifteen days, further research on the physical health risks associated with
shorter-term placements would be beneficial. Such research could be particularly important for
future legal challenges, given the courts’ tendency to determine that only very long periods in
solitary confinement might constitute cruel and unusual punishment. This information would
also be helpful in relation to the use of solitary confinement in jails.
Another area of harm that merits examination relates to the experiences of the families of people
held in solitary confinement. While constitutional analysis of the meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment focuses solely on the experience of the incarcerated person, some legislatures are
beginning to recognize the wider familial impact of prison conditions on family members. 25
Faced with limited access to telephone calls, mail, and email, people in solitary confinement are
disconnected from the people who are likely to support them when they leave prison. The
25

See discussion supra section 5.1.1.3 (describing New Jersey’s Incarcerated Primary Caretaker Parents Act).
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restrictions on contact also impede people’s ability to participate in important family decisions,
including time-sensitive issues such as proceedings concerning parental rights. Courts in various
US jurisdictions have upheld the termination of parental rights where the incarcerated person
was unaware of, or unable to participate in, court proceedings because they were in solitary
confinement.26 Courts have also upheld termination orders where the incarcerated parent did not
maintain contact with their child or participate in court-ordered parenting courses because they
were in solitary confinement.27 Further examination of legislative, judicial, and policy measures
that could address these collateral consequences of solitary confinement would contribute to the
development of a wider framework in which to situate the harm caused by solitary confinement.
This dissertation does not examine other countries’ solitary confinement practices or their
approaches to reform. Comparative analysis may be beneficial, in part to identify the potential
influence of foreign courts’ decisions on US reforms. In the context of extradition proceedings,
some foreign courts have deemed that the “very harsh” conditions of solitary confinement in US
prisons are not a sufficient basis to halt extradition, while others have taken the opposite view. 28
Furthermore, the remedies awarded by foreign courts to address the misuse of solitary
confinement in their jurisdictions might provide further insight into additional avenues worthy of
exploration in the US.29 The experiences and approaches of prison inspectorates in other

26

See, e.g., In Re Walls, 2011 WL 2937141 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (concerning a father who was in solitary
confinement at the time of the permanency planning hearing and who had not received mail during that period to
participate in the hearing, and holding that the trial court did not err when it found reasonable efforts were made to
reunite the father with his child).
27
See, e.g., In the Interest of Devin W, 2015 IL App (1st) 143909 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (upholding parental
termination order and noting, inter alia, that the parent had no visits with his children while he was in solitary
confinement); In Re A.M.S., 272 S.W.3d 305 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding the parental termination order of a
father who was unable to participate in family support meetings and unable to attend parenting classes due to his
placement in administrative segregation); In Re Martinez, 2014 WL 6603073 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming
termination order and observing that the mother was unable to participate in foster care agency services while she
was in solitary confinement, “which was the result of her own aggressive behavior.”).
28
See, e.g., Babar Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 609 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (allowing extradition after finding that
placement in solitary confinement in the Florence Supermax would not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment in
violation of the European Convention); Att’y General v. Damache, [2015] IEHC 339 (Ir.) (declining to commit Mr.
Damache to prison to await extradition to the US on the basis that being subjected to confinement in the Florence
Supermax would violate the Irish Constitution’s rights to bodily and mental integrity, human dignity, and the right
not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment); Assange v. United States of America, [2021] EW Misc1
(MagC) (Eng.) (barring extradition and referring to evidence showing the conditions in US prisons, including longterm solitary confinement, presented a risk to the mental health of Mr. Assange).
29
See, e.g., Francis v. R, 2021 ONCA 197 (Can.) (upholding a damages award of CAD30 million to people held in
administrative segregation in Ontario’s correctional facilities).
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countries may also inform best practice for corrections ombuds and other offices assigned to
investigate solitary confinement conditions in this country.

7.2

Conclusion

Given the long history of solitary confinement in the US, the damage that is caused by this
practice is well-established and well-known. Despite extensive scientific literature about the
different forms of harm, however, reforms have been slow to be implemented and many remain
limited in scope. The recommendations in this chapter identify the measures that must first be
addressed for reforms to be successful.
Some reform measures are promising, but many fall short in achieving significant change. This
is particularly apparent in terms of the failure to address harsh physical conditions and lack of
services for people in solitary confinement, racial and ethnic disparities, protection of vulnerable
groups, and the degree of discretion granted to prison officers who decide when to place people
in solitary confinement. It is also troubling that states and prisons might use reforms to justify
practices that are similar if not identical to solitary confinement, but perhaps with different
terminology and different controls. Such an outcome will only result in ongoing harm. In light
of the coronavirus pandemic and the experiences of incarcerated people over the last year, it is
also concerning that many reforms exclude prison-wide lockdowns from the measures designed
to limit or abolish solitary confinement.
The most appropriate forum for advancing reform will vary between jurisdictions. Based on the
reforms implemented to date, it appears generally that state legislatures are best placed to
implement comprehensive reform. Legislation has the widest reach compared to the more
limited application of settlement agreements, consent decrees, or administrative decisions. It is
also the most effective means of limiting the circumstances in which solitary confinement is
permitted, carefully defining the populations that should be exempt from the practice and the
circumstances under which it should not be allowed, identifying alternative, non-punitive
measures in place of solitary confinement, and establishing oversight functions to monitor
compliance. For legislative changes to be truly effective, robust oversight and enforcement
against prisons that fail to adhere to reform provisions is essential.

339

Comprehensive reform legislation has broad application, but many states lack the necessary
political appetite to enact such statutes. Therefore, a combination of litigation, administrative
measures, and partial legislative reforms will all assist in improving conditions for some groups
currently subject to solitary confinement. The states that have successfully enacted
comprehensive reform to date have all done so after years of attempting unsuccessfully to pass
legislation, or in response to public pressure, investigations, and/or litigation or the threat of
litigation. While caution is warranted when relying on partial legislative reform, administrative
reform, and litigation, the incremental changes offered by these approaches are still valuable to
the extent that they contribute to the ongoing project and are not regarded, of themselves, as the
final result. Litigation can increase public scrutiny of prison practices and lead to improvements
for targeted groups. Ongoing judicial oversight of settlement agreements and consent decrees,
while cumbersome, can help to ensure compliance with the terms and maintain public
accountability.
Administrative reforms that result in meaningful changes and improvements, particularly those
that provide increased protection of vulnerable groups or implement alternatives to solitary
confinement, are also valuable. Caution is needed in relying on administrative reforms,
however, because of the limited oversight and reliance on accurate self-reporting from
departments of corrections regarding the success of these measures. Administrative reforms
have reduced solitary confinement significantly in only two jurisdictions, and these are not
typical of most attempts at administrative reform. Moreover, for administrative reforms to be
truly successful, independent oversight and accountability is needed.
The courts’ influence on reforms overall has been limited. Judicial decisions and the threat of
litigation, however, certainly contribute to recognition by officials and legislators that reform is
required. Moreover, if reforms can be implemented by state legislatures or through
administrative policy, then courts may come to recognize that “evolving standards of decency”
now reflect that solitary confinement is cruel and unusual, in the same way that the Supreme
Court has concluded with respect to the imposition of the death penalty on young people and
people with intellectual disabilities. This may be a longer-term project, however, though some
courts have been more willing than others to acknowledge the harm caused by solitary
confinement.
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Keegan Rolenc, who was held in solitary confinement in Minnesota for twelve months, wrote
from his isolation cell:
“It must have been a very cruel mind to come up with an invention such as this.”30

The inhumanity associated with solitary confinement has been recognized since it was first
introduced in the US, even if some of its early proponents were not motivated wholly by cruelty.
A county judge later described Mr. Rolenc’s experience in solitary confinement as “barbaric,”
and told him, “I don’t know how you did it.” 31 Judges, legislators, medical and scientific
experts, incarcerated people, and prison officials have acknowledged the many types of harm
associated with the practice. While some recent measures are promising, this dissertation
demonstrates that considerable work remains to achieve successful reform.

30

Andy Mannix, Way Down in the Hole: Extreme Isolation Scars State Inmates, MINNESOTA STAR TRIBUNE, (Dec.
4, 2016), https://www.startribune.com/excessive-solitary-confinement-scars-minnesota-prison-inmates/396197801/.
31
Andy Mannix, A Year After Solitary, Keegan Rolenc Walks a Difficult Path, MINNESOTA STAR TRIBUNE, (Dec.
26, 2017), https://www.startribune.com/a-year-after-solitary-keegan-rolenc-walks-a-difficult-path/466501163/.
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